A decade of diplomacy, sanctions and nuclear brinkmanship involving Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (plus Germany) led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This accord enshrined a core compromise that Crisis Group had advocated since 2003: acceptance of a limited, tightly monitored uranium enrichment program in Iran in return for that country’s reintegration into the global economy. Despite the JCPOA’s successful first years, the U.S. withdrew from the deal in 2018, putting it at risk of collapse while raising the danger of conflict between Tehran, Washington and their respective allies. Through field research and high-level advocacy, Crisis Group focuses on salvaging the JCPOA and preventing regional tensions from boiling over.
Washington and Tehran have reached an accord bringing U.S. hostages home from Iran and unfreezing Iranian assets. The agreement has much to recommend it, despite what critics say.
De-escalatory understandings between U.S. and Iran began to take shape, underscoring potential for sustained mutual restraint on nuclear and regional fronts, but maritime tensions remained elevated.
First evidence emerged of U.S.-Iran de-escalation. U.S. 10 Aug confirmed Iran’s release of five U.S. nationals from prison to house arrest. Iran’s deputy FM same day indicated that frozen Iranian assets in South Korea were in process of being released, along with “several Iranians who were illegally detained in America”; assets, estimated at around $6bn, will be held in Qatar, where they be available for non-sanctionable humanitarian trade. Additionally, U.S. media reports mid-Aug indicated Tehran had tapered growth of its enriched uranium stockpiling at highest end, while major attacks on U.S. and allied forces by Iranian/Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria appeared to be in lull.
Tensions in maritime domain persisted. After U.S. throughout July announced series of military deployments to Gulf region, various media outlets 3 Aug reported Washington was in advanced deliberations about possibility of dispatching U.S. forces aboard commercial vessels that request it. U.S. 6 Aug announced arrival of 3,000 forces in region facilitating “greater flexibility and maritime capability”; next day Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps warned Iran would “respond in kind to any U.S. action and mischief, including the seizure of ships”. U.S., EU and UK naval authorities 12 Aug alerted commercial vessels of unspecified threat and advised distance from Iranian waters.
Normalisation with Saudi Arabia continued. After Iranian officials 13 Aug reported reopening of Saudi consulate in Mashhad, FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 17-18 Aug travelled to Saudi Arabia for meetings with his Saudi counterpart and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman; Amir-Abdollahian described meetings as “frank, beneficial and productive” (see Saudi Arabia).
Western sanctions mounted. Canada 8 Aug sanctioned seven Iranian individuals, including secretary of Supreme National Security Council, citing their involvement “in activities that gravely threaten international peace and security or that constitute gross and systemic violations of human rights”. UK same day blacklisted nearly dozen Iranian persons and organisations as part of set of 25 designations of foreign entities giving military support to Russia.
The Iranians seem reluctant to give away most of their leverage to restore the nuclear deal not knowing who the next U.S. president will be.
[US President Joe] Biden is in an election cycle, and the types of sanctions relief Iran is seeking won’t pass muster with the Congress.
Many experts still assume that whoever is in the White House will guide Saudi policy on Iran, but that simply isn’t true today.
Lowering the temperature with Iran is a smart way to lower tensions across the region and mitigate some of the proxy battles surrounding Saudi Arabia.
We can see a de-escalation in the regional layer of the [Saudi-Iranian] conflict. It is a multi-layered conflict, with domestic and regional causes, not just a proxy war
The Saudi-Iran deal is a clear sign that both countries are ready to turn the page after years of turmoil.
Episodes of unrest in Iran often unfold similarly: the government nods to public concerns, but then resorts to repression, setting the stage for another confrontation between state and society. The pattern is clearest in peripheral provinces like Khuzestan, where a pressing grievance is water scarcity.
Tehran’s crackdown on anti-government protests and deepening military cooperation with Russia have put relations between Iran and Europe in a downward spiral. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2023 – Spring Update, Crisis Group urges the EU to reinvigorate its efforts to de-escalate tensions.
A Regional Agreement Could Succeed Where Washington Failed
On 10 March, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic relations as part of a Chinese-sponsored initiative that appears aimed at reducing tensions across the Middle East. Crisis Group experts offer a 360-degree view of the implications for the region’s many flashpoints.
Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Founder of the Gulf Research Center and member of Crisis Group’s Board of Trustees, talks about the revival of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in a deal brokered by China.
On 10 March, prodded by China, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations within two months, after seven years of severed ties. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Dina Esfandiary and Anna Jacobs look at the emerging rapprochement.
This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood is joined by Ali Vaez, Crisis Group’s Iran director, to discuss the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian deal, Iran's evolving foreign relations and its fast advancing nuclear program.
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