Tracking Conflict Worldwide

CrisisWatch is our global conflict tracker, an early warning tool designed to help prevent deadly violence. It keeps decision-makers up-to-date with developments in over 70 conflicts and crises every month, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. In addition, CrisisWatch monitors over 50 situations (“standby monitoring”) to offer timely information if developments indicate a drift toward violence or instability. Entries dating back to 2003 provide easily searchable conflict histories.




Sudanese army (SAF) made significant gains against paramilitary forces (RSF) and fighting reignited in North Darfur, amid rising risk of famine.

RSF lost ground amid SAF offensive. SAF recaptured much of Omdurman city from RSF, with its forces 12 March taking control of national radio and television headquarters. Offensive 17 March reached Signal Corps in Bahri city, which risks becoming next epicentre of fighting; SAF could also attempt to retake capital Khartoum, increasing danger of protracted urban warfare. SAF launched multi-pronged offensive into RSF-controlled El Gezira state; paramilitary holds state capital Wad Madani, critical for maintaining its positions in Khartoum. Sudan Liberation Movement under Darfur governor Minni Minawi 24 March announced group was joining SAF to expel RSF from Khartoum and El Gezira. Meanwhile, violence 15 March broke out in North Darfur’s capital El Fasher, with SAF conducting airstrikes on RSF positions; fighting could engulf state in conflict, drawing in armed groups from Darfur that have so far remained neutral. 

Various diplomatic efforts continued, albeit without clear results. AU High-Level Panel for Sudan 6 March met separately with members of former President Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and Forces for Freedom and Change-Democratic Bloc in Egyptian capital Cairo. Panel next day separately met RSF and civilian coalition Taqaddum in Ethiopia; both criticised panel’s talks with NCP, indicating challenge of bridging Sudan’s polarised political landscape. UN Security Council 8 March urged cessation of hostilities during Muslim holy month Ramadan; RSF next day welcomed call, but SAF 10 March ruled out truce unless RSF leaves civilian locations. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello 11 March embarked on regional tour, 26 March said he hoped for restart of talks around 18 April, though RSF and SAF remained sceptical about U.S. mediation. Rumours circulated of secret RSF-SAF meetings in Cairo, which RSF denied. Regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development 26 March appointed Special Envoy for Sudan.

Humanitarian agencies warned of looming hunger crisis. World Food Program head 6 March warned conflict risks triggering “world’s largest hunger crisis”, with “over 25 million people across Sudan, South Sudan and Chad trapped in a spiral of deteriorating food security”. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 29 March called for immediate action “to prevent famine”.


Political manoeuvring intensified ahead of 2026 general elections, with appointment of President Museveni’s son as army chief. 

Inter-govt tensions over succession continued. President Museveni 21 March appointed son, Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as head of military, in move widely seen as grooming him for succession but also stalling Muhoozi’s informal campaign for presidency in 2026, when Museveni is expected to seek re-election. In lead up to appointment, Muhoozi continued campaigning efforts for newly formed Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU) as part of his presidential ambitions, including in Masaka district 15 March. 

Authorities warned that Allied Democratic Force remained threat. Military 18 March heightened alertness after receiving intelligence that suspected Islamic-State-affiliated Allied Democratic Force fighters had entered country from DR Congo, warning against large gatherings in churches, bars and other public places.

In other important developments. Viral social media campaign exposed corruption within parliament; under banner #UgandaParliamentExhibition, leaks from govt’s financial system made public on social media sparked outrage from late Feb through March; disclosures revealed mass corruption among parliamentarians across political spectrum including misuse of public funds on personal projects, wastage on foreign travel and excessive spending on partisan political activities. Meanwhile, court 12 March dismissed LGBTQ+ rights advocacy group Sexual Minorities Uganda’s petition seeking govt registration amid ongoing tensions around anti-LGBTQ+ laws. 


Govt crackdown continued with mass evictions and discussion of law restricting civil society; relations with U.S. strained amid adjustment of sanctions. 

