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Kobani’s central market destroyed by mortars from the Islamic State, December 2014. MAGNUM/Lorenzo Meloni

乘乱而为:基地组织和伊斯兰国

伊斯兰国、基地组织、博科圣地组织等极端主义运动代表了当今世界最致命的危机,导致国际反恐难度不断加大。他们利用战争、国家崩溃和中东地缘政治的动荡局势,在非洲建立新据点,给其他国家和地区带来持续不断的威胁。夺回失地需要各方避免重蹈覆辙,因为正是因为之前的失误造成了恐怖组织的崛起。

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伊斯兰国、基地组织、博科圣地组织等极端主义运动代表了当今世界最致命的危机,导致国际反恐难度不断加大。他们利用战争、国家崩溃和中东地缘政治的动荡局势,在非洲建立新据点,给其他国家和地区带来持续不断的威胁。夺回失地需要各方避免重蹈覆辙,因为正是因为之前的失误造成了恐怖组织的崛起。这就意味着要认清各个组织持不同的图谋;更加审慎地使用军事力量,在打败武装分子之前要具有有效的重建计划;并寻求开启沟通机制,甚至包括和强硬派对话。同样重要的是,敦促各方领导人展开对话,鼓励各方加入反恐,改革现行机制,理性应对恐怖袭击,借以缓解由这些组织助长的危机,阻止其它危机的爆发。最关键的是不能由于打击 “暴力极端主义”而忽略或加剧更严峻的威胁,特别是加剧国际大国和区域列强之间的对抗。

圣战分子——虽然国际预防危机组织不愿如此称呼,但该报告囊括的组织却自我认定为“圣战分子”,具体原因参见第二页——的影响力在过去的几年里迅速扩大。有的运动已经演变成强大的的反政府势力。他们占据领土,推翻政府,并以软硬兼施的方式来统治。虽然仅靠军事手段未必就能挫败他们,但其倡导的目标是难以通过谈判妥协满足的,因为这些目标在不同程度上和国家体制相悖,也遭到当地民众的拒绝。多数的组织显示很顽强,能够适应不断变化的局势。今天危机的区域分布意味着很多类似的组织将挑起未来的战争。

伊斯兰国重塑了全球圣战局势:自2013年脱离基地组织,它采取了比基地组织更血腥的策略;目前已经在伊拉克和叙利亚大部分地区建立了哈里发,掌控了利比亚沿海一带;招募了成千上万的外国人和几十个不同的运动;在穆斯林世界和西方国家开展恐怖袭击。它在几个前线同时作战-对抗伊朗的盟友,逊尼阿拉伯政权和西方世界-将宗教派系之间分歧、革命主义和反帝国主义的理念融入到圣战主义思想。伊斯兰国的领导层主要来自伊拉克,但此组织相当诡异:有的是千禧年信徒,有的是地方叛军;对于一些人他们提供了庇护,对另外提供了社会机会,还有的在此运动中中找到了人生意义;有些帮派希望巩固建立的哈里发,占领巴格达甚至麦加,或者引诱西方国家陷入末日战争。最主要的是,伊斯兰国的崛起反映了伊拉克和叙利亚的近史:美军入侵伊拉克所产生的乱局,逊尼穆斯林遭受排挤,整个社会处于无序混乱状态;总理马利基(Nouri al-Maliki)统治期间的苛待政策,以及叙利亚总统阿萨德及其盟友的暴虐手段。任何应对策略都必须兼顾到伊斯兰国的多面性。但是最主要的是要避免在黎凡特的逊尼穆斯林人受到迫害。在逊尼阿拉伯国家已经广泛传播着一种受迫害心态。这种心态也是个危险信号。

基地组织亦产生了演化,其部分是因受伊斯兰国崛起而被忽略之故。其在马格里布、索马里、叙利亚和也门的分支仍然强大,其中一些的实力还与日俱增。有的和当地叛军合并,显现出一定的务实行为,不轻易屠杀穆斯林,也遵守当地习俗。活跃在乍得湖流域一带的博科圣地组织也是近几年才出现的若干复兴运动之一。 它的根源是北尼日利亚在政治经济上受到的歧视,和根深蒂固的暴力。现在的博科圣地已经从一个个别的种族势力演变为一个泛区域的邪恶组织,即便参加了伊斯兰国也没有改变多少。不同标志的组织—自盟军从阿富汗撤退后东山再起的阿富汗塔利班独立组织、巴基斯坦的武装团体,如宗教派系活动、在中部省份作战的部落武装分子、以克什米尔或阿富汗为目标的隶属巴军方的武装势力-共同构成了演变于南亚地区的圣战现况。

扩张的根源难以一言蔽之。激进化的模式因地、因人而异。独裁、政治排挤、西方国家的干预不当,统治不力,和平的政治观点表达受阻,产生在受忽略范围里的对中央政府的不信任,传统的精英势力的权威在衰退,年青人数在增加,却缺少就业机会,这一切都促成了激进主义的增长。另一方面,其他意识形态的吸引力在不断减弱,尤其是圣战主义主要的意识形态竞争对手--和平的伊斯兰政治集团穆斯林兄弟会。随着埃及总统穆尔西(Mohammed Morsi)被罢黜以及随之而来的镇压,穆斯林兄弟会影响力大不如前。在一些地方,(错误)传导不宽容的伊斯兰教义为激进主义奠了基。目前穆斯林国家的教派间的矛盾一方面因伊斯兰国而加剧,同时也在助延伊斯兰国的壮大。

虽然根源错综复杂, 但触发因素则很清楚。2011年发生在阿拉伯的社会运动诸多都陷入了混乱,并为极端主义势力创造了巨大的机会。随着危机的加剧和演变、资金、武器和武装分子的流入以及暴力事件的升级,极端主义运动愈演愈烈。政府间的敌对情绪持续滋长,导致该地区的主要国家更加忌惮传统对手、而非极端主义势力,因此在打击伊斯兰国时,他们借机铲除其他敌人,或默许圣战分子代其行之。尤其是在中东地区,圣战分子的快速扩张是地区不稳定的结果,而非原因,其激进化亦是更多产生在危机中而非在危机前,它得益于敌人之间的相斗而不是靠其本身的实力。因而,这样的激进运动难以在除了战争地带和已崩溃的国家之外的区域扩张势力或占领地盘。

地缘政治博弈导致各国之间难以同仇敌忾。化解危机的起点应设为先减轻沙特和伊朗之间的敌对,因为正是两国之间的敌对推动着逊尼派和什叶派的极端主义势力,加深了区域危机,是今天的世界和平和安全的最严峻的威胁之一。缓和其它紧张局势-比如说,土耳其政府和库尔德武装分子之间、土耳其和俄罗斯、保守的阿拉伯政权和穆斯林兄弟会、巴基斯坦和印度甚至俄罗斯和西方国家-也至关重要。在叙利亚、利比亚和也门,打击圣战分子需要建立全新的秩序,使它们失去支持,团结其他势力。当然,这些做起来都不容易。但是一个更明智的做法是加倍努力去弥补分歧,而不是去遮掩这些分歧,建立一个虚幻的对抗“暴力极端主义”的共识。

同样重要的是要吸取9/11——2011年——袭击的教训。每个极端行动,即便彼此有联系,甚至有跨国联系,都有其自身的特点,植根于当地局势;每个都需要针对实情采取应对措施。但是它们会造成类似的困境和失策。国际大国和受影响的地区势力及政府要努力做到以下几点:

