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What Comes After the Bloody Battle for Aleppo?
What Comes After the Bloody Battle for Aleppo?
Tombs in a Muslim cemetery are silhouetted during sunset in the village of Karateren near the Aral Sea, in southwestern Kazakhstan, April 2005. REUTERS/Shamil Zhumatov
Briefing 72 / Europe & Central Asia

Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia

The Islamic State (IS) is attracting Central Asians to Syria and fostering new links among radicals within the region. Unless the five Central Asian governments develop a credible, coordinated counter-action plan, including improved security measures but also social, political and economic reforms, growing radicalism will eventually pose a serious threat to their stability.

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I. Overview

Growing numbers of Central Asian citizens, male and female, are travelling to the Middle East to fight or otherwise support the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIL orISIS). Prompted in part by political marginalisation and bleak economic prospects that characterise their post-Soviet region, 2,000-4,000 have in the past three years turned their back on their secular states to seek a radical alternative. IS beckons not only to those who seek combat experience, but also to those who envision a more devout, purposeful, fundamentalist religious life. This presents a complex problem to the governments of Central Asia. They are tempted to exploit the phenomenon to crack down on dissent. The more promising solution, however, requires addressing multiple political and administrative failures, revising discriminatory laws and policies, implementing outreach programs for both men and women and creating jobs at home for disadvantaged youths, as well as ensuring better coordination between security services.

Should a significant portion of these radicalised migrants return, they risk challenging security and stability throughout Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan form a brittle region, sandwiched between Russia and Afghanistan, Iran and China. Each suffers from poor governance, corruption and crime. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan resemble authoritarian police states. Kazakhstan has some wealth, but its regions are in disrepair, and its political system is autocratic. All five fail to deliver quality social services, particularly in rural areas. Their security services – underfunded, poorly trained and inclined to resort to harsh methods to compensate for a lack of resources and skills – are unable to deal with a challenge as intricate as radical Islam. Rather than promoting religious freedom while safeguarding secular constitutions and attempting to learn from European or Asian experiences in rehabilitating jihadis, the five fuel further radicalisation by using laws to curb religious growth and the police to conduct crackdowns.

Recruitment to the extremist cause is happening in mosques and namazkhana(prayer rooms) across the region. The internet and social media play a critical but not definitive role. The radicalisation of women is often a response to the lack of social, religious, economic and political opportunities afforded to them in Central Asia. Economic reward is not a motivation for those drawn to IS-controlled territory. For some, it is a personal adventure; for others it is a call to arms. Many find themselves providing support services to more experienced fighters from the Caucasus or Arab states.

Ethnic Uzbeks, including citizens of Uzbekistan, are most numerous among the Central Asians with the Islamic State, but Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Turkmen and Tajiks are also well represented. Some are recruited at home; others are radicalised abroad, often as migrant workers. The problem is acute in southern Kyrgyzstan, where the risks are amplified by the alienation of the Uzbek community since the violence in Osh in 2010.

The appeal of jihadism in the region is also rooted in an unfulfilled desire for political and social change. Rich or poor, educated or not, young or mature, male or female, there is no single profile of an IS supporter, but fatigue with social and political circumstances is an important linking thread. Uzbekistan is particularly exposed. Frustrated and excluded, people who would not have considered fighting with the longer-established Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) or the Taliban in Afghanistan perceive the Islamic State as the creator of a novel and ordained political order.

The number of Central Asians receiving combat training and progressing through IS command structures is increasing, as are the jihadi networks of which they are a part. Although most Central Asians find themselves in jamaats (factions) organised loosely along ethnic and linguistic lines, these form larger regional battalions of cooperating fighters from across the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China’s Xinjiang region. The risk is rising that these connections will gather pace and purpose in Central Asia, blindsiding governments ill-prepared to respond to a security threat of this type.

Russia and China are already concerned and have urged the Central Asian states to address the problem of radicalisation in light of the rise of IS. The region’s other international partners, including, the EU and the U.S., should recognise that Central Asia is a growing source of foreign fighters and consider prioritising policing reform, as well as a more tolerant attitude to religion, in their recommendations for combating the problem. Without a concerted effort on the part of the Central Asians, including their security services with respect to intelligence sharing, however, the response outside powers seek will likely flounder.

Bishkek/Brussels, 20 January 2015

Residents escape Assad regime bombardment in Al Moyaser neighbourhood of Aleppo, Syria on 29 November, 2016. ANADOLU AGENCY/Jawad al Rifai

What Comes After the Bloody Battle for Aleppo?

