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From Conflict to Cooperation? Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda
From Conflict to Cooperation? Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda
To Intervene or Not? China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan Raises Questions
To Intervene or Not? China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan Raises Questions
Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir (L) welcomes Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni as he arrives at Khartoum Airport for talks during an official visit to Sudan on 15 September 2015. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah
Commentary / Africa

From Conflict to Cooperation? Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda

When South Sudanese leaders travelled to Khartoum in early June, pragmatically declaring their intent to “normalise relations” with their northern neighbors, it was a tentative sign of hope for what has been one of the Horn of Africa’s worst war zones.

Uganda, historically a staunch ally of South Sudan, is now seeking more constructive relations with Sudan too. The current processes – formal and informal, public and private – tackle a wider set of challenges that have historically inhibited good relations between the three countries. A new understanding between the three could bring a welcome change to the Horn’s complex balance of alliances and animosities.

The new overtures are driven by South Sudan’s economic crisis, coupled with Uganda’s and Sudan’s desire to protect their interests in the country. South Sudan has large oil reserves, which are exported through Sudan, but its production fell sharply with the eruption of civil war in December 2013. With the civil war’s end, Juba now wants to renegotiate the terms of its 2012 oil transfer agreement that mandates large payments to Sudan, arguing that a new deal needs to reflect the global downturn in prices and its own post-civil war financial straits. While Juba wants a new arrangement with Sudan, such a deal would come with strings attached. Donors’ reluctance to bail out South Sudan financially, unless Juba adopts stringent transparency and accountability measures, makes other options seem worse than a wider deal with Sudan.

 

A new understanding between the three could bring a welcome change to the Horn’s complex balance of alliances and animosities.

Sudan now wants to cooperate too. Its economy, though more resilient, still suffers from the 2011 division of the country, the loss of shared oil revenue, and, like South Sudan, obstacles to full cross-border trade. But in return Khartoum wants South Sudan to help end wars in Darfur and the Two Areas, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and stop its alleged support for Sudanese rebel groups.

Reaching agreement could be tough but conditions are more favourable than at any time since South Sudan’s secession five years ago. If both sides continue to work seriously on their bilateral relations, chances will rise of resolving other interlinked conflicts, notably the conflict in the Two Areas. A Khartoum-Juba deal would likely limit the operational space of Sudanese rebels – especially the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) – and lead to new border security arrangements.

Map showing South Sudan’s historic regions and the border with Sudan. CRISIS GROUP

Khartoum and Kampala’s long rivalry

The territory of southern Sudan (South Sudan since 2011) has long been a site of mutual interventions and proxy conflict between Khartoum and Kampala. During the 1990s, Uganda was suspicious of Islamist Sudan’s apparent desire to expand Arab and Islamic influence southwards. To counter the perceived Islamist threat, Uganda backed the Southern Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in the Sudanese civil war. Khartoum supported Ugandan rebel groups, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), among others.

South Sudan’s 2011 independence directed its neighbours’ rivalry toward competition for influence over the new state. Despite this, Sudan and Uganda have shared interests in common, including unhindered South Sudanese oil production and stability under President Salva Kiir.

Kampala’s concerns have shifted substantially from security to economic.

Sudan needs regular “transit fees” – a per barrel payment for use of the northern export pipeline – to buttress its fragile post-secession economy. Kampala’s concerns have shifted substantially from security to economic. It wants a prosperous South Sudan to trade with, particularly in the Equatoria region bordering Uganda. Kampala also believes it should have influence over major strategic decisions made in Juba; its historical support for the SPLA is reflected in a longstanding defence cooperation agreement, which includes allowing cross-border interventions by the Ugandan army.

When South Sudan’s civil war erupted in December 2013, Uganda deployed troops in support of the embattled Juba government, reviving tensions with Sudan. In response, Sudan provided limited backing to the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO).

From civil war to regional peace?

The potential for regional contagion following the outbreak of South Sudan’s civil war demanded mediation from the Horn of Africa’s regional security organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Though it failed to stop the war from escalating within South Sudan in its early months, IGAD’s largely unheralded success was to pull Uganda and Sudan (both member states) back from more aggressive posturing and toward a resolution of the war that both could support.

Critical to the eventual Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015 were key provisions negotiated at the IGAD Head of State level involving Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. These included the withdrawal of Ugandan forces – completed in October 2015 – and the “disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation” of any Sudanese rebel forces present in South Sudan, which include the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A-N) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – which Khartoum alleges are materially supported by Juba. The long-running African Union mediation to end the armed conflicts in Sudan has also engaged both these groups.

Peace in the Sudans is dependent on all three countries’ approach to regional relations.

As the 2015 South Sudan peace agreement recognises, peace in the Sudans is dependent on all three countries’ approach to regional relations. Improved relations between Uganda and Sudan have been reinforced by regional heads of state summits during South Sudan’s peace process, joint efforts to resolve South Sudan’s civil war, presidential and vice presidential visits, mutual disparagement of the International Criminal Court and plans to create a Joint Permanent Commission on bilateral affairs.

Precedents for Cooperation

Despite political will, the inherent complexities of the disputed Sudan-South Sudan border and relationships on both sides make this a fraught process with no guarantee of success. Skepticism and a degree of distrust remain on all sides. Yet negotiators are drawing from past agreements considered a success – notably the Chad-Sudan 2010 agreement, which precipitated the weakening of both Chadian and Darfur rebel groups; and the arrangement between Khartoum and Juba that led to the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) disbanding and its members returning to the South in 2013. Elements of the former SSLA control part of the border as part of the Juba-Khartoum deal, which served both their interests during South Sudan’s civil war.

