Violence broke out in west as efforts to form new executive heightened political tensions, all the while undermining UN moves to organise elections in late 2023.

Eastern-based PM Bashagha dismissed amid negotiations for unified executive. Eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) 16 May suspended PM Bashagha as head of HoR-backed govt citing allegations of financial irregularities, and appointed finance minister and close ally of eastern army commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Osama Hammad, as interim PM. Haftar’s sons and heads of militias close to rival Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba in May met in Egypt’s capital Cairo to forge deal on new unity govt that would leave Dabaiba in place, while conceding some ministries to Haftar affiliates; some MPs are opposed to this plan, however, and want Dabaiba removed. Meanwhile, as part of UN-backed efforts to hold presidential and legislative elections by year’s end, 6+6 joint committee – composed of HoR and rival Tripoli-based High State Council representatives – 23 May announced breakthrough on number of issues related to elections but conditioned further steps on agreement on new govt.

Political tensions fuelled violence between armed groups in Zawiya city. Clashes between rival militias who battle for influence and control of trafficking routes 21-24 April left at least four civilians dead in Zawiya city (west). Renewed clashes 11 May erupted, reportedly leaving two people dead. Precarious calm in following days prevailed following mediation by notables and community leaders, but tensions rose again after Tripoli-based govt 25 May ordered drone strikes on militia-held buildings in Zawiya, targeting factions close to MPs who want to dislodge Dabaiba. Fresh drone strikes in Maya port outside Zawiya 29 May killed two and wounded nephew of HoR MP Ali Bouzriba; HoR immediately condemned attack, and armed group close to Bouzriba same day closed off gas pipeline to local electricity plant in retaliation.

Concerns persisted over fallout of conflict in Sudan. State-owned National Oil Corporation 1 May denied media reports that it delivered oil from Sarir refinery to Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, however locals claimed fuel smuggling from south-eastern Libya toward Sudanese border continued.

Efforts to unify country’s rival factions behind electoral roadmap remained in stalemate, making presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023 increasingly elusive; concern grew over potential fallout of Sudanese conflict.

Political process remained stalled. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 2 April published in official gazette series of amendments to 2021 laws on presidential and parliamentary elections. Amendments provide for ineligibility for president of dual nationals, but otherwise do not significantly differ from original laws, suggesting their main purpose may be to show Libyans, UN and international partners that parliament is actively working toward elections as means of fending off a UN-backed alternative mechanism. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 18 April said he had offered UN technical assistance to HoR-High State Council committee working on electoral laws, made no mention of his previously announced proposal to create High-Level Panel for Elections that would take over drafting of election laws.

UN gathered rival military coalitions’ leaders on Libyan soil for first time in years. Bathily 26 March in capital Tripoli and 8 April in Benghazi city hosted meetings between commanders of rival military coalitions; another meeting between rival chiefs of staff held 14 April in Benghazi without participation of UN envoy. Bathily early April also toured Libya’s neighbouring states of Chad, Niger and Sudan to discuss repatriation from Libya of foreign fighters.

Potential fallout of conflict in neighbouring Sudan sparked concern. After conflict between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 15 April broke out in Sudan, credible media reports, including from The Wall Street Journal 19 April, alleged eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces delivered weapons to RSF, which Haftar denied; some reports claimed weapons delivered via airlift, but local sources alleged weapons hauled overland. Matter could fuel tensions between Haftar and its Egyptian ally, which supports Sudanese army (see Egypt). Amid growing concern about potential spillover of fighting into southern Libya, where Sudanese militiamen are present, Haftar forces 24 April closed border with Sudan and reportedly sent military reinforcements to southern town of Kufra.

UN initiative to provide constitutional framework for elections struggled to gain traction.