Repression continued including removals of those living on state-owned land. Govt kept up campaign to remove people living in “illegal” dwellings on state-owned land, with police arresting thousands of settlers since measures began mid-Jan, drawing opposition from civil society as well as some in ruling ZANU-PF party; criminal actors took advantage of situation, with local NGO 11 March reporting gang had attempted to violently enforce evictions in village with gold mining opportunities in Insiza district, Matabeleland South province, leading to clashes with villagers. Meanwhile, parliament 1 March began process to pass controversial Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill that critics argue will be used to control civil society organisations.

Washington lifted broad sanctions and imposed targeted ones. U.S. treasury 4 March removed broad program of sanctions, imposed new penalties against eleven people, including President Mnangagwa and his wife, and three companies for corruption and human rights abuses under Global Magnitsky measures; spokesperson for Mnangagwa – who became first sitting head of state to be sanctioned under program that blocks access to U.S. visas, property and services – 6 March condemned “illegal coercive measures”. In sign of worsening tensions, U.S. aid chief Samantha Power 8 March decried “unacceptable” intimidation following alleged Feb harassment, detainment and deportation of U.S. aid staff in capital Harare; govt accused workers of interfering and violating sovereignty.

Burkina Faso

Jihadist-related attacks and counter-insurgency operations continued to exact high toll on civilians; govt used forced enrolment to silence opponents and signed security agreement with Mali and Niger. 

High-level violence persisted, with at least 100 civilians reported killed in one day. Following late Feb surge of violence that saw hundreds of civilians killed by jihadist fighters and reportedly state security forces, further conflict reported: special police and al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 8 March clashed in Piela commune, Gnagna province (East region), resulting in four insurgent deaths, while same day drone strikes killed around ten Islamic State Sahel Province militants near Touka-Bayel village, Seno province (Sahel region). Next day, JNIM attacked Tessoague village, Koulpelogo province (Centre-East region), killing at least 27 including two civilian auxiliaries (VDPs). JNIM militants 26 March attacked govt forces in Sanaba town (Boucle du Mouhoun region), leading to deaths of at least eleven soldiers and twenty insurgents. Meanwhile, reports emerged that suspected soldiers 16 March allegedly killed at least 100 civilians in several villages in Kompienga province (East region) during apparent attempt to relieve area from JNIM blockades in place since 2022; observers suggested attacks may have been retaliation for locals’ alleged support to militants and Feb series of jihadist killings.

Govt continued repressive measures against civil society. Concerns grew over authorities forcing opponents to join VDPs following late Feb abduction of Rasmane Zinaba and Bassirou Badjo, activists and members of Balai Citoyen civil group, amid suspicions govt obliged them to enrol with civilian auxiliaries; UN 5 March condemned continued “enforced disappearances” and “forced mobilisation.” Govt 7 March released former FM Ouédraogo, who reported military keepers had told him to spread word about consequences of criticising military authorities; next day Daouda Diallo, another civil society actor forced into VDP enrolment in Dec 2023, also released. 

Security agreement announced with Mali and Niger. Alliance of Sahel States 6 March announced creation of joint counterterrorism force to combat regional jihadist insurgency and address shared security needs.

Côte d’Ivoire

Jostling continued ahead of 2025 presidential election with announcement of first candidacies. 

Opposition party African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) 9 March announced former President Laurent Gbagbo as candidate for 2025 presidency polls, despite his ineligibility due to 2018 criminal conviction for looting Central Bank of West African States during 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis. Main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) leader Tidjane Thiam 11 March confirmed good relations with Gbagbo. Meanwhile Philippe Legré, member of ruling party Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace’s (RHDP) executive board and governor of Bas-Sassandra region, 16 March said President Ouattara would be RHDP candidate for 2025 election. 


Junta announced formation of new govt amid questions over regime stability and future of transition. 

New administration composed of technocratic and junta-friendly ministers. Junta 13 March announced 29-member cabinet following Feb dissolution of govt amid internal power struggles. Junta-allied Defence, Security and Foreign Ministers among fourteen who kept posts from previous administration; both former PM Goumou and former Justice Minister Charles Wright, whose tensions with one another may have contributed to Feb dissolvement of govt, lost posts. Meanwhile, PM Bah 25 March said elections “cannot effectively be held” in 2024; civil society remained concerned transitional govt would continue past proposed Dec 2024 end date due to lengthy process of finalising Constitution and organising elections; first draft of new Constitution, promised for March, yet to be circulated.

