Tuer les autres, se tuer soi-même
Tuer les autres, se tuer soi-même
A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West
A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West

Tuer les autres, se tuer soi-même

La violence des jeunes auteurs des attentats de Paris fonde une identité valorisante de héros moderne, d’un romantisme guerrier que les réseaux sociaux contribuent à construire dans un contexte européen d’intolérance raciste et d’absence d’avenir pour toute une jeunesse. L’organisation de l’État islamique la récupère à son profit en lui offrant un espace concret où elle peut s’incarner.

L’aspect le plus troublant des massacres commis à Paris est qu’ils ressortent d’une violence intime. C’est ce que nous peinons à cerner et qui nous travaille. La recherche d’une explication qui reposerait sur l’altérité des commanditaires ou des exécutants, suggérant un changement de stratégie de la part de l’organisation de l’État islamique (OEI) ou un profil singulier des meurtriers, nous met sur une fausse piste.

Les cibles choisies sont révélatrices, paradoxalement, parce qu’elles n’ont aucun sens a priori. Elles ne renvoient à aucune visée immédiatement intelligible, par contraste avec la pléthore d’objectifs relevant d’une logique insurrectionnelle ou «  terroriste  » plus classique : symboles de l’État, infrastructures stratégiques, sites touristiques, lieux assimilables à une certaine classe sociale, organes représentant la liberté d’expression, etc. Ici, les cibles frappent au contraire par leur banalité. Elles relèvent d’un quotidien ordinaire qui aurait très bien pu être celui, justement, des exécutants. D’ailleurs, nombre de victimes appartenaient à la même strate sociale que ces derniers. Le Stade de France, le Bataclan, un restaurant branché mais sans chichi attirent une clientèle issue de la périphérie autant, sinon davantage que les Parisiens. Si les Champs-Élysées manquent à l’appel, cela s’explique peut-être par leur statut hybride : haut lieu des virées parisiennes de la banlieue, c’est aussi un symbole de l’État et un site touristique. Son absence dans le choix des cibles ne fait que renforcer leur déroutante insignifiance.

Au fond, ce que les tueurs assassinent, c’est eux-mêmes. Ils s’en prennent à des lieux de consommation courante qui auraient pu être les leurs en d’autres circonstances, dans une «  vie d’avant  ». Ils s’attaquent à un système de valeurs qu’ils partageaient sans doute avant leur radicalisation éclair qui les conduit à se démarquer, avant tout, par rapport à ce qui leur est familier. Il s’agit donc, essentiellement, d’une violence organique et involutive, et non d’une «  stratégie  » conceptualisée par quelque émir au Proche-Orient. Et cette violence du pareil au même est ce qui crée une fracture au sein de la société : tout devient possible dans un registre aussi profondément apolitique, où il n’y a plus rien pour structurer l’action.

COMME DANS ORANGE MÉCANIQUE

La difficulté à dresser un profil véritablement éclairant des exécutants en découle, et rajoute à l’anxiété que leur propre banalité génère. Leur seul signe distinctif, c’est un rapport avec l’organisation de l’État islamique (OEI) qu’il convient d’analyser sur le plan de l’imaginaire plus que sur celui du lien opérationnel, même si ce dernier existe par ailleurs. En effet, l’OEI est une créature protéiforme qui a une capacité extraordinaire à incarner différentes choses pour différentes personnes. Pour certains éléments du parti Baas irakien, par exemple, c’est un véhicule permettant leur recyclage après l’humiliation, le déclassement et la paupérisation qui ont suivi l’invasion irakienne de 2003. Pour beaucoup de volontaires issus des banlieues européennes, c’est plutôt le cadre d’une aventure romantique.

Il est relativement facile de se rendre en Syrie pour rejoindre les rangs d’un «  djihad  » en forme de questionnaire à choix multiples. Les candidats peuvent cocher les cases suivantes : look combattant, propos virils, maniement des armes, construction d’une image valorisante sur les réseaux sociaux, retournement des stigmates habituels en emblèmes et réalisation de soi instantanée à travers une forme d’héroïsme très moderne malgré les références superficielles au Prophète de l’islam.

