Les tensions croissantes entre le gouvernement, les chercheurs d’or et la population teda du Tibesti font craindre une escalade sécuritaire au Nord du Tchad, dans un contexte régional fragile. Les autorités devraient desserrer l’étau autour de la localité de Miski, éviter les discours réducteurs et rechercher le dialogue.
Intercommunal violence escalated in Ouaddaï and Dar Sila provinces in east leaving several dozen dead and prompting govt to impose state of emergency and close borders with Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) and Libya, while Boko Haram (BH) continued attacks in west. In Ouaddai province, clashes between nomadic Arab herders and ethnic Ouaddaï farmers in Hamra and Chakoya early Aug left at least 37 dead. In Dar Sila province, clashes between ethnic Dadjo and Mouro in Arata and Sésabané 8-9 Aug left several dozen dead. Govt 19 Aug declared 21-day state of emergency (20 Aug-10 Sept) in Ouaddaï and Dar Sila provinces in east and Tibesti province in north where army continued to confront illegal gold miners; next day announced deployment to three provinces of 5,000 soldiers and closed borders with Sudan, CAR and Libya. Unidentified gunmen 24 Aug attacked Gamba, Mayo-Kebbi East province killing three villagers and abducting one. In south, violence between farmers and herders 26 Aug left eleven dead in Koumogo, Moyen-Chari province. President Déby 26-27 Aug reshuffled security sector. Following presidential decree in July unseating Ouaddaï province’s traditional leader for mismanagement of intercommunal violence, Déby 6 Aug signed decree appointing new leader. Police force’s attempt to remove deposed leader’s family from his residence in Abéché 15 Aug met resistance; hundreds next day demonstrated at palace. In Lake Chad province in west, BH female suicide bomber night of 13-14 Aug detonated explosive vest killing four civilians and one soldier in Kaiga-Kindjiria. In capital N’Djamena, police 11 Aug used tear gas to disperse supporters of opposition movement-turned-party Les Transformateurs. Following meeting with Déby, opposition parties 15 Aug submitted list of representatives to be included in National Framework for Political Dialogue (CNDP), platform comprising ruling majority, opposition and civil society to discuss conduct of elections; Déby next day signed decree appointing CNDP members.
Les relations entre une frange de la jeunesse sahélienne et le gouvernement tchadien se détériorent, ce qui risque de nourrir les insurrections tchadiennes hors des frontières. Pour y remédier, les autorités devraient lutter contre l’impunité, y compris s’agissant des proches du pouvoir, et éviter les amalgames entre émigration et rébellion.
Créée en février 2017, la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est une force de nouvelle génération dans un espace sahélien où se bousculent des initiatives militaires et diplomatiques parfois concurrentes. Il ne suffira pas de fournir des armes et de l’argent pour résoudre les crises sahéliennes. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, la force doit gagner la confiance des populations et des puissances régionales et obtenir leur soutien.
Since 2015, the conflict between Chad’s armed forces and Boko Haram has destabilised the Lake Chad region in the west of the country. Defeating this resilient insurgency requires the state to go beyond a purely military campaign and relaunch trade, improve public services and reintegrate demobilised militants.
Regional armies in the Lake Chad basin deploy vigilantes to sharpen campaigns against Boko Haram insurgents. But using these militias creates risks as combatants turn to communal violence and organised crime. Over the long term they must be disbanded or regulated.
Ahead of Chad’s presidential election on 10 April popular discontent is rising amid a major economic crisis, growing intra-religious tensions and deadly Boko Haram attacks. The regime that portrays itself as spearheading the fight against regional jihadism could see all sorts of violent actors gain influence at home if it pursues exclusionary politics and denies its people a viable social contract.
[There are no] significant indications of other violent extremist activity [in Chad aside from Boko Haram], so in that respect, [the decision to include Chad in the U.S. travel ban] is completely baffling.
Rural insurgencies across the Sahel are destabilising the region and undermining local security and governance. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue support for the Alliance for the Sahel and promote local dialogue to buttress law and order.
The West sees Chad as a reliable ally in the fight against extremists in the African Sahel. But it needs to take more care. Chad is breaking prior agreements by spending much of its oil revenue on the military, while social services and good governance have suffered.
The Boko Haram insurgency is weakening in the Lake Chad basin, but its underlying socio-economic drivers remain to be addressed. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2017, we urge the EU and its member states to support regional governments with winding down vigilante groups, funding youth employment projects, rebuilding agriculture and trade, and restoring public services.