  • 别对待而不是一概而论:非暴力伊斯兰主义者,尤其是穆斯利兄弟会,愿意接受政治和宗教多元化并参与政治;把他们看成敌人的做法无异于自我挫败(错误)。有的运动是为了在国际秩序中寻求一席之地,有的是为了完全颠覆国际秩序;识辨这些不同点也很重要。即便属于后者的伊斯兰国,区域分支和基地组织分支也不是铁板一块。他们拥有忠诚的核心和跨国界目标,但下属官兵拥有不同的,而往往是局部性的动机。这些下属的忠心会随着情势的变化而改变,也可能被改变。(错误)即便都是激进组织,政府也应酌情而对,以终止暴力为大局,而不是把它们一概而论找架打。
  • 牵制是退而求其次的做法国际力量在推翻武装分子的时候必须有一套可行的后续方案;身处其腹地的当地政府也一样。目前实行在伊拉克的策略-摧毁整座城镇来打败伊斯兰,继而希望巴格达逊尼派的领导人能重建而重获失去的合法性-既不能解决逊尼派的苦衷,也不能为逊尼派创建条件来建立新的政治身份。在利比亚(错误)缺少一个大范围的政治和解方案的前提下,采取猛烈轰炸(错误),或使用西方军队来对付伊斯兰国,这个做法是错误的,有可能加剧混乱。无论是在伊拉克还是利比亚,放慢军事行动的步伐虽然也有严峻的风险,在想出可行的解决方案之前,不啻为一种更为保险的选择—对于想要介入的势力和处在受影响区域里的人来说都是如此。
  • 慎地使用事力量:虽然派遣军队是应对方案中不可或缺的一部分,但是政府在加入战争时仍然太过草率。植根于民间的运动利用的是民众真正的不满情绪,而且有时有外国势力的支持。不论他们的意识形态多么令人反感,要想根除十分困难。索马里和阿富汗的战争就反映出一些有缺点的对策:如轻易将敌人定义为恐怖分子或暴力极端主义者,或在没有更广泛的政治对策前提下,包括努力去调停,就试图建立中央集权式政府机构,并配以军事行动打击反对派。俄罗斯在车臣的焦土政策—抛开损伤人命不谈,也无法照搬到今天受影响的地区,因为这些地方有着驻守松懈的边境,垮台的政府,和采用代理人战争的做法。
  • 尊重原通常针对极端主义势力的军事行动要么适得其反,导致更多的人投奔极端组织,要么令当地平民夹在它们严苛的规则和盲目的军事行动之间。而圣战分子能够给当地平民提供护身,使免受政权、其他武装团体和外国势力的迫害,这也是圣战分子的一大优势之一,可以说相比意识形态,更是他们成功的原因。虽然圣战分子也常常犯下暴行,但在这些冲突里,所有参战方都违反国际人道主义法,所以重建规则必须为首重。
  • 减少使用定点清除:无人机袭击在有的地方可以遏制极端组织的行动,限制其打击西方部队的能力,及其领袖的活动。但同时助长了对当地政府和西方的仇恨情绪。那些能承受领袖的死亡的组织,以及取代他们的头目,往往更加强硬。要想预测定点清除带来的影响,在相对稳定的秩序下已是困难,更不要说在都市作战和圣战团体内部混战-基地及其他组织对抗伊斯兰国-的境况当中。即便抛开秘密的做法、合法性和问责制等问题不谈,定点清除并不能够真正结束圣战者的斗争,也不能绝对性地削弱大多数的运动。
  • 开启对话沟通渠道:虽然困难重重,但政府应该表现出谈判意愿,甚至和激进分子谈判的意愿。对于一些组织,象塔利班、索马里青年党领袖以及博科圣地组织和利比亚的伊斯兰教法虔信者,通过对话来减轻暴力的机会已经不复存在。和一个组织能否达成和解的最终决定权在该组织领袖手里,而不在政府手里。虽然政策制定者不能对伊斯兰国和基地组织的头目抱任何幻想,但是通过民众领袖、非国家调停方和其他中介展开非官方的、谨慎的对话渠道,这个做法仍是值得尝试。尤其是在涉及人道主义的问题上,双方或许能找到共同利益。
  • 缩减反暴力极端主(CVE)政策:CVE政策主要由一些发展组织率先提倡,旨在改进后9/11时代的安全政策。这是一个非常重要的议题。同样重要的是认识到哪些情况在某些地方有助于极端势力招募新兵。此外还有一要点是要把军事开支转移到发展援助项目上。但如果一味地把反暴力极端主义日程包装成“治本”之策,尤其是认为政府可以就此不用再尽对公民的基本义务,如提供教育、就业或补助弱势群体等,这样那就太鼠目寸光了。把“暴力极端主义”——一个定义模糊并常常被滥用的词——认定为地区稳定的主要威胁,实际上忽略了其它不稳定因素。民众对政治不满成了不合法行为;侮辱当地社群为潜在极端分子。政府和捐助国必须仔细思考反暴力极端主义政策的定义,对激进化成因进行更深入的调查,并广泛听取受影响区域个方的意见。
  • 建立冲突防机制:伊斯兰国和基地组织最近的扩张进一步显示了预防的紧迫性,应该在危机当中和危机上游采取措施阻止激进化。从西非到南亚,一旦在这一带出现进一步危机,很可能会形成新的极端主义—可能是这些运动本身引发了危机,更可能的是这些运动从危机的升级中受益,虽然一般的对策价值有限,但是敦促领导人建立一个更包容、更具有代表性的政治环境,平抚社群的怨愤,有分寸地应对恐怖袭击,通常是可取的做法。换言之,总的来讲,采取防范措施来遏制暴力极端主义比直接打击更有效果。

在过去的25年里,圣战暴力浪潮此起彼伏:第一次浪潮出现在20世纪90年代初,来自阿富汗反苏联圣战势力加入了其他地区的反政府组织;由基地组织引领的第二次浪潮在9/11袭击达到高潮;第三次浪潮由美军入侵伊拉克触发,今天的第四次浪潮是最危险的。一部分是因为伊斯兰国控制了地盘和提出的新意识形态—它同时利用了当地逊尼派以及普遍的对现行制度的不满。但大体上说,第四次浪潮之所以危险是因为后边有力量在推动,尤其是中东国家的混乱局势,和各地政府与民间社会的关系在断裂。世界领导人的担忧不是没有道理:伊斯兰国的袭击屠杀平民并危害社会团结。面临巨大的压力,这些领导人必须采取行动,但他们必须小心行事。一旦失策—无论是轻率的海外军事行动、血腥的国内镇压、将反激进化置于援助之上、网撒得太广、冒然出手打击“暴力极端主义”从而忽略更严重的威胁等—这一切都将加剧圣战暴力浪潮,让圣战分子计谋得逞。

布鲁塞尔,2016年3月14日

A heavily armed military convoy of the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army pass through a checkpoint at Chibok in Borno State north-east Nigeria on 25 March 2016. STEFAN HEUNIS / AFP
Report 273 / Africa

Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province

Three years after Boko Haram broke apart, one faction, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, is forming a proto-state in northern Nigeria. The state should press its military offensive against the jihadists but also try undercutting their appeal by improving governance and public services.

What’s new? The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter of Boko Haram, is growing in power and influence in north-eastern Nigeria. It has notched military successes and made inroads among Muslim civilians by treating them better than its parent organisation and by filling gaps in governance and service delivery.

Why does it matter? The resurgence of a potent jihadist force around Lake Chad means continuing conflict for Nigeria and neighbouring states, as well as ongoing peril for civilians caught in the crossfire.

What should be done? State authorities should supplement their military campaign with efforts to weaken ISWAP’s influence by improving governance and services in the north east. While the time may not seem right for comprehensive negotiations, the parties should keep channels of communication open in order to advance short-term goals like increasing humanitarian access.

Executive Summary

The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter of Boko Haram, is growing in power and influence. From its territorial base on the banks and islands of Lake Chad, this jihadist group is waging a guerrilla war across north-eastern Nigeria and elsewhere on the lake’s periphery. By filling gaps in governance and service delivery, it has cultivated a level of support among local civilians that Boko Haram never enjoyed and has turned neglected communities in the area and islands in Lake Chad into a source of economic support. If Nigeria and its neighbouring Lake Chad states want to sever the bond between ISWAP and these communities and they should then they cannot stop with countering ISWAP in battle. They will need to complement military action by filling the service and governance gaps that ISWAP has exploited.

Displacing ISWAP will not be easy. Although the group’s methods are often violent and coercive, it has established a largely symbiotic relationship with the Lake Chad area’s inhabitants. The group treats local Muslim civilians better than its parent organisation did, better than its rival faction, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), does now, and in some ways better than the Nigerian state and army have done since the insurgency began in 2009. It digs wells, polices cattle rustling, provides a modicum of health care and sometimes disciplines its own personnel whom it judges to have unacceptably abused civilians. In the communities it controls, its taxation is generally accepted by civilians, who credit it for creating an environment where they can do business and compare its governance favourably to that of the Nigerian state.

ISWAP’s approach appears to have paid dividends in terms of recruitment and support. With an estimated 3,500-5,000 members according to Crisis Group’s sources, it overshadows JAS, which has roughly 1,500-2,000, and appears to have gained the military upper hand over the latter. It has also caused real pain to the Nigerian military, its primary target, overrunning dozens of army bases and killing hundreds of soldiers since August 2018. As its name suggests, ISWAP is affiliated with the faded Islamic State, or ISIS, caliphate in Iraq and Syria, whose remnants count ISWAP victories as their own. ISWAP appears to be working hard to gain greater favour from its namesake organisation, and it has obtained some support already, notably in the form of training, though it is not clear how significant a boost this will afford.

ISWAP’s deepening roots in the civilian population underscore that the Nigerian government (and, to a lesser extent, those of Cameroon, Chad and Niger) cannot look purely to military means to ensure its enduring defeat. Instead, they should seek to weaken ISWAP’s ties to locals by proving that they can fill service and governance gaps at least in the areas they control, even as they take care to conduct the counter-insurgency as humanely as possible and in a manner that protects civilians.

To combat impunity among the security services, they should release the report of the panel that President Muhammadu Buhari appointed in 2017 to investigate alleged military abuses and implement those recommendations that advance accountability. They should enhance public safety in towns that are under government control in Borno and neighbouring states where ISWAP is building influence.

They should take care that in seeking to cut off ISWAP’s access to local markets they do not alienate locals by also strangling their ability to trade. And even though negotiations to end hostilities may not be a realistic prospect at this time, they should keep lines of communication open with ISWAP, focusing on practical issues such as how to get more humanitarian assistance to local communities.

These strategies certainly do not guarantee victory for state authorities over ISWAP – but they could help counteract important sources of the organisation’s strength, provide a useful complement to ongoing efforts to degrade it militarily, and at the same time channel important support to communities in the region, which sorely need it.

Dakar/Brussels, 16 May 2019

Crisis Group's West Africa Expert Vincent Foucher carries out interviews during his field research in Maiduguri, north east Nigeria, in December 2018. CRISIS GROUP / Jorge Gutierrez Lucena

I. Introduction

Since the early 2010s, the jihadist armed group Boko Haram has wielded power and influence in north-eastern Nigeria and parts of adjoining states in the Lake Chad basin. The group clawed its way back from a failed uprising in July 2009 against the Nigerian government that left more than 1,000 dead, including the group’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, to re-emerge as a full-fledged insurgency under the command of one of Yusuf’s lieutenants, Abubakar Shekau, a year later.[fn]For background, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°213, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, 3 April 2014; and N°168, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 20 December 2010. See also Alex Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton, 2017).Hide Footnote Over the next five years, and at a particularly rapid pace between 2013 and 2015, the group seized control of much of Nigeria’s Borno state, and began operating in border areas of neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The organisation plundered villages and bombed markets and churches, as well as mosques it deemed “infidel”. In April 2014 it staged the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno state. This mass abduction, which earned it global condemnation, was only one in a long series of violent incidents of striking brutality.

Yet, starting in 2015, Boko Haram found itself under increasing pressure from the Nigerian military and its regional allies, which fed its internal divisions, causing it to shrink in power.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°120, Boko Haram on the Back Foot?, 4 May 2016.Hide Footnote In March of that year, Boko Haram lost its self-proclaimed capital, Gwoza, to Nigerian troops, and over time, notable towns it had overrun in Borno state fell back into government hands, forcing the group back into safe havens on the periphery of Lake Chad, in the Sambisa Forest and in hills and mountains east of Gwoza.

Boko Haram’s retreat exacerbated longstanding personality clashes and doctrinal differences within the organisation. The group was still intact in March 2015 when Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and it took up the name Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). But a year later it fractured in two. Following the lead of Mamman Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, a son of Mohammed Yusuf, a number of senior leaders split off from Shekau’s forces. Nur and al-Barnawi’s faction, retaining the name ISWAP, gained recognition from ISIS and attracted a growing number of militants.