Despite the Syrian regime’s brutally effective campaign to recapture Aleppo, it cannot celebrate victory yet. In this Q&A, Senior Syria Analyst Noah Bonsey talks about the factors likely to fuel greater violence, increased radicalisation and more massive displacement. 

What are the immediate implications of the regime’s victory in Aleppo?

Aleppo illustrates the bleak state of the Syrian war, more than five years into the conflict. The regime and its allies are defeating rebel groups by employing an expanded version of their long-favoured military approach: massive collective punishment, including siege tactics and relentless bombardment targeting civilians. With crucial support from Russian air power and Iran-backed foreign fighters, this set of tactics has enabled the regime to compensate, for now at least, for its eroding military and limited base of reliable Syrian fighters. 

This approach has enabled the regime to achieve significant military and political gains at minimal cost to itself. The human suffering it creates is truly unimaginable, in both scale and intensity, particularly among civilians in opposition areas—as the images emerging from Aleppo remind us. But the regime and its allies are at best unconcerned with civilian casualties, and at worst appear intent on increasing them. They have multiple objectives: to push local civilians to pressure the fighters in their midst toward surrender; to signal to Syrians elsewhere the price of continued resistance; and to displace pro-opposition populations that might pose challenges to regime governance in the future. Meanwhile, the regime and its allies see clearly that the opposition’s backers and broader “international community” are unwilling or unable to take action to raise the price for this scorched-earth approach--despite all the bloodshed, displacement, and radicalization it generates. Given those incentives—high rewards, with minimal costs to themselves--it is no wonder that the regime, Russia, Iran and allied proxies have repeatedly employed this brutal strategy. It has worked around Damascus and Homs, it has now worked in Aleppo, and they will presumably seek to employ it again—perhaps next in Idlib, or in Eastern Ghouta [outside Damascus]. What we are seeing in Aleppo is not only an unfathomable human disaster unto itself, but also a preview of what is likely to come.  

This approach has enabled the regime to achieve significant military and political gains at minimal cost to itself.

What particular importance does Aleppo have within the Syria conflict?

The eastern half of Aleppo was arguably the opposition’s most valuable strategic holding, given the city’s size, economic weight, and proximity to the Turkish border. As the conflict has evolved, Aleppo city and portions of the adjacent countryside were also the part of the north where non-jihadi factions remained the dominant local forces, even as Jabhat al-Nusra (now known as Fath al-Sham) asserted hegemony over much of neighbouring Idlib. Aleppo’s loss is a huge blow to the non-jihadi portion of the rebel spectrum, and thus to the opposition’s political ambitions in general. 

Regime strategy has long aimed to militarily cripple the non-jihadi opposition and render it politically irrelevant. Ever since 2014, Crisis Group has highlighted the importance of Aleppo, pointing out that the regime’s capture of the city would seriously jeopardize any remaining prospect for a negotiated end to the conflict and likely to strengthen jihadist groups. For any settlement to prove viable, you need a non-jihadi opposition that is sufficiently pragmatic to make a deal, and strong enough on the ground to implement it. The evisceration of non-jihadi factions in the north will increasingly play to the advantage of jihadists like Fath al-Sham. It will also offer new opportunities to the Islamic State (IS), which is widely despised by the rest of the rebellion but, as that rebellion loses momentum, may find openings to assert itself and even rebuild some credibility with the anti-regime base.

Where does the opposition go from here?

Aleppo reflects long-standing problems within the pro-opposition camp that weakened their ability to defend territory. Poor coordination and competing priorities among state backers have consistently undermined their Syrian allies. Recent months were no exception, with Saudi Arabia stuck in a quagmire in Yemen, Turkey caught in a trans-border struggle with Kurdish forces, and the U.S. focused on fighting IS while engaging in fruitless rounds of diplomacy with Moscow. 

That left the armed opposition more or less to their own devices in Aleppo, and they played a bad hand very poorly—succumbing to in-fighting at the worst possible moments, and undermining their own cause with indiscriminate shelling of regime-held western Aleppo. Rebels would have struggled to defend their territory in the city in any case, given the breadth and intensity of the pro-regime offensive, but it must be noted that the pro-opposition camp’s effort proved less than the sum of its parts. 

