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De-escalating South Sudan’s New Flare-up
De-escalating South Sudan’s New Flare-up
South Sudanese policemen and soldiers stand guard along a street following renewed fighting in South Sudan’s capital Juba, 10 July 2016. REUTERS
Commentary / Africa

De-escalating South Sudan’s New Flare-up

In this Q&A, senior analyst for South Sudan, Casie Copeland, explains what is behind the fighting in Juba and what can help prevent the conflict spiralling out of control.

Violent clashes in the capital of South Sudan have soured the country’s fifth anniversary of independence. Hundreds of soldiers and civilians were killed in the four days after 7 July, including two Chinese peacekeepers. The confrontation threatens to destroy the fragile progress made toward implementing a 2015 peace agreement to end a two-year civil war. The deal had allowed some opposition soldiers back into the capital, Juba, and the clashes have been between them and units of the national army and presidential guard. The UN is protecting tens of thousands of civilians in its compounds around the city, one of which has been repeatedly hit. 

Crisis Group: What triggered this recent spate of violence, and who is responsible?

Casie Copeland: The return to conflict was a growing danger, as Crisis Group noted in its 1 July statement on Preventing Renewed War in South Sudan. In the nine months that the ceasefire has been observed, forces have simply paused hostilities while remaining in close proximity: there has been no joint security oversight or move toward unification or demobilisation. This would have been an untenable status quo even if there had been political progress, which has not materialised.

The South Sudanese warring parties signed the 2015 peace agreement, brokered by the regional security organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), under tremendous external pressure, particularly from neighbouring Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as China and the U.S. Following the signing, regional powers greatly reduced their focus on South Sudan and IGAD’s mediation became inactive. This allowed the South Sudanese parties to backtrack to their original uncompromising positions. By early July, there had been no political progress on implementing the peace agreement and, in the absence of credible external intervention, no such progress seemed likely.

Tensions thus never dissipated between government forces loyal to President Kiir and Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-in Opposition (SPLA-IO) troops following First Vice President Machar, who had returned to Juba under the 2015 peace agreement. Frictions rose over a series of incidents – with both groups at fault at different points – in the last weeks of June and early July. By 7 July almost anything could have sparked the larger battles that began on the weekend of 9-10 July. Once fighting broke out, combat continued despite calls by both leaders to stop, highlighting the complicated relationship between the leadership and different military units.

What’s at stake for South Sudan?

Renewed war would be devastating. The civil war from 2013 to 2015 was particularly brutal, with many instances of ethnic targeting and other atrocities, and humanitarian suffering that was compounded by a growing economic crisis. The fighting killed far more than 50,000 people, displaced approximately 2.3 million and the UN estimates that some five million will require humanitarian assistance in 2016. In 2014, regional powers were drawn in when the Ugandan military intervened in favour of Juba and Salva Kiir, and Sudan provided limited support to the SPLA-IO opposition forces.

IGAD’s mediation mission was partly motivated by the risk of regional war. International actors joined the group in putting enormous pressure on President Kiir and First Vice President and SPLA-IO leader Riek Machar to sign the August 2015 peace agreement and establish a transitional government – both leaders objected to parts of the deal.

What can IGAD do to pull South Sudan back from the brink?

A unified regional position in IGAD, backed up by the African Union, China and the U.S., is crucial. Both Kiir and Machar know they cannot sustain a war for long without the support of at least some neighbouring states. During the recent days of fighting, each of the IGAD heads of state reached out to Kiir, Machar and others involved in the fighting to make clear that they needed to lay down their arms and that no one in the region supported a return to war.

Beyond a ceasefire – which is a temporary measure at best – IGAD must come to agreement, again supported by the African Union, China and U.S., on the consequences the two men, their military commanders and factions will suffer if they do not stop fighting. This is especially important for Uganda and Sudan, which have particular influence with the government and opposition SPLA-IO respectively.

Will Uganda and Sudan seek to repeat their interventions seen earlier in the civil war?

A nascent rapprochement between Uganda and Sudan, and a great wariness in Khartoum and Kampala about the destabilising potential of greater involvement in South Sudan’s conflicts, are directing their efforts toward peace rather than supporting renewed war. Uganda in particular feels unfairly criticised for sending in troops to support the government in 2013.

