L’Indonésie face au radicalisme à Poso
L’Indonésie face au radicalisme à Poso
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 75 / Asia

L’Indonésie face au radicalisme à Poso

Un an après les grandes opérations de police menées dans le district de Poso, dans le Sulawesi central, il est permis de manifester un optimisme prudent et de penser que la violence jihadiste et autres violences entre chrétiens et musulmans appartiennent au passé.

Synthèse

Un an après les grandes opérations de police menées dans le district de Poso, dans le Sulawesi central, il est permis de manifester un optimisme prudent et de penser que la violence jihadiste et autres violences entre chrétiens et musulmans appartiennent au passé. Mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour garantir une paix durable, notamment apporter une solution aux revendications de la population concernant l’efficacité de la justice et garantir une utilisation et un contrôle efficaces des fonds destinés au développement post-conflit dans ce district.

Poso a vécu une décennie de violence grave. Entre 1998 et 2001, elle a été la scène de combats entre chrétiens et musulmans. Après 2001 et la signature d’un accord de paix sous les auspices du gouvernement, la violence est devenue unilatérale lorsque les extrémistes locaux, dont beaucoup étaient liés à l’organisation extrémiste Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) dont ils recevaient leurs ordres, se sont mis à organiser des attaques contre des chrétiens, des responsables locaux et des informateurs présumés. Les opérations de police qui se sont déroulées les 11 et 22 janvier 2007 étaient l’aboutissement de presque une année d’efforts infructueux de la police pour persuader les responsables d’actes criminels de se rendre. Quatorze militants et un policier ont été tués durant ces opérations mais Poso est désormais, au dire de tous, plus calme et plus sûre qu’elle ne l’a été depuis des années. Conséquences de ces opérations :

  • presque tous les professeurs religieux de la Jemaah Islamiyah originaires de Java ont fui la région ;
     
  • ceux qui ont perpétré l’ensemble des crimes commis au nom du jihad depuis l’accord de paix de Malino en 2001 ont été identifiés et la plupart ont été arrêtés, jugés et condamnés sans provoquer de réaction particulière ;
     
  • l’unité administrative de la JI à Poso (wakalah) semble avoir été détruite, au moins de manière temporaire ;
     
  • un programme de formation professionnelle est en cours dont le but est de s’assurer que les extrémistes en puissance ont devant eux des opportunités professionnelles qui les tiendront à l’écart d’activités dangereuses ;
     
  • le gouvernement central a libéré de nouveaux fonds, notamment pour améliorer l’éducation dans l’espoir de dissiper l’influence des enseignements radicaux ; et
     
  • aucune violence grave n’a été constatée depuis douze mois à Poso.

En dépit de questions persistantes quant au nombre de victimes des opérations policières de 2007, celles-ci doivent être considérées comme une avancée positive en direction de la paix. Mais plusieurs problèmes demeurent et la question est aujourd’hui de savoir comment garantir une paix durable. Les revendications fondamentales, notamment celles relatives à la justice, n’ont pas été réglées. Les nouveaux fonds pour le développement de la région sont mal contrôlés, des allégations de corruption circulent et des difficultés empêchent d’assurer l’équité entre les différents groupes récipiendaires. Les problèmes rencontrés dans la remise d’argent aux victimes du conflit rappellent les difficultés rencontrées à Aceh dans le cadre du financement de la réintégration des anciens combattants. La méfiance du public envers la police reste élevée, en particulier parmi les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), ce qui entrave les espoirs d’établir une sécurité au niveau communautaire.

Le gouvernement à tous les niveaux – national, provincial et district – doit de toute urgence instaurer des mesures strictes d’audit et augmenter la transparence quant à la manière dont les fonds sont déboursés et à destination de qui. La police et les ONG doivent trouver un moyen de mettre fin à la guerre froide qui les oppose. Quant aux bailleurs de fonds, ils doivent s’assurer qu’un programme de formation professionnelle efficace destiné aux prisonniers et jeunes gens présumés potentiellement dangereux pourra être mis en œuvre.

Jakarta/Bruxelles, 22 janvier 2008

I. Overview

A year after major police operations in the Central Sulawesi district of Poso, there are grounds for cautious optimism that Muslim-Christian and jihadist violence is a thing of the past. But much remains to be done to ensure that peace is sustained, including resolving underlying grievances relating to justice and accountability, and ensuring effective targeting and oversight of recovery funding.

Serious violence in Poso has had a ten-year history. Between 1998 and 2001, it had been the scene of Christian-Muslim fighting. After 2001 and a government-brokered peace pact, the violence became one-sided, with local extremists, many of them linked to and directed by the extremist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), mounting attacks on Christians, local officials and suspected informants. The 11 and 22 January 2007 operations were the culmination of almost a year’s unsuccessful effort by the police to persuade those responsible for criminal acts to turn themselves in. Fourteen militants and one policeman died in the process, but Poso is quieter and safer, by all accounts, than it has been in years. As a result of the January operations:

  • almost all the JI religious teachers from Java have fled the area;
     
  • the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash;
     
  • the JI administrative unit (wakalah) in Poso appears to have been destroyed, at least temporarily;
     
  • a major vocational training program is underway aimed at ensuring that would-be extremists have career opportunities that will keep them out of trouble;
     
  • the central government has made new funding available, including for improving education in the hope of diluting the influence of radical teaching; and
     
  • no serious violence has taken place in Poso in twelve months.

Despite remaining questions about whether the death toll was needlessly high, the operations have to be seen as a net gain for peace. But many problems remain, and the question is how to ensure that peace will be sustainable. Underlying grievances, particularly relating to justice and accountability, have not been fully resolved. Oversight of the new funding is poor, there are many allegations of corruption, and there are problems in ensuring equity among different groups of recipients. The problems with cash handouts to conflict victims mirror the difficulties that Aceh has faced with reintegration funding. Public distrust of the police remains high, particularly among non-governmental organisations (NGOs), hampering the prospects of community-based security.

The government at all levels – national, provincial and district – needs urgently to institute strict auditing measures and increase transparency about how and to whom funds are being disbursed. Police and NGOs need to find ways to end their cold war. And donors need to ensure that a useful vocational training program for released prisoners and young men deemed potential troublemakers can be evaluated and continued.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 January 2008

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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