Popular pushback continued against lack of services and repression. Electricity blackouts led to demonstrations and unrest, with police allegedly killing two youths during protests related to power cuts in Kindia city 12 March and another in capital Conakry 14 March; in response to lack of supply, President Doumbouya 16 March sacked several senior electricity officials. Meanwhile, in apparent attempt to pursue conciliatory tone, Bah 6 March met with journalists and subsequently said he would consult with Doumbouya about lifting media constraints, with govt having removed internet restrictions in Feb.


Govt-sponsored inter-Malian dialogue took initial steps amid ongoing stifling of civic and political rights; jihadist and other armed violence continued.

Initial phase of dialogue approved, albeit without main rebel and jihadist groups. Piloting Committee 4 March submitted terms of reference for Inter-Malian dialogue process to transitional President Col. Goïta, following approval from representatives from capital Bamako, regions and diaspora; participants agreed on five thematic committees covering peace and reconciliation, security, economic development, geopolitical issues and political reforms. Several key actors remained outside process including main rebel and jihadist groups; govt 8 March imposed initial six-months long financial sanctions on two leaders associated with al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), and four from Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), coalition of armed groups from 2015 Algiers Accord. 

Concerns rose over restrictions on civil and political freedoms. Govt 6 March dissolved influential group Coordination of Movements, Associations and Sympathizers (CMAS) – led by well-known figure and vocal govt critic Imam Mahmoud Dicko – and 13 March shut down Association of Malian Students. National Human Rights Commission 6 March expressed concerns about “serious threats” to political freedoms, especially freedom of association; UN human rights body 13 March also condemned moves. Meanwhile, over 80 political parties and civil society groups 31 March called for end to transition and organisation of presidential elections as soon as possible.

Violence by jihadist and other armed groups remained high. Notably, Islamic State Sahel Province militants 6 March attacked army base in Labbezanga, Gao region, leaving at least four attackers dead; JNIM shelling targeted airports in Gao city 16 March and Timbuktu city two days later, causing injuries and material damage. Alliance of Sahel States 6 March announced creation of joint counterterrorism force to combat regional jihadist insurgency and address shared security needs. Meanwhile, Dozo militia 8 March reportedly abducted and killed around 30 Fulani near Kingolola village, Segou region.

In other important developments. Hundreds 16 March protested high cost of living and insecurity in Ménaka city. Officials 19 March visited Russia’s capital Moscow for discussions on security cooperation and expanding partnership in commerce, transportation, and more.


Govt severed military accords with U.S. and moved closer to Sahelian partners; jihadist violence continued.

Niamey distanced itself militarily from Washington. After U.S. diplomatic delegation 12 March visited capital Niamey and met PM Zeine and others, authorities 16 March “denounced with immediate effect” its military accords with Washington; govt accused delegation of disrespect of diplomatic protocol and intention to limit Niamey’s sovereignty in choice of international partners; uncertainty grew over whether 1,000 U.S. military personnel, many based at Agadez military base, will remain in country; govt and U.S. ambassador 27 March discussed future plan for “disengagement” of U.S. forces. Earlier, Alliance of Sahelian States 6 March announced creation of joint counterterrorism force to combat regional jihadist insurgency and address shared security needs.

Jihadist-related violence persisted in Tillabery. In Tillabery region (south west), Islamic State Sahel Province militants 3 March attacked convoy of trucks near Koutougou Haoussa village, killing around seven people and burning seven vehicles; militants 19 March ambushed military position near Teguey town killing 23 soldiers and wounding seventeen, with some 30 assailants killed. In Diffa region (south east), military 13 March killed ten alleged Islamic State West Africa Province militants in airstrike near Assaga village.

In important regional developments. After West African regional bloc ECOWAS lifted sanctions on govt in Feb, land borders between Niger and Nigeria re-opened 22 March; border with Benin, however, remained closed, although 2,000km-long Niger-Benin pipeline began transporting crude oil from Niger’s Agadem field to Benin in early March.