IGAD member states, along with their supporters including the U.S. and Chinese governments, helped secure a ceasefire which was declared by Kiir and Machar on 11 July. If it does not hold, the position of regional states will be critical, since any additional measures, such as an intervention brigade or any form of sanction, whether against individuals or an arms embargo, would need to be implemented and enforced by these countries.

In its communiqué on 11 July, IGAD called for an “intervention brigade”. This was first proposed in 2014 during the mediation but faltered as the UN and IGAD could not agree on its relationship to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), or on the mechanisms of financial and logistical control. The Security Council also suggested UNMISS could be augmented by troops from the region to secure Juba. Deploying regional forces into UNMISS or independently would take time and would not resolve the immediate standoff.

Why is the IGAD-led peace process worth saving?

Some argue that the IGAD deal deferred some issues, such as what type of federal government should be created and whether a power-sharing arrangement between the war’s two main protagonists could set South Sudan on the path to stability. But it halted the fighting, created a framework for reform, transitional justice and elections and prevented regional powers being further sucked into South Sudan’s war. IGAD agreed that it would not be destabilised under an agreement that kept Kiir as president and Machar as first vice president. A divided IGAD where individual states meddled in South Sudan would have led to far greater bloodshed.

A particular problem since the peace agreement’s signing has been that the IGAD leaders who helped forge it have been absent during the difficult implementation phase. Specifically, the failure to implement a number of the agreement’s political and security provisions laid the groundwork for recent conflict. Now that a ceasefire has been called, those IGAD leaders should push Kiir and Machar to quickly operationalise the security arrangements in the peace agreement, particularly by establishing Joint Integrated Police units to patrol Juba, empowering the Joint Operations Center to ensure communication and coordination between forces in Juba, and empowering the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission. These mechanisms should also be supported by donors.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 11 July urged the Security Council to impose an arms embargo on South Sudan, sanction leaders and commanders who are blocking the implementation of a peace deal and fortify a UN peacekeeping mission. If agreed to, would this help?

At this point, with a fragile ceasefire agreed and thus far holding, any punitive international action should be imposed carefully – and only in close coordination with IGAD and regional powers – otherwise it could undermine the ceasefire or even empower hardliners who support renewed war. Sanctions and arms embargoes can be valuable tools, but only where they serve clear political objectives.

Given the breakdown in the peace agreement, IGAD, supported by the African Union and major powers, particularly the U.S. and China, should re-assess their various political objectives in South Sudan, including the promise of stronger action if there is no compliance or if there is further fighting. The African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government summit meeting in Kigali, Rwanda on 17-18 July is a good opportunity to convene a high-level meeting on South Sudan.

Do President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar actually have full control over their forces?

The situation is fluid and, especially on the opposition side, lines of control have exhibited the same level of flux they exhibited during most of the war. Many soldiers have followed senior opposition officials other than Machar. Another problem is that many of the opposition soldiers killed were from Machar’s own official guard.

As Crisis Group noted in South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, many opposition forces are not personally loyal to Machar, instead they rose up in response to violence against ethnically Nuer civilians in Juba in December 2013 and only begrudgingly accepted Machar as the movement’s overall leader. This has always been the case and the recent fighting is no different to challenges in command and control the opposition SPLA-IO faced across the country during their rebellion.

The government has continued to counsel restraint among its forces but reports of looting, drunkenness and attacks on the UN base indicate that many have not heeded these orders.

With a number of peacekeepers killed in the recent fighting, how vulnerable is the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)? Do they have the resources needed to protect civilians fleeing the violence?

Peacekeepers have the means to respond to and deter some attacks on protection of civilian sites in or near UNMISS bases. When challenged by UN forces, some South Sudanese armed groups have retreated. UNMISS, however, lacks the numbers and equipment to protect all civilians, including those in Juba. Yet the mission has not been very assertive and not all of its forces are equally committed to its mandate. Some have literally run from their protection obligations.

There have been many attacks on UN facilities during the last years of war and, to date, no one has been arrested or prosecuted. The UN is an “easy target” in the eyes of many, making the situations particularly dangerous for its staff and civilians under its protection.

So far, the violence appears to be mainly confined to Juba. What is the risk that the fighting may escalate to other areas in South Sudan?