By filling a void in civilian governance and service provision, ISWAP is strengthening its hand for the future.

ISWAP’s leadership has changed in the intervening three years. In 2018 an internal dispute reportedly led it to execute Nur, and in March 2019, it announced that Abu Musab had been replaced by another (albeit unrelated) al-Barnawi, Abu Abdallah.[fn]The surname al-Barnawi means “from Borno”. It does not indicate kinship between the two.Hide Footnote Shekau remains in control of a rump faction of Boko Haram that reassumed the group’s original name, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).[fn]Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”. It was the first official self-appellation of “Boko Haram” (generally translated from Hausa as “Western education is forbidden”), which is a derisive epithet coined by Salafi critics. This report nonetheless uses the familiar term “Boko Haram” to refer to the group before the 2016 split and to the ISWAP and JAS factions together.Hide Footnote

Neither of the two successor factions controls nearly the territory that Boko Haram once held. Their sway is limited to the marshland around and islands of Lake Chad, parts of the Mandara hills on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, and the inaccessible forests of Borno and Yobe states – terrain that provides cover from Nigerian and allied air power.

Yet the two remain potent military forces. It is difficult to estimate the two factions’ precise numbers. Each is made up of a mix of ideologically motivated combatants toting AK-47s, watchmen bearing locally produced hunting rifles, and captives acting as ammunition carriers or weapon servants. But the numbers remain significant. A Western security official estimated in February 2019 that ISWAP had 3,500-5,000 fighters and JAS 1,500-2,000.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communication, February 2019; see also “Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad”, Reuters, 30 April 2018. A Nigerian research organisation recently produced a much higher figure for ISWAP’s numbers – between 18,000 and 20,000 fighters – apparently based on an unpublished examination of ISWAP’s combat groups built from contacts with both Nigerian military and ISWAP sources. “Survival and Expansion: The Islamic State’s West Africa Province”, Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation, April 2019. Given the lack of detail about the methodologies and primary data used to generate both sets of figures, there is no ready explanation for the discrepancy.Hide Footnote Moreover, ISWAP has been expanding its reach. In December 2018, it overran a major military base in Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, which the Nigerian army had recaptured in February 2015. On 23 February 2019, the day of Nigeria’s general elections, ISWAP launched its first-ever attack on Borno state’s capital, Maiduguri, firing rockets at military targets.[fn]“Boko Haram attacks reported across northern Nigeria on polling day”, Defense Post, 23 February 2019.Hide Footnote

Perhaps most worrying for Nigeria’s and its neighbours’ security is the way in which ISWAP has adapted its military tactics and policies toward civilians. This adaptation has allowed it to foster ties with local communities that its parent and parallel organisations never enjoyed. By curbing some of Boko Haram’s most wanton practices, and by filling a void in civilian governance and service provision, ISWAP is strengthening its hand for the future. The deeper it sinks its roots into the neglected communities of north-eastern Nigeria, the more difficult it may be to dislodge.

This report explores how and why ISWAP emerged from Boko Haram, how it has gained ground both territorially and politically against Shekau’s JAS faction, and how it uses guerrilla tactics to challenge regional armies, particularly Nigeria’s. It focuses in particular on ISWAP’s efforts to forge links to the rural population, and how these ties have become a source of its strength. The report considers what Nigerian and other government authorities are doing to provide their own governance and services and to encourage its own forces to conduct counter-insurgency operations humanely and in a manner that protects civilians. It also makes suggestions for how they might raise their game in order to deny ISWAP the competitive advantage that it seeks.

This report is based primarily on interviews carried out in December 2017 and March, October and December 2018 in Abuja and Maiduguri, supplemented by additional research conducted through May 2019. It reflects contributions from Crisis Group analysts working in all four Lake Chad countries. While it was impossible to get direct access to active jihadists, the report draws on interviews with civilians from the north east of Nigeria who are familiar with ISWAP because of the relations it has built with the local population and the fact that it allows people to move between areas it controls and Maiduguri. Several former Boko Haram members aware of its internal politics were also interviewed, in addition to vigilantes, diplomats, religious scholars, local and federal state officials, non-governmental organisation workers, human rights activists, and international and Nigerian security experts, as well as journalists. Lastly, the report draws on the lively debates among academics who study Boko Haram.

II. Anatomy of a Break-up

The fracturing of Boko Haram is a story of clashing personalities, military one-upmanship and political manoeuvring. A key figure in the split was the late Mamman Nur, who first gained stature in the organisation as a top lieutenant of the group’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, and a rival of Yusuf’s successor, Shekau. A charismatic figure with some higher education – a rare trait in Boko Haram’s leadership – Nur married one of Yusuf’s widows. He dropped out of sight for several years following Yusuf’s death in 2009. According to some reports, while Shekau was establishing himself as Boko Haram’s new leader, Nur spent some time abroad, possibly in Somalia and Sudan, forging ties to other jihadist groups, including ISIS.[fn]One Nigerian security analyst believes that Nur had forged a direct link with ISIS in Syria. Crisis Group electronic communication, August 2018.Hide Footnote Nigerian authorities labelled Nur the mastermind of the August 2011 bombing of the UN building in Abuja, although some local sources question this claim.[fn]“UN House bombing: The hunt for Mamman Nur”, Vanguard, 4 September 2011. A Nigerian security expert and a religious scholar acquainted with Nur were sceptical of this claim. Crisis Group electronic communications, November 2018 and February 2019.Hide Footnote At some point in 2014 or 2015, he joined Shekau in his stronghold in the Sambisa forest in Borno State.[fn]Crisis Group interview, former JAS member, Maiduguri, October 2018.Hide Footnote

It was not long before Nur and Shekau clashed. As links developed between Boko Haram and ISIS, Nur and other internal critics of Shekau’s autocratic, brutal and mercurial leadership began pushing for a formal affiliation with ISIS, which was then on a winning streak.[fn]Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The ‘Boko Haram’ allegiance pledge to Islamic State: An Ansar al-Shari‘a Tunisia connection”, Pundicity, 8 August 2018.Hide Footnote They were probably acting on a mix of enthusiasm for the newly-declared caliphate and a hope that they could use that affiliation to curb Shekau’s power. Shekau was reluctant, but he eventually bowed to internal pressure, pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in March 2015.[fn]Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “ISWAP vs. Abu Bakr Shekau: full text, translation and analysis”, Pundicity, 5 August 2018. Some experts say Shekau tried to assert Boko Haram’s weak connection to al-Qaeda, through al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as a way of dodging the pressure to rally to ISIS. Crisis Group electronic communications, December 2018.Hide Footnote

Both ISIS and the new ISWAP faction heavily promoted the raid’s success on social media in an apparent attempt to establish the new faction’s credibility.

But disputes over the group’s future were not over. In late 2015, Nur reportedly left the Sambisa enclave to establish his own camp.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, former JAS members, Maiduguri, October 2018; “Boko Haram fracturing over Islamic State ties, U.S. general warns”, Reuters, 21 June 2016. Shekau mentions another splinter group trying to set up camp in late 2015 or early 2016 in Falgore forest, a reserve at the juncture of Bauchi, Kano and Kaduna states. See Abdulbasit Kassim and Michael Nwankpa, The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State (London, 2018), chapter 74.Hide Footnote The following June, the Boko Haram council (shura) held a reconciliation meeting in the Sambisa forest, but the effort failed. Nur challenged Shekau’s leadership, as did Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who enjoyed some notoriety because he was one of Mohammed Yusuf’s surviving sons. ISIS media were already promoting al-Barnawi to replace the more rough-edged Shekau as Boko Haram’s main public figure.[fn]Al-Barnawi is an alias. His true name is Habib Yusuf. Tellingly enough, al-Barnawi’s first appearance in January 2015, was to discuss the group’s recent attack in Baga, and al-Barnawi insisted that only associates of the Nigerian state had been killed, not regular civilians. See Kassim and Nwankpa, op. cit., chapter 53.Hide Footnote Nur and al-Barnawi sent a letter to ISIS, asking for arbitration of the leadership dispute. Before an answer arrived, Shekau’s critics fled, fearing for their lives.[fn]According to a Nigerian security analyst, Shekau tried to have Nur and al-Barnawi killed after the meeting. Crisis Group electronic communication, August 2018.Hide Footnote The response eventually came to Nur, deciding in his and al-Barnawi’s favour.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

After Nur and al-Barnawi escaped the Sambisa enclave, they consolidated their own faction in Yobe state and on the banks and islands of Lake Chad in northern Borno state. They began planning their operations. Their first major independent military operation was a 3 June 2016 attack on a Nigerien base in Bosso, a town on Lake Chad close to the Nigerian border. It illustrated what would become ISWAP’s modus operandi: a raid targeting the military, capturing weapons and supplies, without civilian casualties.

Both ISIS and the new ISWAP faction heavily promoted the raid’s success on social media in an apparent attempt to establish the new faction’s credibility.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communication, security official from Niger, July 2018. Altogether, ISIS and ISWAP media put out at least five communiqués. See Rida Lyammouri, “Updated: Rundown of Boko Haram attacks on Bosso, Yébi, Diffa region in last 2 weeks”, Maghreb and Sahel, 4 June 2016 (updated 10 June 2016); “Islamic State West Africa Release: ‘Killing 35 Apostates and Injuring Approximately 70 from the Armies of Niger and Nigeria in Southeastern Niger’ – 6 June 2016”, trac.org, 7 June 2016; “New video message from the Islamic State: ‘The Raid of Niger: Coverage of the Liberation of the Nigerien Military Training Camp in the Bosso Area: Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah’”, Jihadology.net, 6 July 2016; “IS’ AMAQ Publishes Infographic on West African Province’s June 2016 Attack in Bosso”, SITE, 18 July 2016.Hide Footnote Shortly thereafter, in early August 2016, the ISIS weekly al-Naba’ published an interview with al-Barnawi, mentioning that ISIS had just designated him as ISWAP’s new wali (governor). (By some accounts, Nur had voluntarily stepped aside to ease al-Barnawi’s ascent.[fn]For an annotated translation, see Alex Thurston, “Abu Mus‘ab al-Barnawi’s Interview with the Islamic State’s al-Naba’ Magazine”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 36, no. 1 (2017), pp. 257–275. According to a source interviewed by the Institute for Security Studies, Nur was ISIS’s initial appointee as wali, but he stepped aside in favour of al-Barnawi. Nur, as Shekau’s long-time rival, may have thought that al-Barnawi’s prestigious lineage would make him a less controversial nominee. Crisis Group electronic communication, August 2018; Omar S. Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”, Institute for Security Studies Research Report, July 2018, p. 12.Hide Footnote ) Shekau soon released audio and video recordings insisting that ISIS had been tricked and that he remained the leader of jihad in the region.[fn]See Kassim and Nwankpa, op. cit., chapters 71 and 73.Hide Footnote But the split was complete, and with a military win to its credit and the effective endorsement by ISIS under its belt, the new faction emerged with a strong hand.

