Since 2012, Mali has faced a volatile crisis as political armed groups, including ethnic based movements, jihadist groups and transnational criminal networks, fight for hegemony and the control of trafficking routes in the North. The 2015 peace agreement remains very difficult to implement and signatory groups still resort to violence to settle differences. Jihadist violence against security forces is increasing and militants have gone rural to capitalise on local conflicts and the absence of the State to secure safe havens and new recruits. Mali’s instability has regional consequences as violent extremism spills into neighbouring countries. Through field research, timely reports and advocacy with regional and local actors, Crisis Group seeks to broaden understanding of the complex roots of violence in Mali via local, gendered and regional lenses and to find solutions to problems of governance.
The Malian government’s battle with jihadist insurgencies goes on after two coups in Bamako in the last two years. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2022 – Spring Update, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to endorse talks about a return to constitutional rule, increase support for civil society and back electoral reform initiatives.
Jihadists pressed ahead with offensive in north, while govt forces and allies sustained counter-insurgency operations in centre; transitional authorities pushed ahead with plan to change constitution.
Islamic State Sahel Province clashed with rival as it consolidates control in north. In Ménaka region, local populations in Oct continued to flee from areas around regional capital Ménaka amid rumours that IS Sahel militants may seek to assault city. Also in Ménaka, IS Sahel and al-Qaeda Affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) late Oct reportedly engaged in intense fighting in Adéraboukane, Inchnane and Tamalate localities; local sources said JNIM had gained upper hand. IS Sahel continued to make progress in Ansongo district of Gao region, where ambush on military convoy near Fafa locality 1 Oct wounded six. In Kidal region, UN mission MINUSMA peacekeepers 17 Oct hit explosive device near Tessalit village, leaving four dead.
Fighting continued apace in centre as military tries to reconquer lost territories. Military 3-5 Oct killed 31 presumed JNIM militants and destroyed two of their bases in Niono district (Ségou region); 4-6 Oct arrested 50 presumed jihadists in Sofara town and Mopti city (both Mopti region). Also in Mopti, public bus 13 Oct hit explosive device between Bandiagara and Goundaga towns, killing 10; local officials 31 Oct claimed govt forces and private security company Wagner operatives previous day killed at least 13 civilians in Guelledjé locality, Ténenkou district.
Transitional authorities poised to change constitution and militarise police. Constitutional drafting commission 11 Oct submitted preliminary draft of new constitution to interim President Goïta, who wants to put new constitution to referendum in March 2023. Coalition gathering dozens of opposition parties in following days insisted drafting process should be handled by democratically elected civilian govt. Meanwhile, transitional legislative body late Oct passed law allowing police and civil protection services to play more active role in fight against jihadist groups while also depriving officers of their right to strike.
Govt continued to confront traditional security partners. At UN Security Council, FM Abdoulaye Diop 18 Oct again accused France of supporting jihadists and undermining Mali’s sovereignty; Paris immediately denounced “slander”. Negotiations for release of 46 Ivorian soldiers dragged on (see Côte d’Ivoire).
Considering Ecowas’ recent failures to deter coups, what happened in Mali and Burkina Faso may inspire other officers in the region.
Everyone seems obsessed with what is going on in Bamako, and that is another indication for the people in [Mali's] countryside that the state is not coming back.
Mali has a lot of issues related to the Sahel.
Eight years of effort, investment, presence to basically return to the situation of Mali at the time of the 2012 coup, with a confused situation in Bamako, more violent a...
The composition of the national assembly is disputed. If the [Malian] president were to resign, it would mark a big jump into the void.
[Mahmoud Dicko] has been able to position himself as this person who can channel the people's anger toward protest on several issues.
In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood and Naz Modirzadeh talk with Sahel experts Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim and Richard Moncrieff about France’s announcement it will pull troops from Mali, and what the withdrawal means for the fighting against jihadist insurgents.
Authorities in Mali seem to be considering negotiations with Jamaat Nusratul Islam wal-Muslimin, the country’s largest Islamist insurgency. Pursuing talks will be a tall order, given the stakes and the group’s al-Qaeda connection. Both the government and the militants should begin with incremental steps.
In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood and Naz Modirzadeh talk with Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, Crisis Group’s Sahel expert, about whether it is time for a new strategy in Mali as the government and its allies struggle against jihadist insurgents.
Successive coups in August 2020 and May 2021 have thrown Mali into turmoil as violence persists in rural areas. While their track record so far has been disappointing, the transitional authorities can still materialise the call for change and hold transparent general elections in 2022.
Military officers have arrested the heads of Mali’s transitional state and government, installed following the August 2020 coup. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Jean-Hervé Jezequel details the possible fallout of this second putsch in a country already weakened by conflict with jihadists.
Since 2013, when it sent troops to Mali, France has led international efforts to root out Islamist militancy from the Sahel. Yet the jihadist threat has grown. Paris and its partners should reorient their military-centred approach toward helping improve governance in the region.
In Mali, violence in the areas to the south and east of Mopti is taking on an increasingly ethnic dimension. The transitional authorities should harmonise dialogue initiatives and strengthen state presence, while seeking to resolve substantial issues such as land disputes.
Le 18 août 2020 au Mali, un coup d’Etat militaire intervient après deux mois de manifestations contre le président Keïta. Les acteurs maliens et leurs partenaires doivent restaurer l’ordre constitutionnel, sans se contenter de rétablir le système et de remettre en place les personnalités renversées, qui ont largement contribué à générer la crise.
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