How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
Briefing 45 / Europe & Central Asia

Status Kosovo: Predstojeći Teški Meseci

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Pregled

Sve je veća zabinutost da kratko odlaganje koje je Specijalni izaslanik UN Marti Ahtisari objavio krajem novembra 2006., kako bi sačekao održavanje parlamentarnih izbora u Srbiji, neće biti i poslednje odlaganje u tom procesu, koji bi mogao da se oduži do druge polovine 2007. godine. Nervozni albanski političari brinu da nakon marta 2007. neće biti u stanju da odole pritiscima javnosti. Sa sve čvršćim ruskim stavom i sve izraženijom srpskom tvrdoglavošću, jedinstvo EU je od suštinskog značaja – premda daleko od toga da je zagarantovano – u održavanju statusnog procesa na pravoj putanji, najpre u Kontakt grupi, koja je upravljala kosovskim pitanjima od 1999. godine, a zatim i u Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, mestu donošenja konačne odluke.

Jedan broj članica EU ukazuju da će oklevati da promene kosovski status usled jakog suprotstavljanja Srbije. Ako Brisel ne uspe da održi jako unutrašnje jedinstvo, on rizikuje da rizikuje da nasledi  novu, poveću krizu. Ovakva situacija predstavlja hitan izazov, posebno za Nemačku koja 1. januara preuzima šestomesečno predsedavanje Evropskom unijom. SAD favorizuju donošenje rezolucije o statusu Kosova ali je ne mogu usvojiti usled sve češćih i sve specifičnijih pretnji iz Moskve, koje ukazuju na mogućnost upotrebe veta u SB ukoliko EU ne da svoj doprinos u podizanju teškog tereta.

Zbog odlaganja međunarodne zajednice, kosovski Albanci misle da im predstoji mukotrpan period. „Šta god da uradimo nije dovoljno dobro; svaki naš potez je kritikovan“, jadikuje jedan kosovski Albanac. Ahtisari je jasno signalizirao da tek nakon održavanja izbora planira da predstavi iscrpan i nedvosmislen predlog. Ako se želi pomak u tom procesu, onda bi međunarodna zajednica trebalo da pruži Ahtisariju značajniju podršku, jer vreme rezervisano za Kosovo ističe. Krivica, umnogome, može biti prebačena na Albance koji nisu ostvarili onoliko koliko su mogli sa već ograničenim upravnim mogućnostim i koji su hitali da prete nasiljem umesto da rade na smanjenju srpskog straha. Ali, činjenica je da sve što se dalje zalazi u  2007. godinu bez rešenja, suočava sa većim rizikom od izbijanja nemira.

Smandrljan statusni proces koji nije uspeo da iznedri nacrt kosovske države sa sadašnjim granicama i koji ograničava podršku EU i drugih multilateralnih tela, zasejaće seme novih destruktivnih procesa. Među Albancima u regionu bi bio usađen osećaj nepravde, ojačala bi panalbanska, ideološka netrpeljivost prema trenutnim granicama i uz to bi, verovatno, bile obogaćene nove snage radikalnog Islama.

Neki zvaničnici se plaše da međunarodna zajednica možda neće imati dovoljno energije i volje za rešavanje kosovskog statusa bez krize u regionu. Nedonošenje odluke je, ustvari, donošenje odluke“, smatra jedan diplomata UN-a. „Ako se učini da je situacija na terenu stabilna, Savet bezbednosti će izabrati da ne uradi ništa radije nego da uradi nešto koplikovano“, dodaje drugi. Jedan evropski zvaničnik, zadužen za pitanja bezbednosti, slikovito je objasnio nešto rasprostranjeniji stav: „Pustimo da truli pa ćemo onda videti šta ćemo. Rešenje za Kosovo će počivati na velikom haosu i nasilju u martu“.

Ovakav stav mora biti opovrgnut. Međunarodna zajenica se mora jasno i eksplicitno pridržavati svojih obećanja. Posebno:

  • Kontakt-grupa ne sme da dozvoli odlaganje Ahtisarijevog predloga nakon 21. januara 2007. godine i ne sme ga ublažavati. Dalje, te predloge mora brzo da usmeri na razmatranje SB Ujedinjenih nacija.
     
  • Savet EU treba da skrene više pažnje i evropskog javnog mnjenja i Saveta bezbednosti na svoje pripreme i zahteve za preuzimanje poslestatusnih zaduženja. Predstojeće nemačko predsedavanje treba da doprinese jedinstvenoj podršci Ahtisarijevog predloga.
     