UN envoy’s plan for elections failed to secure endorsement. Special Representative of UN Sec-Gen for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 11 March said legislative bodies, House of Representatives (HoR) and High State Council (HSC), had agreed to form joint committee of six members each to draft electoral laws; also said presidential and legislative elections could be held by year’s end if clear roadmap and electoral laws are in place by June. Statement appeared to give centre stage to legislative bodies’ initiative to provide legal framework for elections, suggesting Bathily has backtracked on his recent proposal to establish High-Level Panel for Elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 13 March reiterated opposition to Bathily’s proposal, confirmed HoR is on track with its own roadmap and intends to appoint new interim govt once election laws are finalised; issue of new executive to replace Tripoli-based govt of PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba is major point of departure from Bathily’s plan. UN Security Council 16 March adopted presidential statement on Libya, stating that Council “recognises the continued role of the HoR and HSC” to securing legal basis for elections, while downplaying Bathily’s initiative.

Efforts to unify divided military institutions inched forward. Bathily 16 March hosted meeting of 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) – which brings together representatives of armed forces from eastern and western Libya – in Tunisia’s capital Tunis to discuss way forward in security track and reunification of military institutions; renewed commitment to create initial joint force (one unit) to be deployed in central Libya. Military leaders from both east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) and Tripoli-based military coalition, including some JMC members, 26 March met in capital Tripoli under UN auspices, committed to continue to work toward unification of military.

National oil company chairman allegedly under U.S. scrutiny. Allegations in March surfaced among Libyan businessmen that chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, Farhat Bengdara, is under U.S. scrutiny for his alleged role in allocating funds to cover expenses of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s LNA forces, part of which might have bankrolled sanctioned Russian paramilitary Wagner Group.

Political deadlock persisted one year after Libya split into two rival govts.

East-based parliament continued to chart unilateral path out of political crisis. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 7 Feb approved constitutional amendment that could be used as basis for elections. Amendment calls for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections to take place within 240 days of adoption of election laws by joint committee of HoR and Tripoli-based advisory High State Council (HSC) members. Tripoli-based critics of HoR, including some HSC members, accused body of seeking to buy time, notably opposing open timeline for drafting election laws and obligation to have presidential election. In another unilateral move, HoR President Aghela Saleh 16 Feb proposed formation of 45-member committee – including HoR, HSC and independent members – to decide on new executive to replace two govts now in place.

UN Libya envoy proposed new initiative to break stalemate. In briefing to UN Security Council, Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 27 Feb criticised HoR’s constitutional amendment as “controversial”, underscoring that it does not stipulate clear roadmap, including timeline, for holding elections in 2023. Instead, Bathily proposed formation of high-level steering committee composed of representatives of political and security institutions, and other political, tribal and civil society leaders to facilitate adoption of legal framework and time-bound roadmap to enable elections in 2023.

UN welcomed coordination mechanism for withdrawal of foreign fighters. UN Support Mission to Libya 8 Feb said officials from Libya’s 5+5 Joint Military Commission – which brings together representatives of armed forces from eastern and western Libya – as well as liaison committees from Sudan and Niger, approved “coordination mechanism” for “withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya” during two-day meeting in Egypt. Mechanism unlikely to affect presence of Turkish forces alongside Tripoli govt or Russian Wagner contractors alongside eastern forces.

Energy deal with Italian company ENI sparked controversy. Opponents of Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba, including his own oil minister and HoR members, early Feb criticised as “illegal” $8bn agreement struck late Jan between National Oil Corporation and Italian state-owned oil company ENI, arguing it required HoR buy-in; investment plan notably outlines steps to increase Libya’s oil and gas export capacity.

Dialogue between rival assemblies on amending draft constitution to chart roadmap toward elections reached dead end, and disputes around demarcation of maritime boundaries continued.

