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Kosovo: Izazov tranzicije

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Ključno pitanje u ovom momentu procesa iznalaženja konačnog statusa je stvaranje Kosova koje će imati najveću mogućnost za dugoročnu stabilnosti i razvoj. Dok dogovor izmedju Beograda i Prištine ostaje poželjan u teoriji, vrlo je teško očekivati da će srpska Vlada dobrovoljno pristati na vrstu nezavisnosti, uslovnu ili ograničenu kakva god ona bila, a što je neophodno za stabilno, dugotrajno rešenje. Medjunarodna zajednica, a pogotovo Specijalni izaslanik UN kome je dato u zadatak rešavanje procesa statusa, Marti Ahtisari, mora u skladu sa time da se pripremi za mogućnost nametanja “paketa nezavisnosti” za Kosovo, koliko god to može ispasti diplomatski bolno u kraćem roku, pre nego da se nada uspehu u rafinirano premošćavanje razlika izmedju Prištine i Beograda i dobijanje nekakvog maglovitog rešenja, ili rešenja u kojem se ključni elementi odlažu za kasnije.

Ništa od gore navedenog ne oslobadja većinsku zajednicu kosovskih Albanaca od odgovornosti. Oni moraju ponuditi “pakete” prava kosovskim Srbima i drugim manjinama u bar tri oblasti: centralne institucije, decentralizacija, verska i kulturna baština. Detalje uključivanja i predstavljanja u glavnim vladinim institucijama, uz sporazum o uključivanju relevantnih zemalja-matica u oblastima kao što su kultura, obrazovanje i možda još po nešto, treba dogovoriti ne samo sa srpskom manjinom na Kosovu, nego i sa Turcima, Bošnjacima i drugima. Jedan sporazum o decentralizaciji, koji bi na početku trebalo dogovoriti od strane Ahtisarija i njegovog tima, mogao bi da bude implementiran pod medjunarodnim nadzorom na tri godine, kao što je to bio slučaj sa Ohridskim sporazumom u Makedoniji. Prištinski pregovarači treba takodje da odmah otpočnu pregovore sa Srpskom pravoslavnom crkvom na Kosovu oko “paketa” aranžmana za zaštitu crkve i njenih objekata. Samo onda kada se ovako postave temelji Kontakt grupa treba da se pripremi da učini konkretizovane, formalne korake prema priznavanju nezavisnosti Kosova.

“Paket” nezavisnosti koji medjunarodna zajednica postavi Kosovu treba da prioritizira njegov socijalni i ekonomski razvoj. Sama izrada (“paketa”) treba da bude prilika Evropskoj uniji i posebno njenim zemljama-članicama da prošire svoj angažman, kao i resurse, prema celom Zapadnom Balkanu uopšte. Potreban je velikodušan program pomoći u obrazovanju, zajedno sa liberalizacijom viznog režima, kao i pomoć za ruralni razvoj. Evropska unija ne bi smela da potroši više na troškove svoje misije na Kosovu posle rešavanja statusa nego što troši na strukturalne fondove za pripremu za članstvo nove države.

Iako će nova rezolucija Saveta bezbednosto UN biti vitalna da Kosovo postavi na kurs nezavisnosti od Srbije, bilo koja nova medjunarodna misija tamo treba da bude zasnovana na sporazumu sa novom državom, po mogućstvu zasnovanom na njenom ustavu. Ovakvo medjunarodno prisustvo treba da ima manja ovlašćenja nego što ih imaVisoki predstavnik UN u Bosni. Institucije EU ispravno naglašavaju da žele Kosovo koje bi se tretiralo u većini aspekata kao normalna država, sa političarima koji su odgovorni sopstvenim biračima. Ali postoji jedna oblast gde medjunarodna zajednica mora da razmotri misiju sa malo više ingerencija za mešanje: severno Kosovo, a posebno Mitrovica, gde srpske paralelne strukture podjednako prkose UNMIK-u i privremenim institucijama Kosova. Ostaviti novoj vladi Kosova da inkorporiše severni deo bi samo izazvalo nasilan raspad. Prelazna medjunarodna uprava bi tamo bila jedini razuman odgovor.

Priština/Beograd/Brisel, 17. februar 2006

Executive Summary

The key issue in the current final status process is the creation of a Kosovo that will have the greatest chance of lasting stability and development. While agreement between Belgrade and Pristina remains desirable in theory, it is extremely unlikely that any Serbian government will voluntarily acquiesce to the kind of independence, conditional or limited though it may be, which is necessary for a stable long-term solution. The international community, and in particular the UN Special Envoy charged with resolving the status process, Martti Ahtisaari, must accordingly prepare for the possibility of imposing an independence package for Kosovo, however diplomatically painful that may be in the short term, rather than hoping to finesse Pristina and Belgrade’s differences with an ambiguous solution, or one in which key elements are deferred.

None of this removes any responsibility from Kosovo’s Albanian majority. They must offer packages of rights for Kosovo’s Serb and other minorities in at least three areas: central institutions, decentralisation and religious and cultural heritage. Details of inclusion and representation in core governing institutions, with arrangements for involvement of the relevant mother country in fields such as culture, education and possibly more, should be negotiated with not only Kosovo’s Serb minority but also its Turks, Bosniaks and others. An agreement on decentralisation, to be brokered in the first instance by Ahtisaari and his team, could then be implemented under international oversight for three years, as was done with the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. Pristina’s negotiators should also immediately start direct negotiation with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo on a package of protection arrangements for it and its sites. Only once this groundwork has been done should the Contact Group be prepared to make concerted, formal moves toward recognising Kosovo’s independence.

The independence package the international community settles upon Kosovo should prioritise its social and economic development. Crafting it should be an opportunity for the European Union and its member states in particular to expand their commitment, including resources, to the Western Balkans generally. A generous education assistance program and visa liberalisation are needed, as is assistance for rural development. The EU must not end up spending more on its own post-status mission costs in Kosovo than it does on pre-accession structural funds for the new country.

While a new UN Security Council resolution will be vital to set Kosovo on a course of independence from Serbia, any new international mission there should desirably be based on agreement with the new state, preferably founded in its constitution. This international presence should have fewer powers than the High Representative has enjoyed in Bosnia. EU institutions properly emphasise that they want a Kosovo which can be treated in most respects as a normal country, with politicians answerable to their own electorates. But there is one area where the international community should consider a more intrusive mission: northern Kosovo, and Mitrovica in particular, where Serb parallel structures defy UNMIK and the provisional government (PISG) alike. Leaving a new Kosovo government to try to incorporate the north would invite a violent breakdown. A transitional international authority there is the only sensible answer.

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 17 February 2006

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