icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Youtube
Bashir Moves Sudan to Dangerous New Ground
Bashir Moves Sudan to Dangerous New Ground
Briefing 68 / Africa

Sudan: Preventing Implosion

Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup. The main mechanisms to end conflicts between the central government and the peripheries – the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement – all suffer from lack of implementation, largely due to the intransigence of the National Congress Party (NCP).

I. Overview

Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup. The main mechanisms to end conflicts between the central government and the peripheries – the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement – all suffer from lack of implementation, largely due to the intransigence of the National Congress Party (NCP). Less than thirteen months remain to ensure that national elections and the South Sudan self-determination referendum lead to democratic transformation and resolution of all the country’s conflicts. Unless the international community, notably the U.S., the UN, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the Horn of Africa Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), cooperate to support both CPA implementation and vital additional negotiations, return to North-South war and escalation of conflict in Darfur are likely.

Democratic transformation should remain a key goal, as ultimately only this can entrench peace and stability. National unity is unattractive to Southerners because the two parties – the NCP and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – that fought the North-South conflict ended by the CPA and now form the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum have failed to advance it. The South’s self-determination referendum, which must be held no later than 9 January 2011, will thus almost certainly result in a decision for separation, despite the enormous difficulties of establishing an independent South Sudan that is economically viable and peaceful. The failure to foster democratic transformation in the North has also undermined the chances for political settlement in Darfur and exacerbated tensions in both the East and the far North.

The recent progress of NCP-SPLM negotiations on the modalities of national and regional elections and the referendum bill is welcome but does not advance far enough on a credible path for all-Sudan peace. Both parties want elections for the wrong reasons. The NCP wants votes in April 2010 that would allow it to regain the political legitimacy it needs both to protect President Bashir against the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant and to be in a stronger position to declare a state of emergency if needed, including in the event of a new war. The SPLM is concerned that derailed elections might jeopardise its overriding goal of holding the referendum on schedule. It threatens to declare unilateral independence if pushed to accept a referendum postponement.

Opposition parties in both North and South maintain that the current conditions for elections are unconstitutional and undemocratic and seek postponement until a genuinely inclusive transitional government has been established that implements reforms needed for free and fair voting. The main Darfur insurgency groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA), continue to fight and contemplate possible alliances with the SPLM (if the referendum is endangered) and with armed tribal groups such as the Baggara in Darfur and Kordofan, the Nuba and Ingesana in Blue Nile and disgruntled constituencies in the East and north of Khartoum.

With the NCP and SPLM drifting apart, the role of international actors becomes more essential. The challenge is to craft a process that produces credible and fair elections, an on-schedule referendum and, if its decision is independence, two economically viable and stable democratic states. The CPA provides the overall political framework but does not address the Darfur crisis, the post-2011 arrangements or intra-South issues. Consequently, an additional protocol that addresses these issues, unites the several peace processes and revises the timing of some benchmarks should be negotiated.

It is essential to move rapidly on a number of fronts, including to negotiate a Darfur peace agreement that allows all Darfuris to vote in national elections; to implement legal reforms necessary for a free and fair national election process; and to agree on the commissions for the South’s self-determination referendum and the Abyei referendum. Time is also required to negotiate a framework for the negotiations over how two highly interdependent states will relate to each other, were the South to decide in its referendum for independence, as appears quite certain. This should cover two periods: first, from the day after the referendum to July 2011, when the CPA’s interim period ends; and secondly, for a further several years – perhaps the four-year equivalent of a parliamentary term – to complete implementation of the peaceful transfer of sovereignty and decide numerous practical details. The NCP and SPLM should negotiate this framework as early as possible in 2010.