Series of mass abductions by bandits and jihadists underlined widespread insecurity; violence also continued in South East and Niger Delta, while deepening economic crisis heightened social tensions.

Criminal groups kidnapped hundreds and killed dozens in North West and North Central. In Kaduna state, gunmen 7 March abducted scores of students and a staff member from schools in Kuriga town, Chikun area, demanding 1bn Naira (roughly $650,000) for their return; govt 24 March said all 137 students rescued alive from neighbouring Zamfara state, but staff member died in captivity. In Kaduna state, daily reports of bandit attacks 8-17 March saw at least 190 abducted and unconfirmed number killed, mostly in Kajuru and Birnin Gwari areas; in Niger State, armed group 21 March killed 29 people in attack on local market in Rafi area.

Jihadist-related insecurity continued in North East. In Borno state, UN 6 March reported jihadists 29 Feb kidnapped over 200 internally displaced people near Gamboru Ngala town; local sources said between 113 and 319 were abducted amid conflicting reports over whether Boko Haram or Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were responsible. Military continued operations against jihadists reporting hundreds killed, while reports also emerged that former fighters had threatened to rejoin insurgency.

Violence continued in South East and flared in Niger Delta. Security forces continued operations against Biafran separatists in South East. Notably, troops 7 March killed twenty members of Indigenous People of Biafra armed wing Eastern Security Network, destroying major camp at Mother Valley in Orsu area, Imo state. In Niger Delta, clashes between communities over land dispute in Bomadi area of Delta state killed sixteen soldiers on peace mission 14 March, causing widespread outrage.

Deepening economic malaise heightened social tensions, risking unrest. Fears over cost of living crisis-related insecurity grew following late Feb stampede at food auction site in Lagos city that killed seven, with food inflation at over 35%. In suburb of federal capital Abuja, residents 3 March looted food items from govt warehouse. Crushes at relief distribution centre in Nasarawa state 22 March and charity giving event in Bauchi state 24 March left ten people dead.


Korean Peninsula

U.S. and South Korean conducted military drills as North Korea resumed missile testing, while Russia vetoed renewal of UN panel tasked with monitoring sanctions compliance. 

Following seasonal alliance military drills, Pyongyang launched missiles. U.S. and South Korea 4-14 March held annual Spring exercises, which passed off without dramatic North Korean response; this may indicate some form of distress inside North Korea – with domestic media focused on agricultural challenges – but there is chance North Korea may respond more forcefully to drills in coming months. Following exercises, leader Kim Jong Un 18 March supervised live-fire drill of multiple rocket launchers and Pyongyang same day fired three short-range ballistic missiles into waters off peninsula’s east coast. State media 20 March reported successful test of solid-fuel engine for intermediate-range hypersonic missile.

Russia wielded veto to block renewed mandate for UN Panel of Experts. Vote on renewal of UN Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions – tasked with monitoring compliance with sanctions – was delayed and thrown into doubt after Russia 12 March proposed changes, including sunset clause for sanctions and reducing reporting period from every six months to annual. U.S. and its allies remain steadfast in opposition to alterations to sanctions or reporting framework, arguing sustained pressure on North Korea is essential. Russia 28 March vetoed renewal, ensuring panel’s mandate will expire 30 April; U.S. accused Russia of silencing body because it began reporting on “Russia’s blatant violations of the UN Security Council resolutions”. In further sign of Russia’s lack of sanctions enforcement and compliance, Financial Times 26 March reported that Russia 7 March began “first documented direct seaborne deliveries” of oil to North Korea in contravention of 2017 UN sanctions, possibly in part payment for munitions deliveries. 

South Korea issued stern warning against Pyongyang’s provocations. Speaking at ninth West Sea Defence Day, which commemorates North Korean provocations in West Sea, South Korean President Yoon 22 March cautioned Pyongyang against reckless provocations and emphasised resolve of South Korea govt and military to push back against aggression; Yoon also pledged to further enhance trilateral security cooperation with U.S. and Japan.

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