In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood and Naz Modirzadeh talk with Sahel experts Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim and Richard Moncrieff about France’s announcement it will pull troops from Mali, and what the withdrawal means for the fighting against jihadist insurgents.
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Authorities in Mali seem to be considering negotiations with Jamaat Nusratul Islam wal-Muslimin, the country’s largest Islamist insurgency. Pursuing talks will be a tall order, given the stakes and the group’s al-Qaeda connection. Both the government and the militants should begin with incremental steps.
Les deux coups d’Etats d’août 2020 et mai 2021 ont plongé le Mali, toujours en proie aux violences armées, dans l’instabilité. Malgré un bilan jusqu’ici décevant, les autorités de la transition malienne peuvent encore concrétiser l’aspiration au changement et organiser des élections générales transparentes en 2022.
A spate of mass killings in Niger’s Tillabery region has raised the spectre of broader civil strife. Most worrying is the ethnic dimension to the crimes. Authorities should move quickly to prioritize civilian protection lest vigilantes take matters into their own hands.
Dans le sud-ouest du Niger, le banditisme armé pourrait renforcer la méfiance entre les communautés et favoriser des insurrections susceptibles d’être exploitées par les jihadistes. Les autorités nigériennes devraient agir pour remédier aux injustices subies par les communautés vivant de l’élevage, initier des dialogues intercommunautaires et mieux encadrer les groupes d’autodéfense embryonnaires.
Since 2013, when it sent troops to Mali, France has led international efforts to root out Islamist militancy from the Sahel. Yet the jihadist threat has grown. Paris and its partners should reorient their military-centred approach toward helping improve governance in the region.
Au Mali, les violences dans la zone située aux sud et sud-est de Mopti prennent un caractère de plus en plus communautaire. Les autorités de transition devraient harmoniser les initiatives de dialogue, renforcer la présence étatique et traiter les problèmes de fonds, notamment les conflits fonciers.
Considering Ecowas’ recent failures to deter coups, what happened in Mali and Burkina Faso may inspire other officers in the region.
Maybe this is a mistake. But the French are downsizing, they’re not withdrawing [from the Sahel]. They’re still the biggest military force in the region.
Deploying counterterror forces [in the Sahel region] has wiped out some leaders but failed to defeat or contain the threat. Instead, there has been a rise in authoritarian rule, a spread in instability and much higher risk to civilians.
Everyone seems obsessed with what is going on in Bamako, and that is another indication for the people in [Mali's] countryside that the state is not coming back.
Putting a bounty on militant leaders’ heads, these types of policy moves, make negotiations and outreach [in Burkina Faso] quite a bit harder.
This virtual roundtable examines the various and complex links between climate change and conflict.
Les autorités françaises ont annoncé, le mois dernier, la mort d’Adnan Abou Walid al-Sahraoui, fondateur et chef de l’Etat islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS). Dans ce Q&A, Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim et Jean-Hervé Jezequel expliquent comment sa disparition pourrait ouvrir un espace propice au dialogue entre certains commandants locaux de l’EIGS et les gouvernements sahéliens.
In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood and Naz Modirzadeh talk with Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, Crisis Group’s Sahel expert, about whether it is time for a new strategy in Mali as the government and its allies struggle against jihadist insurgents.
Could the seizure of Afghanistan by the Taliban just before the twentieth anniversary of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks be a turning point for jihadist militancy worldwide? (Online Event, 28th September 2021)
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