Negotiations between Huthis and Saudi Arabia remained stalled despite flurry of diplomatic activity and confidence-building steps, while rival forces jostled for control in southern provinces.

Huthi-Saudi talks remained deadlocked despite steps to ease tensions. In attempt to increase pressure on Huthis, Saudi Arabia 5 June held talks on Yemen with Chinese officials and 7 June with U.S. officials. Other diplomatic efforts continued at high intensity: notably, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 4-5 June travelled to Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Presidential Leadership Council leader Rashad al-Alimi 8 June met U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in Saudi capital Riyadh. Negotiations, however, remained stuck over various Huthi demands, including salary payments and increasing flights from Sanaa airport. In positive steps, national carrier Yemenia Airways 8 June announced doubling flight schedule to six, with first direct flight since 2016 between Yemen and Saudi Arabia 17 June arriving in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah; Huthi media 21 June reported Saudi Arabia and Huthis exchanged bodies of fighters. Huthis officials issued weekly warnings of return to hostilities and Huthi redeployments along front underscored potential of renewed war. Meanwhile, UN 16-18 June convened talks between govt and Huthis in Jordanian capital Amman, where Huthis reportedly agreed to negotiate release of prominent political prisoner and Islah member Mohammed Qahran.

Regional actors manoeuvred their affiliated forces in south. Following Riyadh’s request, Al-Alimi’s Nation Shield Forces 6 June deployed from Saudi border toward Aden province, signalling intent to counteract United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) influence in south; STC next day reportedly sent reinforcements to Aden. In Hadramawt province, after STC took steps to solidify its influence with UAE support in recent months, Saudi Arabia invited several prominent Hadrami leaders to Riyadh for discussions regarding future of region, underscoring tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi; participants of discussions 21 June established Hadramawt National Council.

In other important developments. Huthis continued to economically undermine govt, notably by importing cooking gas through Hodeida port to break govt’s monopoly in Marib. Clashes between suspected al-Qaeda militants and UAE-backed pro-govt Shebwa Defence Forces 10 June reportedly killed three in Shebwa province.

Hopes of breakthrough deal between Saudi Arabia and Huthis dwindled, while southern separatists demanded independent state and factions jockeyed for control of Hadramawt province.

Huthi-Saudi talks stalled. After Saudi diplomatic visit in April raised expectation of breakthrough, Huthis refused to sign Saudi-proposed roadmap or deal with Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and refused to provide guarantees to enter intra-Yemen talks; Huthis reportedly demanded Riyadh pay reparations for war. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 2-3 May visited capital Sanaa and held “constructive” meeting with Huthi leaders; 3 May travelled to Aden for “fruitful” discussion with PLC head al-Alimi. Grundberg 17 May briefed UN Security Council, noting “clear determination on all sides to make progress” toward peace deal despite violence along front lines, particularly in al-Jawf, Marib, Taiz and Saada governorates.

Southern Transitional Council (STC) made bid for leadership in south. In attempt to build consensus among southern groups on secession and position itself as main force in south ahead of anticipated intra-Yemeni talks, STC 4-8 May convened Southern National Consultative Meeting, which 8 May produced “national charter” calling for “restoration of the state of the south”; several important groups, notably Hadramawt Inclusive Conference and National Conference for the People of the South, refused to attend, stating opposition to STC’s expansionist agenda. STC 8 May announced council’s restructuring, including creation of legislative body of 392 members. STC President and PLC Vice President Ayderous al-Zubaidi 9 May appointed three new STC vice presidents.

Tensions persisted in Hadramawt, UN proceeded to salvage FSO Safer. Amid STC threats to take over Wadi Hadramawt – northern valley of Hadramawt controlled by Saudi-aligned Islah forces – Saudi-led delegation 5-6 May met Hadramawt and Shebwa governors as part of Saudi strategy to challenge STC’s power and deploy Nation’s Shield Forces headed by al-Alimi. PLC 22 May met Saudi defence minister in Riyadh, where council members criticised STC’s moves in Hadramawt. UN 4 May fell short of funding target to salvage stranded oil tanker FSO Safer but planned to begin rescue operation.

First Saudi diplomatic visit to Yemen in eight years and prisoner swap injected momentum into peace talks, raising hope for comprehensive agreement in May to halt hostilities.

