Sudan

An October 2021 coup added new dangers to the turbulent transition that followed Sudan’s 2019 ouster of Omar al-Bashir, one of Africa’s longest-ruling leaders. The strongman’s toppling, prompted by a sustained, peaceful campaign by a diverse and well-organised protest movement, raised hopes that the country might make a transition to more inclusive, civilian-led rule. Military officers were however reluctant to change. Civilians blamed them for inciting an ethnic group demanding greater representation under an October 2020 peace deal to block access to Khartoum from the coast, causing crushing shortages of essentials in the capital. Sudan matters because it sits in one of the most geostrategic locations on the continent, straddling the Horn and North Africa, with a long Red Sea coastline, and serves as a historical bridge between North and sub-Saharan Africa. Through research and advocacy in Sudan, we aim to reduce the likelihood of domestic conflict by encouraging more inclusive governance and positively engaged regional and foreign policies.

CrisisWatch Sudan

Unchanged Situation

“Phase II” negotiations to restore civilian rule struggled to make headway as manoeuvring by Egypt and South Sudan risked further complicating transition; Israel sought to advance normalisation.

Phase II negotiations to resolve outstanding issues and restore civilian rule stalled. Trilateral mechanism led by African Union (AU), UN mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 31 Jan-3 Feb organised workshop on controversial Juba Peace Agreement (JPA); JPA signatories, who reject December Framework Agreement, boycotted meeting; Quad – U.S., UK, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) – mid-month offered to facilitate talks amid standoff between JPA signatories and main opposition group Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FCC-CC). Meanwhile, number of tribal representatives 12-15 Feb attended conference on crisis in eastern Sudan, but some Beja chieftains boycotted meeting. FFC-CC throughout month held closed meetings on transitional justice and security sector reform to address internal divisions before negotiating with military.

Egypt hosted parallel conference rejecting Framework Agreement. In move widely viewed as attempt to increase Egypt’s role in negotiations and secure its interests in Sudan, Cairo 2-7 Feb organised parallel conference on transitional period. Egypt claimed meeting would complement trilateral mechanism, but did not invite UN, AU or IGAD. FFC-CC rejected invitation, accusing Egypt of derailing transition to civilian govt. Over 80 representatives participated, mostly from FFC-Democratic Block, National Movement Forces and Alliance of the Revolution Committees, as well as UAE, South Sudan, U.S., and Arab League. Participants rejected Framework Agreement and 7 Feb outlined new proposals for sovereign council and announced new alliance, National Democratic Forces Coordination.

South Sudan hosted parallel meeting on implementation of JPA. South Sudan 13-19 Feb hosted conference in its capital Juba to discuss JPA implementation. Sudanese military and 13 rebel groups that signed JPA attended but Juba did not invite FFC-CC, which demands amendments to JPA. Participants 19 Feb signed implementation matrix for original JPA, ignoring civilian demands for revision.

In other important developments. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Israeli FM Eli Cohen 2 Feb agreed to move toward normalising relations; scores 6 Feb protested agreement in capital Khartoum. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 8-9 Feb visited Sudan to garner support against Western sanctions levied against Russia over war in Ukraine.

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In The News

11 Dec 2021
Aid [for Sudan] should be wielded in a way that doesn’t have the military pocketing it or taking credit for it. Al Jazeera

Jonas Horner

Former Deputy Project Director, Horn of Africa & Senior Analyst, Sudan
22 Nov 2021
The [Sudanese] military has shown its cards, it's clearly not seeking to deliver on the transition that people had called for during Sudan’s revolution in 2018-2019. VOA

Jonas Horner

Former Deputy Project Director, Horn of Africa & Senior Analyst, Sudan
17 Nov 2021
There is increasing prospect of the military [in Sudan] splintering and dividing as some sections of junior officers may begin siding with protestors. Al-Monitor

Jonas Horner

Former Deputy Project Director, Horn of Africa & Senior Analyst, Sudan
11 Nov 2021
The military [in Sudan] clearly feels little constraint to expanding its powers from either the street or international stakeholders. Bloomberg

Jonas Horner

Former Deputy Project Director, Horn of Africa & Senior Analyst, Sudan
28 Oct 2021
They [Sudanese military] misunderstand the will on the street quite to their detriment. I think they are badly advised by regional powers supportive on this and uneasy by... Reuters

Jonas Horner

Former Deputy Project Director, Horn of Africa & Senior Analyst, Sudan
15 Oct 2021
[The] completion of Sudan’s transition to a civilian government would imperil the military’s tight hold over the economy and its impunity over abuses during and after the... Al-Monitor

Jonas Horner

Former Deputy Project Director, Horn of Africa & Senior Analyst, Sudan

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Shewit Woldemichael

Senior Analyst, Sudan
Shewit Woldemichael

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