Although the militants who formed the new faction were united in disapproval of Shekau, there is reason to believe that they did not all see eye to eye about everything. Some wanted to carry on fighting but felt that Shekau was a hindrance; others felt caught between the rock of Nigeria’s stronger military response and the hard place of Shekau’s ruthless command and were looking to reach a settlement with the authorities. Nur himself was in the latter camp, according to a religious scholar in direct contact with him and to someone involved in facilitating discussions between ISWAP and the state.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Maiduguri, December 2018 and Abuja, March 2018.Hide Footnote This fundamental difference, muted at the time of ISWAP’s emergence, may later have contributed to Nur’s killing (discussed in section VI below).

III. A Struggle for the Mantle of Jihad

Immediately after the break-up, Shekau sent his troops after the dissenters, and the two factions clashed several times through the end of 2016.[fn]ISWAP claims that JAS harried its fighters for months following the 2016 split. See ISWAP’s list of incidents in Al-Tamimi, “ISWAP vs. Abu Bakr Shekau”, op. cit. ISWAP also went after Shekau “like the military”. See “Ex-Boko Haram ‘intelligence chief’ speaks from detention on the reason Albarnawi, Nur and other commanders split from Shekau”, Premium Times, 24 December 2017.Hide Footnote According to a former ISWAP member, dozens of ISWAP fighters were killed in one such battle in July 2016, near Chukungudu, Nigeria, on the shores of Lake Chad.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Maiduguri, October 2018.Hide Footnote ISWAP survived, defeating a number of JAS subgroups and absorbing others.[fn]On the two factions’ areas of control and influence, as well as their numbers, see the next section and Appendix C.Hide Footnote

Since then, fighting has reduced in intensity, and the two groups reportedly reached a ceasefire agreement, which included a deal for JAS to free the families of ISWAP commanders that it had been holding since ISWAP broke away. It is possible that ISIS itself, which has never disowned Shekau’s pledge of fealty, pushed for the ceasefire.[fn]Crisis Group interview, international military expert, Abuja, October 2018; electronic communication, Nigerian security expert, November 2018.Hide Footnote

Occasional clashes still occur, particularly when Shekau’s raiders seek to rob and kidnap civilians in ISWAP-controlled areas on the Nigerien and Nigerian shores of Lake Chad, as well as in the Konduga local government area in Nigeria, and ISWAP units try to fend them off.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Nigerian NGO worker, herdsmen, transport workers and charcoal traders, Maiduguri, March 2018; electronic communication, international NGO worker, September 2018. Local government areas are administrative subdivisions of states.Hide Footnote Some fighters still loyal to Shekau have formed a group on the Nigerien side of Lake Chad and have been particularly persistent raiders.[fn]According to NGO sources, in early February 2019, JAS fighters killed a number of ISWAP traders in Bague, Niger, and kidnapped some women. ISWAP later fought off the marauders and rescued the women. Crisis Group electronic communication, February 2019.Hide Footnote

While the fighting subsided relatively soon after the split, a war of words between the two groups raged until at least mid-2018. Alongside audio recordings in Hausa and Kanuri, the main local languages, the two factions put out elaborate texts in Arabic, painstakingly drawing on Islamic theology and jurisprudence to justify their respective stands and call into question – sometimes explicitly, sometimes not – those of the rival faction.[fn]Ibid., chapters 70 and 72; and Al-Tamimi, “ISWAP vs. Abu Bakr Shekau: full text, translation and analysis”, op. cit. While each faction bolstered its arguments with quotations from Islamic scripture and jurisprudence, their back-and-forth reveals deep practical disagreements about policy and strategy.Hide Footnote The Arabic publications appear targeted at an international jihadist audience.

ISWAP made clear that it, by contrast, had adopted a posture less hostile to Muslim civilians.

For their part, the ISWAP materials highlighted the ways in which the new faction sought to distinguish itself from Shekau’s. They portrayed Shekau as acting brutally, in violation of Islamic doctrine, and using methods that alienated the Lake Chad basin’s inhabitants and thus undermined support for Islamist militancy in the region.[fn]The materials deplore “the results and fruits that [Shekau’s] evil doctrines have produced”, and argue that Shekau’s violence resulted in “the people’s total aversion from the group”. See Al-Tamimi, “ISWAP vs. Abu Bakr Shekau: full text, translation and analysis”, op. cit.Hide Footnote They were especially critical of Shekau for treating Muslims living outside Boko Haram territory as infidels and thus fair game for attack.[fn]In Shekau’s eyes, anyone carrying identity papers issued by a state other than ISIS is pledging allegiance to that non-Islamic state and thus committing a capital offence against Islam. Senegalese jihadists who had spent time in JAS-held Sambisa mentioned Shekau’s stance on identity cards during their trial in Senegal in 2018. “L’accusé Omar Yaffa sur son voyage dans le fief de Boko Haram: ‘J’ai vécu une déception, je n’y ai pas trouvé ce que je cherchais’”, Le Quotidien, 19 April 2018. Based on this stance, Shekau has ordered indiscriminate bombings of Muslim crowds in government-controlled areas, including at mosques and markets.Hide Footnote ISWAP made clear that it, by contrast, had adopted a posture less hostile to Muslim civilians.[fn]In his inaugural interview in al-Naba’ magazine, published by ISIS, al-Barnawi said “whoever manifests Islam and does not manifest one of the things that violates it, we do not declare him an unbeliever, let alone declare [spilling] his blood lawful”. Thurston, “Abu Mus‘ab al-Barnawi’s interview”, op. cit. Debates about the treatment of Muslims who are not jihadist followers are a classic feature of struggles among contemporary jihadist groups. They were for a time at the heart of the dispute between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. ISWAP draws explicitly on the recent past of jihadism – for instance, likening JAS to the brutal Algerian Groupements Islamiques Armés. On the debate between al-Qaeda and ISIS, see Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State”, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper no. 19, March 2015. On the debate within ISIS itself, see Cole Bunzel, “Caliphate in Disarray: Theological Turmoil in the Islamic State”, Jihadica, 3 October 2017; and “A House Divided: Origins and Persistence of the Islamic State’s Ideological Divide”, Jihadica, 5 June 2018. Also see the discussion of Boko Haram’s 2016 division in Romain Caillet, “Analyse: de l’usage du takfir au Nigéria – la controverse de Boko Haram avec l’État Islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest”, Religion.info, 2 September 2016.Hide Footnote

ISWAP also levelled criticisms that appeared to target Shekau’s leadership style. It accused him of behaving in a dictatorial manner, refusing to take advice or criticism, and misappropriating the organisation’s spoils, including money and captive women.[fn]On the question of Boko Haram’s female captives, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°242, Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency, 5 December 2016. A forthcoming report will examine the issue of women returnees – some of whom were captives and others willing members – from Boko Haram territory.Hide Footnote It was particularly critical of what it characterised as the unjustified, secretive killings of several fellow senior militants whom Shekau saw as challenging his authority.[fn]Kassim and Nwankpa, op. cit., chapter 72.Hide Footnote ISWAP likewise questioned Shekau’s fitness for military command, saying he could not “protect the dependents and offspring of [his] soldiers” or supply his soldiers with “sufficient ammunition”.[fn]Al-Tamimi, “ISWAP vs. Abu Bakr Shekau”, op. cit.Hide Footnote

As for the materials that JAS put out, these contained a mix of defensive parrying and religious claims of its own. Shekau claimed repeatedly that ISWAP leaders had duped ISIS and sabotaged his own attempts to explain himself.[fn]Alex Thurston, “Four recent reports/translations on Boko Haram”, Sahel Blog, 16 August 2018.Hide Footnote JAS also questioned its rival’s religious bona fides. In an August 2016 message addressed to all “mujahidin” and “particularly” to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, JAS insisted that al-Barnawi did not “follow a sound doctrine from authentic Salafism”.[fn]Kassim and Nwankpa, op. cit., chapter 73.Hide Footnote

ISWAP felt threatened enough by Shekau’s jabs to put out a 120-page treatise, its longest written communication ever and its first explicit indictment of Shekau, in June 2018. The document called Shekau a “tumour” to be removed.[fn]See the annotated translation by Al-Tamimi, “ISWAP vs. Abu Bakr Shekau”, op. cit., as well as comments by Alex Thurston, “Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa’s new history of itself”, Part 1 and 2, Sahel Blog, 23 and 24 July 2018; and Andrea Brigaglia, “‘Slicing Off the Tumour’: The History of Global Jihad in Nigeria, as Narrated by the Islamic State”, CCI Occasional Papers, no. 1, August 2018.Hide Footnote No public answer came from ISIS, and the verbal sparring has since died down, at least publicly.

