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Understanding the New U.S. Terrorism Designations in Africa
Understanding the New U.S. Terrorism Designations in Africa
This photo, taken at Place de L'Indentite in Lubumbashi, shows the Katanguien Identity monument, 22 May 2016. AFP/Junior Kannah
Report 239 / Africa

Katanga : Le cœur minier de la RDC sous tension

Alors que le régime ne cesse de retarder la prochaine échéance électorale, la montée des tensions et la répression étatique au Katanga, une région riche en ressources, pourraient être les prémices d'une escalade de la violence. Sans un dialogue national crédible et l'amélioration des relations entre le pouvoir central et les nouvelles provinces, le pays pourrait plonger dans une crise semblable à celle qu'il a connu à la fin des années 1990.

Synthèse

Le Katanga est au cœur de tensions politiques croissantes qui agitent la République démocratique du Congo (RDC). Le retard intentionnel dans les préparatifs des élections prévues en novembre et la mise en œuvre bâclée et politisée de la décentralisation et du découpage de certaines provinces, y compris celle du Katanga, ont nourri des tensions entre la région et le gouvernement central, et entre opposition et majorité gouvernementale du Président Joseph Kabila.  Celles-ci ont pris une allure ouvertement politique lorsque l’ancien gouverneur du Katanga, Moïse Katumbi, a déclaré sa candidature à l’élection présidentielle, amenant Kabila à lancer une enquête et à délivrer un mandat d’arrêt pour menace à la sécurité nationale. Les institutions fragiles du Congo sont sous pression. Il est urgent d’établir un dialogue national crédible portant sur la gestion de la transition, d’obtenir un engagement à ne pas modifier la Constitution à des fins politiques et à ne pas prolonger la transition pour préserver le statu quo, et d’avancer dans la préparation des élections de façon tangible. Afin d’éviter une crise risquant de se prolonger et des violences probables, l’ONU et les partenaires internationaux doivent soutenir et développer les efforts mis en œuvre par l’Union africaine (UA) pour engager le dialogue.

Le Katanga est un élément central de l’histoire politique tumultueuse de la RDC, d’abord en tant que siège d’un mouvement sécessionniste qui a cependant échoué au moment de l’indépendance, puis en tant qu’important champ de bataille durant la deuxième guerre du Congo (1997-2003). Sous Kabila père, puis sous son fils Joseph qui lui a succédé à sa mort en 2001, les Katangais ont occupé de nombreuses positions clés aux seins du gouvernement et des forces de sécurité. Le mécontentement envers Joseph Kabila n’a cessé de croître depuis les élections de 2011, au Katanga et ailleurs. L’échec, à travers le pays, à financer correctement les administrations provinciales, est venu exacerber, au Katanga, un sentiment d’ayant-droit né de l’immense contribution de ses exportations minières au budget national. Tout ceci a pris un tournant politique en 2014 lorsque Katumbi et des membres importants de l’élite locale, anciens alliés de Kabila pour la plupart, se sont exprimés contre le projet manifeste de ce dernier de rester au pouvoir au-delà de la fin de son deuxième – et, selon la constitution, dernier – mandat prévu en décembre 2016. Le climat de répression s’est amplifié et le gouvernement central a renforcé la présence militaire pourtant déjà importante dans la région. 

Début 2015, notamment en réaction à une opposition croissante, le gouvernement a décidé de mettre en œuvre le découpage des provinces, tel que prévu par la Constitution, faisant ainsi passer leur nombre de onze à 26. Le Katanga s’est retrouvé divisé en quatre nouvelles provinces. Tandis que certaines élites locales se réjouissent de pouvoir diriger leurs propres administrations, beaucoup au Katanga se plaignent de ce qu’ils perçoivent comme une tentative de diviser pour mieux régner. Le découpage a été bâclé, mal préparé, sous-financé et a coïncidé avec une crise budgétaire due avant tout à la chute de la demande en produits miniers du Katanga.

Katumbi s’est déclaré opposant principal à Kabila au moment-même où le parti gouvernemental, dont il était membre, se divisait. Si l’opposition s’en retrouve renforcée, elle est également divisée. Le 4 mai 2016, Katumbi a déclaré sa candidature à une élection présidentielle pourtant encore éloignée, alimentant ainsi les tensions. L’annonce d’une enquête judiciaire lancée à son encontre a provoqué des manifestations importantes à Lubumbashi, la plus grande ville du Katanga, et le candidat présidentiel a quitté le pays pour des examens médicaux.

