Building peace – and a belief in the future
Building peace – and a belief in the future
Toward a Common Set of Signals from the G20 about Russia’s War in Ukraine
Toward a Common Set of Signals from the G20 about Russia’s War in Ukraine
Op-Ed / Global

Building peace – and a belief in the future

Along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, state failure is one of the big three security problems that will preoccupy the world in the first decades of the 21st century. What can be done to confront the problem – and to contain the threats? What should be the guiding principles of intervention, peacekeeping and regeneration? Gareth Evans analyzes the lessons of the past and offers some pointers to the future.

The problem of fragile, collapsed and internally warring states is one that must be confronted systematically by the international community. Along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism – with which the failed states issue is now inextricably linked – this is one of the big three security problems that will preoccupy the world in the first decades of the 21st century.

The most familiar contemporary examples of failed and failing states are Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia. In addition to the existing failing states, a number of new ones continue to emerge right across the arc of instability from west Africa to east Asia.

These are countries where – as a result of government action, inaction, incapacity or huge internal division – there is a major threat to the country’s own people or a threat to others through the export of drugs, trafficked humans, fleeing refugees, health pandemics, environmental catastrophe or terrorism.

During the 1990s both Afghanistan and Sudan provided a home base for al-Qaeda while it planned and carried out terrorist attacks on US targets. Islamic fundamentalists from around the world were taught terrorism skills and techniques at training camps there. They then went across the world from the US to Indonesia to put their newly acquired skills to use.

The development community has been preoccupied from the outset with the issue of state fragility – the capacity of governments to perform the most basic public functions and deliver the most basic services to their own peoples. The security policy community, by contrast, has been traditionally much less focused on these issues. But the events of the past decade brought home the need to be involved.

So are there any lessons we can learn from the way in which we have so far been helping states at risk? How can we stop them sliding into the kind of decay that generates so much misery for their own peoples and, increasingly, those of other nations too?

What can we do, in particular in post-conflict situations, to rebuild some semblance of confidence in the future and ensure that any peace will be sustainable? And what can we do in failing state situations to reduce the chances of any mass violence breaking out?

Self-evaluation, like peacebuilding itself, is a wearying business: so many good intentions, so much frustration, so little certainty that we can do better next time.

But, that said, there are lessons to be learned and applied from all our accumulated experience, for better or worse, in trying to rebuild societies in crisis both before and after war. Maybe, for a start, we should try to follow the following 10 principles.

  1. Understand the overall task. The basic need is to create, or recreate, structures and capacities that will enable internal conflict to be resolved before violence breaks out. Every society has conflicts between individuals and groups – political, economic, legal and social. The point is not to eliminate, but to contain and channel them, by developing institutional structures and processes capable of relieving each of these pressure points as they arise.

    The conflict containment structures and capacities that need to be applied in a postconflict environment, to prevent violence from recurring, are essentially exactly the same as those that need to be applied in failed or failing states to prevent violent conflict breaking out in the first place.

    This means, institutionally, that exactly the same kinds of people, in national and intergovernmental agencies, that work on pre-war structural conflict prevention should also be working on post-conflict peacebuilding.

    Sustainable peace cannot be guaranteed just because a diplomatic peacemaking initiative has apparently been successful – think of the horror still to come after the Angola Agreement of 1991 or the Rwanda Accords in 1993.Nor can it be ensured because a clear-cut military victory has apparently been won – think of Afghanistan and Iraq right now. The focus must be on structural prevention, and post-conflict peacebuilding is a hugely complex and often hugely costly enterprise. It has all too often been neglected or mismanaged, and when this happens it is only a matter of time before the boil erupts again.
  2. Recognize outsiders’ limits. We know that outsiders have a critical role in peacebuilding, with the degree of importance depending on the local capacity for recovery and the local legacy of war-related hostility.

