Le sort des réfugiés centrafricains au sud du Tchad
Le sort des réfugiés centrafricains au sud du Tchad
Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic
Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic
Commentary / Africa

Le sort des réfugiés centrafricains au sud du Tchad

Thibaud Lesueur, analyste pour l’Afrique centrale à l’International Crisis Group, s’est rendu dans les camps de réfugiés au sud du Tchad pour évaluer la situation, le sort des réfugiés ainsi que l’impact de la crise centrafricaine sur la région.

Depuis le coup d’Etat de mars 2013, la crise centrafricaine a jeté environ 240,000 personnes sur les routes de l’exil vers le Cameroun et le Tchad. Ce n’est malheureusement pas la première fois. Lors des deux dernières décennies, de nombreux centrafricains ont trouvé refuge dans le sud tchadien pour échapper soit aux violences de la tristement célèbre garde présidentielle soit aux exactions de groupes armés et de coupeurs de routes. Les tensions intercommunautaires générées par cette crise pourraient s’exporter au sud du Tchad. En outre, l’afflux vers une région principalement agricole, de réfugiés centrafricains, en majorité musulmans, et dont certains possèdent du bétail, accroit la compétition sur les ressources naturelles et rend la cohabitation entre les habitants et les nouveaux arrivants difficile.

Réfugiés et rapatriés

Selon l’Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM), depuis le début de la crise en 2013, plus de 113,000 personnes– réfugiés centrafricains et retournés tchadiens vivant en RCA depuis plusieurs générations – ont cherché refuge dans la capitale tchadienne Ndjamena, ainsi que dans des camps et villages au sud du pays. Certains sont venus par camions, à bord d’avions affrétés par les autorités tchadiennes à partir de Bangui ou à pieds pour les moins chanceux. S’il existe aujourd’hui une réelle prise en charge de ces populations par les organisations humanitaires, ces dernières ont été, au début de l’année 2014, submergées par le flot de réfugiés et leurs moyens demeurent encore largement insuffisants au regard des besoins de ces populations. Selon le Bureau pour la Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires (OCHA), seuls 30 millions de dollars, sur les 127 millions prévus, ont été alloués pour les urgences liées à la crise centrafricaine au Tchad. La fermeture de la frontière par le gouvernement tchadien en mai 2014 est venue compliquer l’accès au pays pour les réfugiés ; et bien que le Tchad ait récemment annoncé l’ouverture prochaine d’un couloir humanitaire, son emplacement pose problème. En effet, il est éloigné des foyers de population centrafricaine et difficile d’accès pour les ONG.

Mes fils et ma femme ont été tués, je n’ai pas pu les sauver. Je suis sorti par le Cameroun avant de venir retrouver mon frère au Tchad.

Les situations les plus dramatiques concernent les réfugiés qui sont venus à pieds. Pendant des semaines ou parfois des mois de marche, ils ont été les cibles des embuscades des anti-balaka, sont arrivés affaiblis et en ordre dispersé. Parmi eux, beaucoup ont perdu des proches: « Mes fils et ma femme ont été tués, je n’ai pas pu les sauver. Je suis sorti par le Cameroun avant de venir retrouver mon frère au Tchad » (un réfugié originaire de Bouar, Goré, avril 2014). Selon un récent rapport de Médecins sans frontières (MSF) intitulé «Réfugiés centrafricains au Tchad et au Cameroun : « La valise et le cercueil » », les derniers arrivants au Cameroun et au Tchad passent la frontière dans des états de santé alarmants et beaucoup souffrent de malnutrition.

