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Horn of Africa States Follow Gulf into the Yemen War
Horn of Africa States Follow Gulf into the Yemen War
Crisis Group Yemen Update #10
Crisis Group Yemen Update #10
Op-Ed / Africa

Horn of Africa States Follow Gulf into the Yemen War

Originally published in The Africa Report

In the Horn, where cash-strapped regimes often teeter on the brink of financial survival and alliances are made and broken with bewildering regularity, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has found willing partners as Saudi-Iranian tensions escalate.

In the commercial melting pot of Dubai, where British bankers rub shoulders with Afghan carpet sellers, you would be hard-pressed to imagine that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is fighting a major war in Yemen that has sucked in several other Gulf states and four Horn of Africa countries.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two key external belligerents, have small populations and large bank accounts filled with revenue from vast oil and gas reserves. The former has made the largest financial contribution with the latter supplying most of the troops.

When they decided to intervene militarily in Yemen, in March 2015, to halt a Houthi (a Zaydi, Shiite group) rebel takeover attempt, it became apparent that they would need additional boots on the ground. Conveniently situated ports and air bases were also needed. They found willing partners in Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Most of Yemen, especially its second city, the port of Aden, is closer to Asmara, Djibouti, Khartoum, Mogadishu and Hargeisa than Riyadh, Doha or Dubai. At the Bab al-Mandab – the straits where the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden meet – the country is just 30km from the Eritrean and Djiboutian coastline. Geographically, Horn of Africa involvement in the war makes sense.

The other half of this equation involves the political dynamics of the Gulf states, which collectively form the GCC. The GCC is also attempting to assert itself as a grouping capable of countering a perceived Iranian encroachment. In this context, and whether justified or not, the Houthi rebellion was seen as an Iranian-backed proxy.

Follow the money

Gaining supporters for the Yemen intervention wasn't simply about military power, but was also an assertion of diplomatic strength – particularly with Sunni Arab partners such as Sudan. Regional dynamics are thus likely to provide opportunities for willing partners in the Horn. Sudan, to take one example, has a complex relationship with the Gulf, historically based on two factors.

First, the weak economy has pushed many professional Sudanese to seek employment outside the country. Saudi Arabia hosts up to 900,000 Sudanese migrant workers, the UAE 75,000 and Qatar 30,000. Since the 1989 Islamist coup in Sudan, the diaspora has become a key source of remittances, propping up the very system they were forced to leave due to a stagnant employment market and repressive political culture.

Second, due to the parlous state of the economy, Sudan is perennially searching for new financial backers. In the late 1990s and 2000s, it experienced an oil boom, relying on Chinese, Indian and Malaysian companies to fill the investment gap left by Chevron (a US oil major), which exited in 1990. The 2011 secession of South Sudan brought a sharp dip in oil revenues and exposed the limited Asian appetite in the non-oil economy.

The ideological legacy of the 1989 coup – including the new regime's refusal to show solidarity with the Gulf states by denouncing Iraq's Kuwait invasion in 1990 – brought isolation, and a close relationship with Iran. It was also a source of arms vital for fighting the war in southern Sudan.

Saudi Arabia found Sudan's Iranian links and Islamist sympathies deeply concerning and, as recently as 2014, imposed financial restrictions on its banking sector, and threatened to deport thousands of migrant workers.

A windfall for the Horn of Africa

But in late 2014 Sudan made a much-publicised shift away from Tehran, closing Iranian cultural centres in Khartoum, which it accused of spreading Shiism. When the war in Yemen started, the Saudis made an offer far in excess of what Iran was prepared to commit, with unconfirmed reports stating that Sudan received $2.2 billion in return for diplomatic and military support. Initially Khartoum made only a notional military contribution, but as Saudi and Emirati losses mounted, they asked more of the Sudanese, who in October 2015 deployed what reports estimate to be between 350 and 700 ground troops.

Eritrean, Djiboutian and Somali involvement in Yemen is more opaque. In Eritrea's case, the port of Assab is being used as an air-sea logistical hub for Saudi-Emirati operations. However, unlike Khartoum, Asmara has been silent as to whether it has deployed troops. The UN Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group wrote in September 2015 that Eritrean troop deployments would constitute "a clear violation" of UN resolution 1907 – which imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea in 2009.