La crise nationale qui se profile fragilise le climat politique déjà tendu et pourrait prendre la forme d’une augmentation de la violence armée, de la répression étatique et des divisions au sein des forces de sécurité. Ces évolutions pourraient avoir lieu, et certaines ont d’ailleurs déjà été observées au Katanga qui a toutes les chances d’être au cœur d’un conflit politique violent représentatif des problèmes nationaux. Des tensions graves existent entre les communautés, notamment entre les groupes ethniques locaux, les migrants et les déplacés internes, dont le nombre a augmenté de 50 000 à 500 000 entre 2011 et 2014. La crise économique risque d’augmenter les ressentiments et de rendre plus difficile la résolution des problèmes.

Cette crise, qui pourrait représenter une menace sérieuse pour la stabilité de la région, et pour les efforts internationaux de maintien de la paix, doit être évitée. Tandis que le jeu politique national est de plus en plus polarisé à mesure que l’échéance électorale se rapproche, certains acteurs, y compris au niveau local, ont encore fortement intérêt à dissiper les tensions pour prévenir l’émergence d’un conflit. Des mesures précoces contre des groupes armés illicites, et en particulier contre ceux qui les soutiennent, contribueraient à éviter que ces groupes ne deviennent un bien plus grand problème à terme. Les politiciens doivent renoncer à utiliser des groupes armés pour faire pression sur leurs opposants, et les autorités nationales doivent agir, avec le soutien de la mission de stabilisation de l’ONU (MONUSCO), pour les en décourager. La MONUSCO doit user de son influence à bon escient et déployer plus de moyens au Katanga, surtout dans les domaines du suivi des droits humains et de la police. Mais son influence diminue et face à une tempête imminente, des mesures plus radicales, telles qu’une réduction de ses forces, devront éventuellement, le moment venu, être envisagées.

Afin de pallier au manque de confiance entre le centre et les provinces, les flux financiers doivent être plus réguliers, transparents et conformes aux règlements en place. Les auditeurs nationaux et la société civile doivent pouvoir surveiller ces transactions et leur usage. Pour résoudre les problèmes de la RDC à l’échelle nationale et provinciale, il faudra plus de confiance et de dialogue, et des progrès notables vers la tenue des élections. L’initiative de dialogue actuellement paralysée, facilitée par Edem Kodjo de l’UA, doit être poursuivie et d’autres canaux de communication doivent être maintenus pour permettre des échanges entre les élites sur les questions d’intérêt national et provincial. Les partenaires internationaux doivent soutenir le dialogue, comme le fait l’UA, et s’assurer que la question centrale des relations entre le centre et les provinces reste sur la table des négociations. 

Nairobi/Bruxelles, 3 août 2016

An Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) soldier takes part in a foot patrol following an alleged ADF attack in the village of Manzalaho near Beni, 18 February 2020. AFP/ Alexis Huguet
Q&A / Africa

Understanding the New U.S. Terrorism Designations in Africa

The U.S. has designated two armed groups in the DRC and in Mozambique as terrorist organisations, claiming they are affiliated with the Islamic State, and creating potential legal peril for peacemakers who may deal with them. Crisis Group analyses the implications.

Which armed groups did the U.S. designate under its terrorism authorities and what is their backstory?

Last week the U.S Department of State designated two armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique, as well as their leaders. U.S. officials allege that these two groups – the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC, and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah (ASWJ) in Mozambique – have become Islamic State (ISIS) franchises. It refers to them as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique (ISIS-Mozambique). ASWJ is also known locally as Al-Shabaab, although it is distinct from its Somali namesake.

The U.S. designations come amid expressions of increasing alarm in Washington that despite the end of ISIS’s physical caliphate in the Levant, the group could be gaining influence elsewhere, especially in Africa. Already, local groups in Nigeria and the Sahel fight under ISIS’s banner. Since 2019, ISIS has stated that its “Central Africa Province” includes parts of the DRC and Mozambique, where it says it has developed alliances with local armed groups, including the ADF and ASWJ.

The ADF and ASWJ are groups whose violence has historically been first and foremost driven by local dynamics and grievances. They recruit mainly local fighters.