Symptôme d’une crise qui n’a épargné personne, les camps offrent un échantillon représentatif de la diversité des populations. Au sud du Tchad se mêlent ainsi des fonctionnaires, des éleveurs avec ou sans troupeaux, des agriculteurs, des commerçants ou familles de commerçants, des diamantaires, des professeurs, des étudiants et même d’anciens rebelles de la Séléka. On retrouve dans les camps de réfugiés des Peulhs Mbororo, Uda, Jaafun et Sankara, qui ont été la cible avec leurs troupeaux de miliciens anti-balaka et des commerçants arabes Missérié ou Salamat qui ont tout perdu lors des pillages. On trouve aussi, dans une moindre mesure, des agriculteurs Kaba et Gbaya qui ont fui les exactions commises par la Séléka. En outre, il est difficile de déterminer qui est tchadien et qui est centrafricain. « Les retournés tchadiens » et les réfugiés ont rarement des papiers d’identité et beaucoup déclarent être centrafricains ou ne pas avoir d’attaches au Tchad ni de familles pour les accueillir.

Sécurité et vengeance

Jusqu’à présent les problèmes de sécurité liés à ces camps ont été contenus mais des tensions émergent parfois. Les camps s’organisent et se structurent sur des bases communautaires ou même sociales. Au camp de Dosseye, les habitants de Bangui, pour la plupart d’anciens commerçants plus instruits que la moyenne, restent à l’écart. « Là-bas, ce sont des gens de Bangui, ils nous prennent de haut » (réfugié venant de Paoua, arrivé au camp de Dosseye en avril 2014).

Au sein des camps, la question de la représentation des réfugiés ravive des luttes de pouvoir anciennes en RCA. Les rivalités entre les éleveurs (majoritairement des Peulhs vivant dans la brousse) et les commerçants (majoritairement des arabes urbanisés) ont refait surface au sud du Tchad et s’expriment ouvertement: « Comme les délégués du camp sont arabes, ils nous mettent toujours de côté », confie un Peulh ; un commerçant arabe explique quant à lui « nous ne pouvons pas être représentés par des peulhs analphabètes ». Pour autant, les tensions qui se manifestent verbalement ne dégénèrent pas encore en violence.

Au sud du Tchad, la présence conjuguée d’éleveurs centrafricains et tchadiens, qui ont écourté leur transhumance en Centrafrique pour fuir le conflit, crée un phénomène de congestion. La compétition sur les ressources s’accroit et les incidents entre agriculteurs et éleveurs se multiplient. La combinaison de l’arrivée de nouveaux troupeaux et du blocage de la transhumance vers la Centrafrique pendant la saison sèche entraine ainsi une saturation des pâturages et complique la cohabitation entre populations locales et nouveaux arrivants.

« Les autorités nous bloquent », explique un réfugié de Bouca, arrivé à Sido en mars. « Ce n’est pas nous qui décidons où nous devons être ou où nous devons aller, ce sont nos troupeaux. Si on reste, nos bœufs vont mourir. En plus, les militaires veulent nous désarmer alors que nos armes nous servent pour nous défendre».». A Mbitoye, ville située sur un couloir traditionnel de transhumance et qui sert aujourd’hui de zone de transit pour de nombreux éleveurs ayant fui les conflits, un représentant des autorités locales estime impossible d’encadrer le mouvement des éleveurs : « on ne peut pas contrôler les éleveurs, peut-être que certains passeront par le Cameroun, peut-être que d’autres passeront la frontière, il sera difficile de les contenir ».

Le désir de vengeance est fort dans ces camps. Si jusqu’ici les forces armées tchadiennes ont globalement réussi à maintenir le calme au sud du pays, les incidents sont fréquents et la tension reste palpable au sein des camps. A Mbitoye, les habitants évoquent plusieurs incursions des anti-balaka du côté tchadien de la frontière pour voler du bétail au début de l’année 2014. Par ailleurs, des mouvements pendulaires de jeunes éleveurs armés réfugiés au Tchad et passant la frontière pour se venger ont été observés. Si la fermeture de la frontière en mai a considérablement réduit ces mouvements, d’autres réfugiés évoquent depuis des départs réguliers de groupes de jeunes vers la Centrafrique : « Nous voyons toutes les semaines des jeunes rejoindre la RCA pour se faire enrôler dans les groupes armés » (un étudiant, camp de Dosseye). Les camps au sud ne sont pas hermétiques aux influences extérieures et les informations qui circulent suffisent parfois à convaincre des jeunes vulnérables de s’enrôler dans les groupes armés : « Au camp, on dit qu’on peut toucher 75 000 FCFA si on rejoint la Seleka » (un réfugié, camp de Dosseye). Cette tendance est confirmée par des membres du Détachement pour la protection des réfugiés et des humanitaires qui précisent cependant que ces cas restent isolés.