The development of Eritrean relations with Saudi Arabia also appears to have worried Ethiopia, which wants to keep its erstwhile rival diplomatically isolated.

The role of Somalia and Somaliland is even murkier. Somalia made public that it has granted permission for GCC countries to use of its airspace, but it has not confirmed reports that Somali National Army soldiers are, like the Sudanese, deployed in Yemen as mercenaries. And while Somaliland has agreed to rent out port facilities at Berbera it is unknown whether this offer has been taken up. Meanwhile, Djibouti – an established Saudi ally and host of US, French and Japanese military bases – also appears to have permitted the use of its airport infrastructure for some coalition bombing missions, despite some recent tensions in relations.

The internationalisation of the Yemen war is proving a major windfall for the Horn of Africa, providing a source of ready cash and diplomatic support for governments in the region. Their involvement illustrates how regional conflagrations can drag in multiple actors with their own varied motivations. In the meantime, the Saudi-led alliance-building with countries in the Horn is likely to increase.

Yemeni insurgent groups take security measures at the entrance to Aden, in the city of Ad Dali against Houthis on 12 April 2015, as the clashes continue between Loyalists of embattled President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and Yemen's Shiite Houthi movement. Wail Shaif Thabet / Anadolu Agency

Crisis Group Yemen Update #10

This is Crisis Group’s tenth update on recent developments in Yemen, focusing on al-Dhale in the south. A ceasefire in Hodeida notwithstanding, violence is on the rise on other key front lines and could undermine prospects for a future peace process.

Fighting between Huthi (Ansar Allah) and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces is intensifying in the southern governorate of al-Dhale. Battles have cut off key transit routes connecting the southern port city of Aden, the Huthi-held capital of Sanaa in the north, and the central governorate of Taiz, which houses important food processing, packaging and distribution facilities. If allowed to continue, the fighting could significantly deepen the country’s economic woes and further complicate efforts to revive a national peace process.

Al-Dhale sits on the historic fault line between former North and South Yemen, separate countries before 1990. Formed after Yemen’s unification by combining districts of the two former states, it is a natural battle ground for future north-south struggles. Since the Huthis and their allies were pushed north out of Aden in July 2015, al-Dhale became a front line in the current civil war where fighting flares periodically. Before and after the UN-led talks in Sweden in December 2018, fighting intensified in al-Dhale with Yemeni government and UAE-aligned forces claiming advances against Huthi fighters.

Now the Huthis appear to be making gains. Yemeni media reported on 1 May that Huthi forces had captured two towns along the highway linking al-Dhale with Ibb governorate to the west. After seizing the towns of Fakhir and Shakhab, they were closing in on Qataba, a town near an important junction between the westbound and northbound highways that link southern Yemen with Huthi-held territory. If the Huthis were to take Qataba, the ensuing fighting would also cut off the northbound highway that links rival forces in Damt district in northern al-Dhale with their supplies from the south, weakening the position of separatist forces. Fighting on the Damt front has also escalated in recent weeks.

Blocked highways are yet to cause an increase in food prices in the north of the country, but humanitarian organisations worry that continued fighting could cause a price spike. Aden airport has become the main route in and out of the country for Yemenis, especially those seeking medical treatment abroad, and ongoing violence along the highways would also impede travellers from Huthi-held territory.

Map: The Huthis’ Southward Advance into al-Dhale Governorate Google

Yemeni government officials view ongoing battles in al-Dhale and neighbouring governorates as part of a Huthi plan to exploit the current UN-mediated ceasefire in Hodeida to make gains on the ground in other areas. They claim the attacks are part of a pincer move to pressure UAE-backed forces in the south and to draw UAE-backed front-line forces away from the Red Sea theatre. Indeed, some forces have been redeployed from Hodeida to al-Dhale to help turn the tide against the Huthis. Some suspect the Huthis may even be preparing to push south again toward Aden, the government’s temporary capital.