Fortunately the fighting has died down for now. But if it resumes there is a risk that it spreads and becomes much more difficult to end. Forces throughout the country are preparing for war and civilians are fleeing areas where they fear fighting. During the civil war, most of the fighting was confined to the Greater Upper Nile, where the opposition is strong in the far north, but since the August 2015 peace agreement the SPLA-IO has been actively recruiting in other areas particularly in greater Equatoria, in the south, where government forces are stronger. Fighting in the former Upper Nile state could be very intense, while in the Equatorias, fewer weapons and forces means it would likely be on a much smaller scale. The possibility of conflict spreading to different areas remains and is of grave concern.

Rwanda's President Paul Kagame (R) and Chairperson of the African Union Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat (L) attend a commemoration ceremony for 23rd anniversary of Rwandan genocide, on April 7, 2017. Jacques Nkinzingabo / ANADOLU AGENCY
Briefing 135 / Africa

Seven Priorities for the African Union in 2018

In 2018, the African Union (AU) and its new Assembly Chairperson President Paul Kagame of Rwanda have the chance to push ahead with much-needed institutional reforms. But the AU must not lose focus on dire conflicts and defusing potential electoral violence.

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What’s the issue? African Union leaders meet at the end of January for their bi-annual summit. Vital institutional and financial reform will likely be at the top of the AU’s 2018 agenda, but the organisation must ensure that its implementation does not draw focus away from conflict prevention and resolution.

Why does it matter? The African conflict landscape has changed: new threats, especially from transnational jihadist and criminal networks, aggravate more traditional forms of conflict. The geopolitical climate has become even harder to navigate. And elections, often the trigger for political crisis and violence, will take place in eighteen African countries in 2018.

What should be done? The AU must pay particular attention to Africa’s most dire conflicts and those where it can have real impact: South Sudan, Central African Republic and Somalia. As a priority, it should advance preparations for elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo and deploy observations teams early in Cameroon, Mali and Zimbabwe.

Overview

2018 could be a year of dramatic change for the African Union (AU) as it pursues an extensive program of institutional and financial reform. At the end of January, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame – the author and chief supervisor of the process – takes over as chairperson of the AU Assembly, the organisation’s highest decision-making body, meaning that reform will rise to the top of the AU’s agenda. The changes are critical for the organisation’s long-term health, but driving them through will not be quick or easy. Kagame, working closely with AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, should ensure their implementation does not sap too much energy from the AU’s other vital work, especially continental conflict prevention and resolution.

Faki himself, since taking office in March 2017, has focused squarely on peace and security, in strong contrast to his predecessor, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who tried to reorient the organisation toward long-term development. During his first week in office, Faki visited Somalia, where an AU force is battling Al-Shabaab’s resilient insurgency. In his second, he travelled to South Sudan, scene of the continent’s deadliest conflict. These visits, together with subsequent ones to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the G5 Sahel states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), provide a strong indication of where Faki believes the AU’s gravest peace and security challenges lie.

Additionally, he has worked to strengthen relations with the AU’s two most important strategic partners – the UN and the European Union (EU). In April, he signed the long-delayed Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Cooperation on Peace and Security, which should improve collaboration between the two organisations. Faki was instrumental in repairing relations with the EU, which had reached a low point in 2016 due to disputes over payments to troops in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Discussions ahead of November’s AU-EU summit suggest a cooperation agreement, similar to that between the AU and the UN, is likely to be adopted in 2018. The joint AU-EU-UN task force on migration, born out of disgust with migrant slave auctions in Libya, is a positive development that capitalises on each institution’s strengths. As the AU re-evaluates its partnerships with other multilateral organisations and non-African states in 2018, it should build on these successes and not neglect relations with the EU and UN.

The geopolitical climate, already challenging when Faki took office in March, has become still harder to navigate. Tensions between Gulf powers – notably between Saudi Arabia and its allies on the one hand and Qatar on the other – have spilled into the Horn of Africa, adding to instability in Somalia and exacerbating friction over the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia, which have adopted different positions on the dispute. Divisions between major powers on the UN Security Council makes achieving consensus on crises, including those in Africa, ever harder. While U.S. President Donald Trump has largely ignored Africa, his administration’s escalating counter-terrorism operations risk further complicating crises in Somalia and the Sahel absent more comprehensive U.S. support for peace efforts.