Cette nouvelle identité clef en main, mâtinée de jeux vidéos et de télé réalité, se construit dans une érotisation de la violence dont l’OEI est davantage le produit que l’origine. Cette pornographie se donne à voir dans le culte de la sécurité qui s’approfondit dans la sphère culturelle et politique américaine, par exemple, où les notions de justice, de droit, de défense et d’intérêt national sont de plus en plus associées à des corps «  bodybuildés  », des discours dopés à la testostérone, des armes qui relèvent du fantasme et des orgies de violence qui sont censées tout régler. Et la virilisation de la politique intérieure et étrangère est un phénomène éminemment contagieux, une épidémie globale.

L’OEI a offert un espace concret où une violence pornographique pouvait s’exprimer, se chercher, se désinhiber et monter en puissance. Ce n’est pas un hasard, du reste, si les convertis européens en ont été les principaux agents. Dépourvus d’expérience militaire, de formation religieuse et généralement de compétence linguistique, ils ont défini leur valeur ajoutée dans une ultraviolence qui évoque le film de Stanley Kubrick Orange Mécanique par son sadisme, mis en scène avec les talents instinctifs de communicants formés à l’ère de Facebook.

C’est là un aspect crucial du trip djihadiste romantique de la jeunesse européenne convertie : relativement bien intégrée à domicile, elle ne s’ancre pas vraiment sur le terrain. Elle reste en revanche étroitement connectée à son vrai milieu d’origine — à savoir la périphérie des grandes villes — dans le cadre d’un djihad «  sans fil  » où l’on envoie autant de tweets que de balles. Il n’est pas surprenant dès lors que l’érotisation de la violence soit rapatriée à la maison.

SI PROCHE ORIENT

Ce qui est effrayant en la matière, c’est l’ampleur du va-et-vient. On parle de milliers de volontaires européens qui acquièrent en Syrie et en Irak une première expérience concrète du meurtre, cultivent une image de soi intoxicante et sont susceptibles d’alimenter un trafic d’armes de guerre sans précédent. On ne peut douter, dans ce contexte, que des attentats de cette nature ont vocation à se répéter.

L’Europe, qui a voulu traiter les conflits irakiens et syriens comme s’ils se situaient à l’autre bout de la planète, va devoir comprendre à quel point ils nous concernent dans un espace méditerranéen intégré qu’on n’a jamais su construire politiquement, mais qui se construit lui-même envers et malgré tout. Ces attentats posent la question de la libre circulation des personnes, des biens et des idées avec une telle acuité qu’elle pourrait faire exploser l’espace Schengen. Le Proche-Orient devient un facteur dans l’ascension des partis d’extrême droite — bien enclenchée par ailleurs. La stigmatisation des communautés immigrées ne peut que renforcer l’attrait de l’OEI pour ceux que l’on enferme dans l’impasse d’une identité musulmane caricaturée.

Face à de tels défis, nos réponses martiales semblent bien inadaptées. Il n’y a pas lieu de s’en étonner : le problème de la jeunesse européenne désœuvrée a autant de ramifications complexes dans un ordre socio-économique et politique en faillite que celui de l’OEI dans un Proche-Orient où les structures établies s’effondrent. Détruire l’OEI, très bien, mais pour le remplacer par quoi  ? Des milices chiites, un régime syrien dont les pratiques ont contribué à son émergence  ? En détourner nos jeunes, parfait, mais pour leur offrir quelles alternatives, dans nos sociétés qui génèrent peu d’emplois et encore moins de repères  ?

Il est plus probable que la cacophonie s’amplifie, ce qui profite aux acteurs dont le discours est binaire, au nombre desquels comptent les partis politiques, notamment les plus populistes, ainsi que l’OEI. Comme toujours, la radicalisation des uns se nourrira de celle des autres.

Au Proche-Orient, l’organisation de l’État islamique provoque la violence de ses adversaires supposés pour détruire le tissu social local, ce qu’il ne saurait faire aussi efficacement par lui-même. En Europe, la même logique risque de s’appliquer, sur un plan plus symbolique et politique. L’OEI vient de trouver un filon : la paranoïa et la stigmatisation peuvent faire autant de ravages à Paris ou Bruxelles que les frappes aveugles qui détruisent l’Irak et la Syrie. Ainsi, ce sont ceux qui œuvrent à l’uniformisation impossible de la société française qui contribueront sans doute le plus à exacerber ses clivages. Voilà, s’il y en a une, la «  stratégie  » de l’organisation de l’État islamique.
 