These processes require strong, united international facilitation, as well as support from other major political forces in Sudan. Cooperation can be promoted by providing significant economic and political incentives for the NCP, the SPLM and Darfuri rebel groups and by isolating and sanctioning recalcitrant parties. The current U.S. initiative goes part way toward what is needed but is not comprehensive enough. The U.S., China, other members of the UN Security Council, members of the AU Peace and Security Council and IGAD member states should cut through the welter of multiple facilitators by agreeing to support an individual of international stature to lead the several negotiations with a view to reconciling the paths of the Sudan peace process. The ideal sequence would be along the following lines:

  • implementation early in 2010 of outstanding major pre-electoral CPA benchmarks: legal reforms guaranteeing basic freedoms of expression, association and movement; demarcation of the 1956 North-South border, including Abyei; and agreement on the commissions for the South’s self-determination referendum and the Abyei referendum;
     
  • completion on the basis of the recommendations of the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) by April 2010 of a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive security arrangments, monitored by the international community;
     
  • negotiation of a new CPA protocol by June 2010 to allow fair Darfuri participation in elections; establish post-election transitional arrangements to administer the South’s referendum and the new Darfur ceasefire and security arrangements; decide the process, if necessary, for transfer of sovereignty to an independent South; and create a strong international mechanism to monitor and support these terms and other CPA elements; and
     
  • postponement of general elections to November 2010, along with adoption of a constitutional amendment by July 2010 to authorise extension of the term of the present GNU through those elections or, in the event that they are further postponed, to July 2011, and incorporate the terms of the post-referendum transition.

The lead mediator should mobilise support for the above by brokering an agreement between the U.S., China, the AU, European Union (EU), UN and the Arab League in particular on incentives (eg, financial aid, lifting of sanctions, deferment of ICC action) and disincentives (eg, further sanctions, increased isolation, national arms embargo) to be applied to the parties depending on their actions. International support for the elections and its results should be conditioned on the credibility of the process.

Progress should be monitored closely and a decision taken by July 2010 at the latest whether it has been sufficient to maintain the full agenda. If implementation again lags badly, it will be necessary to concentrate on achieving the minimum essential to prevent return to deadly chaos, namely ensuring that the South’s referendum is held on schedule, and a day-after arrangement is in place. Elections would consequently have to be postponed until such time after January 2011 as the Darfur peace process had advanced adequately; delay in other CPA benchmarks such as governance reforms might also have to be accepted reluctantly.

Nairobi/Brussels, 17 December 2009

Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir is seen during a swearing in ceremony of new officials after he dissolved the central and state governments in Khartoum, Sudan February 24, 2019. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah
Statement / Africa

Bashir Moves Sudan to Dangerous New Ground

Faced with the most serious protests against his 30-year rule, President Omar al-Bashir’s declaration of a state of emergency will not save his bankrupt, unpopular regime. Instead, security forces must halt worsening violence, Bashir should step down and all sides should work on a broadly inclusive transitional government.

President Omar al-Bashir’s address to the nation on the evening of 22 February attempted to defuse the crisis that has engulfed his administration in the longest wave of protests in decades. Instead, the president’s words infuriated protesters and steered the confrontation, pitting the regime against a diffuse, still-peaceful protest movement into a new, more dangerous phase. Bashir spoke of the need for dialogue but in declaring a state of emergency, he placed more obstacles in the way of talks. He dissolved the government at the federal and provincial levels and, shortly after his speech, appointed security chiefs to head all 18 of the country’s regional states. He has in effect allowed the armed forces to run the country for a year.

Protesters greeted Bashir’s words with derision and anger. The president offered what seemed like a concession in declaring that parliament, which is dominated by the ruling party, would defer proposed amendments to the constitution designed to allow him to run in 2020. But this did not satisfy protesters calling for him and his circle to step down and for the formation of a transitional government.

The embattled president has played this card before. In 2013, following large protests by university students unhappy with the state of the economy, Bashir promised not to stand for election in 2015 only to renege. Although intelligence chief Salah Gosh told the media before the president’s speech that Bashir would resign as head of the National Congress Party (NCP), which would have ruled him out as a candidate in 2020, Bashir made no such announcement. More importantly, by suspending the constitution and giving the security services the lead role in maintaining order, Bashir deliberately set the stage for a lopsided dialogue which the opposition has already rejected. This too is a card Bashir previously played in 2013 when he used massive repression against protesters and then called for talks with a weakened opposition a year later.

Demonstrators poured into the streets in large numbers, [...] braving a police response that included use of live ammunition and tear gas.