With many competing peace and security concerns, the AU should focus on Africa’s most dire crises and those where the continental body or its representatives have useful roles to play. With this in mind, this note lays out priorities for the AU in 2018. These include the important reform efforts; limiting any disruption to the institution’s work caused by friction between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s (SADR); helping resolve or avert election-related crises in the DRC, Cameroon, Mali and Zimbabwe; and managing conflicts in the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan.

Strategic Direction

I. Build consensus on institutional and financial reform

The AU has embarked on a potentially radical reform process, which if fully implemented could prove as significant as the 2002 transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union. Current reforms, spearheaded by Kagame at the behest of the Assembly, aim to reduce the AU’s focus to just four areas: peace and security; political affairs; the establishment of a continental free trade area; and voice and representation in global affairs. Integral to this process, which should make the organisation leaner and more efficient, is increased financial self-sufficiency. In 2012, when the AU was at its most dependent, member states funded just 3 per cent of its programmatic budget. By 2017, this had increased to 14 per cent, still well short of member states’ July 2015 commitment to finance 75 per cent of the AU’s programs by 2020, plus 25 per cent of its peace and security activities and all of its spending on operations. Extra resources are to be raised through a 0.2 per cent levy on “all eligible” goods imported to the continent under a plan drawn up by Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund.

2018 is a pivotal year for these reforms. At the end of January, Kagame takes over from President Alpha Condé of Guinea as Assembly chairperson, and is widely expected to use his year at the helm to push through the agenda he developed, endorsed by his fellow leaders at the January 2017 AU summit. Member states, the Commission and the regional economic communities (RECs) have expressed disappointment with the process to date, however, citing a lack of consultation. Reforms could be derailed without a more inclusive and collaborative approach.

In particular, Kagame must allay the apprehensions of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has laid out a comprehensive list of concerns including the practicality of the 0.2 per cent import tax, the reduced role of the Permanent Representatives Committee comprising member states’ ambassadors to the AU, and the establishment of a troika of current, outgoing and incoming Assembly chairpersons to represent the AU at summits with partners. He must also win over the five biggest contributors to the AU budget – Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa – all of which have serious doubts about the financial reforms, among other proposals. To do this, Kagame will have to build and mobilise a coalition of supportive states, drawn from each sub-region, to win over sceptics. He and Faki should consider joint visits to the secretariats of each AU-recognised REC or attend their respective summits to explain the benefits of reform. Member states will need time to undertake domestic consultations, particularly regarding the 0.2 per cent levy on imports, which will require ratification by parliament or other local authorities in many countries.

As part of the reform process, the AU should undertake a wholesale review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The continental conflict landscape has evolved dramatically since APSA was designed and developed in the early 2000s. New challenges have emerged, including the expanding influence of non-state actors, especially jihadist movements and criminal networks that operate across borders and often exploit and aggravate more traditional forms of conflict. The AU has endorsed the ad-hoc forces that groups of states have mobilised in response – the Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and G5 Sahel Joint Force – but exercises little, if any, oversight over their mandate or operations. A review of APSA would consider whether these forces should be brought into continental structures and, if so, how.

II. Limit disruption caused by tensions between Morocco and SADR

Morocco rejoined the AU in January 2017, after 33 years of self-imposed exile, a protest against the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria and several other states strongly opposed Rabat’s return on the grounds that its “occupation” of SADR contravenes AU principles. Many believe Morocco will attempt to isolate and eventually expel SADR from the AU and fear its presence could be disruptive: before rejoining, Morocco staged walkouts during several international meetings attended by SADR representatives. In his debut speech to the AU Assembly, King Mohammed VI attempted to reassure fellow leaders. “We have absolutely no intention of causing division, as some would like to insinuate”, he said, adding: “[The Kingdom’s] action will, on the contrary, help bring about unity and progress”.

Many believe Morocco will attempt to isolate and eventually expel SADR from the AU and fear its presence could be disruptive.

Despite his assurances, tensions between Morocco and SADR have already disrupted the AU’s work, delaying or derailing both internal meetings and those with external partners. In August 2017, during a ministerial meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in Maputo, Mozambique, the Moroccan foreign minister was prevented from taking part after he protested against SADR’s inclusion, a dispute that degenerated into a physical altercation. During preparations for November’s AU-EU summit, a great deal of time and political goodwill was expended convincing Morocco to take its seat, though the king eventually participated fully, in large part because of the importance of the partnership with the EU to both Morocco and Africa as a whole.