So what’s left for the opposition on the ground? They face a bleak map, where the most promising spot is northeast of Aleppo, where non-jihadi factions working directly with Turkish forces have recaptured from IS a large swath of territory along the border, and are now attempting to take the city of al-Bab, some 35 km east of Aleppo. Ankara charts the course for this joint effort, known as Euphrates Shield, which aims primarily to push IS from the Turkish border and block the Syria-based People’s Protection Units (YPG, Kurdish forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK) from connecting their territory east of the Euphrates river with the Afrin canton they control north of Aleppo. Participation in Euphrates Shield carries significant costs for the opposition: forces deployed there might otherwise have helped strengthen efforts to defend eastern Aleppo; and Ankara’s need to maintain Moscow’s goodwill, in order to prevent the interference of the Russian air force, constrained its ability to help rebels counter the pro-regime campaign there. Yet the benefits are also significant, as the operation’s gains have provided new space and relevance for non-jihadi opposition elements facing existential threats elsewhere in the north.

The northern province of Idlib has been much discussed as the next point of conflict in the north, can the opposition rally there? 

Efforts to evacuate civilians and fighters from Aleppo began today, after repeated delays, with convoys headed toward Idlib, the opposition’s remaining northwestern stronghold. The situation in Idlib is even more dynamic--and combustible. The pro-regime camp may seek to escalate there after Aleppo, applying similarly brutal tactics against cities and towns that remain crowded with civilians, including many displaced from elsewhere. Rebel control in the area is split primarily between Jabhat Fath al-Sham—a salafi-jihadist group that until recently maintained official links to al-Qaeda—and Ahrar al-Sham, a group incorporating a range of Islamists that has situated itself between Fath al-Sham and more mainstream factions on the rebel political and ideological spectrum. These are two of the rebellion’s strongest factions, and they will likely prove better situated to defend their ground than did their Aleppo counterparts. However, their unambiguously Islamist platforms and Fath al-Sham’s al-Qaeda ties may limit international outcry over the pro-regime camp’s attacks on areas under their control. This may be a moot point, given that international outcry has done little to restrain the regime and its allies elsewhere. Meanwhile, a long-standing ideological, political and personal rift between pragmatist and hardline camps within Ahrar al-Sham has recently deepened. A break between the two camps, should it occur, may prove healthy for the opposition in the medium to long term, but would likely further weaken their defensive capacity in the immediate future.

Does the opposition have any better hopes for a come-back in the south?

The opposition in southern Syria has won only mixed returns from compromise. Non-jihadi factions there continue to control significant swaths of territory, but an apparent understanding between Russia and Jordan, upon which rebels depend for supplies, has largely frozen that front for the time being, with occasional exceptions. This has offered some degree of respite for rebel-held areas there, but has also enabled the pro-regime camp to divert resources toward escalation against other opposition pockets—and in turn, by some accounts, lowered morale among southern rebels.

Elsewhere, armed opposition control is limited to isolated pockets—most notably the besieged Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta, controlled primarily by non-jihadist factions and still home to a large civilian population. Reasserting its authority throughout the capital region is a long-standing regime priority, and the regime’s success in Aleppo would appear to raise the likelihood of a similarly devastating campaign for what is left of rebel-held Ghouta. 

In theory, to avoid the human and potential political toll of massive pro-regime offensives targeting Eastern Ghouta or parts of Idlib, non-jihadi factions and their state backers might be best served by jointly pursuing something akin to the non-aggression arrangement that has largely prevailed in the south. Also in theory, such an understanding could hold appeal for Russia—which has at times appeared wary of the regime’s limited capacity to hold regained territory and whose air support is crucial to enabling further regime offensives. Moscow’s concerns were underlined with the recent recapture of Palmyra by IS, just nine months after a Russian-backed military campaign had succeeded in expelling the group. In practice, however, there is little apparent appetite for a non-aggression arrangement within the fractious pro-opposition camp. And it is hard to imagine Russia—let alone the regime and Iran—choosing to halt their march against rebels now when they enjoy such momentum. Even if the rebels suffers continued territorial losses, that will not spell the end of the regime’s armed opponents. It will leave those wishing to continue the fight with little choice but to shift to a longer-term strategy of asymmetric insurgency—a scenario which plays further to the advantage of salafi-jihadis, and would make it still harder for the rebellion to cobble together a coherent, credible, and practical political leadership. 

Is the regime on its way to proving that there is a military solution to this conflict after all?