Conscient de ce phénomène, le président tchadien Idriss Déby a mis en garde ceux tentés par la vengeance, durant une visite dans la région en mai. Depuis, les autorités tchadiennes ont essayé de désarmer les pasteurs et de sensibiliser les jeunes, mais la tâche est complexe. A Goré, les autorités ne font pas mystère d’une situation tendue: « A Danamadja, les jeunes sont parfois très agressifs et très revanchards, nous sommes en train de gérer une population explosive et nous n’avons pas assez de moyens pour gérer cette situation ».

Rentrer chez soi

La pluralité d’origines et d’identités sociales suscite des envies de retours contrastées. A Sido et Danamadja, certains commerçants arabes centrafricains confient avoir tout perdu et ne plus vouloir retourner en Centrafrique. Beaucoup d’entre eux ont l’intention d’ouvrir des commerces au Tchad et de s’intégrer dans le tissu économique et social tchadien : « S’il y a de la sécurité, nous réussirons à recommencer depuis le début ici. Nous irons à Sarh ou à Moundou » (un réfugié, originaire de Bangui, arrivé à Sido en février 2014).

A l’inverse, d’autres comme les Peulhs centrafricains disent ne pas vouloir rester au Tchad, ne pas y avoir d’attaches et être décidés à rentrer dès que le conflit centrafricain aura baissé d’intensité. Beaucoup d’entres eux insistent sur le fait qu’ils n’ont pas de famille au Tchad, n’ayant jamais vécu dans le pays. Au camp de Danamadja, un vieux peulh centrafricain qui a perdu tout son troupeau évoque même une possible reconversion : « j’ai des amis qui travaillent dans le diamant et d’autres dans le commerce général, je vais voir ce que je peux faire pour retravailler ». Tous mettent l’accent sur une cohabitation apaisée avec le reste de la population centrafricaine avant la crise et regrettent l’amalgame Seleka-musulmans : « on nous a pris pour des Seleka, parce que nous sommes musulmans » confie un Peulh avant d’ajouter « si la crise prend fin, on reviendra en Centrafrique et on recommencera comme avant ». Alors que certains réfugiés demeurent optimistes, d’autres réalisent qu’en raison du degré de violence en Centrafrique, la réconciliation sera certainement longue et difficile. Pour eux, c’est la perspective d’un retour qui s’éloigne.

Russian and Rwandan security forces take measures around the site during election meeting in Bangui, Central African Republic on December 25, 2020. Nacer Talel / ANADOLU AGENCY / Anadolu Agency via AFP
Commentary / Africa

Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic

Russia has become the Central African Republic’s preferred ally in its battle with insurgents. But the government’s use of Russian mercenaries as it goes on the offensive is causing domestic divisions and alienating other external partners. Concerns about rights abuses and misinformation campaigns are mounting.  

Russia has rapidly expanded its influence in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the last few years, using military support to become President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s closest ally. Prone to coups, rebellions and communal strife, CAR has been engulfed in conflict for over twenty years. While the government wields authority in the capital Bangui, it is largely absent from the provinces, where an array of rebels and other armed groups exercise their own form of predatory rule. Disappointed by the inability of UN peacekeepers to extend the state’s writ, Touadéra turned to Russia in 2017, securing weapons and military instructors to bolster CAR’s shambolic army after the UN Security Council approved an exemption to the arms embargo on the country. Today, Russian advisers have the government’s ear in not just military but also political and economic matters.