If Sudan and South Sudan cannot strike a new deal then the broader regional configuration may well revert to its previous state of instability, mutual suspicion and proxy conflict. But the emergence of a new and pragmatic grouping could shift the regional balance of power in the Horn of Africa with significant advantages to the regimes in Kampala, Juba and Khartoum, and help end one of Africa’s most enduring conflicts.

Op-Ed / Africa

To Intervene or Not? China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan Raises Questions

Originally published in South China Morning Post

China’s growing involvement in South Sudan’s civil war differs from its past approach to non-interference, though there is debate on the long-term implications as its role in African, and global, security affairs expands.

China’s announcement of plans to vastly expand its first-ever overseas military base in Djibouti follows a dramatic display in July, when two Chinese navy vessels steamed across the Indian Ocean towards the dock. On both counts, Asia’s pre-eminent power declared in no uncertain terms that it will sit on the sidelines no longer. China’s growing naval capacity is being put to use in its deepening involvement in the Horn of Africa’s security. For years, it has been testing, refining and growing its clout in turbulent South Sudan – an indication that its adherence to the long-standing policy of non-interference is becoming less doctrinaire.

China initially found itself in South Sudan’s conflicts more by default than design. Just two years after it gained independence, civil war broke out in December 2013. Beijing was faced with the choice of stepping in and supporting mediation or withdrawing and abandoning its assets – most significantly oilfields – to looting and destruction.

It wasn’t an easy decision, as greater involvement went against decades of caution and the aversion to responsibility ingrained in China’s foreign policy doctrine. Since its “Go Out” policy in the 1990s, Chinese companies and diaspora had spread far and wide, often to unstable regions. But when instability turned into crises, Beijing had invariably opted for withdrawal. From 2006 to 2011, China conducted 10 large-scale evacuations of nationals from foreign countries due to unrest, wars and natural disasters. Chinese diplomats had reasoned that the best course was to pack up and cut losses as China had neither the desire nor the capabilities to interfere in another country’s affairs.

Beijing’s sheer economic heft in the region naturally translated into influence over otherwise intransigent parties and their regional backers.

The calculation began to change as Beijing’s diplomatic and military clout grew and its willingness to passively accept loss – and outcomes “imposed” by “meddling” Western powers – shrank. When Horn of Africa nations asked China to help with mediation in South Sudan, China seized the opportunity.

Beijing’s sheer economic heft in the region naturally translated into influence over otherwise intransigent parties and their regional backers. Both Juba and South Sudan’s rebels are well aware that Sudan’s and South Sudan’s economies live and die with Chinese investment in oil, which constitutes almost all of South Sudan’s exports and government revenue. When China speaks, they can ill afford to ignore.

In 2015, the Chinese foreign minister brought together South Sudan’s warring parties and regional mediators to talk in Khartoum. The meeting did not produce concrete new agreements, but secured pacts not to attack oil infrastructure and jolted into life a stalling peace process. More importantly, it framed Sudan – still sore from South Sudan’s independence – in the role of a responsible player and implicitly warned it against inflaming the South’s conflict. For Beijing, convening peace talks was a “groundbreaking” experiment.

Beijing has also skilfully tailored the timing and manner of humanitarian assistance to maximise impact and influence. Since 2013, US$49 million has been given in aid, often in response to Juba’s direct requests and delivered in visible fashion to ensure political goodwill. It was able to leverage its influence over Juba to ensure continued humanitarian access for the UN into rebel-held territories.

Undoubtedly Beijing has been at least partially driven by self-interest, as protecting the oilfields has been a priority. But Beijing also felt the time was ripe to test a new, more proactive foreign policy so it could better protect its overseas interests, assert its influence over international security affairs and live up to the expectations of a responsible power.

As the experimentation continues, China’s role as a peace-builder remains challenged by its aversion to risk. Beijing is comfortable as a table-setter for talks but unwilling to publicly offer solutions or enforce outcomes. It is reluctant to apply pressure, even when necessary, instead deferring to “African solutions” or leaving the tough-talking to African or Western mediators.

Beijing still holds on to “non-interference” [...] as a foreign policy doctrine, but there is a broad-based agreement that its interpretation and application should be more flexible.

China’s risk aversion reflects a calculation to preserve its access and influence but also capacity constraints. When the conflict in South Sudan broke out, China had merely 20 staff members in its embassy in Juba, while the US boasted around 300. Conflict resolution remains a nascent discipline, even for the foreign ministry, and, unlike Western nations, China does not have independent NGOs on the ground that can complement the government’s expertise and support its agenda.

Beijing’s experimentation in its new role has inspired curiosity and even some suspicion among Western powers and regional nations. Not least because China prioritises development over accountability and democratic procedures, and it naturally believes its own model of development and governance is better suited to the region than Western democracy. Yet so far, reviews of Chinese contributions have been positive. Beijing has largely pulled in the same direction as other powers that want peace in South Sudan, and has brought influence and access that others do not have.

The relative success of its South Sudan endeavour is shaping China’s foreign policy debate. Beijing still holds on to “non-interference into one another’s internal affairs” as a foreign policy doctrine, but there is a broad-based agreement that its interpretation and application should be more flexible. “Internal affairs” can be more narrowly defined, and acceptable interference more broadly applied, particularly in cases where regional security is threatened and parties consent to outside mediation. China’s role in African, and even global, security affairs is growing. Although it complements the traditional power players, it also requires accommodation and adjustment.

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