Workers carry boxes of humanitarian aid near Bab al-Hawa crossing at the Syrian-Turkish border, in Idlib governorate, Syria, June 30, 2021. Picture taken June 30, 2021. REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano

A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West

The UN Security Council is considering renewing an understanding whereby UN agencies transport aid to Idlib, an area held by Syrian rebels. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan, Dareen Khalifa and Ashish Pradhan explain why the arrangement remains essential.

What is at stake in the Security Council?

The UN Security Council is set to vote soon on the renewal of a mandate that allows UN agencies to deliver aid to rebel-held Idlib in north-western Syria via a border crossing with Türkiye without asking for approval from the government in Damascus. The UN calculates that nearly two and a half million people rely on this lifeline for food and other essential supplies. Yet the arrangement is contentious. Since 2019, Russia, the Syrian regime’s ally, has aimed to curtail the mandate, arguing that the UN should work with Damascus on aid deliveries out of respect for Syria’s sovereignty.

In 2021, the U.S. made a concerted effort to convince Moscow to help keep the mandate alive, but it has made no similar push in 2022, as the two powers’ relations have collapsed over Russia’s war in Ukraine. Senior UN officials worry that Russia may veto the mandate – which should be renewed by 10 July – causing a dramatic drop in humanitarian assistance to Idlib and potentially leading to an influx of refugees into Türkiye. What happens with the mandate is a concern for the UN and, more importantly, for the people in Idlib.

The Security Council first authorised the UN to deliver cross-border aid to opposition-controlled areas of Syria without Damascus’s approval in 2014. At first, this mandate covered four crossing points, giving UN agencies access to southern and north-eastern Syria as well as the north west. The Council members’ cooperation on humanitarian issues despite their broader rifts over the war in Syria was a rare bright spot in UN diplomacy. But in rancorous debates in late 2019 and mid-2020, during which Russia and China used their vetoes three times to block resolutions renewing the mandate, Moscow succeeded in limiting the UN’s cross-border operations to a single crossing, at Bab al-Hawa between Türkiye and Idlib. Russia also made clear that the mandate could not be renewed indefinitely.

In 2021, the Biden administration identified maintaining aid to Idlib as an area for better relations with Russia. U.S. officials negotiated over the mandate’s future bilaterally with their Russian counterparts in Vienna and Geneva. While the official U.S. position was that the Council should reauthorise opening all four original crossings – an outcome few UN officials and diplomats thought likely – Russia assented that July only to keeping Bab al-Hawa open. Moscow also demanded that the UN work harder on channelling aid into Idlib from government-held Syrian territory (which is referred to as “cross-line” aid, as opposed to cross-border from Türkiye) and called for greater international funding for “early recovery” projects in government-controlled parts of Syria. Finally, Russia insisted that the UN Secretary-General report on cross-line aid halfway through the mandate period in January 2022, indicating that it might try to block the mandate’s continuation at that point (though it did not act on this threat). Despite these caveats, the Biden administration presented the fact that Russia was willing to keep the mandate alive at all – and the absence of public rows and vetoes at the UN like those in 2019 and 2020 – as proof that the U.S. could do business with the Kremlin.

Security Council members [fret] that Russian and Western diplomats would fail to reach an agreement on the future of aid to Syria.

A year on, that optimism looks like a thing of the past. Since Russia’s assault on Ukraine in February and the sharp deterioration in Moscow’s relations with Western powers, Security Council members have fretted that Russian and Western diplomats would fail to reach an agreement on the future of aid to Syria. As things stand, the mandate’s fate remains unclear with less than a week to go before the deadline for its renewal.

Ireland and Norway, the Security Council’s two elected members acting as “penholders” (diplomatic leads) on the issue, introduced a draft resolution renewing the authorisation for aid deliveries through Bab al-Hawa for twelve months on 27 June. Russia has yet to make a definitive response, and Council members expect that there may be intense wrangling over the text before the vote. The outcome will have a major effect on the lives of civilians in Idlib. It is also a crucial test of how far Russia and the West can continue to work together at the Security Council – however grudgingly – as the war in Ukraine rages and their policies become ever more hostile to one another.