Touadéra’s government also brought in the Wagner Group, a Russia-based military contractor that is active in Libya and Sudan, and which Mali’s transitional government has signalled an interest in hiring to fight jihadists. Moscow claims that it has no ties to Wagner, saying it is a private company that is free to sell its services to other sovereign governments as it sees fit. But Wagner is widely believed to be managed and financed by businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is close to the Kremlin and under U.S. sanctions for attempted meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections. In 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department also imposed sanctions on companies and people working on Prigozhin’s behalf “to advance Russia’s influence in the Central African Republic”. Prigozhin has denied any links to Wagner. For his part, Touadéra has repeatedly said he has not signed a contract with the group. Wagner has no office or spokesperson in CAR. Yet its presence – estimated at between 1,200 and 2,000 personnel – is barely a secret in Bangui, where men in camouflage gear can be seen riding around in unmarked military-style vehicles. Rather than eradicating armed groups, the contractors are perpetrating abuses that increasingly drive violence in the provinces and fuel guerrilla warfare against government troops by rebels scattered in the bush.

At first, Central Africans greeted Moscow’s support warmly, … [now] their enthusiasm seems to be dimming.

At first, Central Africans greeted Moscow’s support warmly, hopeful that Russia would succeed in tamping down the country’s conflict where other foreign powers had successively failed (Libya under former leader Muammar Qadhafi, South Africa and France have all been involved in CAR in the past). Their enthusiasm seems to be dimming, however, due to Touadéra’s outsized reliance on Russian advisers, his government’s growing tendency to stifle dissent and allegations of human rights abuses in the counter-insurgent campaign. Moreover, the government’s opaque dealings with Russia and the lack of transparency surrounding Wagner’s involvement have driven a wedge between it and its traditional donors, in particular France, which sees Moscow as encroaching on its interests in the region. CAR is now in the tricky position of having to balance the benefits of Russia’s military and political support with the prerogative of securing the Western financial support on which it will continue to depend. Touadéra’s determination to achieve military victory is understandable, given the repeated failure of peace deals, but his close alliance with Wagner has antagonised Western partners to the point where CAR’s financial lifeline may be at risk.  

Poster praising the former close military relationship between the Central African Republic and France. Bangui, October 2021. CRISIS GROUP / Pauline Bax

A Country Plagued by Insurgency and Hardship

Russia’s role has drawn more attention amid the political crisis that has gripped CAR since shortly before December 2020 presidential and legislative elections. In the run-up to those polls, the country’s top court rejected the candidacy of former President Francois Bozizé, who had been ousted by the Seleka rebel coalition in 2013 after a decade in power. His successor, Michel Djotodia, ruled for barely a year before other Central African leaders forced him to resign amid mounting clashes between Seleka loyalists and so-called anti-balaka groups that had formed to fight them. The appointment of a transitional leader and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA, then paved the way for 2016 elections, which Touadéra won. In 2019, with Moscow’s encouragement, the government signed the African Union-sponsored Khartoum agreement with fourteen armed groups controlling most of the provinces, a deal that still serves as the country’s roadmap to peace today. Following Bozizé’s exclusion from the 2020 polls, however, a loose alliance of armed groups known as the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), made up of six signatories to the Khartoum agreement, declared its intention to disrupt the elections. Bozizé later confirmed in a statement that he headed the CPC. Rwanda swiftly sent 300 “force protection troops” to help safeguard the elections. After Touadéra won a second five-year term, the insurgents advanced on Bangui in January aiming to topple the government. A combination of UN peacekeepers, Wagner personnel and Rwandan soldiers repelled the attack.

As Touadéra ordered a counteroffensive in the countryside, his government began closing political space in the capital. It barred several opposition politicians from leaving the country and arrested civilians and military officers seen as close to Bozizé. In the following weeks, troops led by Wagner contractors ended a rebel blockade on CAR’s supply channel from Cameroon and wrenched control of more than twenty towns and villages away from various rebel groups. A day before Touadéra’s swearing-in ceremony on 30 March, Russian Ambassador Vladimir Titorenko warned that Bozizé and other rebel leaders would be “absolutely eliminated in military operations” if they continued to wage war against the government. By April, government troops had reached most rebel strongholds. In a country that has been plagued by insurgency for the past twenty years, it was a momentous achievement that boosted Touadéra’s popular support. Many Central Africans hailed the Russian mercenaries as liberators.   