Although it emerged in the 1990s as an Islamist movement fighting the Ugandan state, the ADF has since the 2000s mostly been active in the northern part of the DRC’s North Kivu province, where it has recruited Congolese fighters, including by force, and entrenched itself by manipulating disputes among local chiefs and communities in areas under its control. Having developed tactical alliances with both senior army officers and armed groups fighting security forces, it both fuels and feeds off an internecine and murky conflict on the ground.

In Mozambique, ASWJ formed when frustrated youth, including local petty traders and poor fishermen, began building their own mosques and prayer houses in Cabo Delgado province and challenging established religious leaders they saw as too close to state authorities. As the police clamped down, they eventually took up arms, launching their first attack in 2017. Some former ruby miners, expelled from mining concessions earlier that year, also joined the fight, according to Crisis Group’s research.

There is some evidence of prior contacts between the two designated groups. Local observers and officials in the DRC and Mozambique say that there are some known cases of Mozambicans, including some of the leaders of ASWJ, travelling to the DRC for training, but these movements are believed to have ended years ago. The U.S. Department of State says the two groups are “distinct”.

Women wait in line during a World Food Program distribution at a school in Matuge district in northern Mozambique, 24 February 2021. AFP/Alfredo Zuniga

How dangerous are the ADF and ASWJ?

Both the ADF and ASWJ have grown more dangerous over the years, becoming increasingly bold in their attacks against security forces while inflicting terrible violence against civilians.

The ADF, long dormant in the DRC, first began resurfacing again in 2014, mainly committing atrocities against civilians in gruesome machete attacks. From 2017, the group then began turning its attention increasingly against government security forces and UN peacekeepers. Its operations became more sophisticated and used greater firepower. According to a December 2020 report by UN investigators in the DRC, the ADF has over time also become better at building improvised explosive devices, although it has nothing like the ISIS core’s expertise.

Recent Congolese military operations between late 2019 and October 2020 have killed hundreds of fighters belonging to the ADF, which Crisis Group’s research indicates is now split into competing factions. Some elements have moved east to the foothills of the Rwenzori mountains bordering Uganda, and some north into neighbouring Ituri province, where they have been involved in reported killings.

In Mozambique, ASWJ has become significantly more dangerous and sophisticated since it first started up in 2017. In the early stages of the insurgency, attackers grouped in small packs of a few fighters to attack remote police outposts or villages, often brandishing blunt weapons. But by early 2020, the insurgents had taken significant stockpiles of weapons from government security forces and were able to mount attacks on district capitals, including the port of Mocimboa da Praia. Government forces fled the city in August and have yet to retake it. Violence against civilians also escalated over the past year, as the insurgency swept south towards the provincial capital Pemba, with numerous credible reports of atrocities committed by ASWJ fighters.

In recent months, security forces working with foreign military contractors from South Africa have caused the group some setbacks, destroying some of their camps and storage facilities in the bush. Nevertheless, insurgents continue to regroup and mount guerrilla attacks on security forces, while also plundering villages for food.

Are countries in the region concerned about these groups?

Yes, although for the time being the DRC’s and Mozambique’s neighbours in the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa are less concerned about the groups’ possible territorial ambitions than the threat they might pose to public spaces in their capitals and other locations. Some worry that they will face the kind of attacks that Kenya has seen in recent years in Nairobi, or that Uganda saw in Kampala in 2010. Somalia’s Al-Shabaab jihadist group has claimed responsibility for the Nairobi and Kampala attacks, although some Ugandan security sources believe the latter was carried out with assistance from ADF operatives. South Africa also shows signs of being worried about militant groups, including those from the Great Lakes region and Mozambique, using its territory as a base or safe haven, and about possible links between home-grown militants in South Africa and those in the DRC and Mozambique.

What is the Islamic State’s relationship with the two groups?

Crisis Group has shown in the past how ISIS was able to strengthen and shape the tactics of the Boko Haram faction that became the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) by deploying a limited amount of resources, training and instruction, although any influence ISIS possessed did not transform the movement’s overwhelmingly local aspirations. There is little to suggest that ISIS has gained anything like that level of sway over either the ADF or ASWJ, much less the ability to exert command and control over them.   