Both groups, however, appear to see continuing advantage in being associated with ISIS. Shekau has never renounced his pledge to al-Baghdadi. In his public articulation of JAS’s program and creed, Shekau referred to the group as “JAS in West Africa in the Islamic State”.[fn]“The letter of jihadi sheikh Abu Muhammad Abu Bakr bin Muhammad al-Shekawi”, 5 March 2018, electronic document in Crisis Group’s possession; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Abu Bakr Shekau in his own words: translation and analysis”, Pundicity, 17 September 2018.Hide Footnote Since early 2017, JAS has used a combination of ISIS and JAS logos on its messages.[fn]On the logo, see Mahmood and Ani, op. cit., fn 55 and Mina al-Lami, “How Boko Haram is ripping off Islamic State branding”, BBC Monitoring, 14 November 2018.Hide Footnote More recently, JAS stepped up its outreach to the international jihadist audience with the release of several high-quality videos purporting to show its military prowess, done in ISIS style.[fn]See the page dedicated to JAS on the jihadology.net website.Hide Footnote

ISIS has shared videos that showcase ISWAP footage and include ISIS stylistic touches, indicating growing cooperation and easier communications between the two groups.

While Shekau could be mimicking ISIS without its approval, some security analysts interviewed by Crisis Group think Shekau is still courting ISIS, and that the latter is keen on reunification between the factions. Some also think ISIS has played a part in bringing about an unsteady ceasefire between JAS and ISWAP, and even pushed the two to collaborate.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communications, January and February 2019.Hide Footnote At least two attacks in January and February 2019 reportedly involved fighters from both groups.[fn]Crisis Group interview, humanitarian experts, Dakar, April 2019; Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation, “Insurgent activities in Northeast Nigeria: 2019 elections”, Abuja, 2019.Hide Footnote Given the bad blood between the two groups, however, full reunification seems unlikely.

As for the link between ISIS and ISWAP, ISIS’s fast-growing promotion of ISWAP’s military successes – likely seen as welcome counterpoints to the collapse of its holdings in Iraq, Syria and Libya – suggests that the organisations are drawing closer. Through its communications channels, ISIS has shared videos that showcase ISWAP footage and include ISIS stylistic touches, indicating growing cooperation and easier communications between the two groups.[fn]See the page dedicated to ISWAP on the jihadology.net website.Hide Footnote Some Western sources claim that money flows from the Middle East to ISWAP (which stopped at some point in 2017 as ISIS came under severe pressure) have resumed though they remain limited.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Western military, diplomatic and security officials, Abuja, December 2017 and March 2018.Hide Footnote An unspecified number of Nigerian and West African militants who fought abroad for ISIS have reportedly joined ISWAP and several civilians claim to have seen trainers of Arab origin in ISWAP areas.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, herdsmen, trader and community leader, Maiduguri, March and December 2018; electronic communications, Western military official, September 2018. Sources often insisted they saw “white” Arabs, to distinguish them from the black Arabic speakers living in the Lake Chad region. The presence of small numbers of visiting Arab militants was also reported about Boko Haram before the 2016 split, and Nur actually accused Shekau of having tried to kill some of them. Audio recording in Kanuri attributed to Mamman Nur in Crisis Group’s possession, August 2016.Hide Footnote A civilian source familiar with the region reported witnessing the departure of a convoy of ISWAP men from Baga in February 2019 to fight or train with ISIS in Libya.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communication, February 2019.Hide Footnote While it is possible that foreign fighters have contributed to the operational evolution that military experts have observed in ISWAP – from the use of improvised explosive devices (including vehicle-borne devices with custom-made armour) to new infantry tactics and quartermaster techniques – it is also possible that some or all of these were self-taught.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, international military experts, Ndjamena, 7 November 2018; Maiduguri, December 2018; Jacob Zenn, “Up-armored SVBIEDs make their way to Nigeria”, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 July 2018.Hide Footnote

IV. ISWAP Asserts Itself: Tactics, Territory and the Regional Response

A. New Tactics Bring Success

ISWAP’s military successes can be traced in part to some early good fortune but also, more enduringly, to its novel, flexible strategy and improved tactics.

After it struck out on its own, ISWAP enjoyed some breathing room from the Nigerian military. The Nigerian military was focused on Shekau because of his global profile as the Chibok girls’ kidnapper, the organiser of child suicide bombings in Maiduguri and a provocative propagandist. ISWAP’s early activities got less attention. Some observers even suspected that the Nigerian authorities had cut a deal with ISWAP, though the existence of such a pact seems unlikely given that ISWAP began attacking military targets soon after its formation.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and security experts, Abuja, December 2017.Hide Footnote

But at the same time that Shekau was drawing attention away from ISWAP, ISWAP was demonstrating that it had also learned from Shekau’s mistakes. Together with JAS, it learned from Shekau’s 2015 failure to defend his capital, Gwoza, and his broader retreat from territory Boko Haram once held, that jihadists could not at present win a conventional war and hold towns against state armies with air support. Both ISWAP and Shekau’s JAS faction understood that they had to fall back to rural strongholds offering some protection from air power – for ISWAP, the forests of Yobe and Borno states, and the marshes and island of Lake Chad – and resort to guerrilla tactics.[fn]Vincent Foucher and Jean-Hervé Jézéquel, “Forced Out of Towns in the Sahel, Africa’s Jihadists Go Rural”, Crisis Group Commentary, 11 January 2017.Hide Footnote

ISWAP’s tactics seem to have contributed to a notable drop in civilian casualties in north-eastern Nigeria since 2016, and a rise in military casualties in 2018.

Yet important differences also emerged between the two groups, notably in terms of targeting. Whereas JAS continued to stage raids to capture civilians and plunder their resources, terrorise crowded markets and mosques with suicide bombings, and conduct mass killings and abductions at roadblocks, ISWAP focused primarily on military targets as well as, to a lesser extent, civilian targets associated in one way or another with the state – eg, local officials, chiefs, vigilantes and suspected informers.[fn]For instance, according to Nigerian security sources, three suspected informers were slaughtered in the village of Kalari on 25 March 2017. “Boko Haram : la faction Barnaoui étend discrètement son emprise”, AFP, 30 March 2017.Hide Footnote While ISWAP, like JAS, would sometimes direct suicide bombers at military targets, unlike JAS, it did not send women or children on these suicide missions, and it does not attack civilian targets. And while there are outliers, by and large ISWAP units seemed to make efforts to spare civilians, and they highlighted these efforts in direct contacts with the local population, as they did when they took the town of Baga in December 2018.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, charcoal trader, Maiduguri, March 2018, and trader from Baga, Maiduguri, December 2018. With respect to the outlier incidents, much of the violence against civilians in the ISWAP-controlled area of Lake Chad seems to have to do with the presence of a JAS enclave on Nigerien territory. There may also be weaknesses of command and control in ISWAP, with some groups resorting to increased predation on civilians because of a gap in resourcing by the central command. One humanitarian source insisted that some groups were left some “leeway” to prey on civilians for funding. Crisis Group interview, humanitarian expert, Dakar, April 2019. Still a third explanation for outlier incidents, such as attempted suicide bombings at mosques in Gujba local government area, Yobe state, in May 2018, may be small groups of fighters shifting loyalties between the two main factions. “Deaths averted: Suicide bomber caught inside mosque”, Premium Times, 20 May 2018.Hide Footnote ISWAP’s tactics seem to have contributed to a notable drop in civilian casualties in north-eastern Nigeria since 2016, and a rise in military casualties in 2018, particularly after ISWAP launched a major offensive in August that year.[fn]On the evolution of civilian and military casualties, see Appendix D.Hide Footnote

ISWAP’s focus on military targets has produced certain practical benefits. After it split from Shekau, ISWAP likely suffered from weapons shortages, and frequent raids on military sites allowed it to replenish its supply.[fn]For a time, junior ISWAP militants were carrying decoy wooden guns into battle. Crisis Group interview, international military expert, Abuja, March 2018.Hide Footnote Following its repeated failed attacks on Kangarwa, a large Nigerian army base in the Lake Chad region, between August 2016 and January 2017, ISWAP adjusted tactics, selecting smaller military targets. This adjustment appears to have won it both arms stockpiles and combat experience. Since June 2018, it used these advantages to attack larger military targets again, meeting with more success.

The faction’s July 2018 raid on a battalion-sized camp (approximately 700 soldiers) in Jilli, Yobe state is a good indicator of ISWAP’s growing capabilities. The choice of target suggested that ISWAP possessed reliable intelligence about the camp’s vulnerability (the battalion was far from the centre of fighting and comprised fresh, inexperienced recruits with new equipment); effective internal coordination (the raiding party reportedly included a few hundred fighters coming from distant locations); and operational sophistication (ISWAP used captured vehicles bearing the latest Nigerian army markings and camouflage).[fn]Crisis Group electronic communication, international military expert and community leader, August 2018.Hide Footnote

Since then, ISWAP has waged many more such attacks on significant military sites, many of them successful. On 7 September 2018, it overran the town of Gudumbali – the first time since 2015 that militants had seized a local government area headquarters. Consistent with its guerrilla tactics, rather than trying to hold territory, ISWAP looted the camp and left. On 26 December 2018, it overran the twin towns of Baga and Doro Gowon, taking over major army and navy bases there. This time, ISWAP was confident enough in its defensive capabilities to maintain a presence there. The Nigerian army was overmatched and had little choice but to regroup. In December 2018, it eventually evacuated all its outposts on the lake, including Kangarwa, which it had defended fiercely in 2016-2017.

B. A Two-Zone Territorial Presence

The territory that ISWAP has staked out appears to be divided into two different zones. The group’s power is greatest in its core territory on the banks and islands of Lake Chad, where the vegetation provides some protection from aerial attack, it has permanent bases and directly governs civilian settlements. Beyond these areas is a wider zone where ISWAP projects its influence via patrols, emissaries and sympathisers who criss-cross significant parts of the northern Borno countryside.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, international NGO workers and security experts, Maiduguri and Abuja, March 2018; international NGO workers, Paris, April 2018.Hide Footnote One telling sign of its power projection is that civilians living far from ISWAP camps occasionally feel compelled to bring back fleeing captives. Another indicator is that residents of communities in the outer zone have been known to pay taxes to ISWAP, even when they are living close to a local government area headquarters controlled by the army.[fn]“Schoolgirls seized by Boko Haram tell of Christian friend’s escape bid”, The Guardian, 30 March 2018; Crisis Group interview, community leader, Maiduguri, October 2018.Hide Footnote

For now ISWAP’s focus is clearly on consolidating and extending its networks.