    But what matters is that outside peacebuilders recognize not only what they can do, but also what they cannot – including takingownership of another nation’s land and people, even temporarily. If that mindset exists, any attempt at building peace-sustaining institutions in that country is destined to fail.
  3. Allocate functions appropriately. One of the tasks for those seeking to recover traction for multilateral cooperation on security issues is to try to produce more consensus than exists at the moment. When it comes to peacebuilding functions, it is crucial to determine who (particularly the UN) should do what and when – immediately, over a medium transition period and in the long term.

    In pre-conflict situations, responsibility has been assumed in an almost completely ad hoc fashion: by bilateral aid donors; a constellation of international organizations including the World Bank, UNDP and many specialized agencies; and a multitude of humanitarian and other NGOs. All of them are largely dependent for their effectiveness on the degree of local support and cooperation they receive.

    In post-conflict peacebuilding, a pattern has developed of a de facto protectorate or trusteeship arrangement being established. Sometimes these are UN-led (as with UNMIK in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor). Sometimes they are non-UN, but still with broad international support and legitimacy (as with the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia & Herzegovina). And sometimes they are run just by the military occupiers – as now, controversially, in Iraq.

    There is no common mechanism available, and, perhaps, there will never be, for acceptable exercising authority that could allocate roles among the various relevant players and determine priorities.

    But for both pre- and post-conflict situations, an idea worth revisiting (perhaps by the UN secretary-general’s just established High Level Panel on global security) is to vest in the now largely defunct UN Trusteeship Council a central role in the reconstruction of failed states. The Council is presently prevented by Article 78 of the UN Charter from exercising any responsibility for actual member states.
  4. Pursue multiple objectives simultaneously. If conflict or mass violence is ever to bestopped from occurring, or recurring, there are a myriad of structural and governanceimproving measures that can be usefully applied. 

    The task is multi-dimensional: the necessity to address effectively not only immediate security needs, but economic and social needs, governance and participation needs, and justice and reconciliation needs as well has certainly been the central conclusion of every peacekeeping mission, successful and unsuccessful, of the past decade.
    The established toolbox of available strategies is large, embracing political and diplomatic measures, legal and constitutional measures, economic measures and security sector measures. But too often one or more compartments have been neglected.
  5. Coordinate effectively. Although coordination is acknowledged by everyone as a necessity, at least in principle, it is often lacking. The UN system is getting much better at it, but there is still some distance to go.

    Too much planning is still unsystematic and ad hoc. It is partly a function – as is so much else in the UN system – of the acute neuralgia of many states to contingency planning based on any assumption that state breakdowns, or conflict, or post-conflict intervention will actually occur.

    And there are still acute difficulties in the biggest coordination task of all when it comes to all kinds of peace operations: getting an appropriate mix and match of mission, mandate and resources.
  6. Commit the necessary resources. Peacebuilding is never cheap, and the resources to support it are rarely available on anything remotely like the $20 billion scale that the US administration has been granted by Congress for Iraq. Certainly they are not equally available for what is the almost equally pressing problem of rebuilding post-war Afghanistan, a much more comprehensively failed state. Not much more than one-twentieth of that sum has, by contrast, been approved.

    If reasonable resources are ever to be obtained for what is necessary, the perennial problem of finding plausible political reasons for spending taxpayers’ money has to be addressed.

    One helpful argument in the present context is that inaction may be more costly than intervention in the long term. In a 1999 study for the Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, it was estimated that the costs to the international community during the decade of not intervening to prevent genocide ended up at some $4.5 billion, whereas the cost of effective early intervention would have been around $1.3 billion.
  7. Understand the local political dynamics. One size of peacebuilding certainly does not fit all, and it is crucial to recognize that every such task – not least every post-conflict peacebuilding situation – is likely to require a quite different approach, depending on local circumstances.

    In East Timor, with a new state being created, there was effectively no human infrastructure with which to work. In Afghanistan, by contrast, although the country was physically destroyed, there was a highly educated diaspora available to be recruited.

