Despite Chad’s economic woes and its citizens’ frustration with elite impunity, its civil society organisations have struggled to mobilise into a coherent protest movement. But these groups might yet play a more important role if the country undergoes more dramatic and potentially destabilising changes.
Intercommunal violence flared up in several regions leaving dozens dead, while govt continued to repress opposition amid COVID-19 restrictions. Farmer-herder clashes 10 Dec killed at least 12 in Doulbarid locality, Ouaddai province (east). Land dispute between ethnic Bulala and Arab communities 12 Dec escalated into brawl in Achiguek village, Batha East province (centre), leaving at least 25 dead. Herder-farmer clashes overnight 13-14 Dec also reportedly left nine dead in Béré town, Tandjilé province (south); angry mob next day ransacked préfet’s residence and vandalised police vehicles in Béré, leaving another two dead. Meanwhile, President Déby’s constitutional revision suffered setback. Parliament 3 Dec adopted constitutional reform bill providing that head of Senate – and not VP, personally appointed by president, as favoured by Déby – would take over as interim president in case of presidential vacancy or inability; Déby 14 Dec passed text into law. Court 11 Dec acquitted and released human rights activist Alain Kemba Didah and two co-defendants of “public order offenses” and “acts of rebellion” including breaching COVID-19-related restrictions; trio was arrested late Nov after organising opposition’s “citizens’ forum” in capital N’Djamena. Govt 11 Dec suspended opposition Parti Réformiste for three months after party chairman Yacine Abdramane Sakine 7 Dec said military was “held hostage by a small minority […] to keep Déby’s corrupt regime in power”. Members of opposition party Les Transformateurs 12 and 23 Dec gathered in N’Djamena to call for greater political freedom; police used tear gas to disperse them, citing COVID-19 regulations, leaving at least three injured. Amid small rise in COVID-19 cases, Déby 31 Dec banned all movement in and out of N’Djamena (including through airport) and all but essential movements within city for one week.
Des violences intercommunautaires opposant principalement des communautés arabes et non arabes ont ravagé l’Est du Tchad en 2019, et pourraient menacer la stabilité du pays. Le gouvernement devrait ouvrir un large débat sur la gestion des mobilités pastorales et soutenir l’organisation d’une conférence inclusive à l’Est.
Les tensions croissantes entre le gouvernement, les chercheurs d’or et la population teda du Tibesti font craindre une escalade sécuritaire au Nord du Tchad, dans un contexte régional fragile. Les autorités devraient desserrer l’étau autour de la localité de Miski, éviter les discours réducteurs et rechercher le dialogue.
Les relations entre une frange de la jeunesse sahélienne et le gouvernement tchadien se détériorent, ce qui risque de nourrir les insurrections tchadiennes hors des frontières. Pour y remédier, les autorités devraient lutter contre l’impunité, y compris s’agissant des proches du pouvoir, et éviter les amalgames entre émigration et rébellion.
Créée en février 2017, la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est une force de nouvelle génération dans un espace sahélien où se bousculent des initiatives militaires et diplomatiques parfois concurrentes. Il ne suffira pas de fournir des armes et de l’argent pour résoudre les crises sahéliennes. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, la force doit gagner la confiance des populations et des puissances régionales et obtenir leur soutien.
Since 2015, the conflict between Chad’s armed forces and Boko Haram has destabilised the Lake Chad region in the west of the country. Defeating this resilient insurgency requires the state to go beyond a purely military campaign and relaunch trade, improve public services and reintegrate demobilised militants.
Regional armies in the Lake Chad basin deploy vigilantes to sharpen campaigns against Boko Haram insurgents. But using these militias creates risks as combatants turn to communal violence and organised crime. Over the long term they must be disbanded or regulated.
Chad is an essential component of Western countries’ strategy in the Sahel and in the fight against terrorism.
[Chadian president Déby] has a pretty fractious inner circle, and he knows that any local conflict could quickly escalate into a national one.
[There are no] significant indications of other violent extremist activity [in Chad aside from Boko Haram], so in that respect, [the decision to include Chad in the U.S. travel ban] is completely baffling.
Une incursion de l’Union des forces de la résistance (UFR) en territoire tchadien depuis la Libye, début février, a été arrêtée par des frappes aériennes françaises, en coordination avec l’armée tchadienne. Cette menace sécuritaire inédite depuis plusieurs années met en relief les fragilités du Tchad et du pouvoir en place.
Rural insurgencies across the Sahel are destabilising the region and undermining local security and governance. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue support for the Alliance for the Sahel and promote local dialogue to buttress law and order.
The West sees Chad as a reliable ally in the fight against extremists in the African Sahel. But it needs to take more care. Chad is breaking prior agreements by spending much of its oil revenue on the military, while social services and good governance have suffered.
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