So far, however, ISWAP has not strayed beyond Boko Haram’s traditional territory.[fn]Before 2016, Boko Haram, too, operated in northern Adamawa and Yobe.Hide Footnote Within that territory, areas of militant control are fluid but – according to aid organisations that have sought to delineate zones where the two factions hold sway – the border between ISWAP and JAS zones seems to run through the Mafa, Dikwa and Kala Balge local government areas.[fn]56 Appendix C reproduces a map produced by Reuters based on data from the U.S. Agency for International Development.Hide Footnote It is now generally agreed that ISWAP’s reach extends well beyond the lake area, into northern Borno state, in the Alagarno forest and along the Komadugu Yobe river, and into eastern Yobe in the Farooq forest. ISWAP is present around Maiduguri, notably in the Konduga local government area. Some observers think that ISWAP operates in the north of another north-eastern state, that of Adamawa, more than a hundred kilometres south of Maiduguri. ISWAP has also carried out some attacks against Cameroonian security forces in the district of Logone-et-Chari in Cameroon.[fn]“Amaq reports 20 casualties in ISWAP attack on Cameroonian soldiers near Fotokol”, SITE, 8 April 2019.Hide Footnote

While ISWAP’s long-term ambitions are uncertain, for now its focus is clearly on consolidating and extending its networks rather than trying to establish undisputed territorial control over larger areas. Several sources report ISWAP is trying to deploy networks in Nigeria beyond the north east in classic Boko Haram fashion, notably in Taraba, Kogi and Jos states, using loans to create networks of supporters who can help for logistics.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Nigerian security official, Abuja, March 2018;Hide Footnote Also, ISWAP has links to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS), an ISIS franchise operating at the joint border of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The publication in March 2019 by the ISIS media arm of a picture of ISGS fighters under an ISWAP caption seems to confirm a connection and may even suggest that ISGS is, at least in some formal way, subordinate to ISWAP.[fn]See, for instance, the tweet by Rida Lyammouri, @rmaghrebi, global jihad scholar, 4:44 am, 23 March 2019.Hide Footnote A Nigerien security source mentions the presence of a few Nigerian fighters in the ranks of ISGS (though it is not certain they are from ISWAP) and some religious scholars originating from ISGS area of operation reportedly sit on ISWAP’s shura.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Dakar, April 2019; electronic communication, Islamic scholar connected to ISWAP, March 2019.Hide Footnote Although some Western diplomats and security analysts fear ISWAP is turning its sights toward terror operations elsewhere in Nigeria or West Africa, or to mount attacks on Western interests, there is little evidence of this so far.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Abuja, March 2018.Hide Footnote

C. The Nigerian and Regional Military Response

Nigeria’s military has struggled to counter ISWAP and is now looking to enhanced regional cooperation to advance its efforts.

For the Nigerian army, the challenge has been multifaceted. On the one hand, it is facing a formidable adversary: ISWAP is more battle-ready, better trained and more rooted in the population than its parent organisation was. On the other hand, the army itself struggles to be effective. Experts describe how its troops are badly led, poorly equipped and insufficiently supplied. Army bases are poorly fortified. Troop rotation is rare, medical evacuation capacity is feeble, coordination with air support (which has occasionally been essential to repelling attacks on ground troops) is weak, and senior leadership has been slow to grapple seriously with its problems.[fn]Crisis Group interview, international military experts, Abuja, October 2018; Maiduguri, December 2018. The Twitter timelines of Nigerian security experts @PeccaviConsults, @beegeaglesblog and @DonKlericuzio are illuminating on the issue. See also Obi Anyadike, “‘Year of the Debacle’: How Nigeria Lost Its Way in the War Against Boko Haram”, World Politics Review, 30 October 2018.Hide Footnote

ISWAP’s successful attacks over the course of 2018 hit the army increasingly hard, contributing to low morale. Soldiers have staged a few protests, and there are many reports of desertions.[fn]Crisis Group interview, international military experts, Abuja, October 2018; Maiduguri, December 2018. On protests, see “Protesting Nigerian troops fire into air at north-eastern airport”, Reuters, 12 August 2018.Hide Footnote The Nigerian army typically downplays its losses, repeatedly claiming (as they did about Boko Haram before its 2016 split) that ISWAP’s attacks are “the last kicks of a dying horse”.[fn]“Army to punish troops who flee from enemy attack”, Leadership, 10 November 2018.Hide Footnote But the army’s repeated threats to punish fleeing troops and frequent rotation of commanders indicate significant internal difficulties.[fn]Ibid.; on repeated changes in command, see “Nigeria names fifth commander in under two years to lead fight against Boko Haram”, Reuters, 10 November 2018.Hide Footnote

For Nigeria to counter ISWAP militarily, it will likely need to invest more heavily in cooperative efforts under the auspices of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – a regional command that is supposed to coordinate the troops of the four Lake Chad basin countries operating in the area (ie, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad).[fn]On the MNJTF, see Crisis Group Briefing, Boko Haram on the Back Foot?, op. cit., p. 6-8. Crisis Group is preparing a dedicated report on the MNJTF.Hide Footnote The MNJTF has taken time to rise to the challenge that ISWAP presents. Its Operation Amni Fakhat (April-July 2018) aimed to reoccupy key positions and begin some service delivery to populations in the lake area but achieved little; ISWAP launched a massive offensive right after the operation stopped.

A new MNJTF operation, Yancin Takfi, began in March 2019. This time, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari canvassed neighbouring states for support in person, and troops from Chad, which had played a key part in the 2015 pushback against Boko Haram, entered deep into Borno state to participate. After an unconvincing start (including a three-month delay), there are indications that the Chadian and Nigerian troops, backed by massive air support, are making some headway, reaching a number of important sites in ISWAP core territory.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communications, March 2019.Hide Footnote It remains to be seen whether they can hold their positions on the lake as the rainy season approaches (it begins in July), creating operational challenges for the MNJTF, which is a heavier, less agile force than ISWAP.

V. Building a Jihadist Proto-State

While ISWAP owes its relative strength in part to its break from Shekau’s most brutal tactics, it also has benefited by cultivating the economic strength and favour of communities in its territory through the provision of a semblance of justice and governance that was otherwise lacking.[fn]Asked about ISWAP, Nigerian military officers tend to deny its specificity. They thus told Reuters: “We are not interested in the faction. What has that got to do with it?” and “They are not a government; they kidnap girls from schools”. “Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad”, Reuters, 30 April 2018. See also “What we know about Boko Haram’s new leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi”, Vanguard, 7 August 2016.Hide Footnote

One way in which ISWAP has governed in its core areas has been through its own brand of “Islamic justice”. It has created a sense of security among locals that distinguishes ISWAP from its parent and parallel organisations – and from the Nigerian state, which was never very responsive in the Lake Chad basin. Notwithstanding the draconian nature of its punishments (described below), many civilians are grateful that they seem to have brought about a drop in crime. They note for instance that banditry, and particularly cattle rustling, a major problem on the lake, has disappeared from ISWAP areas. ISWAP also helps resolve disputes between herders and others: its local chiefs (amirs) allocate grazing lands, adjudicate allegations of trespassing and impound errant cattle, which herders can retrieve for a fee.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, community leader and herdsmen, Maiduguri, March 2018.Hide Footnote

Herdsmen and traders who operate in the Lake Chad area also mention that ISWAP closely monitors its combatants’ behaviour toward civilians. One Nigerian NGO worker noted that ISWAP ordered its fighters not to bear arms when visiting places deemed safe.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Maiduguri, March 2018.Hide Footnote Reflecting a local perception that ISWAP (in contrast to JAS) tolerates unaffiliated Muslim civilians, one Fulani herdsman said, “Dawla [the Arabic word for “state”, which is a reference to ISWAP] is trying to be friendly to people. They don’t kill. … They insist that jihad is not against people who say ‘la illah illa Allah’ [the first words of the shahada, the Islamic creed]. Only against people in uniforms”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, herdsmen, Maiduguri, March 2018. Locals often use the Arabic word for state, dawla, to designate the organisation and its territory.Hide Footnote An ISWAP amir reportedly ordered the execution of a fighter who had murdered a civilian in the Nigerian part of the Lake Chad basin. And in the Komadugu-Yobe area, ISWAP allegedly purged fighters who were kidnapping civilians for ransom; the expelled fighters formed a small splinter group.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, herdsmen, fish traders and community leader, Maiduguri, March 2018; electronic communications, international NGO worker, August 2018.Hide Footnote

To be sure, aspects of ISWAP’s approach to law and order are extraordinarily harsh and violent. It metes out the full range of punishments it believes the Quran to mandate, including cutting off the hands of alleged thieves and killing adulterers, though some units are reportedly more lenient than others. It meets perceived threats to its fiscal base (fishing without authorisation, failure to pay requisite taxes) and security (using mobile phones in areas where they are forbidden, which is interpreted as spying) with brutal beatings, sometimes even executions.[fn]On at least two occasions, dozens of fishermen were killed for fishing in waters claimed by ISWAP. “Bodies of 42 fishermen butchered by Boko Haram pulled from Lake Chad”, International Business Times, 15 June 2016; “Boko Haram kills 31 fishermen in Lake Chad”, NAN, 8 August 2017.Hide Footnote And it also polices public morality and worship, prohibiting smoking and drug use, and compelling both attendance at and the manner of prayer. But overall its system of justice is less draconian than Shekau’s or the unified Boko Haram’s before 2016.