Member states and AU Commission staff are increasingly frustrated with both sides; they will need to exercise deft diplomacy to ease frictions. Faki should work with allies among member states to persuade Morocco, SADR and their respective supporters to allow the AU to work unhindered. Warmer relations between Pretoria and Rabat may help; the two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors after King Mohammed VI and President Jacob Zuma met on the sidelines of the AU-EU summit.

Contested Transitions

III. Help advance preparations for elections in the DRC

In 2017, President Joseph Kabila extended his tenure in power at least until the end of 2018, despite the December 2016 Saint Sylvester agreement, which required elections to be held in December 2017. The opposition and civil society, meanwhile, continue to struggle to forge a credible popular movement in the face of continued repression. Kabila retains the upper hand, controlling the government, the security forces and the electoral commission. For now, there is no guarantee or discernible commitment to the effective organisation of elections. The deadly 31 December crackdown on protesters demonstrates that political repression continues unabated, reinforcing concerns that electoral preparations are a smokescreen.

The Congolese economy is in crisis, however, and the government’s writ is weak in large areas of the country. A number of provinces suffer local insurrections or intercommunal conflict, resulting in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The danger that violence could escalate further remains high: the experience in Kasai, where politicisation of a local chief’s installation led to conflict affecting several provinces, illustrates how quickly unrest can spread. The recent killing of fifteen UN peacekeepers in Beni is also a stark reminder of the dangerous dynamics in eastern DRC.

Political Blockage and Rising Violence in DR Congo

Crisis Group’s Central Africa Project Director Richard Moncrieff describes the political blockage that is fuelling popular frustration and the spread of violence in DRC. CRISIS GROUP

International engagement has been lacklustre and incoherent, even as Kabila’s government has wilfully broken the Saint Sylvester provisions. The U.S. and the EU have been more critical, imposing targeted sanctions on key officials. The AU, meanwhile, like many of its member states, denounces sanctions. Some African leaders express frustration with Kabila in private, but their tacit public support has given his government breathing space.

The electoral commission has rescheduled presidential, legislative and provincial polls for 23 December 2018. This provides an opportunity for concerted and coordinated Western and African diplomacy based on strict adherence to the new timetable, a credible vote, an opening up of political space and a guarantee that the constitution will not be amended to allow Kabila another term. The opposition should actively engage in the electoral process.

The AU, which has stepped-up its diplomacy on the DRC in recent months, could use the new electoral calendar as the basis for sustained engagement to bridge divides between Africa and the West. Together with regional actors (in particular SADC, South Africa and Angola) and the wider international community, the AU should monitor the electoral commission’s progress to avoid further delays and uphold the key principles of the Saint Sylvester agreement.

A small but representative envoy group, comprised of Western and African nations and organisations, including the AU, could help forge international consensus and limit Kabila’s opportunities for forum shopping. This group should establish and monitor benchmarks for the electoral process and connect initiatives at the local, regional and international levels. Finally, the AU should use its own influence and legitimacy, especially that of the Peace and Security Council, to nudge the Kabila administration toward a transition and the opposition toward engaging in the electoral process.

IV. Deploy observation teams well in advance of other critical elections

In addition to the DRC, seventeen other African countries are scheduled to hold presidential, parliamentary or local elections in 2018. Of these, at least thirteen are embroiled in or emerging from conflict or have a history of recurrent electoral strife. Flawed or violent polls, or a series of votes that provoke political crises, could have wider implications for democracy and stability on the continent, parts of which already show signs of backsliding.

The AU’s chronically understaffed and underfinanced Department for Political Affairs cannot effectively monitor all these contests; it should concentrate efforts on those most requiring scrutiny. In addition to short-term teams that monitor polling and counting, the AU should deploy long-term observers, ideally at least six months in advance, to keep track of broader conditions for elections and the campaign environment; unfair conditions are frequently created well in advance of polling. The AU could also consider combining its observation operations with those of regional economic communities.

Three polls, aside from those in the DRC, merit particular attention in 2018:

Cameroon faces a growing Anglophone crisis in the south west, which the government, already struggling with Boko Haram in the Far North and militias from the Central African Republic in the east, appears ill-equipped to defuse. Unrest in Anglophone areas shows signs of an incipient insurgency and could ignite a wider political crisis that risks disrupting elections scheduled for October. The AU and other international actors should push both the government and Anglophone militants toward dialogue and promote conditions for a credible vote.

