Les tensions croissantes entre le gouvernement, les chercheurs d’or et la population teda du Tibesti font craindre une escalade sécuritaire au Nord du Tchad, dans un contexte régional fragile. Les autorités devraient desserrer l’étau autour de la localité de Miski, éviter les discours réducteurs et rechercher le dialogue.
Boko Haram (BH) kept up attacks on security forces in west as authorities continued to repress opposition and civil society nationwide. In Lake Chad province in west, BH militants 15 April attacked army position at Bohama killing at least eleven soldiers, unknown number of militants also killed; unidentified assailants 16 April attacked gendarmerie position at Dabansali killing one gendarme; BH 23 April attacked army at Tetewa, fighting left four soldiers and six militants dead. Supreme Court 12 April ruled that Romadoumngar Félix Nialbé should replace Saleh Kebzabo as parliamentary opposition leader on grounds that, following defection of one MP from Kebzabo’s party, Romadoumngar’s party had more MPs than Kebzabo’s. Governor of Guera province banned congress of Kebzabo’s party planned for 12 April citing security concerns. Govt 23 April rejected request of youth-led movement Les Transformateurs to become political party. Govt 22 April banned protest against three-month shortage of butane gas that civil society collective had scheduled for 25 April. Authorities 23 April arrested collective’s leader Dingamnayal Versinis after he continued to call for protest, but released him next day when he postponed it. Authorities 25 April arrested thirteen protesters for defying protest ban; released twelve 28 April after public prosecutor dismissed cases against them, but one still detained, reportedly for having contacts with rebel group. President Déby promoted 104 military officers to senior grades 12 April, day after Sudanese military unseated President Bashir. Déby 23 April attended summit on Sudan in Cairo 23 April, at which African leaders gave Sudan’s Transitional Military Council three months to hand over power to civilians.
Les relations entre une frange de la jeunesse sahélienne et le gouvernement tchadien se détériorent, ce qui risque de nourrir les insurrections tchadiennes hors des frontières. Pour y remédier, les autorités devraient lutter contre l’impunité, y compris s’agissant des proches du pouvoir, et éviter les amalgames entre émigration et rébellion.
Créée en février 2017, la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est une force de nouvelle génération dans un espace sahélien où se bousculent des initiatives militaires et diplomatiques parfois concurrentes. Il ne suffira pas de fournir des armes et de l’argent pour résoudre les crises sahéliennes. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, la force doit gagner la confiance des populations et des puissances régionales et obtenir leur soutien.
Since 2015, the conflict between Chad’s armed forces and Boko Haram has destabilised the Lake Chad region in the west of the country. Defeating this resilient insurgency requires the state to go beyond a purely military campaign and relaunch trade, improve public services and reintegrate demobilised militants.
Regional armies in the Lake Chad basin deploy vigilantes to sharpen campaigns against Boko Haram insurgents. But using these militias creates risks as combatants turn to communal violence and organised crime. Over the long term they must be disbanded or regulated.
Ahead of Chad’s presidential election on 10 April popular discontent is rising amid a major economic crisis, growing intra-religious tensions and deadly Boko Haram attacks. The regime that portrays itself as spearheading the fight against regional jihadism could see all sorts of violent actors gain influence at home if it pursues exclusionary politics and denies its people a viable social contract.
[There are no] significant indications of other violent extremist activity [in Chad aside from Boko Haram], so in that respect, [the decision to include Chad in the U.S. travel ban] is completely baffling.
Rural insurgencies across the Sahel are destabilising the region and undermining local security and governance. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue support for the Alliance for the Sahel and promote local dialogue to buttress law and order.
The West sees Chad as a reliable ally in the fight against extremists in the African Sahel. But it needs to take more care. Chad is breaking prior agreements by spending much of its oil revenue on the military, while social services and good governance have suffered.
The Boko Haram insurgency is weakening in the Lake Chad basin, but its underlying socio-economic drivers remain to be addressed. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2017, we urge the EU and its member states to support regional governments with winding down vigilante groups, funding youth employment projects, rebuilding agriculture and trade, and restoring public services.