This is not Sudan’s first state of emergency. Previous rulers faced with mass protests have often turned to this blunt tool. Bashir himself has repeatedly declared an emergency in several provinces since 2011 in a bid to quell uprisings. In practice, this means deploying more troops – with fewer restraints on their behaviour – and erecting multiple roadblocks in an effort to control the civilian population’s movements. Under the terms of the decree, security forces can raid premises without warrants and seize property. The order also grants authorities power to ban organisations without explanation.

Shortly after Friday’s announcement, armed security forces surrounded the offices of physicians who have been at the vanguard of protests, firing tear gas to force them out before detaining several of them, according to activists. Unarmed doctors have been among the most active professionals taking part in weekly protests calling for change. The regime also detained dozens of protest and opposition leaders Friday night and Saturday morning. Credible reports are emerging of isolated clashes between units of the National Intelligence and Security Services (seen as most loyal to Bashir) and army units siding with protesters in Port Sudan and other cities. Despite the increased danger, demonstrators poured into the streets in large numbers in several cities and towns around the country a day after Bashir’s speech, braving a police response that included use of live ammunition and tear gas. The risk of an escalation of violence is higher now than it has been at any time since protests broke out in the third week of December.

Sudanese police and its various armed forces already operate under notably permissive laws, enjoying immunity from prosecution. Human Rights Watch reports that security forces have killed at least 51 civilians since the latest round of protests began. With the regime’s back to the wall, these forces are likely to behave with even greater brutality.

Although a new wave of repression against civilians represents the most pronounced danger in the coming weeks and months, it is not the only one. Prolonged unrest has widened pre-existing fissures within Bashir’s regime. According to officials with close links to senior members of the ruling party, by dissolving the government Bashir sought to pre-empt a potential coup from within the NCP. Indeed, the regime appears more divided than in the past. The most prominent divide reportedly pits the senior military establishment (whose loyalty Bashir attempted to further cultivate by appointing 16 out of 18 state governors from their ranks) on one side and an Islamist wing whose leaders are said to advocate a more positive response to demonstrators’ demands on the other. If the split deepens, it could raise the spectre of a dangerous confrontation between these well-organised and well-armed camps. 

Bread and More

Protests began in mid-December in Atbara, a mid-size town 350km from the capital Khartoum and the historic home of Sudan’s once-powerful trade union movement. The immediate trigger for the public outpouring of dissent was a cut to a government subsidy that tripled the price of bread.

Protests are about much more than the price of staples, however. Anger has focused on the failures of what they see as an insular, security-focused regime whose ruinous policies and wanton corruption have created a sclerotic economy with few avenues for socioeconomic advancement. The scale of the current economic crisis, amid rampant inflation and biting foreign currency shortages, is illustrated in long queues of depositors trying to withdraw their funds from banks and reports of account holders having to bribe cashiers to cash their cheques. Scrambles around vans delivering money to banks add to the sense of an economy in freefall. Many families survive on remittances from relatives working abroad.

That some of the most intense protests have occurred in Bashir’s strongholds, in the wealthier centre of the country, is a potent new development.

More than in previous rounds of protests, Bashir’s opponents have proved unexpectedly resilient. Protesters come from mixed political and economic backgrounds. Professionals, particularly doctors and engineers, have teamed up with opposition parties, many younger ruling party members and the Girifna, a coalition of youthful anti-regime university students formed in 2009. That some of the most intense protests have occurred in Bashir’s strongholds, in the wealthier centre of the country, is a potent new development. The regime has veered between repression and promises of reform including supposedly fair elections in 2020, but all this has not been enough to stop the protests.

What Should Be Done

Bashir has a reputation as a survivor but this latest challenge to his rule is especially acute because he has no tool to fix the economic crisis – and no external partner willing to invest the billions that could stabilise the economy. Indeed, the president has reached out to Doha, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as well as Cairo and Moscow, but extracted little more than verbal promises of support. Despite having given Bashir substantial funds in the past and wishing that Sudan not collapse into chaos, Gulf partners prefer not to pump substantial money into Khartoum, believing the economic crisis is structural and requires a substantial change in state policies before a recovery can begin. Qatari defence minister Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah arrived in Khartoum shortly before Bashir’s speech but authorities did not issue a statement on the content of his discussions with officials.