    In Bosnia and Kosovo there was plenty of human potential, but in environments where there had been no previous state. In Iraq there was plenty of sophisticated human potential, along with a well-established state, but a more hostile environment than had been anticipated.

    It is critical to have a close understanding of both the cultural norms and the internal political dynamics of the society that one is trying to rebuild. It is important to be acutely sensitive to those norms, but at the same time not so deferential that the larger task of state building is put at risk.

    In Iraq, for example – not a failed state, but certainly a very fragile one now – the coalition’s precise arithmetic weighting of the Interim Governing Council and its offshoots to reflect exactly Shiite and Sunni, and Arab and non-Arab, proportions of the populations seemed at first sight clever.

    But, for the first time in the country’s modern history, sectarian and ethnic identity has been elevated to the rank of primary organizing political principle, and the danger that the country will disintegrate on religious and ethnic lines, previously much exaggerated, is now becoming real.
  8. Make security the first priority. While security cannot be the only priority of peacebuilders, there can be little argument against it being the first priority.
    Without law and order – imposed through an effective military or police presence, or both – there won’t be much chance of securing higher order objectives like fostering the rule of law, participatory government and more participatory economic and social institutions. Afghanistan continues to be the starkest contemporary example.
  9.  Make justice and the rule of law a higher priority. In post-conflict situations too much attention tends to be focused on democratic elections as the primary target for peacebuilders: the critical exit signpost. Not enough attention, before as well as after war, has been directed to the establishment of a viable justice system and something approximating the rule of law.

    This is not just a matter of consolidating a sense of personal security. It is about creating the minimum conditions for serious economic activity and foreign investment, for which the most generous aid in the world is no substitute if a broken country is ever to get back on its feet.

    Getting the balance right between justice and reconciliation in post-conflict societies highly traumatized by internal mass violence is one of the most difficult of all peacebuilding tasks.

    The only rule of thumb is that there is no rule of thumb, and that outsiders must listen very carefully indeed to what local people are telling them. Sometimes people just want to draw a line under the past and move on.
  10.  Know when to get out. All intrusive peace operations need, as has often been remarked, if not an exit timetable, then certainly an exit strategy. The vesting, as soon as humanly possible, of real authority, responsibility and sovereignty in the people of the country being rebuilt must remain the overriding objective of those outsiders engaged in peacebuilding.

    Peacebuilders need to know when to leave, if the rebuilding of a failed state is not to turn itself into a permanent occupation.

    That said, the point has been well made that many of the worst peacebuilding mistakes of the past decade had more to do with leaving too soon or doing too little than staying too long or doing too much.The intervention in Somalia may have been mismanaged, but the manner of the country’s abandonment in 1993 was sadder still. Ten years later it is still a comprehensively failed state.

    Whatever one might feel about how Iraq was entered in 2003, no one can seriously argue that the international community’s only responsibility now is to leave. The consequences of Iraq becoming a failed state will be immeasurably more serious for the global community than any case, even Afghanistan, that has gone before.
Members of the police stand in front of banners of the G20 summit near a venue for the G20 Finance Ministers Meeting in Nusa Dua on Indonesia's resort island of Bali, on July 14, 2022. Sonny Tumbelaka/Pool via REUTERS
Commentary / Global

Toward a Common Set of Signals from the G20 about Russia’s War in Ukraine

The G20 countries’ positions on the war in Ukraine contrast starkly, yet the conflict raises issues of global concern – economic shocks and nuclear risks – that the leaders cannot pass over in silence.

When the Group of Twenty (G20) leaders gather in Bali, Indonesia, on 15 November, one head of state who belongs to the Group will be notable by his absence. Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided not to attend the event. This news will be a relief for Western participants, who hardly want to share photo opportunities with Putin while he pursues his war in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, will be in Bali, but he may not be relishing the prospect. Lavrov walked out of a G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in July after his Western counterparts accused Russia of sparking the global food price crisis by invading its grain-producing neighbour.

