Sudan is an important crossroads between the Horn and North Africa and, for this reason, a country of transit for regional refugee flows and trans-Mediterranean migration networks. While Khartoum and its surrounding provinces remain relatively stable, instability and internal conflict still occur in the country’s peripheries, including the western Darfur region. Many Western countries, including the U.S., European Union and its member states are now seeking better relations with Khartoum. To this end, in October 2017 U.S. economic and trade sanctions were lifted. Through field research and advocacy with Sudanese and international actors in the region, we aim to reduce the likelihood of conflict inside Sudan and encourage Khartoum’s shift toward positively engaged regional and international relations.
A UN mission has largely succeeded in keeping the peace in Abyei, an oil-rich area claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. But there has been less progress made on the mission's work in aiding political mechanisms to determine the final status of Abyei and demilitarise and demarcate the border. As the UN Security Council debates the mission's scope, these mechanisms deserve ongoing support.
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Sporadic fighting continued between govt forces and Sudanese Liberation Army faction led by Abdel Wahid (SLA-AW) in Jebel Marra region of Central Darfur. Govt reportedly mobilised up to 2,000-strong force of Rapid Support Forces militia and Sudan Armed Forces to retake positions from SLA-AW in Jebel Marra raising possibility of more fighting in coming months. Amid ongoing drawdown of UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix 11 June proposed to close all UNAMID bases within two years but reinforce and expand mission’s presence in Jebel Marra. Govt 7 June also advocated for UNAMID drawdown, arguing it is able to provide security and stability there. UN Security Council 29 June voted to extend current UNAMID mandate until 13 July citing insecurity. Ahead of general elections in 2020, Sudan Council of Ministers 10 June approved draft election law reducing number of seats in parliament from 450 to 300 and increasing subnational state representation from two MPs to three; draft to be ratified by National Assembly in Oct. Former opposition party, now member of National Consensus Govt, Popular Congress Party 16 June said law did not reflect opinions of consensus govt. Following talks hosted by President Bashir in Khartoum, S Sudanese President Kiir and his former first VP turned rebel leader Riek Machar signed framework peace agreement 27 June (see South Sudan).
By 12 October, Washington will decide whether the steps Sudan has taken qualify it for lifting some U.S. sanctions. But to push forward afterwards will require a new roadmap that ties further sanctions relief and improved bilateral relations to political reform and human rights.
China, traditionally averse to intervening abroad, is testing the role of peacebuilder in South Sudan, where it has unique leverage. This could portend a growing global security role, but further Chinese engagement will likely be tempered by self-interest, capacity constraints and aversion to risk.
The clock is ticking for President Trump who must decide by 12 July whether to lift decades-long U.S. sanctions on Sudan. The failure of economic penalties to alter Khartoum’s behaviour so far means Washington should repeal some sanctions and continue a process of conditional engagement.
Sudan's government is in survival mode. As it drifts away from its former radical Islamist ideology toward a new foreign policy pragmatism, Western powers should encourage Khartoum to solve the internal wars that have done so much damage to the country and blocked the normalisation of external relations with this increasingly active player in the Middle East.
Talks led by East Africa’s IGAD offer the best chance to end South Sudan’s spreading war. International partners must put aside their disillusionment and rally to the regional body’s new IGAD-PLUS mechanism to help mediators reach a deal.
The two-year-old flare-up of violence in Darfur continues, adding 100,000 people this year to more than 2.5 million who have lost their homes since war began in 2003. Sudanese, regional and international peace processes have stalled. They should restart with parallel initiatives that take into better account all of Darfur’s communities and armed groups.
While [Sudan] wants to show [its] independence from Egypt on the diplomatic front, [it] can’t afford to have a more powerful enemy, such as Egypt, that can affect [its] relationship with the Gulf states.
[Salah Abdallah Mohammed Salih] may be seen [by Sudan's President] as a strong guy who could handle the difficult political situation given the recent protests.
This is a dangerous moment [for Sudan]. By taking out [Darfur's powerful militia chief] Musa Hilal, [Khartoum] has pitched two Darfuri Arab clans against each other.
[After the lifting of U.S. sanctions in Sudan] there’s been a lot of excitement among the Sudanese middle classes, even for things like getting a cinema. The sanctions have not been effective.
It is appropriate to offer Sudan incentives and the beginning of a way back to a kind of international order from which it was thoroughly expelled. They had made enough progress, and we need to keep pushing them to climb.
If the U.S. is smart it will use the momentum it has gained in its relations with Sudan [by announcing an end to its 20-year-old trade embargo] and push for further improvements in the conduct of the Sudanese government.
Addis Ababa can win economic and security gains if it perseveres with its impressive commitment to peace efforts in South Sudan. With its new two-year membership on the UN Security Council, Addis Ababa has the opportunity to better connect regionally-led political processes to UN action.
President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.
Originally published in Daily Monitor
Originally published in Sudan Tribune
Jihadist groups have regrouped in the neglected hinterlands of Sahel countries and are launching attacks from them. To regain control of outlying districts, regional states must do far more to extend services and representation beyond recently recaptured provincial centres.
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