A recent study on the ADF by George Washington University, which some U.S. officials privately endorse, provides evidence that ISIS has given financial assistance to the DRC group, and that there have been communications between the two organisations. Specifically, the report details financial transactions between Waleed Ahmed Zein, an ISIS financial operative who was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury in September 2018, and his alleged ADF contacts. It additionally details cases where ISIS disseminated propaganda about ADF attacks and presents ISIS-published photos of ADF leader Seka Musa Baluku, who according to the study has pledged allegiance to the global ISIS leadership, preaching to his recruits.

The study also states, however, that it has found “no evidence of direct command and control orders” from ISIS to the ADF. The December 2020 UN report states that even if ISIS claimed 46 purported ADF attacks in 2020, compared to 29 in 2019, many of the claims inaccurately described the attacks’ locations and dates, leading the authors to conclude that ISIS had “limited knowledge and control” of these operations. In the meantime, sources close to the ADF say one ADF faction appears to have rejected ISIS and may even be turning against Baluku’s group.

Similarly, while there is evidence that ISIS has had some contact with jihadists in Mozambique, it is unclear how close or meaningful their ties are. In a report issued last year, UN investigators working on Somalia stated that Mohamed Ahmed “Qahiye”, a native of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in northern Somalia and a member of an ISIS-linked Al-Shabaab splinter group, had travelled to Mozambique in early 2020. Regional security sources say he is a trainer and a bomb-maker. While ASWJ attacks did become more sophisticated in 2020, the group has yet to show evidence of explosive device capacities.

In addition, communication between the groups and some coordination in disseminating propaganda does not suggest especially close links. When ASWJ took control of the port of Mocimboa da Praia in August, ISIS did not broadcast this in its Al-Naba magazine for two weeks. Nor has it claimed any ASWJ attack as its own since October. U.S. officials say this is because the ISIS core’s media wing is under pressure that currently limits its output.

Are there foreign fighters in ASWJ?

Yes. The biggest cohort of foreigners fighting within the ranks of ASWJ, according to government officials, regional security sources and eyewitnesses interviewed by Crisis Group, are from Tanzania. Many of them appear to be acolytes of Aboud Rogo, a former Kenyan cleric who was linked to both al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and who was assassinated in 2012. Abu Yasir Hassan, whom the U.S. has identified as ASWJ’s leader, is also Tanzanian.

What will be the effect of these designations and how might authorities in the DRC and Mozambique manage the fallout?

Among other things, the terrorism listings freeze all of the assets under U.S. jurisdiction that belong to the ADF and ASWJ or their designated leaders, and make it a U.S. criminal offense to knowingly provide material support to any of the designees.  

While the sanctions that flow from these designations in theory do not criminalise all contact with the two groups, they are extremely broad, and their implementation could create problems for both humanitarians and peacemakers. Humanitarian agencies may shrink from providing support to vulnerable populations in Mozambique and the DRC if they believe they might end up resourcing someone who could later be accused of being an ADF or ASWJ member. Government or UN officials who might want to put resources into the hands of insurgents or fighters in order to, for example, transport them to a forum for peace negotiations, could technically also fall foul of the material support restrictions that flow from the designations.

Nor is there much likelihood that the designations will lead to a quick dismantling of these armed groups, which manage much of their money in cash or via forms of money transfer that will require painstaking work to investigate and chase, and may put them beyond the reach of U.S. sanctions.

The U.S. designations meanwhile could unintentionally send a counterproductive signal to political actors in the region. Especially in the DRC and Mozambique, where these measures are not fully understood even by top policymakers, they could be used by hardliners to justify calls for addressing the challenge posed by the ADF and ASWJ through military action alone. Diplomats in the region also now wonder whether the official unveiling of a U.S. military training program for Mozambique right after the sanctions were announced will be the thin end of the wedge for more U.S. military engagement in the gas-rich country. So far, however, the Mozambican government has signalled very clearly it does not want any foreign boots touching the soil of Cabo Delgado. Military operations in the DRC and Mozambique have recently dented both groups, but tackling the threat they pose will require a broader approach, including efforts to appeal to the Congolese and Mozambican citizens who respectively make up the bulk of fighters in both groups.

Contributors

Deputy Director, Africa Program
DinoMahtani
Deputy Project Director, Central Africa
PMvandeWalle
Senior Consultant, Southern Africa
PiersPigou
Researcher, Horn of Africa
Meron_El