Another step ISWAP has taken relates to social services, which the settlements where ISWAP exerts influence tended to lack. ISWAP seeks to provide Islamic education (Western-style education is banned) and basic health care. ISWAP has at its command a number of medical specialists, both militants and captives, who serve not just fighters and their families, but also local civilians, sometimes for a fee, sometimes for free. The group procures medicine in raids on health centres or purchases it in Cameroon and Nigeria’s Yobe state. ISWAP can organise the transfer of seriously ill patients to hospitals in neighbouring countries. The improvement in access to health care has been particularly felt around Lake Chad, where previously it was minimal.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, community leader, herdsmen, and international and Nigerian NGO workers, Maiduguri, March 2018; and international NGO workers, Paris, April 2018.Hide Footnote More recently, for both public health and religious reasons, ISWAP engaged in a program of latrine construction in some of the localities it controls. It also allowed humanitarian workers to proceed with polio vaccinations in its area of influence, though these campaigns have long been controversial in northern Nigeria.[fn]Some Muslims in the north believe that the polio campaigns are a conspiracy to sterilise them. Elisha P. Renne, “Polio Vaccination, Political Authority and the Nigerian State”, in Christine Holmberg, Stuart Blume and Paul Greenough (eds.), The Politics of Vaccination: A Global History (Manchester, 2017). ISWAP’s overall attitude toward humanitarian NGOs is mixed. It tolerates humanitarian workers, including expatriates, operating in its areas of influence, though not in its core areas. Crisis Group interviews, international and Nigerian NGO workers, Maiduguri, March 2018; and Paris, April 2018. But it can also at times seize humanitarian assistance or ransack health centres. In March 2018, furthermore, ISWAP killed and kidnapped several humanitarian workers in Rann, who happened to be at an army base. It later executed two of the workers, both nurses working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Several NGO sources suspect that the killings were not ideologically motivated, but instead related to the ICRC’s part in controversial negotiations occurring at the time. Crisis Group interviews, Maiduguri and Abuja, December 2018. In another incident, on 8 October 2018, ISWAP killed two Nigerians who were carrying out a survey for an NGO. It seems that the men were ex-soldiers working as subcontractors for a local private security company – they had maps and GPS apps. ISWAP probably saw them as spies. Some international security sources, however, express concern that ISWAP may be developing an interest in taking expatriates hostage. In November 2018, a group of fighters attacked a work party of a French company drilling boreholes in the Nigerien region of Diffa, not far from the border with Nigeria. It is not clear that the fighters belonged to ISWAP, however, and a group loyal to Shekau is known to operate in this area.Hide Footnote

Security personnel monitor the entrance to an IDP camp on the outskirts of Maiduguri, north east Nigeria, in December 2018. CRISIS GROUP / Jorge Gutierrez Lucena

ISWAP’s approach toward local civilians has helped create an environment from which it can draw economic sustenance. ISWAP levies taxes, and though it does not seem to have a unified tax policy, most civilians with direct experience interviewed by Crisis Group seem to consider ISWAP’s taxation acceptable as a reasonable fee for services rendered, notably the provision of public safety. They see ISWAP’s system as more predictable and less exploitative than the various levies that competing government officials, civilian and military, exact.[fn]Reported categories include the kharaj, a yearly head tax on all adult males; ushr, a tax on inheritance; and jangal, a tax on cattle sales; as well as taxes on trade in fish and charcoal. Crisis Group interviews, herdsmen and fish traders, Maiduguri, March 2018; journalist, Abuja, March 2018; international NGO workers, Paris, April 2018; electronic communication, journalist, August 2018. According to one source, a herder pays the cash equivalent of one 30th of his herd to be allowed to graze on the lake during the dry season, and an additional 3,000 to 5,000 nairas ($8-13) to sell a head of cattle. Another source said fishermen had to pay 3,000 to 4,000 nairas ($8-11) for a fishing permit when they met a patrol. Farmers on the lake are expected to hand out 10 per cent of their produce, but the rate can go up to 30 per cent in other areas.Hide Footnote One herdsman described ISWAP’s tax collectors as scrupulous in their calculations and unlikely to abuse contributors.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Maiduguri, March 2018.Hide Footnote A Fulani community leader deplored, however, that the tax had gone up in the course of 2018.[fn]Crisis group interview, Maiduguri, October 2018.Hide Footnote

By forging ties with civilians, ISWAP maintains its capacity to buy food, fuel and medicine as well as sell its produce, which includes charcoal, cattle, hides and fish. It encourages traders to do business in areas it controls, asking them to bring goods in high demand and to sell products in ISWAP-controlled markets to its members and to local civilians. To encourage traders to supply its markets, it does not cap the prices they can command for the goods they bring into ISWAP’s territory.[fn]Crisis Group interview, trader, Maiduguri, December 2018.Hide Footnote At roadblocks, ISWAP militants sometimes seize the goods they need, but they often pay compensation, sometimes at high prices – a good way to keep the supply coming. The group seems particularly keen to buy fuel, which it needs for mobility.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, transport workers and Nigerian NGO workers, Maiduguri, March 2018. From interviews and media accounts, it seems that ISWAP has many more trucks, cars and motorbikes than JAS, whose fighters increasingly ride horses or camels or even walk. ISWAP’s better relations with civilians probably allow for better fuel supply.Hide Footnote

Reinstating an old Boko Haram policy, ISWAP reportedly extends micro-loans to local youth and farmers.

Reviving rural trade is also part of ISWAP’s policy to attract displaced persons back to its areas, as reflected in its propaganda videos that show well-stocked markets, fat cattle and bountiful crops. These videos circulate in displaced person camps, as a means of convincing the uprooted to resettle under ISWAP’s protection. Women living under ISWAP are advising their relatives living in camps in Maiduguri to come to the Lake Chad area, insisting that they will find decent wages there as agricultural labourers, as well as matrimonial opportunities.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Nigerian security official, Abuja, December 2017; Crisis Group electronic communication, trader, March 2019; Idayat Hassan, “The danger of a better-behaved Boko Haram”, IRIN, 21 August 2018.Hide Footnote Reinstating an old Boko Haram policy, ISWAP reportedly extends micro-loans to local youth and farmers.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, diplomat, Abuja; and international development worker, Maiduguri, March 2018.Hide Footnote In the Lake Chad area, it sets caps on the retail price of local agricultural products, so as to ease access to basic food items for all. As a result, food prices are reportedly low, with a sack of maize selling for 3,500 nairas ($9) on the lake, compared to 11,000 nairas ($28) in Maiduguri.[fn]Crisis Group interview, trader, Maiduguri, December 2018; Crisis Group electronic communication, NGO worker, February 2019.Hide Footnote ISWAP reportedly digs wells and distributes seeds and fertilisers to farmers; farmers who use motor pumps can apparently procure fuel. According to various reports, agricultural production in ISWAP-controlled areas has risen substantially over the last year.[fn]“Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad”, Reuters, 30 April 2018.Hide Footnote

VI. ISWAP After Nur

Internal differences that likely characterised ISWAP from its beginnings have gained in importance. They created the backdrop for its 2018 execution of founder Mamman Nur and the ensuing leadership shuffle, which has not yet fully come to rest.

While the reasons for Nur’s execution by members of ISWAP in August 2018 are still not well understood, they appear to be at least partly an outgrowth of a rift between a militant sub-faction that views ISWAP’s future as bound up in continuing conflict with the Lake Chad states, and others within the organisation who favour looking for an exit from the conflict. Nur was in the latter camp and, to this end, had played a key role in Swiss-mediated talks that some members of ISWAP quietly conducted with the Nigerian government.

It appears that a hostage-taking incident at the beginning of 2018 might have accentuated this rift.[fn]Although ISWAP seeks to distinguish itself through its better treatment of civilians, its conduct is not always consistent, and the group has taken hostages, for example, to use as chits in prisoner swaps with local authorities and to extract cash ransoms. In October 2016 and May 2017, talks under the auspices of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs led JAS to release some of the 276 girls whom Boko Haram had abducted from a school in Chibok in April 2014. On 10 February 2018, talks conducted through the same channel secured the release of three lecturers from the University of Maiduguri taken by ISWAP the previous July. On the same day, Shekau released another set of hostages.Hide Footnote On 19 February 2018, ISWAP fighters swept into the town of Dapchi in Yobe state and abducted 112 schoolgirls and one boy. On 21 March, following talks with the Nigerian government, the fighters released 107 of their hostages, leaving only one in captivity (five of the original 113 died during capture).[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°137, Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria, 12 April 2018. Leah Sharibu, the girl still in captivity, remains so reportedly because she refuses to convert to Islam and thus can be enslaved according to ISWAP’s version of Islamic law. It is nevertheless clear that she has value as a hostage.Hide Footnote Though there were undocumented reports to the contrary, both the government and ISWAP denied that ISWAP had received a ransom. As Crisis Group has previously reported, ISWAP claimed that it was making a good-will gesture, and the government suggested that the group was concerned about jeopardising the talks that had been underway, which it said included the possibility of a ceasefire.[fn]Crisis Group Briefing, Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria, op. cit.Hide Footnote

Whether because hardliners wanted to make clear their opposition to these talks, or because they blamed Nur for another aspect of how the Dapchi incident was handled, or for another reason altogether, ISWAP’s leadership caused him to be detained and executed after the March 21 release.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communications, Nigerian and international security experts, July and August 2018; “Senior Boko Haram figure reportedly killed by allies”, The Guardian, 14 September 2018.Hide Footnote

Since Nur’s death, ISWAP has seen further changes in its top ranks, which are now more dominated by hardline militants. Two ISWAP commanders who had been rivals of Nur and are reputed for their fierceness, Abubakar Mainok and Mustapha Kirmima, soon emerged as new leading figures in the organisation. And although Abu-Musab al-Barnawi remained wali for the remainder of 2018, in March 2019, an audio recording disseminated by ISWAP announced that ISIS had ordered him replaced by the similarly named but unrelated Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-Barnawi.[fn]See the translation in a Twitter thread by Abdulbasit Kassim, @ScholarAKassi1, leading Boko Haram scholar, 10:44 am, 11 March 2019.
 Hide Footnote

Theories about the reason for this possible change in leadership (which ISIS has not confirmed at the time of this writing) include speculation that Abu Musab was deemed too junior to lead the organisation as it grappled with the aftermath of Nur’s execution, or that his close connection to Nur was a problem, or that there was suspicion of his efforts to engage jihadi contacts in Mali, presumably affiliated to al-Qaeda.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communications, Nigerian security analyst, March 2019; Islamic scholar and trader familiar with ISWAP, April 2019.Hide Footnote One Nigerian security analyst suspects that the leadership struggle is not over, but two sources report that Abu Musab has moved on by leaving ISWAP to establish his own group.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communication, 11 March 2019. Tweet by Ahmad Salkida, @A_Salkida, journalist, 2:22 am, 16 March 2019. Crisis Group electronic communication, Islamic scholar familiar with ISWAP, 5 May 2019.Hide Footnote Even among those who have stayed under Abu Abdullah and ISWAP, there are reports of tensions. An Islamic scholar familiar with the group thus mentions that Nur’s former supporters “are with the new ameer [chief in Arabic], but they are not with him truly”.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communication, 5 May 2019.Hide Footnote