Rival assemblies’ dialogue track came to an abrupt halt. Heads of rival assemblies, Aghela Saleh of Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and Khaled Mishri of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC), 5 Jan met in Egyptian capital Cairo, pledged in vaguely-worded joint statement to refer amended constitutional draft to their respective chambers. Cairo 11 Jan hosted meeting between head of Presidential Council Mohamed Menfi and head of Libyan National Army, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar; 15 January held another meeting between Menfi, Haftar and Saleh. Saleh in following days however refused to sign off on document outlining key agreements between HoR and HSC and reaffirmed HoR is Libya’s one and only legislative body and does not need HSC’s approval, suggesting that HoR amend 2011 constitutional declaration “before March”.

Diplomatic initiatives to press for elections continued. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns 12 Jan made first visit to Libya since 2012, met with PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba in capital Tripoli and reportedly also with Haftar in Benghazi city; Burns pressed on his interlocutors need to move forward with elections before year’s end. Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan 17 Jan also visited Tripoli and met with Dabaiba and Mishri to discuss political situation; reportedly also met with some armed groups’ leaders in Tripoli.

Controversies over disputed demarcation of maritime boundaries continued. National Oil Corporation 2 Jan protested against Athens’ ongoing oil and gas exploration in waters disputed between Greece and Libya. Tripoli’s Court of Appeals 9 Jan suspended implementation of Libya-Türkiye deal on oil and gas exploration that two countries had signed in Oct until final verdict on case. Meanwhile, Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity 28 Jan signed deals with Italian govt aimed at boosting Libyan energy supplies to Europe and clamping down on migrants attempting to cross Mediterranean Sea.

UN efforts to foster dialogue between rival parliaments faced new challenges, handover of terrorism suspect to U.S. sparked outrage domestically, and maritime borders riled Mediterranean waters.

Spat erupted between country’s rival parliaments after period of rapprochement. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 6 Dec voted to set up constitutional court in eastern city of Benghazi. Tripoli-based advisory High Council of State (HCS) same day condemned move – which could invalidate recently reactivated Tripoli-based Constitutional Chamber – as unlawful, and 11 Dec suspended contact with HoR. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh and HCS Chairman Khaled al-Mishri 23 Dec however agreed to drop plans to create constitutional court. Meanwhile, meeting between Saleh and al-Mishri scheduled for 4 Dec as part of UN-led political process postponed for “logistical reasons” and “political obstacles”. U.S. embassy in Libya 24 Dec called for “alternative mechanisms” to be considered as way of producing constitutional basis for elections if HoR-HCS talks fail.

Handover of Lockerbie suspect to U.S. sparked tensions. Media outlets, including British daily The Guardian 13 Dec, reported Tripoli-based govt (GNU) handed over Abu Ajila Masoud al-Marimi – key suspect in bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie town in Scotland in 1988 – to U.S. authorities after armed group in Nov kidnapped him in Tripoli. Head of rival govt, east-based PM Fathi Bashagha, 13 Dec called move “illegal”. Attorney general’s office next day announced investigation into Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba’s decision to extradite Masoud, and demonstrations against extradition 16 Dec took place in several cities.

Standoff persisted over maritime borders in Mediterranean Sea. GNU 7 Dec criticised as “irresponsible” Greece’s recent agreements with energy firms for oil and gas exploration near maritime borders with Libya. Athens same day retorted that GNU’s recent energy deals with Türkiye violated international law. After Egyptian President al-Sisi 11 Dec issued decree demarcating Egypt’s western maritime border, GNU 16 Dec and HoR 22 Dec said decision violated Libya’s territorial waters. Bashagha 14 Dec called on Egypt, Türkiye and Greece to not “take any unilateral steps” that would “worsen the situation in the Mediterranean”. Greek media late-Dec reported Athens plans to extend territorial waters south and west of Crete island.

Tensions between Tripoli-based institutions reached new heights as country remained divided into two rival govts with no political solution in sight.

