In November 2023, the Malian armed forces, supported by Wagner Group paramilitaries, recaptured Kidal, a northern town which had been under the control of rebel groups since 2012. This event marked the culmination of a renewed conflict, beginning that August, between the government and some of the signatories to the 2015 Algiers Accord, which had ended the earlier hostilities. All the while, the centre and north of the country faced jihadist attacks. This profusion of deadly fighting has plunged northern Mali into a new spiral of violence, with alarming humanitarian consequences and an uncertain outcome. Recapturing Kidal was certainly a triumph for the Malian authorities, but they should have no illusions: neither of the belligerents can win by force of arms alone. The return to war also accelerated the demise of the Algiers Accord, which had been on life support for the last two years. An inter-Malian dialogue proposed by the transitional authorities at the end of 2023 is an opportunity for negotiations to prevail over fighting once more. Talks remain the only way to achieve a sustainable peace in northern Mali. 

The 2015 Algiers Accord offered a useful framework for peace that all the belligerents had accepted. The subsequent process faced delays, however, stumbling over essential questions related to transferring prerogatives to regional governments and integrating former rebels into Mali’s defence and security forces. The first transitional government, established following the coup d’état of August 2020, wanted to maintain the agreement and made progress in bringing it to fruition. The regime that emerged from the second coup in May 2021, however, took a different path, taking a more military approach.

With power firmly in their grasp, the officers focused on strengthening the armed forces and reasserting the Malian state’s sovereignty over the entire country. To these ends, they stepped up cooperation with Russia and called on Wagner for reinforcements. They also requested – and secured – the departure of the French Operation Barkhane, the European Takuba Task Force and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Finally, Mali’s leaders withdrew from the G5 Sahel and its joint counter-terrorism force. In September 2023, together with military rulers in Burkina Faso and Niger, they set up the Alliance of Sahel States, a mutual defence pact. 

At the same time, relations deteriorated between the transitional authorities and the armed groups that signed the Algiers Accord, grouped together as part of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) since 2021, with each side preparing itself for renewed fighting. Discussions about fulfilling the agreement’s terms reached an impasse: the government that emerged from the May 2021 coup welcomed figures hostile to the agreement into its ranks, while the signatory groups adopted uncompromising positions of their own. Meanwhile, jihadists took advantage of the deadlock and the vacuum created by the departure of international forces to extend their hold on vast rural areas of northern Mali. 

Against this backdrop of escalating tensions, the Malian authorities’ occupation of former MINUSMA bases in the north of the country sparked new hostilities. Fighting resumed in August 2023, culminating in the capture of Kidal by the armed forces in November. This highly symbolic feat of arms remains an important win for the Malian authorities, embodying their commitment to reclaiming state control of the entirety of national territory. This accomplishment resonates strongly with a substantial portion of the public, particularly those most hostile to the separatist aspirations of the part of the CSP that wants to create an independent entity named Azawad.