But the intense fighting took a heavy toll. In March, the UN Working Group on mercenaries first sounded the alarm over Wagner’s activities, saying it had received reports of serious rights abuses, including summary executions, torture and forced disappearances. In June, a UN expert panel accused Russian instructors and CAR soldiers of large-scale looting, use of excessive force and indiscriminate killing. It also stated that Syrian and Libyan mercenaries were engaged in combat alongside Russian instructors. Russia angrily denied the charges. Two months later, MINUSCA and the UN human rights office voiced concern about mounting abuses by all belligerents, holding the army and Russian paramilitaries responsible for nearly half the documented incidents. There are reports in domestic and international media – corroborated by UN and humanitarian agency workers – that Wagner mercenaries and soldiers carried out summary executions of members of Bozizé’s ethnic Gbaya group. There are also reports of massacres committed by both the government and rebel sides.

Wagner mercenaries in the provinces tend to conflate all Muslims ... with insurgents.

Also worrying is that observers say Wagner mercenaries in the provinces tend to conflate all Muslims, particularly the ethnic Fulani, with insurgents, putting Fulani youth at risk of abuse. (The two most active rebel groups – Retour, reclamation et réhabilitation and Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique – are mainly Fulani, but others are not.) The targeting of Fulani could spur support for rebel groups and eventually trigger another dangerous cycle of violence. An independent investigative commission named by Touadéra confirmed in October that Russian instructors had committed abuses, but the full report has not been made public. 

Most of the combat in recent months has occurred in the central Ouaka prefecture and in the west, where Fulani rebels control significant parts of the Nana-Mambéré and Ouham-Pendé prefectures. Despite the military’s unprecedented push into the provinces, its hold on recaptured territory is proving tenuous. Having retreated to the bush, insurgents have stepped up attacks with improvised explosive devices and staged ambushes on army outposts that are left exposed when Wagner mercenaries draw back to their bases. Security sources told Crisis Group that the army, which largely collapsed during the 2013 war that drove Bozizé from power, lacks vehicles and ammunition and is poorly trained. Defections to the rebels are common. Because the army has not really secured the towns it has retaken from rebels, state services remain absent, while the proliferation of combatants hinders delivery of humanitarian aid. On 15 October, Touadéra declared a unilateral ceasefire to allow civilians access to aid, yet military operations continue.        

Central Africans have suffered severe hardship for decades and things may well get worse. CAR has a handful of tarmac roads, few basic services and the lowest life expectancy in the world. Although the army has stabilised Bangui with Wagner’s help, the resurgent violence has aggravated an already dire humanitarian situation in the provinces. The number of internally displaced people has risen to a record 722,000, while an additional 733,000 live abroad as refugees. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that over 60 per cent of the population, or 3.1 million of 5 million people, the highest proportion in five years, needs urgent relief. In parts of the north west, people face famine-like conditions. Chances that aid workers can quickly reach those most in need appear slim, given that troops often block humanitarian convoys from heading into war zones, citing security reasons.

View of Bangui, Central African Republic. October 2021. CRISIS GROUP / Pauline Bax

“Caught in a Battle of Giants”

Russia’s influence in CAR has meanwhile poisoned relations between the government and its main donors, notably the European Union, the U.S. and France. Among diplomats and aid workers, frustrations run high with what they perceive as duplicitous messaging by the president and his allies, who continue to refer to Wagner mercenaries as “instructors”, despite overwhelming evidence that many contractors are shooting at rebels. Indeed, some Touadéra allies reportedly have close ties to Wagner. One is Alexander Ivanov, a Russian who heads the Officers Union for International Security, which purports to be an independent “peace advocacy” group. Russia told a UN expert panel that its defence ministry had recruited all the instructors serving in CAR through the Union. Ivanov runs a Twitter account from Bangui under the Union’s banner.  