Rival institutions remained at odds on means to resolve political crisis. Tripoli-based advisory High Council of State (HCS) Chair Khalid al-Meshri 14 Nov accused militiamen affiliated with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba of “besieging” HCS headquarters; said HCS had convened session to follow up on tentative agreement with eastern-based legislature House of Representatives (HoR) to work toward forming new unity govt. Dabaiba, who is opposed to HoR-HSC negotiations, immediately denounced “incitement and exaggeration”, saying only “a few” protesters had gathered outside HCS building, accused Meshri of making secret “power-sharing” deals to delay elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh same day condemned “threats and intimidation by armed groups using force” against HCS. Dabaiba 29 Nov reportedly accused Meshri and Saleh of “systematically obstructing elections”. East-based military commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar around 22 Nov weighed in on political crisis, saying “time has come for the Libyan people to put an end to failed experiments and dead ends”, accusing politicians of “worshipping their seats of power”.

Greek FM’s refusal to meet Tripoli-based govt minister sparked diplomatic spat. After Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) in Oct signed deal with Türkyie on oil and gas exploration in areas of Mediterranean contested by Athens, Greek FM Nikos Dendias 17 Nov canceled Tripoli visit upon landing to avoid being welcomed by his Libyan counterpart, FM Najla al-Mangoush; Dendias claimed he had come to meet Tripoli-based Presidential Council head Mohamed al-Menfi. GNU subsequently recalled its ambassador from Athens and summoned Greek chargé d’affaires in Tripoli.

In other important developments. In his briefing to UN Security Council, UN sec-gen’s special representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, 15 Nov renewed call for legislative and presidential elections but did not articulate how he planned to address sources of friction over electoral roadmap. International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan early Nov met with Haftar during first ever visit to Libya, 9 Nov told UN Security Council he expects latter to cooperate with ICC investigations into alleged crimes committed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Series of deals between Ankara and Tripoli inflamed internal and regional tensions; UN Security Council extended political mission’s mandate as new envoy took office in capital Tripoli.

Energy deals between Tripoli-based govt and Ankara triggered uproar. Tripoli-based govt 3 Oct signed preliminary economic and maritime agreements with Türkiye, opening door to joint oil and gas exploration and drillings in Libya-claimed Exclusive Economic Zone in Mediterranean, disputed by Egypt and Greece. East-based PM Bashagha and House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh immediately rejected deal as null and void, saying Tripoli-based govt’s term expired in Dec 2021. Egypt and Greece 3 and 9 Oct condemned hydrocarbon exploration deal as “illegal”, with Athens vowing to oppose it “with all legal means”. EU 3 Oct reiterated that it considers 2019 agreement demarcating Turkish and Libyan Exclusive Economic Zones (which latest oil and gas deal builds on) as infringement of sovereign rights of other states. Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 25 Oct travelled to Türkiye and reportedly signed two military deals with Turkish govt with a view to strengthening military cooperation.

Rival camps held military parades, adopted bellicose rhetoric. On occasion of military parade in southern city of Sebha, East-based military commander Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar 17 Oct called for popular “rebellion” against “governmental failure”; said his forces “are ready to protect the people in their uprising”. Forces loyal to Tripoli-based govt 22 Oct held televised military exercise in Dabaiba’s presence. Aguila Saleh and Khaled al-Mishri, head of Tripoli-based High State Council, 20-21 Oct met in Morocco, said they had agreed to take steps to unify rival govts and resume dialogue on holding elections; Dabaiba 21 Oct rejected “parallel paths”.

UN renewed efforts to help break political stalemate. New UN Sec-Gen Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily 14 Oct arrived in Tripoli to assume his duties and in following days held talks with rival leaders, including Dabaiba, Aguila Saleh, Presidential Council Chairman Mohammed al-Menfi, and National Oil Corporation chairman Farhat Bengdara. UN Security Council 28 Oct unanimously extended political mission UNSMIL’s mandate for another year, urged parties to agree on roadmap to presidential and parliamentary elections.

Crisis of two rival govts remained intractable as Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha came out weakened of failed efforts to enter capital Tripoli.