Moreover, in addition to grappling with the foregoing dynamics, ISWAP faces ethnically-driven internal tensions as well. Although its leadership has been largely ethnic Kanuri, ISWAP has recruited significantly among lacustrine communities, notably the ethnic Buduma, many of whom earn a living from fishing. Visitors to the Lake Chad area mention that militants of Buduma origin are pushing for more influence in the movement. Some Buduma may be keen on using their weight in ISWAP to gain ground vis-à-vis competitors for the lake’s resources, such as Kanuri traders and Fulani herdsmen. (Soon after the fall in late 2018 of Baga, a major fish market, Buduma fighters established exclusive control over the town.[fn]The Kanuri form a relative majority of the population of northern Borno and much of the leadership of Boko Haram hails from that community. They were the core of the Islamic kingdom of Kanem-Borno that projected power over the region for centuries until the colonial era. The Buduma are a minority centered on the Lake Chad, and have long stood at the periphery of Kanem-Borno, converting to Islam only lately. See Christian Seignobos, “Boko Haram dans ses sanctuaires des monts Mandara et du lac Tchad (2017)”, Afrique contemporaine, no. 265 (2018), pp. 99-115. The Kanembu, an ethnic group related to the Kanuri with a strong presence on the Chadian side of Lake Chad, and thus often described in Nigeria as “Chadians” or “Francophones”, are apparently also involved in the push to curb Kanuri influence.Hide Footnote )

It is still too early to get a full sense of how the changes in ISWAP’s upper ranks, or the other tensions with which it is grappling, will affect the way it conducts itself. ISWAP’s new militant core is in all likelihood less well disposed towards talks than Nur. One indicator of its attitude may be its murder last fall of two nurses working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has long played a role in supporting negotiations.[fn]“Nigeria: Boko Haram executes second female aid worker”, Al Jazeera, 15 October 2018. On the ICRC’s part in hostage releases, see “ICRC’s role in Chibok schoolgirls’ release”, Deutsche Welle, 21 October 2016.Hide Footnote

But notwithstanding these developments, ISWAP appears to be maintaining its fundamental business model. Residents of the Lake Chad basin report that – aside from increased pressure to pay taxes – little has changed in ISWAP’s behaviour toward Muslim civilians.[fn]Crisis Group electronic communications, diplomats, academics and security experts, October and November 2018; Crisis Group telephone interview, community leader, November 2018.Hide Footnote Whether Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-Barnawi, if he is indeed the new wali, is committed to continuing this model remains to be seen.

See the translation in a Twitter thread by Abdulbasit Kassim, @ScholarAKassi1, leading Boko Haram scholar, 10:44 am, 11 March 2019.Hide Footnote

VII. Taking on ISWAP’s Challenge: Complementing the Military Approach

The crisis in north-eastern Nigeria is about more than the military balance of power, as underscored by the support ISWAP has won by creating a proto-state providing a measure of governance and services. If the Lake Chad states hope to dislodge the group and prevent its expansion, they therefore will have to do more than challenge ISWAP in battle. To make inroads, authorities will need to demonstrate that they can fill gaps in governance and service provision in areas of weaker ISWAP influence.

One place to start is in better policing abuses committed by state security personnel. ISWAP gets credit from the local population for its efforts to regulate its own fighters’ behaviour – an area where regional governments do not have strong reputations. The Lake Chad states, and particularly Nigeria, cannot afford to sit idly by as ISWAP’s reputation in this domain grows and theirs diminish. New scandals keep emerging about security force misconduct in the four Lake Chad countries. In 2018, female internally displaced people (IDPs) accused security personnel of demanding sex for food in certain camps in Nigeria, while a video surfaced showing soldiers executing two female Boko Haram suspects and their children in the small town of Zelevet, Cameroon.[fn]“Nigerian soldiers raped us – IDPs confirm Amnesty International report”, Daily Post, 5 June 2018; “Anatomy of a killing”, BBC News, 23 September 2018.Hide Footnote

To better compete with ISWAP, the Lake Chad states should also tackle persistent problems in food, water and health-care delivery, particularly in the IDP camps of Nigeria’s north east.

Nigeria and the MNJTF member states will need to step up efforts to hold accountable troops who commit such abuses – and do so visibly. So far, the effort has been lagging; it took intense media pressure (including a searching investigation by the BBC) for Cameroon to arrest the soldiers suspected in the Zelevet killings.[fn]“Brutality against women and children: head of state orders investigation”, Cameroon Tribune, 13 August 2018.Hide Footnote Nigeria has taken some steps to redress impunity among security forces, but to date these have been inadequate. Although in 2017, President Buhari appointed a panel to investigate the military’s alleged human rights abuses, its report, submitted in December 2017, has yet to be made public. The president should release it and swiftly act on any recommendations that serve the purpose of accountability. Likewise, the Nigerian military should as a matter of course publicise its court-martials for soldiers accused of abusing civilians. This step would help remind soldiers of their obligations and educate civilians about their rights.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, local government official, Maiduguri, March 2018; former Boko Haram member and victim of abuse, Maiduguri, October 2018; international humanitarian law expert, Abuja, December 2018.Hide Footnote

A second area where the Nigerian government in particular should step up its efforts is in the provision of public safety. It faces a steep hurdle: federal authorities lack access to and therefore cannot presently provide law and order in the portion of rural Borno state under ISWAP influence. But they can start to focus on towns under their control, and where they should be seeking to gird the population against being won over by ISWAP. The introduction of both civilian authorities to help administer these towns and a substantial police presence to help keep them safe is a necessity. As the Buhari administration commences its second and final term, it should take to heart that better protecting the public in north-eastern Nigeria is key to containing and weakening ISWAP.

Thirdly, to better compete with ISWAP, the Lake Chad states should also tackle persistent problems in food, water and health-care delivery, particularly in the IDP camps of Nigeria’s north east. Two years ago, after a visit to the Bama camp, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) sounded the alarm about miserable living conditions there, leading to a steep increase in humanitarian assistance to the region. But even that increase was insufficient. In late 2018, MSF was still calling on the Nigerian authorities to improve nutrition and health care in that same camp.[fn]Compare “Critical humanitarian situation unfolding among internally displaced people in Bama, Borno state”, MSF, 17 August 2018; to “At least 24,000 displaced people in dire health situation in Bama”, MSF, 22 June 2016.Hide Footnote The fewer services the IDP camps receive from state authorities, the more prone they are to become fertile ground for ISWAP recruitment.[fn]Crisis Group has collected testimonies about former associates of Boko Haram – including both voluntary and coerced members – who had returned to either JAS or ISWAP after time spent in IDP camps because they found camp conditions so miserable. Crisis Group interviews, IDPs, Maiduguri, October and December 2018; Crisis Group interview, humanitarian worker, Abuja, October 2018.Hide Footnote

Fourthly, regional authorities should be careful that in their efforts to hobble ISWAP economically, they do not exacerbate the hardships of local communities and create ill will among residents. For example, authorities have struggled to find a good way to stop ISWAP from drawing resources from the markets that ring Lake Chad, which it does by sending its own produce there for sale, taxing goods, and procuring food supplies and manufactured products. The Lake Chad states responded by banning or limiting the trading of certain items (notably fuel, smoked fish and red pepper) and closing certain markets and trade routes that the militants frequent or tax. Yet these instruments are overly blunt, as cutting off trade inflicts economic pain that can drive locals to support militants. It also puts the military in a bad light, as the local population suspects them of using the bans to actually monopolise the trade to their own profit. Niger and Chad have both alleviated the trade restrictions. Nigeria should follow.

One line of effort that may not seem promising for the time being – particularly given the events surrounding Nur’s death, the increasing influence of hardliners within the faction, and the likely internal sense of momentum created by ISWAP’s recent military successes – is the pursuit of substantial negotiations that might lead to an end to fighting. But Nigerian authorities and international partners should keep channels of communication with ISWAP open, at least to test whether there might be ways to improve humanitarian access for NGOs and, where appropriate, organise prisoner exchanges. Though ISWAP is ambivalent about these channels at present, and authorities may face criticism for even limited engagement, they could be helpful in the short term and create openings for more substantial discussions in the longer run.

VIII. Conclusion

ISWAP poses a particular challenge to the Lake Chad states because it represents more than aggressive fighters, rumbling pickups with mounted guns or proclamations of the caliphate’s rebirth. It is filling a gap left by decades of poor governance and neglect in the region. It has cultivated stronger ties with local residents than Boko Haram ever could by helping recover lost cattle, settling disputes over grazing and fishing rights, fending off rustlers, providing care to expectant mothers in rural areas, and imposing swift if terrible justice upon criminals, sometimes including when they are ISWAP members.

ISWAP is often cruel and arbitrary, even with civilians whose support it ostensibly seeks to gain. But for now, in the eyes of many locals, what it has to offer is often better than what came before. The frontier governance and rudimentary services it provides have allowed it to build networks, spread its influence, muster resources and bleed the region’s armies – all while keeping the core territory it must hold modest and working successfully to attract ISIS support.

ISWAP may not achieve its goal of maintaining jihad in the Lake Chad area, much less expand it further afield. Its project is hampered by challenges and contradictions: Shekau is still around; Nur’s death has shaken some of its members; political and ethnic tensions could rip the group apart; and the limited support ISIS can offer may make little difference. The Lake Chad states are finally mounting a stronger counter-insurgency campaign. But for now, in both north-eastern Nigeria and neighbouring states, ISWAP continues to sink roots in various communities and to become a part of residents’ lives. This, too, is an essential part of the battle.

Dakar/Brussels, 16 May 2019

Appendix A: Map of Nigeria

Appendix B: Map of the Lake Chad Basin

Appendix C: JAS and ISWAP Zones of Influence

Appendix D: Monthly Fatalities Associated with Boko Haram Conflict, 2011-2019: Civilians vs. Soldiers