How important is the mandate for Idlib and are there alternatives?

Despite the high level of tension in the Security Council over cross-border aid, this mandate has given the UN essential political backing to guide humanitarian operations in Idlib. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in particular has played a pivotal role in cross-border aid delivery. The Council mandate allowed OCHA to coordinate donor response, lead negotiations with local authorities, and guarantee a significant degree of transparency for aid delivered into these rebel-held areas. OCHA has also helped NGOs involved in relief work navigate the legal and political hurdles of operating in an area under the control of Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militia running most of Idlib. HTS is UN-sanctioned and is listed by Russia, the U.S. and Türkiye as a terrorist organisation.

The UN has additionally led negotiations involving Damascus and the HTS-backed Salvation Government that administers Idlib over the balance between cross-border and cross-line aid operations. The Syrian government and Russia insist that the UN ramp up cross-line assistance as an alternative to channelling aid through Bab al-Hawa, as part of their effort to reinstate Damascus’s influence over aid delivery to all of Syria. UN officials and Western diplomats are sceptical that this proposal is realistic, especially given the Syrian regime’s track record of blocking aid to punish civilians in opposition-held areas and the hostility of its rhetoric toward Idlib and its residents. From a technical point of view, cross-border aid remains the cheapest, quickest and most reliable way to meet Idlib’s needs. A report from the UN Secretary-General in June stated that UN humanitarian monitors counted some 1,686 trucks carrying supplies (four fifths of them bearing food) from Türkiye into Idlib in April and May alone. By contrast, the report noted that the UN had overseen just five cross-line convoys between July 2021 and June 2022, and highlighted one in May that involved just fourteen trucks.

The U.S. and its allies have agreed that the UN should also experiment with cross-line aid ... into Idlib.

Nonetheless, the U.S. and its allies have agreed that the UN should also experiment with cross-line aid, mainly as a political concession to Russia and in hope of retaining Moscow’s acquiescence to cross-border operations. In 2021, the Security Council agreed to “encourage efforts to improve cross-line deliveries of humanitarian assistance” from government-controlled areas into Idlib. Moscow complains that the resolution has not been fully respected, as cross-line deliveries to Idlib have remained irregular, while HTS (and civil society groups in Idlib) as well as many humanitarian agency employees describe these efforts as a sop to the Kremlin rather than serious aid.

This debate has also become highly contentious for local forces in Idlib. HTS and the Salvation Government have reluctantly agreed to some of the cross-line aid deliveries, providing them with security and allowing for safe distribution. Yet HTS has come under fierce criticism from parts of the population and rivals in Syria’s opposition for thus “collaborating” with a regime that has killed thousands and displaced millions of Syrians. In private, HTS members express concern that the cross-line mechanism is a quandary for them: if they cooperate, they are criticised locally; if they don’t, they will be condemned internationally; and in neither situation can cross-line aid address even a fraction of humanitarian needs in Idlib. For the time being, HTS has found it prudent to facilitate the safe passage of several cross-line aid convoys to avoid giving Moscow a pretext to put a halt to the UN’s cross-border mandate and to strengthen Türkiye’s hand in negotiating with Russia. According to HTS, it would be much harder for them to cooperate on cross-line aid if Moscow were to veto the cross-border mandate’s renewal.

What would a Russian veto mean?

If Russia does veto renewal of the cross-border aid mandate, the immediate fallout could be chaotic. It is not clear whether OCHA would have to abruptly end its Syria operations in Türkiye or whether it could continue to play a minimal coordination function during a transitional phase. Regardless, the absence of OCHA’s irreplaceable aid infrastructure and cross-border mandate would significantly reduce the volume of aid and the efficiency of the donor response. It would also leave NGOs and donors struggling to manage aid coordination and oversight, while reducing their leverage in dealing with authorities in Türkiye and Idlib. UN officials estimate that NGOs could supply at best 30 to 40 per cent of the aid that the UN has been providing. In practice that means hunger will increase, medical cases will go untreated, and millions will be at risk of losing shelter and assistance.