Another reason for donors’ annoyance is that they are left guessing who is in charge. “The government has an invisible partner whose face we cannot see”, says one diplomat. While most diplomats contend that relations with their Russian counterparts remain cordial, they have no interlocutors among the Russian advisers who manage two military and economic units that are separate from the embassy and run outside its premises, reportedly by retired Russian officials. CAR relies primarily on Western donors to provide more than half its $496 million state budget. Some donors, worried that funds or equipment could end up in the hands of unaccountable private military actors, have put stringent conditions on future disbursements. MINUSCA stopped supplying the army with fuel after finding evidence that mercenaries had used it for their own vehicles. It is unclear how CAR recompenses Wagner; the state budget does not reflect any payments. 

Vitriolic media campaigns have created further divisions. Ahead of the 2020 elections, Russia and France hurled accusations at each other in a trolling battle related to their role in CAR, prompting Facebook to suspend hundreds of fake accounts linked to Russian and French authorities. In recent months, small street protests targeting the regional bloc Economic Community of Central African States, France and MINUSCA coincided with a swell of online content maligning CAR’s neighbours and other foreign partners, while celebrating Russia’s role in the “liberation” of the country. For example, local broadcaster Radio Lengo Songo has adopted a staunch pro-Russia stance, blaming the UN and France for the country’s crisis. To be sure, much of that content reflects Central Africans’ support for Russia’s political and military involvement. But dissident voices are increasingly suppressed, leading some to ask for UN protection. For its part, France has suspended budget support to the government, citing misinformation as a reason. “We are caught in a battle of giants”, says one senior Central African official. “We need our partners to have a common vision”.

Concerns are growing that Touadéra seeks to rig CAR’s broken economy in favour of Russian business interests.

Furthermore, concerns are growing that Touadéra seeks to rig CAR’s broken economy in favour of Russian business interests. Many observers say the offensive is concentrated in mineral-rich areas, fuelling suspicion that the government is more interested in securing the country’s diamond and gold wealth than protecting civilians. “There is a nefarious backdoor influence that tries to influence public opinion and buy access to natural resources”, says a senior diplomat. In May, the finance ministry unofficially handed responsibility for customs revenue collection to the Russian economic mission that operates outside the embassy’s purview, resulting in what an eyewitness described as inspections of vehicles, including UN trucks, by foreign paramilitaries at CAR’s main border crossing with Cameroon. The ministry cancelled the contract in October after months of intense donor pressure and an outcry from Central African importers. The latter may have been feeling the pinch of more vigorous duty collection, as CAR officials told Crisis Group that the Russian mission had boosted customs income.

Conflict over CAR’s mineral resources could also intensify amid fears that the government may compensate Wagner or associated companies by handing them control of mining zones. Wagner arrived in 2018, around the same time that the government granted gold and diamond mining licences to the Russian-owned company Lobaye Invest SARLU. The UN says the two companies are “interconnected”. Russian media have linked Lobaye directly to Prigozhin.  In 2019, the government cancelled a Canadian company’s licences for the Ndassima gold mine in order to hand them to a Malagasy company that reportedly has links to Russian interests. The International Arbitration Chamber of Paris is mediating the case.

The government is drafting a new mining code, proposing the establishment of a state-owned company that would serve as the country’s principal buyer and exporter of minerals, thereby limiting the number of diamond-buying offices and pushing out the mainly Muslim middlemen, known as “collectors”, who purchase gemstones from artisanal miners on site. The mining ministry says the proposal will make the sector compliant with international standards. Donors have, however, voiced strong objections to the present draft, which they say would deter new foreign investment in the sector. Meanwhile, many Central Africans – including some officials, speaking behind closed doors fear that such policies could eventually backfire on the government. They believe that Touadéra will lose domestic support if he is perceived as handing CAR’s main sources of income to Russian interests. They demand greater transparency in the government’s commercial contracts and foreign relations.