Putin’s absence will not relieve the leaders who go to Bali of the challenge of how to address the war. The G20 is primarily an economic coordination mechanism, which was thrust into the limelight during the global financial crisis in 2008. Unlike the G7, which brings together like-minded Western countries with shared political interests, the G20 encompasses geopolitical rivals – the U.S. and China foremost among them – that are not apt to adopt strong common positions on international affairs. Yet Russia’s assault on Ukraine raises issues of global concern, including the widespread food and energy price shocks and the risks of nuclear weapons use, that the world’s most powerful politicians cannot pass over in silence.

The G20 meeting is, therefore, an opportunity for leaders to signal common positions about the war. Their primary focus should be on concrete commitments by the G20 countries to help poorer ones navigate economic turmoil. But the powers present in Bali could also use the occasion to underscore that they all expect Russia to refrain from nuclear use, in word as well as deed. Ideally, they would be as clear as possible that if Moscow does cross the nuclear threshold, it will face consequences not only from the West, but globally. A joint statement condemning Russia’s prosecution of the war or setting out potential peace terms will likely be impossible, given G20 members’ widely divergent positions on the war. But if G20 members can find common ground on economic issues and the nuclear taboo, the Bali summit will be a worthwhile diplomatic endeavour.

Diverse Ukraine Policies

The G20 members’ positions on the war differ starkly. The U.S. and most of its allies in the Group have imposed sanctions on Moscow and voted to condemn the invasion in the UN General Assembly. Most of the other members have at least condemned Russia’s aggression and illegal efforts to annex Ukrainian territory at the UN, but not resorted to sanctions (see map). Yet three weighty non-Western G20 members – China, India and South Africa – have not only declined to place sanctions on Russia but also abstained in UN votes on the war.

This map shows which G20 members have sanctioned Russia, and which voted to condemn its illegal "annexations" in Ukraine at the UN in October.

Various non-Western members of the G20 have at times tried to establish a diplomatic role in the war, although the results have mainly been negligible. South Africa attempted to take a lead at the UN in March by tabling a General Assembly resolution on humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Western and Ukrainian diplomats rejected the draft out of hand because it made no reference to Moscow’s responsibility for the war (in contrast to an alternative UN text worked up by France and Mexico), although South African officials insisted to Crisis Group that theirs was a good-faith initiative to bolster multilateral cooperation.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited both Kyiv and Moscow over the summer, promising to facilitate communication between the warring capitals. Many observers suspected that his main concern was to make sure that the war would not stop the G20 summit from going ahead. Indonesia has raised the possibility of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attending the summit, although Kyiv has indicated he will most likely only intervene via video link.

Other G20 members have also dipped their toes in Ukraine diplomacy. Mexico surprised and confused UN officials at September’s high-level UN General Assembly week by tabling a proposal for the Pope, the UN secretary-general and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to lead a ceasefire effort. This idea has not taken off to date. There has also been a sporadic flow of speculation among Western commentators that India – which has increased trade with Russia since the February assault – could eventually prove a useful facilitator of Russian-Ukrainian diplomacy, and Modi urged President Putin to take a “path to peace” at September’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.

In contrast to these fledgling and tentative peace efforts, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has emerged as one of the main diplomatic actors in the crisis. Türkiye hosted early, fruitless Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, but had success when it worked with the UN over the summer to broker the Black Sea grain deal. This deal permitted Ukraine to export its harvest by sea without Russian military interference. Türkiye and another G20 member, Saudi Arabia, also facilitated a sizeable prisoner swap – involving some 215 Ukrainians and 55 Russians – in September. Behind closed doors, G20 participants will surely probe Erdoğan as to whether his frequent interlocutor Putin is ready to compromise. But there is no sign in advance of the Bali summit that Ankara sees a breakthrough coming.


For the U.S. and Ukraine’s other allies, Beijing’s view of the war has been a constant source of anxiety.