Huthi officials, however, argue that they are fighting back against a months-long campaign by the Saudi-led coalition and its allies to destabilise territory they control and gain new ground, also under the cover of the Stockholm Agreement reached in Sweden in December 2018. The Huthis are likely trying to seize important supply lines and prevent their rivals from opening new routes into territory they hold while expanding buffer zones between the different cantons of control. Damt in northern al-Dhale has become the de facto border between the warring sides along the Aden-Sanaa highway, while Qataba is similarly important to the westbound routes to Ibb and Taiz city. The buffer zones are important because several tribal and religious groups in Ibb, which borders al-Dhale to the north, have remained neutral throughout the war. Yemeni government officials are convinced that they would join the anti-Huthi cause given a supply line connecting them with the south; the Huthis too are concerned that this might be the case.

Meanwhile, southern separatists have their own interpretation of events. Members of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a pro-secessionist group closely tied to the main UAE-backed forces who are fighting in al-Dhale, suspect that renewed fighting there is directly linked to the issue of southern separation. Their media outlets reported that government military units fell back in the face of the Huthi offensive, and that some previously government-aligned commanders defected to the Huthi side. They have presented the offensive as part of a plot to destabilise the south, undermine the STC and UAE-backed southern forces, and pave the way for a joint Huthi-Islah attack on Aden, despite the fact that Huthis and Islah (a Sunni Islamist party aligned with the Hadi government) are fighting on opposite sides of the current civil war. The STC suspects a “northern” Huthi-Islah reconciliation aimed at subduing the south and pre-empting a possible separation bid.

Regardless of why fighting has again flared up in al-Dhale, the humanitarian consequences could be dire if it continues.

STC suspicions of a new northern alliance against the south are speculative at best, but the Huthis are undoubtedly pressing their advantage to draw forces away from Hodeida. A considerable proportion of the Giants Brigade, the main military force battling the Huthis on the Red Sea coast, are drawn from tribes and families originally from Yafa, a zone that spans modern-day Lahj, al-Dhale and Abyan governorates. Aydrous al-Zubaidi, the STC president and a native of al-Dhale, has visited the front lines there several times since early April, while senior Giants Brigade members have also been photographed near the al-Dhale front. There are reports of some STC-aligned forces already being redeployed from the Red Sea coast to al-Dhale.

Regardless of why fighting has again flared up in al-Dhale, the humanitarian consequences could be dire if it continues. The battle for the governorate has effectively cut off the Aden-Sanaa highway and the westbound highway into Ibb, which in turn links Aden with Hawban, an industrial area to the northwest of Taiz city. As a result, the movement of goods and people between Aden, Taiz and Sanaa is frozen. A great many Yemeni merchants import goods, including foodstuffs, into Aden before transporting them north, often to Hawban, where bulk cargoes are processed and packaged for distribution nationwide. Although food prices have not yet been notably affected by the conflict in al-Dhale, Yemen’s business community warns of a potential “disaster” if the highway remains inaccessible in the coming weeks.

Bottom Line: For better or worse, implementation of the Stockholm Agreement remains the litmus test by which the warring parties judge the chances for returning to national peace talks and as such deserves priority focus. The UN special envoy, Martin Griffiths, may not have the bandwidth to intervene each time fighting escalates along one of the country’s front lines, particularly given the complexity of local dynamics in each location. Still, al-Dhale should not be ignored, given the potential humanitarian consequences and its link to the thorny issue of southern independence/autonomy. While Crisis Group has highlighted other regional battles and political issues in the past, few have the potential to touch as many nerves – or wreak as much economic havoc – as the current battle of al-Dhale. Griffiths has direct contact with both the Huthis and the UAE, who are directing the major frontline forces in al-Dhale. Quiet diplomacy by his team could help reduce the fighting, prevent an escalation in neighbouring governorates and contain the festering issue of southern independence so that it can be addressed through negotiations.

Political and Military Developments

Since concluding the technical details of the first phase of force redeployments from in and around Hodeida in April, the parties have made no progress implementing the Stockholm Agreement (for a breakdown of the latest developments, see Update #9). The UN continues to try to at least partially implement the deal by seeking agreement on two outstanding issues that have stood in the way: a second phase of redeployments from the main population centres inside the city and from positions encircling it (by, respectively, the Huthis and UAE-backed forces), and the composition of local security forces that should secure areas following military redeployments. Absent a quick agreement on these issues, Crisis Group continues to advocate the redeployment of Huthi forces from Hodeida’s ports (at a minimum from Saleef and Ras Issa) as a good-faith, low-cost initial step that does not expose the Huthis to significant military risk but which buys time to enable progress on thornier issues. If there is no movement on the ground, there is a risk that there could be a renewed military push in Hodeida by UAE-backed forces, likely with U.S. support.