Crisis Group’s interlocutors in Idlib agree that the aid flow’s disruption could lead many of the region’s inhabitants – many of whom fled other parts of Syria earlier in the war – to attempt to escape the area, mostly by trying to enter Türkiye. How Ankara would respond to chaos at the border remains unclear; already in Türkiye the presence of an estimated 3.7 million Syrian refugees is a source of socio-political tension, which is on the rise due to economic troubles and elections due in June 2023. Although living conditions in Idlib have improved considerably since Moscow and Ankara forged a de facto ceasefire in 2020, the population remains anxious about the precarious situation. “Our lives depend on the mood in the Kremlin every few months. This is inhuman and unsustainable”, an Idlib resident said.

What are the chances the mandate will survive?

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s assault on Ukraine, Security Council members generally seemed pessimistic about the chances of renewing the mandate for cross-border aid in conversations with Crisis Group. Now, however, some are guardedly optimistic that Moscow will let it survive. It is mostly a matter of speculation. The Russian mission in New York typically has to wait until late in negotiations on this file to get clear instructions from Moscow on how to act. In negotiations on the draft resolution tabled by Ireland and Norway on 27 June extending the mandate, neither Russian nor Chinese diplomats appeared to have definite guidance from their capitals. Western diplomats hope that Moscow will decide that it will retain greater leverage over events in Idlib by agreeing to renew the mandate – which gives it a platform for pushing the UN to work harder at cross-line aid – rather than forcing a crisis.

Western officials hope that Moscow will [refrain from using its veto] on this occasion.

Although Western and Russian diplomats have had toxic relations at the Security Council over Ukraine, Moscow has refrained from using its veto on other resolutions, such as a new mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, that other countries feared it might block. Western officials hope that Moscow will show similar restraint on this occasion, especially as vetoing the resolution would intensify its tensions with Türkiye (Turkish sources, by contrast, insist that they cannot prevent Russia from using its veto, and argue that Ankara should not be expected to fix this problem on behalf of the U.S. and European nations). China may also help moderate Russia’s calculations. During the 2021 negotiations over the Syrian humanitarian mandate, Chinese diplomats told Western counterparts that they did not want a repeat of the public disputes of 2019 and 2020. In 2022, they have emphasised the need to avoid too many blow-ups in the Security Council while the Russian-Ukrainian war continues.

There are different views regarding what Council negotiations will bring. Some Council members speculate that Russia could make last-minute demands – most likely over cross-line aid and funding for recovery – in the coming days. While the Council is slated to vote on mandate renewal on 7 July, it could push the date back, with negotiations perhaps running past the current mandate’s expiry on 10 July. Equally some UN officials guess that Russia will not create this sort of disruption, meaning that the process may end with a quick vote.

What is the longer-term future of cross-border aid to Syria?

It is clear that the best outcome of current UN diplomacy over Syria would be for the Security Council to renew the mandate for cross-border aid for a year. No credible alternative set of arrangements exists for cross-border aid. If Russia does veto the mandate, the fallout would provoke enormous humanitarian suffering, additional displacement and, potentially, political turmoil in and around Idlib. While Moscow has shown scant regard for the disapproval of other Security Council members over its war on Ukraine, it might be wary of straining its relationship with Ankara – and of creating a new crisis for itself in Syria while it is focused on Ukraine.

Nonetheless, Western members of the Council and UN officials need to ready themselves for an end to the cross-border-mandate, either in July or at a later date. The original Council mandate for cross-border aid to Syria in 2014 was based on the assumption that rebel-controlled enclaves around the country were temporary phenomena, and the mandate as well. For now, it appears more likely that the Syrian conflict is moving into an extended stalemate with no clear military or political resolution on the horizon. Areas of northern Syria where millions of displaced Syrians live might remain outside government control – and in need of significant external aid – for some time to come. There is no guarantee that the Security Council will continue to renew the authorisation for cross-border aid indefinitely.

Donors, the UN and NGOs already have plans for the eventuality that the cross-border arrangements end. One option – even if the mandate is renewed – may be for OCHA to gradually wind down its delivery operations while continuing to play a smaller coordination role and helping build up the capacity of NGOs to supply aid to Idlib in place of UN agencies. In this case, a future Russian veto would do less damage to aid supplies than it would do today. For the time being, however, it is essential that the Security Council renew the mandate for cross-border aid to avoid a fresh humanitarian disaster in north-western Syria.

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