But, however much attention Erdoğan garners in Bali, leaders may focus even more closely on what China’s President Xi Jinping has to say. For the U.S. and Ukraine’s other allies, Beijing’s view of the war has been a constant source of anxiety since February. In recent months, Western observers believe they have seen increasing signs of frustration in China with the course of the conflict. Beijing has indicated its concern that Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling, bad enough in itself, might be more than dangerous talk. This concern was heightened by the Kremlin’s vague, erroneous intimations that Ukraine, not Russia, wants to raise the nuclear stakes with a “dirty bomb”. Xi articulated these issues most clearly in a joint statement with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz opposing the “threat or use of nuclear weapons” in Ukraine.

Points of Agreement

While G20 members have, therefore, no shortage of opinions about Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is difficult to see how they could reconcile their divergent views in Bali. It is hard, for example, to square Mexico’s advocacy for an early ceasefire (which Brazil and Argentina also advocated for at the UN in September) with Western powers’ worries that Moscow could use a pause in hostilities to consolidate control over parts of Ukraine even as it rearms and repositions for the next phase of conflict.

Rather than focus on the specifics of how to end the war, G20 leaders may be better advised to identify broad areas of agreement about how to contain the war and its fallout. The most obvious would be for those G20 leaders who are in Bali to endorse the Xi-Scholz condemnation of nuclear threats and nuclear use. Alternatively, or additionally, they could reiterate the basic principle that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, which the five nuclear weapons states (the UK, China, France, Russia and the U.S.) affirmed in a statement to the UN in January. Such a declaration might be complicated by the G20’s incompatible positions on non-proliferation issues (Brazil, for example, has lobbied for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, whereas India is not even a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty). Given Russia’s recurrent allusions to nuclear use in Ukraine, however, the leaders should at least be able to agree they are opposed to nuclear threats and nuclear war.

The goal of such a declaration, however minimal or vague, would be to signal to Moscow that it will face global diplomatic and other penalties, rather than just consequences from the West, if its nuclear rhetoric turns to action in any way. Russia has shown some interest in how its moves in Ukraine – such as its agreement to the Black Sea grain deal – are seen in the non-Western world. G20 leaders are not likely to spell out in concrete terms what steps they would take if Russia does cross the nuclear threshold – indeed, it might be better they do not try to be too explicit, as doing so might only highlight their differences. But some sort of common signalling, especially one that by definition has both U.S. and Chinese buy-in, could help strengthen the nuclear taboo.

G20 members can offer common support to efforts to reduce the global economic damage the conflict is doing.

Turning to the war’s impact, G20 members can offer common support to efforts to reduce the global economic damage the conflict is doing. They could start by making a statement in support of the Black Sea grain deal (which is up for renewal by Russia and Ukraine on 19 November) and calling for this deal, which now has to be reaffirmed every 120 days, to continue indefinitely until hostilities cease. Such a statement would be a fillip not only for President Erdoğan, but also for UN officials working on implementing the agreement, which Russia threatened to quit in October after a Ukrainian attack on its navy.

More broadly, G20 leaders can use the Bali summit to help prop up the teetering global economy, much as their predecessors did in 2008-2009. Potential priorities include pushing multilateral development banks to boost lending to poor countries to handle economic challenges that could foment political instability. In 2021, G20 members committed to support liquidity in the global economy by making available to poor countries $100 billion in International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights (a reserve asset that Crisis Group discussed in detail in a briefing prior to the 2022 G7 meeting). They have been slow to follow through with this pledge, and they need to pick up the pace as the international economic picture gets bleaker.

Given its origins and membership, the G20 has greater credibility as an economic crisis management mechanism than as a security forum. Its actions on the global economy will carry more weight than its members’ political statements about Ukraine. Yet the last year has made it clear that global economic affairs cannot be insulated from security shocks, and big powers must tend to both. At the same time, Russia’s nuclear menacing amid the conflict it is waging in Ukraine is simply too big an issue to ignore. The Bali summit is an opportunity for the leading Western and non-Western powers to at least articulate their shared interest in not letting the war escalate out of all control.

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