Peace process picked up speed amid Saudi-Huthi talks and prisoner swap. Saudi Arabia 3 April invited Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members to Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh to discuss negotiations with Huthis, where it presented draft agreement that reportedly included six-month nationwide ceasefire, end to transport restrictions, release of detainees and payment of salaries to civil and military employees in both Huthi and govt-controlled areas. Saudi-led coalition 6 April announced lifting of most restrictions on commercial ships docking in southern ports, including Aden, for first time in eight years. Saudi and Omani delegations 8 April met Huthi leaders in Sanaa to discuss renewal of ceasefire that lapsed in Oct 2022, in first official Saudi diplomatic mission to Yemeni capital since kingdom launched military campaign in March 2015; draft agreement was reportedly modified to include declaration of cessation of war instead of truce, roadmap for humanitarian aid and economic arrangements, and steps toward comprehensive political solution; parties also discussed departure of foreign forces. Although stumbling block remained over Saudi Arabia’s status as mediator or conflict party, Huthi chief negotiator 14 April said negotiations were “serious and positive”. In key confidence-building measure, Huthis, govt and Saudi Arabia 14-16 April concluded swap of 887 detainees; Saudi Arabia 17 April unilaterally released 104 detainees. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 17 April described talks as best opportunity for peace in eight years.

Parties clashed in Marib, Shebwa and Lahij governorates. Huthi forces and Saudi-backed Salafi group, Saba Axis, clashed along front lines in Marib governorate. Huthis, Giants Brigade and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated Shebwa Defence Forces clashed along border between Shebwa and al-Bayda.

Saudi-led coalition sought to ease tensions in south. Coalition continued meetings with pro-govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated officials to ease tensions, particularly over Wadi Hadramawt area where STC forces seek to replace Islah-affiliated troops. STC President and PLC member Aydrous al-Zubaidi 1 April announced plan for STC to integrate new south-ern components, consolidating STC as chief representative on southern issue.

Huthis escalated hostilities in Marib and Shebwa governorates, ending months-long de facto truce and overshadowing prisoner exchange deal with govt as well as Iran-Saudi agreement.

Huthis launched attacks in Marib and Shebwa. Huthis launched assaults on govt-aligned forces 20 March in Marib’s Harib district and 26 March in mountain range connecting to Merkhah Al Ulya district in southern Shebwa, leading to deadly clashes, displacing hundreds and ending de facto truce in last six months as govt warned of possible return to all-out fighting; Huthi offensive seemingly sought to break stalemate in ongoing backchannel talks with Riyadh and dampened hopes for Saudi-Iran détente. Huthis 25 March conducted drone attack on Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, killing one. Huthis same day announced restrictions on humanitarian flights arriving in capital Sanaa, citing alleged Saudi prohibition on commercial flights.

Diplomatic efforts bore fruit before escalation. Following 10 March Saudi-Iran deal to restore ties (see Saudi Arabia and Iran), Saudi officials reportedly revealed deal included Iranian commitment to halt weapons shipments to Huthis; govt, Huthis and Southern Transitional Council (STC) cautiously welcomed agreement, fuelling hopes of reducing risk of new Huthi offensive; longstanding grievances of local factions, however, remained unaddressed. Meanwhile, Huthi-Saudi talks continued and, in parallel, govt and Huthi delegations 20 March reached deal to exchange 887 detainees in UN-facilitated talks in Switzerland.

Rift between STC and Riyadh continued, govt made overtures to Islah. STC official criticised deployment of Saudi-backed army National Shield Forces in STC-controlled areas, which threatens STC’s grip in south. STC 9 March voiced concern over Saudi-Huthi talks, warning against any deal that goes beyond UN-led process. Separately, Presidential Leadership Council member and leader of Joint Resistance Forces Tareq Saleh 2 March travelled to Islah-stronghold Taiz city and shook hands with rival and Islah military leader Abdo Farhan Mekhlafi, likely signalling attempts to secure pockets of influence in event of Saudi-Huthi settlement.

In other important developments. In first maritime incident in Red Sea this year, unidentified assailants 17 March attacked ship with machine-gun fire. Huthis doubled down on efforts to remove restrictions at Hodeida port, which could jeopardise govt revenues.