PM Dabaiba continued to consolidate control in Tripoli. Militias aligned with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba early Sept reportedly took over security headquarters in Ain Zara town south of Tripoli after repelling forces loyal to rival Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha in late Aug. Situation inside Tripoli remained calm in Sept, but renewed clashes between rival armed factions 2-3 Sept broke out in Warshafana area west of Tripoli with reports of mortar fire. Fighting 25-26 Sept also erupted in Zawiya town, 40km west of Tripoli, allegedly over fuel trafficking; at least five people killed including ten-year-old girl; UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) next day “condemned the use of heavy artillery in densely populated neighbourhoods”.

Parties sought to strengthen relations with Ankara. Dabaiba and Bashagha, 31 Aug-1 Sept made parallel visits to Türkiye to seek Ankara’s support. Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 14 Sept said Türkiye seeks to “build good relations” with various Libyan parties amid media reports that Turkish drones turned late-Aug clashes in Dabaiba’s favour.

New UN envoy appointed. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 2 Sept appointed Senegalese diplomat and former govt minister Abdoulaye Bathily as special representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL after obtaining Security Council’s approval, ending nine-month search. Dabaiba, who in Aug had reportedly objected to Bathily’s nomination, 3 Sept assured envoy of his “full support”. Bathily, who 25 Sept officially assumed duties, will have to mediate between Libyan factions now divided between those adamant that Dabaiba stay on until elections, those proposing new power-sharing deal and govt reshuffle under Dabaiba, and those calling for entirely new “third” govt. Foreign capitals also split on path ahead.

In other important developments. After power struggle erupted in Aug between Supreme Court and Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 15 Sept announced appointment of Abdullah Abu Razizah as new chief justice of Supreme Court to replace Mohammed Al-Hafi; Abu Razizah few days later took office.

Worst fighting in years broke out in capital Tripoli between forces loyal to rival govts, raising prospect of a return to full-blown war. Fighting 26-27 Aug raged across Tripoli as forces aligned with Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)-appointed PM Bashagha failed to take control of capital and oust Tripoli-based govt of PM Dabaiba; 32 people reportedly killed and 159 injured. Flare-up followed days of escalating tensions between rival factions. Smaller-scale clashes 5-6 Aug opposed Bashagha-aligned forces and militia loyal to Dabaiba near airport road in Tripoli. Amid build-up of forces outside Tripoli, UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 23 Aug called for “immediate de-escalation”, warned that “current political stalemate [...] cannot be resolved through armed confrontation”. Bashagha 24 Aug called on Dabaiba to step down and peacefully hand over power to avoid bloodshed; Dabaiba rejected call, denounced “threats to ignite war” and vowed that no one would be allowed to meddle with security of Tripoli. Dabaiba 25 Aug urged head of Tripoli-based consultative High State Council, Khalid Al-Mishri, and HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh to approve constitutional basis for elections. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 18 Aug announced decision to reactivate its Constitutional Chamber, which had been inactive since 2016. Dabaiba same day welcomed move, saying it could act as “deterrent” to “abuses and violations” of 2015 power-sharing agreement. Opponents however denounced political manoeuvring in reaction to HoR session held 16 Aug, during which lawmakers voted on amending statutes of Supreme Court and ruled it could appoint advisers to top court. After Dabaiba in July changed oil leadership, Central Bank 2 Aug reportedly disbursed 8.5bn dinars to National Oil Corporation as part of 15bn “urgent and temporary financial arrangement” concluded in mid-April. Libya’s envoy to UN, Taher El-Sonni, 15 Aug said Dabaiba’s govt had rejected UN proposal to appoint Senegalese former Minister Abdoulaye Bathily as new head of UNSMIL; move came after UN Security Council late July extended UNSMIL’s mandate for only three months amid Russian insistence that new UN mission head is chosen before it agrees to longer extension.