The regime has gone a long way toward dismantling its mainstream opponents inside the country, armed and civilian,—a long standing regime goal that blocks any viable path to a negotiated political transition in the foreseeable future. But despite current momentum, it is not rolling toward a full military victory. Crucial weaknesses within the pro-regime camp remain. Central among them is the erosion of the Syrian military, and the limited base from which the regime can draw reliable, dedicated Syrian fighters. To gain additional territory while maintaining what it has, the regime has steadily grown ever more dependent on Shiite foreign fighters facilitated by Iran – Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan and Pakistani recruits drawn from refugee communities in Iran. They, along with intense Russian air power, have been key to enabling continued regime gains. But in the medium to long term, they do not provide sustainable means of holding—let alone stabilizing—territory in populated anti-regime strongholds amid a continuing insurgency. 

It is unlikely that, absent real compromise, it will be able to use such brutal tactics to win the war outright.

Indeed, even in the short term, holding ground is a serious challenge. The IS recapture of Palmyra earlier this month illustrates this well. With its foreign allies and most reliable Syrian fighters focused on other fronts—most notably Aleppo—regime forces charged with holding Palmyra proved no match for a surprise attack by IS, losing the city within three days despite Russian air support. That regime collapse could happen so quickly in Palmyra—a world-famous heritage site and strategically important location, whose recapture in March was heralded in a major Russian propaganda effort—provides ample indication of its manpower problem. If and when pro-regime forces continue to gain additional territory, the risks they run of over-extending themselves only grow. 

Part of the challenge for the regime’s backers, including Iran, is that they are pushing against the grain of Syria’s demographics—across the country, and in the northwest in particular. This is a notable difference between Syria and Iraq, where Iran’s assertion of hegemony is eased by alliances with political and military forces rooted in—and recruited from—the country’s Shiite majority. In theory, the regime and its allies could attempt to overcome this challenge by expanding and intensifying their existing depopulation efforts in parts of the country where anti-regime sentiment is perceived as especially broad and deep. That would erase whatever line remains between scorched-earth counter-insurgency and systematic sectarian cleansing. It would also generate civilian casualties, displacement, and radicalisation still worse than the horrors Syria has already witnessed. Sadly, given the lengths to which the pro-regime camp has gone thus far, and the lack of any foreseeable external military deterrent, it cannot be ruled out. 

What is the relative strength of IS now? Despite its recapture of Palmyra, is the group not under threat in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa?

The Islamic State’s military fortunes have ebbed and flowed, even in the last couple of weeks, but overall it seems to be losing ground. Yet even if there are further military successes against the group, that alone won’t solve the problem.

A lot of the Western conversation on Syria focuses on specific groups – IS, Fatah al Sham. But that is misleading, and extremely counterproductive. As we have seen in Iraq over the years, even driving a jihadist group beyond the apparent brink of defeat will prove only a short-term success if the underlying conditions on which it fed remain, or re-emerge. Eliminating groups’ leadership is also no guarantee that jihadists are defeated:  three leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq were killed, only to be replaced by the current leader of IS. Groups will evolve as they lose ground, some may disappear and others will introduce themselves; they are symptoms rather than causes of deeper problems in Syria, Iraq and beyond.  Chief among those problems is the massive radicalising force generated by the brutal military tactics used by all armed elements in the country–but which have been carried out most extensively and systematically by the Syrian regime and its allies.

When we look at the levels of violence Syrians have experienced, and those, mostly Sunni, communities that have been the worst affected, it is clear that seizing territory from IS or any jihadist group will not in and of itself sustainably address the problem. The goal must be to secure stability and credible governance within these areas—meaning that questions of how a given city will be administered post-IS, and by whom, are more important than the speed with which IS is driven from that area.

The Islamic State’s military fortunes have ebbed and flowed, even in the last couple of weeks, but overall it seems to be losing ground.

There is a real danger, then, that the U.S. is making a mistake by rushing to arrange a campaign to take Raqqa city led, in practice if not in rhetoric, by Kurdish YPG forces. First, due to Ankara’s intense objection to additional YPG gains—and amid continued violence between Turkey and the PKK/YPG on both sides of the Turkey-Syria border—the momentary benefit of driving IS from the city might pale in comparison to the costs of spiralling destabilisation throughout this arc of tension. Second, due to the YPG’s approach to governance—delegating minimal responsibility to local bodies while clearly retaining more meaningful authorities in the hands of Kurdish YPG cadres—it is difficult to imagine the organisation achieving credible, sustainable governance in an overwhelmingly Arab city of Raqqa’s size. 

How are things shaping up for Turkey and its allies in the battle to take al-Bab from IS?  