Left unresolved, these internal issues [between rival factions] will hamper any attempt to broker a truce in Taiz between the Huthis and the government.

In Taiz, another round of fighting between local government-aligned military units and Salafist fighters saw loyalists of Abu al-Abbas, the UAE-backed Salafist leader, departing the city to a military base to the city’s south. Tensions between rival factions in the city remain high, however (for more details on Taiz, see Update #8). Left unresolved, these internal issues will hamper any attempt to broker a truce in Taiz between the Huthis and the government, as this would require coordination between all anti-Huthi forces on the ground.

Separately, a group of Hadi-affiliated southerners met in Aden on 28 April under the banner of the Southern National Coalition (SNC), which its advocates describe as a necessary counterweight to the separatist-leaning STC. The group’s stated aims are to support President Hadi and implement the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, a series of UN-led talks held in Sanaa in 2013-2014. In particular, they propose a federal model of government that Hadi himself favours. The meeting had been planned for several months; an earlier attempt to convene members in Cairo in March failed. The coalition is largely formed of Hadi loyalists. STC officials have dismissed the SNC as an insignificant group with little legitimacy on the ground (for details of tensions between the STC and the government, see Update #5).

Bottom Line: The UN needs a win in Yemen, and in particular needs to demonstrate some form of progress on Hodeida so that peace talks can begin. Ongoing negotiations over the different phases of redeployments from in and around Hodeida are likely to take some time, so the UN should pursue the Huthis’ prior public offer to redeploy from the ports – at a minimum Ras Issa and Saleef – as a sign of good faith.

Regional and International Developments

In a communiqué issued after a meeting of the “Quad” – the UK, U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE – in London on 27 April, its members again called for implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. The communiqué focussed heavily on the Huthis, calling on them to redeploy from Saleef, Ras Issa and Hodeida ports, in line with Crisis Group recommendations, and to cease the firing of “Iranian-made and facilitated ballistic missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles by Houthi forces into neighbouring countries”. The Quad members said they had an “expectation” that redeployments would be underway by the time the UN Security Council meets on 15 May.

With the Trump administration trying to ratchet up pressure on Iran, many in the U.S. government will continue to view Yemen as a battlefield for countering the Islamic Republic.

On 2 May, the U.S. Senate voted on whether to override President Trump’s 16 April veto of legislation that invoked the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and would have directed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen. A veto override requires a two-thirds vote from each chamber of Congress. The Senate vote of 53-45 fell short of the mark, and spells the end of this legislation. While some of its champions are now promising to move to new strategies for blocking U.S. support to the Saudi-led campaign – most importantly, by inserting defunding provisions in must-pass annual defence spending and authorisation bills – these do not presently appear to have the same bipartisan support as the vetoed legislation. To the extent that some members of Congress supported the war powers legislation because of outrage over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, that outrage is beginning to fade. And to the (perhaps greater) extent that some felt comfortable supporting the legislation as a political gesture primarily because they believed the president would veto it, they cannot repeat this strategy in the context of must-pass legislation.

Separately, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed Iran for delays in implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, and was quoted in the UAE-headquartered The National on 29 April as saying the Huthis "continue to refuse to comply with the agreements that they signed up for in Stockholm, Sweden, they refuse to withdraw from the port of Hodeida...this is because Iran has chosen to direct them to do that”. In the same interview, Pompeo emphasised the Trump administration’s intention to continue its support to the coalition, stating “the support we are providing to the Saudis is in America’s best interest”.

Bottom Line: The U.S. has been the strongest public critic of the Huthis among UN Security Council members since the Stockholm Agreement was signed in December, and is expected to push the Council to censure the group during an upcoming meeting on Yemen in New York on 15 May. With the Trump administration trying to ratchet up pressure on Iran, many in the U.S. government will continue to view Yemen as a battlefield for countering the Islamic Republic. In the aftermath of President Trump’s recent veto, it remains to be seen how effective Congress will be in pushing back against the administration’s policy of continued support to the Saudi-led campaign.

Click here for the latest CrisisWatch entry for Yemen.