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Russian President Vladimir Putin walks with Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev during a ceremony in memory of late Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, September 6, 2016. REUTERS/Alexei Druzhinin
Briefing 82 / Europe & Central Asia

处于转变中的乌兹别克斯坦

自1991年独立以来,乌兹别克斯坦一直处于对内镇压、对外封闭的状态。卡里莫夫在苏联解体之后便一直担任乌兹别克斯坦总统,在他过世之后,外界应抓住这个难得的机会与这个重要的中亚国家重新建立联系。

概述

卡里莫夫的逝世不仅给乌兹别克斯坦,也给其邻国和大国带来了不确定性;这则是因为乌兹别克斯坦的战略稳定同这些国家的利益息息相关。政权过渡的第一阶段进行顺利。自2003年当选总理以来,肖开提米尔则亚耶夫已然成为该国的主要领导人,且其亦有望于今年12月4日当选总统。然而,他将接手的这个集权国家则不仅面临着紧迫的经济、社会和环境问题,还有难测的邻国关系、以及圣战极端主义的威胁。尽管现行制度使大多数乌兹别克斯坦人民生活在水深火热之中,但统治精英仍应将会全力维持现状。出于自身利益的考量,俄罗斯、中国、美国和欧洲都不愿看到乌兹别克斯坦出现混乱失控的场面。然而,这些国家和地区应借政权过渡期、重新考虑它们应如何维护该国长远的稳定,并重新调整和乌兹别克斯坦的关系。它们应和乌兹别克斯坦在实际领域中展开合作、造福民众,同时亦强调改革的必要性;其还应敦促乌兹别克斯坦不再滥权,并让即将上任的领导层意识到继续以警力治国的长远后患。

卡里莫夫在任期间,该国体制腐败不堪,财富仅集中在少数权贵手中。腐败的警察和法制系统、和手段强硬的安全机构造成了乌兹别克斯坦极为恶劣的人权纪录。裙带关系和任人唯亲的现象让公务员系统无法收纳人才。农业改革迟迟未能推进,且其和邻国的水源争端虽已迫在眉睫,却一直难以解决。该国和吉尔吉斯斯坦以及塔吉克斯坦两国的关系复杂,其中包括三方在水源和边境问题上的纠纷。卡里莫夫以镇压之策来控制住中亚最大人口国、并以此应对政府所面临的挑战。然而,在米尔则亚耶夫于9月8日的讲话中,他并未示意政府是否计划对此进行改革。

承袭卡里莫夫在位时的政策和手段或许能在短期内帮助新政府维持局势,但由此对国内长期稳定而造成的风险则将不亚于任何一个外在威胁。强制性劳动、大规模逮捕、和镇压都不能保证一个国家的长治久安。作为乌兹别克斯坦独立25年以来唯一的领袖,卡里莫夫的逝世给与了该国的政坛精英一个审视的机会,即,斟酌他们是否应推行必要的改革,并以此确保国家的长治久安和他们自己的政治命运。

俄罗斯和中国对于自由化改革本身并不感兴趣,但它们需三思的是,如果多重问题最终让乌兹别克斯坦陷入混乱,那中亚亦将面临更多的安全威胁。虽然塔什干当局常常以安全和恐怖主义为自己的铁腕统治辩护,且激进行为和圣战极端主义事件亦的确出现在了该地区,但乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动(IMU)却因为在阿富汗和巴基斯坦十多年的作战而无暇顾及中亚地区。即便如此,IMU现已和伊斯兰国(IS)结盟,并也早已宣布了它要在人口稠密的费尔干纳峡谷建立伊斯兰国的长远野心。

乌兹别克斯坦侵犯人权的行为令西方国家窘迫,尤其是2005年的安集延(Andijon)事件。当时数百名抗议者被屠杀,但无论美国还是欧盟均未对其施加制裁。尤其是美国,相比之下,它更关注的是如何迎合乌兹别克斯坦当局,以此保证驻阿富汗美军后勤要线的畅通、以及它和乌安全部队在打击恐怖主义和毒品走私方面的合作。美国当下应需要仔细权衡,它此前只顾眼前利益而舍弃长远风险的做法是否合理。

乌兹别克斯坦近期发生重大改革的可能性不大,且若由外界推动改革,这势必要遭到当局的强烈抵抗。但是西方国家仍应坚守原则立场,就践踏人权的问题持续向当局施压,因为如果民众的基本权利得不到尊重,那国家的长治久安便无从谈起。但是仅有立场是不够的,西方国家明智的做法应是通过秘密外交,和该国新上任的领导人探讨推进渐进式改革的可能性,并以此令双方均获得有实际意义的利益。而这些改革则应从能造福普通民众又不触及政治的领域开始。