U.S. senior envoy, Cyril Sartor, Special Assistant to the U.S. President and Senior Director for Africa at the National Security Council, travelled to Khartoum in the third week of February to confer with top Bashir administration officials. According to the U.S. embassy there, among subjects discussed were “U.S.-Sudan relations, including concerns about the frequent use of force by the Sudanese government’s security forces to quell recent demonstrations”.

As Crisis Group stated in January, for external actors, the first priority should be to minimise bloodshed on the street. Western partners should warn Bashir and his circle that they will not extend badly needed financial assistance, debt forgiveness, further sanctions relief or normalise relations if the regime keeps up its bloody crackdown against protesters, who have been remarkably peaceful since the uprising began. They should signal to officials close to Bashir that they will be held individually accountable for abuses against civilians. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey, all of whom have ties with Khartoum, should likewise counsel Bashir that the course he has taken will do little to resolve Sudan’s deep crisis.

Bashir appears to be falling back to the script used in 2013 when paramilitary troops killed hundreds to quell large anti-regime protests.

These partners should encourage all sides, especially the government, to abandon a zero-sum approach that could lead to a prolonged stalemate. They should instead consider a broad-based transitional government for a limited period to implement reforms that would set the stage for credible elections. Such a government must exclude Bashir. Because of the dominance of the ruling NCP and the dysfunction of mainstream opposition parties, most protest leaders have good reason to think holding credible elections in 2020 is not possible and are asking for a multi-year transitional government that can hold freer elections in two or three years.

Faced with dwindling options, Bashir has chosen the path of confrontation. By declaring a state of emergency, he has concentrated power even more in his hands and set the stage for a bloody crackdown on protests. Bashir appears to be falling back to the script used in 2013 when paramilitary troops killed hundreds to quell large anti-regime protests. Outside powers can take some steps to help prevent this disastrous scenario:

  • The U.S. and the EU should make clear that they will not normalise relations with Khartoum if the government gives its forces carte blanche to kill and detain protesters. These partners should maintain incentives for Bashir to step down, including the potential deferral of his case at the International Criminal Court under Article 16, but specify that such an offer is conditional on listening to protesters’ demands and enabling a peaceful transition. African leaders who enjoy influence in Khartoum could also encourage Bashir to step aside by offering asylum in a friendly African country. At the same time, international actors should be aware that Bashir’s exit alone will not satisfy the demands of protesters who want the fall of the “regime and its head”, as they chant on the streets, and that forming a broad-based transitional government would be the only acceptable option if Bashir steps down.
     
  • Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, all of whom have good access to key decision makers in Khartoum, should counsel the regime to avoid further bloodshed and to set the stage for credible dialogue with the opposition and the various leaders of the protest movement so all sides can agree on a way to end the stalemate. They should urge Bashir to suspend the state of emergency to pave way for such talks. They should also emphasise to Bashir and his inner circle that speed is of the essence. The longer the crisis persists, the more likely a dangerous descent into chaos.
     
  • Western powers and Khartoum’s allies, including African leaders who maintain contacts with various elements of the government, should reach out through backchannels and lean on them to persuade Bashir to lift the state of emergency and refrain from further violence against protesters. Sudan desperately needs substantial financial assistance to stabilise its economy. Bashir has opted to privilege his own survival over the needs of the nation – a move that should deeply concern elites around him. A state of emergency will further limit economic activity, lock out desperately needed foreign investment and send the economy deeper into the doldrums.
     
  • As far back as 2012, Crisis Group advocated formation of a transitional government for a fixed period including the ruling party, the opposition and civil society to implement defined reforms as one model for a managed transition to end three decades of Bashir’s rule. This remains a credible option that would require concessions by all sides. The opposition would need to accept that the NCP must form part of such an arrangement. The NCP in turn would need to accept that it cannot dominate such a coalition.
     

The sustained wave of protests, gradually mounting since December, has highlighted the frustrations of a wide cross-section of Sudanese with Bashir’s regime. The scale of the economic crisis leaves Bashir with few tools to respond. He seems ready to deploy violent repression to ensure regime survival. All those with access to him should make it clear that this is a losing bet. Further violence will only compound the crisis and could lead to chaos – with a high cost both for him and for Sudan.