As I noted earlier, Turkey and its rebel allies began Euphrates Shield with two immediate objectives: 1) capture from IS the territory adjacent to the Turkish border, and 2) block the YPG from connecting its territory in northeastern Syria with the Afrin canton it controls north of Aleppo. Thus far, Turkey has already accomplished the first goal and is on the verge of achieving the second—if and when it takes al-Bab, it will have nearly completely blocked the YPG’s path to control a single, contiguous stretch of territory. Notably, controlling al-Bab would also provide Turkey and its rebel partners a foothold in a significant population centre just 35 km from Aleppo city, and less than 10 km from the nearest regime-held territory—which explains why Damascus has repeatedly signalled its objection to Euphrates Shield advancing on the city. Thus the battle for al-Bab is between Turkey-backed rebels and IS, but the ramifications are much broader.

If and when Turkey and its Euphrates Shield allies succeed in taking al-Bab, however, there is a real risk that further escalation may ensue. Connecting its Afrin and northeastern cantons is the YPG’s top priority in Syria, and its officials have hinted that the organisation is prepared to respond forcibly to Turkish attempts to block that. Meanwhile, the Turkish leadership has publicly suggested that Euphrates Shield may build on victory in al-Bab with a march east toward Menbij, a city subject to dispute since the YPG and its local allies captured it from IS in August, taking in the process an initial step toward connecting its cantons. Turkey was unhappy with this development, and understood from the U.S. at the time that the YPG was to withdraw from Menbij after seizing it and hand control to local authorities. That did not happen – the YPG has withdrawn some of its assets but kept others, and in any case there is no shared definition between Turkey, the YPG and the U.S. on where the YPG ends and local authorities begin. (The issue is complicated by the PKK/YPG tactic of creating officially autonomous local bodies that in practice remain under the organization’s authority.)The bottom line is that it would benefit all these parties—Turkey, the YPG and U.S.—to pro-actively define a mutually acceptable arrangement in Menbij. If Turkey attempts to resolve the matter with a military push in that direction, it may over-stretch its Euphrates Shield forces in the process—presenting opportunities for IS, the YPG or even nearby regime forces to exploit. Moreover, it could ignite an escalatory cycle between Turkey and the PKK/YPG spanning both sides of the border. The same could result from any YPG escalation against Turkish and allied forces in al-Bab or elsewhere. Indeed, at this point the YPG would be well advised to accept that connecting its cantons via military means is not a realistic objective, and that any attempt toward that end might backfire by inciting an expanded Turkish response.

Given all these dangerous dynamics, what are the prospects for de-escalating the violence in Syria?
 
A first step would be for all actors to be more realistic about what they can accomplish militarily. Repeatedly, over the course of this war, decision-makers on all sides have overestimated what they can achieve and sustain—that is, maximalist objectives have made them all prone to overshooting. This was true of the pro-opposition camp when it had momentum earlier in the conflict, and it’s true of the pro-regime camp now that it enjoys momentum. The regime has won the battle for Aleppo, but at a cost of immense destruction, international isolation, and horrendous civilian suffering. It is unlikely that, absent real compromise, it will be able to use such brutal tactics to win the war outright.  

One would hope that by being more realistic, the conflict’s protagonists could avoid mutually damaging fights; that principle applies not only to Menbij and al-Bab, but also to Idlib—the pro-regime camp is itself in danger of over-stretch. 

The recent flurry of Turkey-Russia diplomacy shows the potential for each to achieve better results—for themselves and their allies—via negotiating a non-aggression arrangement that would avert an all-out war for Idlib, or elsewhere. Agreement between Turkey and Russia is not sufficient, of course—as we saw yesterday in Aleppo, when Iran-backed militias appeared to thwart an evacuation deal facilitated by Ankara and Moscow.  But diplomacy between the two can provide a promising start. 

That said, the obstacles to such a deal are immense:  the regime and Iran have consistently preferred immediate military escalation to Russian negotiation efforts; Moscow itself appears content to press the pro-regime camp’s current military advantage; Fath al-Sham dominates much of Idlib, prefers that the rebels remain on the offensive, and would likely seek to thwart any non-aggression arrangement; and there are limits to Turkey’s will and capacity to pro-actively push its rebel allies on an issue that for Ankara pales in importance to the challenges presented by the PKK and YPG.

At this point, de-escalation seems like wishful thinking, but it is achievable if the major powers involved in this fight are willing to step back and recalibrate based on their longer-term interests. Going forward, the three most critical external actors are likely to be Russia, Turkey and Iran—especially now that the next U.S. administration seems inclined to limit its engagement on Syria. Crisis Group is planning to address these dynamics in a forthcoming report.