Saudi-Huthi backchannel talks displayed signs of progress, Huthis criticised UN’s role in Hodeida and Riyadh announced large deposit in Aden-based Central Bank as govt faced economic troubles.

Tentative signs of breakthrough in Huthi-Saudi negotiations emerged. Contours of deal reportedly became clear as Huthis claimed that Saudi Arabia agreed to their preconditions, including easing movement restrictions around Sanaa airport and Hodeida port and paying state employees’ salaries in Huthi-controlled areas. In positive signals, Riyadh permitted increased movement in Huthi-controlled Hodeida port and both sides toned down negative media rhetoric. Meanwhile, concurrent high-level diplomacy continued. In hope of resurrecting truce ahead of Muslim holy month of Ramadan beginning late March, UN Spe-cial Envoy Hans Grundberg’s military adviser early Feb met govt military commanders, tribal and civil society leaders to discuss possible ceasefire mechanisms. Grundberg 7 Feb met Presidential Leadership Council members al-Alimi and Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami in Aden to discuss inclusive political process; next day met Southern Transitional Council (STC)-aligned Aden governor. Grundberg and Iranian foreign ministry special adviser 9 Feb travelled separately to Oman for talks with Omani officials and Huthi chief negotiator.

Huthis grew critical of UN’s role in Hodeida. Huthis 6 Feb accused UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) of intentionally blocking cargo ships from entering Hodeida port, which UNVIM denied, and called for abolition of mechanism; criticism may reflect Huthis’ desire to diminish UN role ahead of possible lifting of Saudi Arabia’s restrictions on port. Huthis 5 Feb accused UN of delaying mission to salvage rusting oil tanker FSO Safer.

Economic outlook remained bleak, govt forces manoeuvred along front lines. Riyal in govt areas hovered around lowest rate since start of truce, while govt’s oil production remained at near-halt amid Huthi threats; Huthis sought to channel import commodities solely through Huthi-controlled Hodeida rather than govt-controlled Aden. Saudi Arabia 21 Feb announced $1bn deposit intended for Central Bank of Aden. Meanwhile, Nation Shield Forces – commanded by PLC head al-Alimi – deployed across key fault lines in Lahij, Shebwa, al-Dhale and Hadramawt governorates, which have seen friction between STC and Islah forces; move could be aimed at forestalling STC takeover in Hadramawt.

Backchannel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia intensified amid steady rise in skirmishes along front lines, while Saudi-Emirati tensions rose over influence in Hadramawt governorate.

Huthis and Saudi Arabia pursued dialogue to reinstate truce. After Omani mediators 10 Jan arrived in capital Sanaa, Huthi chief negotiator 15 Jan called talks with Omanis “serious and positive” but group warned of military escalation if their conditions are not met. Govt remained excluded from talks, raising fears that Riyadh could make unacceptable concessions. UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 16 Jan visited Sanaa to discuss truce restoration with Huthi officials and same day briefed UN Security Council, reporting “potential step change” in conflict’s trajectory. Meanwhile, low-scale fighting along key front lines in Saada, Marib, Taiz, al-Dhale and Hodeida continued to steadily rise, raising threat of miscalculation and renewed conflict. Head of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Al-Alimi late Jan established Nation Shield Forces, new military units under his direct command.

Emirati-backed groups sought to shift balance of power in Hadramawt. Southern Transitional Council (STC) – backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) – 3 Jan mobilised protesters in Seyoun city demanding replacement of Islah-affiliated First Military Region with UAE-aligned Hadrami Elite Forces. Local tribal bloc Hadramawt Tribes Confederation denounced STC moves. In sign of unity with First Military Region, Saudi delegation 10 Jan met Hadramawt governor. STC’s efforts to establish military presence in areas with strong historical ties to Saudi Arabia could mark beginning of UAE-led initiative to uproot Saudi-backed Islah from Hadramawt, threatening localised conflict.