What Should Be Done

Touadéra faces a difficult choice with Wagner. Its fighters have shielded him from an attempted coup and reset the balance of forces on the ground in the government’s favour for the first time in decades. Touadéra appears understandably sceptical of pursuing talks with rebels who tried to oust him despite the 2019 peace agreement. His decision to use mercenaries is justifiable, from a military point of view, and so far, Wagner has served him well. In the long term, however, the government will have to muster the political will to extend its extremely limited services beyond Bangui if it is to maintain control over the areas its troops have recaptured from rebels. The military intervention force is far too small to push out all the armed groups and keep them out, and its relations with MINUSCA are far too fraught to accomplish much beyond securing mining zones. Despite Wagner’s unprecedented battlefield gains, there is no easy way out for CAR’s government. The offensive may have halted fighting in some areas, but the serious abuses committed by mercenaries and security forces risk leading to more war. Complicated as it may be, Touadéra will have to engage with rebel leaders to ease the suffering of rural dwellers and end the hostilities.  

Touadéra’s first priority should be to ensure that the army and associated foreign troops adhere to the unilateral ceasefire he declared on 15 October. Civilians have borne the brunt of the offensive, as men under arms from all sides roam the provinces, severely limiting freedom of movement and hindering economic activity. The government should enforce the ceasefire, even if temporarily, to facilitate the delivery of much-needed humanitarian relief. It is particularly urgent that aid reach areas where people face famine-like conditions.

The president’s administration ... should expedite preparations for the inclusive national dialogue it has repeatedly pledged to organise

The president’s administration, meanwhile, should expedite preparations for the inclusive national dialogue it has repeatedly pledged to organise. Touadéra remains opposed to including the CPC in these discussions, despite calls from the opposition and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region that he invite the rebels. Touadéra’s antipathy for the CPC is understandable – with the coup attempt, the coalition breached the 2019 peace agreement. But the crisis is sufficiently grave that he should reconsider. On 12 November, Bangui began judicial proceedings against all the main armed group leaders who signed the agreement – even those who did not join the CPC – casting doubt upon not only the proposed dialogue’s inclusiveness but also Touadéra’s sincerity in pursuing it. A backlash is possible.

At the same time, the government should take steps to curb inflammatory content in both social media and local newspapers in order to lighten the tense political atmosphere. Online misinformation about what the UN and France are doing in CAR (they face constant allegations of undermining the government) and street protests have led to serious physical threats against Central African politicians and foreign personnel in the country, in particular MINUSCA staff, restricting their ability to perform their duties. The government should urgently call for moderation among CAR’s social media users to prevent further threats and press local media to refrain from publishing false allegations against regional and foreign partners. While there is no hard evidence that the misinformation campaigns and street protests are orchestrated, their relentless anti-UN and anti-France tone indicates some level of concertation. Given Russia’s experience with online influencing, many suspect that the spread of misinformation is somehow linked to its presence in CAR.

Finally, there is a clear need for a unified policy among all external partners in CAR. It may be hard to fashion one given the acrimony between France and Russia over CAR and Moscow’s refusal to acknowledge links to Wagner. Still, some steps could enhance relations. Russia should strengthen its official representation in the country, first and foremost by filling the ambassador’s post, which has been vacant for months. It should also provide clarity on the role of Russian advisers who operate outside the embassy’s purview. Most partner states and international institutions perceive the government’s use of unaccountable foreign mercenaries as an obstacle to ending the conflict. This perception seems accurate, given the mounting abuses of civilians in the provinces and the widespread fear of foreign mercenaries they have generated. While their departure in the near future is unlikely, given Touadéra’s determination to quash the rebellion, CAR and its partners should urgently find a way to coordinate efforts to stabilise the country. For better or worse, there is no doubt that Touadéra’s political fate increasingly depends on Russia (and Wagner), and there is little prospect of him changing the course he has chosen. Yet his Western partners should continue to press for more transparency in his policies and try to bring Russia on board while doing so.

Subscribe to Crisis Group’s Email Updates

Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.