Since 2012, Mali has faced a volatile crisis as political armed groups, including ethnic based movements, jihadist groups and transnational criminal networks, fight for hegemony and the control of trafficking routes in the North. The 2015 peace agreement remains very difficult to implement and signatory groups still resort to violence to settle differences. Jihadist violence against security forces is increasing and militants have gone rural to capitalise on local conflicts and the absence of the State to secure safe havens and new recruits. Mali’s instability has regional consequences as violent extremism spills into neighbouring countries. Through field research, timely reports and advocacy with regional and local actors, Crisis Group seeks to broaden understanding of the complex roots of violence in Mali via local, gendered and regional lenses and to find solutions to problems of governance.
Au Mali, les combats ont repris entre l’armée appuyée par Wagner et une coalition de groupes armés signataires de l’accord de paix de 2015, mettant en péril le processus de paix. Ibrahim Maïga et Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim expliquent les raisons de ces affrontements et ce que les deux belligérants ont à y perdre.
Military authorities appeared committed to taking control of 2015 peace deal signatories’ stronghold of Kidal, and could launch offensive in days or weeks to come.
Escalation between former rebel groups and govt forces continued in north. In Kidal region, govt and allied Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 7 Oct carried out strikes and took control of Anefis town from Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), which gathers northern armed groups signatory to 2015 peace agreement. As part of second phase of withdrawal, UN mission (MINUSMA) mid-Oct started leaving Tessalit and Aguelhok camps in Kidal region; two Malian military planes that landed in Tessalit to take control of base 16 Oct came under fire from CSP-affiliated Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), who worry arrival of Malian troops in Tessalit may be last step before offensive on Kidal town. CSP 31 Oct claimed takeover of vacated MINUSMA camp in Kidal town. Meanwhile in Gao region, CMA 2 and 4 Oct claimed seizing Bamba and Taoussa bases from army. Divisions emerged within CSP as founding member Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) late Sept announced departure from coalition over CMA’s bellicose stance toward govt; MSA Sec Gen 8 Oct said conflict only benefited jihadists, and several other CSP members also expressed commitment to peace.
Jihadist violence continued in centre and north. In centre, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 7 Oct ambushed soldiers near Batouma, Douentza region, killing 16, and 10 Oct ambushed joint convoy of army, Dan Na Ambassagou militiamen, and Wagner near Sibo village, Bandiagara region, claiming to have killed ten. Civilians continued to pay heavy toll in north. Wagner 8 Oct allegedly killed seven civilians in Takoukate village, Kidal region, while Wagner and govt forces 15 Oct reportedly killed six civilians and committed sexual abuse in Agumeimin and Tichilit villages, Timbuktu region.
Political tensions continued around postponed presidential election. Prominent religious and political figure, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, convened demonstration for 13 Oct in capital Bamako to protest indefinite delay to presidential election, while pro-govt civil society organisation called for counterprotest; authorities 9 Oct banned both gatherings, citing “high risk of unrest”.
MONUSCO has largely failed [in DR Congo] because its deployment has not had a significant impact on security over the past decade.
The Malian army is now demonstrating its ability to organize complex operations, particularly in the center of the country.
What we see in Mali is that Russia does not bring more security or improvements in the situation. The Russian army in Ukraine is not doing well, and in Mali, the Wagner G...
At Bamako’s request, the UN Security Council has begun drawing down the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan and Daniel Forti explore the implications for blue helmet missions elsewhere on the continent.
Le 16 juin, le Mali a demandé au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU d’acter le retrait de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation du Mali (Minusma). Jean-Hervé Jézéquel et Ibrahim Maïga expliquent les raisons qui ont amené les autorités maliennes à cette décision et en analysent les conséquences.
Le Mali et le Burkina Faso sont confrontés à une insurrection jihadiste et à des troubles politiques. Dans cet extrait de l’édition de printemps de la Watch List 2023, Crisis Group souligne ce que l'UE et ses États membres peuvent faire pour éviter que ces deux pays ne tombent dans un isolement régional encore plus grand.
Les autorités maliennes ont opéré un revirement stratégique en s’éloignant de la France et en faisant de la Russie leur principal allié militaire. Les relations entre le Mali et certains partenaires occidentaux et régionaux se détériorent. Les autorités maliennes et leurs partenaires devraient chercher à rétablir des relations plus équilibrées.
Le Royaume-Uni, la Côte d’Ivoire et d’autres pays prévoient de retirer leurs troupes de la mission de maintien de la paix de l’ONU au Mali, assombrissant son avenir alors qu’elle fait l’objet d’un examen interne. Dans ce Q&A, les experts de Crisis Group discutent des défis de la mission et des scénarios possibles pour la suite.
Après deux coups d'Etat en autant d'années, Bamako continue de combattre les insurgés jihadistes au Mali. Dans cet extrait de l'édition de printemps de la Watch List 2022, Crisis Group exhorte l'UE et ses Etats membres à soutenir des pourparlers visant un retour à l'ordre constitutionnel, à renforcer leur aide à la société civile et à encourager les réformes électorales.
In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood and Naz Modirzadeh talk with Sahel experts Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim and Richard Moncrieff about France’s announcement it will pull troops from Mali, and what the withdrawal means for the fighting against jihadist insurgents.
Les autorités maliennes semblent envisager des négociations avec le Groupe de soutien à l’Islam et aux musulmans, le plus grand groupe jihadiste du pays. Les enjeux de ces pourparlers sont à la hauteur des obstacles auxquels ils se heurtent. Pour créer des conditions favorables, le gouvernement et les insurgés devraient prendre des mesures progressives.
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