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Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War
Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
The Search for an African Union Exit Strategy from Somalia
The Search for an African Union Exit Strategy from Somalia
Briefing 99 / Africa

Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War

Despite military gains against Somalia’s Islamist group Al-Shabaab, the insurgents’ defeat will remain elusive until the Somali government and its international partners address longstanding social – often clan-based – grievances through parallel local and national processes, as the basis for the revival of conventional governmental authority.

I. Overview

Despite the recent military surge against Somalia’s armed Islamist extremist and self-declared al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab, its conclusive “defeat” remains elusive. The most likely scenario – already in evidence – is that its armed units will retreat to smaller, remote and rural enclaves, exploiting entrenched and ever-changing clan-based competition; at the same time, other groups of radicalised and well-trained individuals will continue to carry out assassinations and terrorist attacks in urban areas, including increasingly in neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. The long connection between Al-Shabaab’s current leadership and al-Qaeda is likely to strengthen. A critical breakthrough in the fight against the group cannot, therefore, be achieved by force of arms, even less so when it is foreign militaries, not the Somali National Army (SNA), that are in the lead. A more politically-focused approach is required.

Even as its territory is squeezed in the medium term, Al-Shabaab will continue to control both money and minds. It has the advantage of at least three decades of Salafi-Wahhabi proselytisation (daawa) in Somalia; social conservatism is already strongly entrenched – including in Somaliland and among Somali minorities in neigh­bouring states – giving it deep reservoirs of fiscal and ideological support, even without the intimidation it routinely employs.

An additional factor is the group’s proven ability to adapt, militarily and politically – flexibility that is assisted by its leadership’s freedom from direct accountability to any single constituency. From its first serious military setbacks in 2007 and again in 2011, it has continually reframed the terms of engagement. It appears to be doing so again.

Countering Al-Shabaab’s deep presence in south-central Somalia requires the kind of government – financially secure, with a common vision and coercive means – that is unlikely to materialise in the near term. More military surges will do little to reduce the socio-political dysfunction that has allowed Al-Shabaab to thrive; in certain areas it may even serve to deepen its hold. The Somali Federal Government (SFG), supported by external allies, should consider the following political options:

  • implementing, as outlined in the “National Stabilisation Strategy” (NSS), parallel national and local reconciliation processes at all levels of Somali society;
     
  • imitating Al-Shabaab’s frequently successful techniques of facilitating local clan dialogue and reconciliation (as per the National Stabilisation Strategy, NSS), as well as religious education;
     
  • developing a new approach to establishing local and regional administrations that privileges neither SFG appointees nor clients of neighbouring states; and
     
  • making the local (Somali) political grievances that enable Al-Shabaab to remain and rebuild in Somalia the paramount focus, not regional or wider international priorities.

Nairobi/Brussels, 26 June 2014

Podcast / Africa

The Search for an African Union Exit Strategy from Somalia

This week on The Horn, Alan talks to Crisis Group expert Omar Mahmood about the future of AMISOM, the African Union’s mission in Somalia, as its backers search for an exit strategy.

The African Union’s mission (AMISOM) has operated in Somalia for close to fifteen years. Initial military successes have led to a stalemate on the battlefield, as the military coalition of regional African troops has struggled to permanently dislodge jihadist insurgent group Al-Shabaab. Frustration is mounting, both in Somalia and abroad. The Somali government, led by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”, has consistently called for an accelerated transition. International actors, saddled with the bulk of costs, are growing ever more wary of funding the mission without a clearer exit plan. Still, there are no easy options. Immediate withdrawal would almost certainly see Al-Shabaab make significant gains.

This week, Alan is joined by Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Somalia Omar Mahmood to discuss the beleaguered mission and the pressing need for reform. They talk through AMISOM’s mixed record, the possible consequences of a sudden withdrawal, the central and complicated roles played by Ethiopia and Kenya, Somali attitudes toward the mission and the bitter international disputes surrounding AMISOM’S funding. They also talk about the wider challenges facing Somalia and the missing political pieces preventing a smoother pullout by the African Union troops.

Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify

For more information, explore Crisis Group’s analysis on our Somalia page. Make sure to check out Crisis Group's recent briefing ‘Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia'.

Contributors

Project Director, Horn of Africa
alanboswell
Senior Analyst, Somalia
omarsmahmood