Govt continued active diplomatic engagement amid economic deterioration. U.S. Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking and U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin 6 Jan met al-Alimi and PM Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed to mobilise international support for govt; al-Alimi 10 Jan met U.S., UK, French and European Union ambassadors. PLC members and govt officials 8 Jan met in Saudi capital Riyadh to discuss stabilising economy and govt initiative to lower exchange rates against U.S. dollar. Following Huthi-enforced halt to oil exports, govt 8 Jan approved increase of customs exchange rates from 500 to 750 riyals; STC immediately called for reversal as fuel and other commodity prices spiked.

Back-channel efforts to restore truce showed little sign of breakthrough, as economic conflict escalated amid lingering risks of front-line hostilities and regional escalation.

No signs of progress in renewing truce emerged, despite ongoing efforts. Back-channel talks between Saudi Arabia and Huthis failed to make breakthrough as Huthis maintained demand for Saudi-led coalition to use govt oil revenues for public sector salaries, including of security services, which govt refused, while Saudi Arabia sought reassurance that Huthis would commit to political process. Diplomatic efforts continued nonetheless: notably, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 6 Dec concluded trip to Saudi Arabia; European Union (EU) ambassadors 8 Dec concluded visit to Aden city where they met Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) head al-Alimi; EU delegation 10 Dec met Taiz governor and military, security and civil society leaders in Taiz city; head of Huthi Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 6 Dec met EU delegation to Yemen to discuss humanitarian situation. In attempt to ease intra-PLC tensions, al-Alimi, Southern Transitional Council chief and PLC member Ayderous al-Zubaidi, and PLC Islah representative Abdullah al-Alimi 2 Dec met in United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Huthis and govt targeted each other on economic front. Although front-line hostilities did not significantly escalate, parallel economic conflict became increasingly visible. Following Huthi attacks in recent months on govt oil facilities, which paralysed state revenues, economic situation in govt-held areas deteriorated markedly; notably, Aden city witnessed repeated power outages, heightening risk of civil unrest. Huthis intensified threats to target facilities with drones to prevent exports without Huthis receiving share. In response, Central Bank of Aden 6 Dec ordered money exchange companies to freeze accounts of, and stop transactions with, 12 Huthi-affiliated entities; tit-for-tat measures heighten risk of miscalculation that could trigger return to hostilities.

In other important developments. PLC member and leader of National Resistance Force Tareq Saleh 7 Dec oversaw opening of UAE-financed airport in Mokha port city, Taiz governorate, easing movement restrictions for besieged Taiz residents. Defence minister 8 Dec signed military and security cooperation agreement with UAE; Huthi Deputy FM same day called agreement illegal and threatened to target Abu Dhabi.

Back-channel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia signalled deal could be reached outside stalled UN process, while Huthis attacked energy infrastructure, raising risks of front-line and regional escalation.

Huthis and Riyadh intensified back-channel negotiations away from UN process. As UN efforts to resurrect truce remained deadlocked, Huthis and Saudi Arabia intensified Oman-facilitated secret talks that excludes Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and UN Special Envoy. Huthis demanded govt use oil and gas revenues to pay civilian and military state employees; while PLC rejected demand, Riyadh reportedly showed willingness to accommodate request provided Huthis enter political process first. Talks raise prospect of bilateral agreement that excludes PLC, which could incentivise anti-Huthi factions to act as spoilers.

Huthis attacked oil and gas infrastructure and redeployed troops on front lines. Huthis 9 Nov launched “warning shot” drone attack on Qana port in Shebwa governorate and ramped up media campaign threatening to target domestic and regional oil and gas facilities; attack disrupted crude oil exports, which is govt’s only source of revenue, and raised spectre of high-profile attack on Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates during World Cup. Huthis 21 Nov attacked al-Dhabba oil terminal for second time. While violence remained below pre-truce levels, tempo of skirmishes along front lines rose steadily, as Huthis sent reinforcements to Marib governorate. Unknown gunmen 8 Nov killed adviser to defence minister and his driver near Marib city. Meanwhile, UN human rights chief 4 Nov said Huthis had committed war crimes since truce’s expiry. U.S. Navy 8 Nov reported-ly intercepted shipment of missile fuel from Iran to Huthis in Gulf of Oman.

Diplomatic efforts continued to reinstate UN-brokered truce. U.S. Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking 2-8 Nov visited Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to meet Saudi, Emirati and govt officials. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg 7 Nov concluded visit to Saudi capital Riyadh, where he met Saudi ambassador to Yemen who is reportedly prominently involved in back-channel talks. Meanwhile, PLC leader al-Alimi 2 Nov attended Arab summit in Algerian capital Algiers and urged member states to designate Huthis as terrorist organisation, as PLC had done in Oct.