  • Nakon pristizanja Ahtisarijevog predloga, Savet bezbednosti treba da reaguje brzo i pozitivno, shvatajući da bi odlaganje značilo vraćanje Kosova problematičnim okolnostima.
     
  • Kosovske institucije moraju da ojačaju upravu, steknu veći legitimitet u svojoj zajednici kao i da se pripreme za preuzimanje novih zaduženja nakon rešenja statusa.
     
  • Srbiju treba ohrabriti da prihvati nezavisnost Kosova i da iz toga izvuče maksimalnu, dugoročnu korist a kosovskim Srbima naznačiti da Srbija nema mogućnost veta na odluku međunarodne zajednice o konačnom statusu.

 

Priština/Brisel, 20. decembar 2006

I. Overview

There is growing concern that the short postponement UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari announced in November 2006 for presentation of his Kosovo final status proposals to take account of Serbia’s 21 January elections may not be the last delay in a process that now could extend into the second half of 2007. Nervous Kosovo Albanian leaders worry they may not be able to contain public pressures beyond March. With Russia’s position hardening and Serbia as obstinate as ever, EU unity is vital – but far from assured – to keep the status process on track, first in the small Contact Group that has managed Kosovo affairs since 1999, then in the Security Council where ultimate decisions should be made.

A number of EU states are showing signs that they are reluctant to change Kosovo’s status in the face of continued Serbian opposition. If Brussels fails to coalesce quickly around a strong internal consensus, it risks inheriting a major new crisis. This is an urgent challenge especially for Germany, which assumes the six-month EU Presidency on 1 January. The U.S. strongly favours an early resolution of Kosovo’s status but it cannot bring one about in the face of increasingly specific threats from Moscow to use its Security Council veto without the EU doing its share of the heavy lifting.

As the international community hesitates, the Kosovo Albanian perception is that the hurdles ahead are becoming higher. “Nothing we do is good enough; any step we take is criticised”, one lamented. Ahtisaari has signalled clearly he intends to present comprehensive, unambiguous proposals shortly after the Serbian elections. The international community will need to give him strong support if matters are to move from there, however, because time is running out for Kosovo. Blame can partially be laid at the door of its majority Albanians, who have failed to make as much as they should with the limited governance opportunities they have been given and who are too quick to threaten chaos rather than work harder at easing the fears of the Serb minority. But it is a fact of life that the risk of implosion does become greater the deeper Kosovo goes into 2007 without its status settled.

A botched status process that fails to consolidate the prospect of a Kosovo state within its present borders and limits the support the EU and other multilateral bodies can provide would seed new destructive processes. A sense of grievance would become ingrained among Albanians throughout the region, strengthening a pan-Albanian ideology corrosive of existing borders and possibly even enriching the soil for radical Islam.

Some officials fear the international community may not be able to focus sufficient energy or will to resolve Kosovo status without a crisis on the ground. “Not making a decision is making a decision”, a diplomat at the UN observed. “If the situation on the ground seems stable, the Security Council would rather do nothing than something difficult”, another noted. A European official dealing with security bluntly described the attitude of not a few in the international community: “Let it rot, then we’ll see. The Kosovo solution will rely on a big mess or violence in March”.

This must be proved wrong. The international community must deliver upon its promises, implied and explicit. Specifically:

  • The Contact Group should not permit delay in Ahtisaari’s proposals after 21 January 2007 and should not water them down. It should refer them quickly to the UN for Security Council consideration.
     
  • The EU Council should give its preparations and requirements for assuming post-status responsibilities in Kosovo more prominence, both for European public opinion and the Security Council. The incoming German Presidency should make uniting member states behind the Ahtisaari proposals a top priority.
     
  • The Security Council should act promptly and positively when it receives Ahtisaari’s proposals, recognising that delay would likely mean a return of Kosovo to its agenda soon in crisis circumstances.
     
  • Kosovo institutions should strengthen good governance so as to gain more legitimacy with their public and be prepared to exercise new responsibilities effectively once status is resolved.
     
  • Serbia should be encouraged to engage with the Kosovo independence project and extract the maximum benefit for its own long-term interests and those of the Kosovo Serb minority but be left in no doubt that it does not have a veto over the international community’s status decision.

 

Pristina/Brussels, 20 December 2006

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