Presidential, National Assembly and regional elections are scheduled in Mali, but implementation of the June 2015 Algerian-brokered peace agreement remains slow. Armed groups have proliferated, clashing more frequently with Malian and international forces. The government remains largely absent across the north and jihadist groups are consolidating control across many rural areas. Unrest has also spread to central Mali, a region long-neglected by the state. Under these conditions, administering a credible vote in 2018 will be difficult. But the elections should go ahead: popular discontent with the current administration is high and any attempt to postpone them, especially presidential polls, could fuel protests, particularly in the capital Bamako. The AU should assist Malian authorities’ electoral preparations, including encouraging either the UN and EU to support an audit of the voter register.

In Zimbabwe, the euphoria that followed President Robert Mugabe’s ouster subsided as his replacement, Emmerson Mnangagwa, consolidated the power of Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the military, appointing a cabinet filled with supporters and senior army officials rather than building a broader-based coalition. At his inauguration, President Mnangagwa pledged that elections, which must be held before September 2018, will be free and fair but said nothing about the reforms needed to ensure a credible vote. The AU, working in concert with SADC, should push the government to clean up the voters’ roll, establish independent oversight of the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission and create a political environment free from violence, intimidation and propaganda. The SADC Electoral Advisory Council should undertake an assessment of electoral conditions and the AU should deploy long-term observers immediately. Both institutions should also lobby the Zimbabwean government to allow regional and international groups to observe the elections. ZANU-PF and Mnangagwa have an interest in letting observers monitor the process: without scrutiny, a new government would struggle to prove it has the legitimacy needed for donors and international financial institutions to support Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.

Major Crises

V. Implement the new AU roadmap in Central African Republic

The crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) worsened during 2017, with violence causing many civilian casualties and massive displacement. Outside of the capital Bangui, most of the country is in the hands of armed groups, fighting over resources in shifting configurations of alliances. In the north west, violence mostly revolves around competing armed groups and perennial conflicts over the movement of cattle, while in the centre and east, groups are waging guerrilla war over zones of influence and resources. Stabilisation is unlikely in the short term and a military victory over the armed groups even less so. Prospects for the resumption of a broader civil war cannot be dismissed.

Effective mediation between armed groups and the state will require not only dialogue, but also pressure.

So far, the government and its international partners have been unable to stem the unrest or find lasting solutions to widespread violence. Effective mediation between armed groups and the state will require not only dialogue, but also pressure, particularly by squeezing income streams and exercising stronger military deterrence, including making cities weapons-free and arresting the organisers of major attacks. The national authorities must also rebuild trust in the peripheries, for example by addressing concerns of some communities over citizenship.

Various international and regional actors or organisations launched parallel mediation efforts in 2016 and the first half of 2017. Yet divergent agendas, institutional rivalries and differing approaches sent inconsistent messages, notably regarding amnesties for rebel leaders, the integration of combatants into the army and the return to CAR of former presidents. Although the AU took the lead and produced a new Roadmap for Peace and Reconciliation in July 2017, intended to promote dialogue and establish an agreement to disarm combatants, little progress has been made since. If the initiative is to succeed, the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council and Special Representative Bédializoun Moussa Nébié, as well as CAR’s neighbours, must step up their engagement, in particular by pushing armed group leaders and the government to negotiate. The AU should also commit the requisite human and financial resources, ensuring that its liaison office is fully staffed and equipped.

The AU should also iron out points of disagreement – notably over amnesties and the appointment of rebel leaders to lucrative state positions – among CAR’s international partners, who have generally welcomed the recent AU initiative. Any eventual deal between the government and armed groups will require guarantors drawn from African and Western states, continental and regional organisations and the UN. A framework through which donors and others can lend political and financial support is also essential. Identifying options ahead of time would be useful. Central Africans’ ownership of the process is vital to its success, so the AU will also have to secure greater buy-in from the government.

VI. Avert a precipitous withdrawal from Somalia

2017 was a turbulent year for Somalia. Euphoria and optimism followed the February election of Mohammed Abdullahi “Farmajo” as president, only for the country to suffer the deadliest terrorist attack in its history when twin truck bombings in Mogadishu killed at least 500 people in October. The bombings illustrate the challenges confronting Farmajo’s administration: national security forces are chronically weak while the Al-Shabaab insurgency shows continued potency and resilience, recently recapturing territory outside Mogadishu. Farmajo also contends with longstanding clan disputes and his government’s mounting friction with federal states, exacerbated by the Gulf crisis. Nor has his administration made much headway in tackling the chronic governance deficits that underpin Somalia’s instability.