April truce remained stuck in limbo after parties failed to agree extension, raising risk of Huthi regional attacks and new cycle of escalation.

Truce remained stuck between outright collapse and extension. Ahead of 2 Oct expiry, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg 1 Oct proposed reopening roads in Taiz governorate, expanding flights from Sanaa airport, lifting restrictions on Hodeida port, and paying public sector salaries and pensions; however, Huthis at eleventh hour demanded govt pay salaries of defence and interior ministries in Huthi-controlled areas using oil and gas revenues, which govt rejected. Main sticking point during month remained source of revenue that ought to cover salary payments, with reports suggesting possible regional player could foot bill; unconfirmed reports late month suggested backchannel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia to revive truce were ongoing.

In absence of extension, risk of return to frontline and cross-border hostilities grew. Huthis 2 Oct threatened to target international energy companies operating in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, ahead of influx of visits to region for World Cup in Qatar in Nov. In first announced military action since truce expiry, Huthi drone 21 Oct targeted cargo ship docking at oil terminal in al-Shihr port, Hadramawt governorate, as Huthis accused companies of looting country’s resources. In response, govt’s National Defence Council designated Huthis as terrorist organisation. Elsewhere, clashes between Huthis and Saudi-led coalition-aligned Southern Transitional Council (STC) 6 Oct reportedly killed at least eight in Yafa, Lahij governorate. UN 13 Oct reported skirmishes along frontlines in Taiz, Marib, Hodeida and Dhale governorates during month.

In south, tensions continued within anti-Huthi bloc. STC mobilised protestors demanding withdrawal of Islah-aligned forces, in effort to extend its rule in Hadramawt governorate; thousands of pro-STC demonstrators 14 Oct reportedly protested in Seiyun, Hadramawt governorate.

In other important developments. Saudi delegation 12 Oct travelled to Sanaa, and Huthi delegation visited kingdom, to finalise prisoner exchange talks for first time since 2014; both parties reiterated agenda did not include truce. Yemeni riyal’s value 4 Oct plummeted to 1,174 to dollar, lowest since April.

Efforts to extend UN-brokered truce stalled ahead of Oct deadline amid govt disunity and Huthi military build-up, raising spectre of return to full-scale fighting.

Govt and Huthis failed to overcome key sticking points to renew truce. Ahead of expiry of UN-brokered truce on 2 Oct, efforts to secure third extension remained deadlocked amid fear of return to front-line hostilities; main sticking points included Huthi demand for disbursement of salary payments to areas under their control and govt demand for Huthis to first reopen roads in and around Taiz city. Flurry of diplomacy continued: notably, head of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Rashad al-Alimi during month met UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, U.S. Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Grundberg 3-5 Sept met Iranian FM Hossein Amir Abdollahian who reiterated Huthis’ call for lifting “blockade” and disbursing salary payments; Huthis 28 Sept reiterated threats to not extend while Grunberg warned “real risk” of return to war.

Anti-Huthi bloc faced fragmentation amid simmering tensions in south. Following deadly clashes in Aug between PLC factions that saw United Arab Emirates-aligned forces consolidate control of Shebwa and Southern Transition Council (STC) late Aug advance into Lawdar, capital of Abyan governorate, situation in south calmed during month; however, STC signalled intent to push further east into oil-rich Hadramawt and Mahra governorates. Protests supported by STC occurred throughout month in Hadramawt and Mahrah governorates demanding replacement of Islah forces from security positions.

Huthis continued military build-up in Hodeida, al-Qaeda struck in south. Huthis 1 Sept held military parade in Hodeida city; UN mission in Hodeida same day condemned parade as violation of 2018 Hodeida agreement. Huthis 21 Sept held another military parade in capital Sanaa as govt same day held military parades in Marib and Taiz; Huthis may believe resumption of hostilities favours them after weeks of PLC infighting. Meanwhile, suspected al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 6 Sept launched deadly attack on security post in Ahwar, Abyan province, sparking clashes that killed 21 troops and eight militants.