具体而言,乌兹别克斯坦的新领导人和外界大国应致力于从以下三个领域寻找突破口:其一,加强基础服务领域的技术合作;其二,改善或放宽统治方式;其三,参与解决区域性问题。塔什干当局应着重改善基础设施服务,如提供稳定的电力和清洁的饮用水、推行农业改革、改进灌溉系统、减少同塔吉克斯坦及吉尔吉斯斯坦的水源争端。美国和欧盟应对其提供支持,并增加对这些领域的技术援助。新政府应释放政治犯、并取消出境签证。美国则应以停止向乌方提供安保和国防支持为代价,要求新政府落实人权改善,如终止强制性棉田劳动的做法。

在区域政治方面,吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦应和新上任的乌兹别克斯坦领导人启动高层协商,探讨涉及水资源、能源安全和边境等问题。三国政府应承诺会通过外交渠道来解决边界划分问题,建立一个三方委员会、并由此对水资源和土地资源的日常管理进行监督。

比什凯克/布鲁塞尔,2016年9月29日

Report 233 / Europe & Central Asia

中亚地区的水资源危机

Growing tensions in the Ferghana Valley are exacerbated by disputes over shared water resources. To address this, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan urgently need to step back from using water or energy as a coercive tool and focus on reaching a series of modest, bilateral agreements, pending comprehensive resolution of this serious problem.

Executive Summary

Water has long been a major cause of conflict in Central Asia. Two states – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have a surplus; the other three say they do not get their share from the region’s great rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, which slice across it from the Tien Shan, Pamir Mountains, and the Hindu Kush to the Aral Sea’s remains. Pressures are mounting, especially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The population in Central Asia has increased by almost ten million since 2000, and limited arable land is being depleted by over-use and outdated farming methods. Extensive corruption and failing infrastructure take further toll, while climate change is likely to have long-term negative consequences. As economies become weaker and states more fragile, heightened nationalism, border disputes, and regional tensions complicate the search for a mutually acceptable solution to the region’s water needs. A new approach that addresses water and related issues through an interlocking set of individually more modest bilateral agreements instead of the chimera of a single comprehensive one is urgently needed.

The root of the problem is the disintegration of the resource-sharing system the Soviet Union imposed on the region until its collapse in 1991. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provided water to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in summer and received Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek coal, gas and electricity in winter. The system had broken down by the late-1990s, and a plethora of bilateral and regional agreements and resolutions concluded in that decade failed to fix it. The concerns Crisis Group identified in 2002 – inadequate infrastructure, poor water management and outdated irrigation methods – remain unaddressed, while the security environment is bleaker.

Regional leaders seem disinclined to cooperate on any of their main problems. Suspicion is growing between the most directly affected countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Personal relations between Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Uzbek President Islam Karimov have been icy for years, and Karimov and his ministers are increasingly prone to make bellicose statements. International partners, including Russia, the European Union (EU) and the U.S., say they can do little if the countries remain fixated on a narrow interpretation of national interests. Differences over upstream hydropower projects require intensive, high-level resolution. Though some localised efforts to improve water supply have worked, usually with donor aid, corruption has undermined more ambitious ones. Yet, the failure of the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek governments to modernise water-dependent sectors such as energy and agriculture increases their mutual dependence.

For all its complexity, the water issue is probably the one that offers some opportunity for solution. As a Swiss water specialist observed, “water can be a driver of conflict but it can also be a driver of peace”. It is an objective problem, and equitable distribution and a concomitant energy exchange would produce tangible benefits for all. Removal of the water factor from the more intractable problems of borders and enclaves, meanwhile, might mitigate conflicts and perhaps even help solve them. Improved water infrastructure and management projects could thus be crucial for building peace and political stability, while promoting development and economic growth.

Attempts at comprehensive regional solutions have foundered on mistrust. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (and their international backers) should act now in the border areas of the Ferghana Valley to end the annual cycle of competition and conflict over water by dividing the water issue into more manageable portions – seeking gradual, step-by-step solutions along conceptual and geographical lines rather than one all-inclusive resource settlement. If Uzbekistan will not participate, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should work bilaterally. Meanwhile, high-level mediation should be sought to address Uzbekistan’s objections to upstream hydropower projects.

There is no guarantee this would work, but it could give these three states an opportunity to modernise infrastructure and the management of water resources as well as train a new generation of technical specialists. The agreements would also set a modest precedent for other spheres in which cooperation is sorely needed and might help defuse tensions in the region, while improving the grim living conditions of most of its population.