The AU Commission could consider convening a summit in early 2018 [...] with the aim of improving coordination, especially regarding security forces’ training and assistance.

Little suggests Al-Shabaab will be defeated any time soon, despite the gathering pace of an AMISOM military offensive in southern Somalia, backed by U.S. airstrikes. The AU mission, itself underfunded, suffers from low troop morale and is scheduled to pull out by the end of 2020. That date poses an acute dilemma for the AU and Somalia’s other foreign partners. The drawdown, which started in December 2017 with the departure of 1,000 soldiers from all troop-contributing countries, is a political imperative. Yet a precipitous withdrawal would almost certainly open the door to Al-Shabaab gains, including its potential recapture of Mogadishu, given the Somali National Army’s chronic weakness and corruption. The AU Commission could consider convening a summit in early 2018 that would bring together troop contributors, donors, regional bodies and the UN with the aim of improving coordination, especially regarding security forces’ training and assistance. It is critical not to rush the drawdown and to coordinate with the Somali government and allies involved in security sector reform.

The looming withdrawal comes at a time of heightened tension between Mogadishu and the Somalia’s federal regions. During the 2017 Gulf crisis Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) put intense pressure on Farmajo to pick sides by breaking diplomatic relations with Qatar. His attempts to steer a neutral course – the Saudis, Emiratis, Qataris and Qatar’s main international ally, Turkey, all provide critical aid to Somalia – led the UAE to ramp up support and appeal directly to federal governments, as a counterweight to Mogadishu, thus aggravating friction between those governments and Farmajo and fuelling political factionalism.

VII. Help reshape South Sudan’s stabilisation strategy

South Sudan’s failed Christmas cessation of hostilities was a stark reminder of how intractable the country’s conflicts remain. Although fighting has diminished from its height in early 2014, violence remains pervasive. Government forces have the military upper hand, but though fewer regions suffer active combat, much of the country still exists in a state between war and peace: poverty, violence and displacement are constant challenges.

In 2017, the transitional government, led by President Salva Kiir, embarked on a disjointed stabilisation strategy that focused on: reshaping the 2015 regionally-mediated peace agreement in its favour; launching discreet negotiations with rebel groups coupled with military pressure to induce their acceptance of peace on Juba’s terms; and organising a national dialogue. Through this strategy, Kiir successfully shifted from an internationally-monitored forum to a government-led, domestic approach, free from unwelcome external oversight. Neighbouring countries have provided quiet support, largely ending their assistance to rebel groups, but Western governments remain opposed to what they see as Juba’s efforts to shape a victor’s peace.

The limited gains from this strategy, which include peace agreements with more than 10,000 armed rebels, are now at risk. Under pressure from the Troika (Norway, the UK and the U.S.), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, the sub-regional body that mediated the 2015 agreement) began a revitalisation forum to resuscitate the peace accord through a renewed ceasefire and by amending agreed timelines, specifically delaying elections set for 2018. The government has responded to international pressure by elevating less compromising and more bellicose voices within its ranks. Preserving the few advances made and preventing further deterioration should still be possible, though it will require serious political engagement.

Irrespective of other factors, the transitional government controls most of the country and must be encouraged to promote peace and improve living conditions. However, Western governments have been reluctant to engage Kiir and IGAD has focused on preventing regional conflict. This opens an opportunity for the AU to support, shape and transmit difficult messages to the transitional government – publicly and privately – about revising its stabilisation strategy and setting a realistic timetable for elections. Alpha Oumar Konaré, the AU’s High Representative, is perceived as neutral, has a good rapport with Kiir and is capable of delivering hard truths that could push him toward more moderate positions. But Konaré’s engagement has been inconsistent. Sustained involvement, including more frequent visits to Juba, would increase his ability to influence events in South Sudan.

The AU is reviving its High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan, known informally as the AU5, which comprises Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa. The AU5 should engage closely with South Sudan’s neighbours in leader-to-leader talks, ensuring a balance between mitigating regional tensions and supporting peace in South Sudan. The AU5, in conjunction with Konaré, should also consider engaging Kiir on his government’s strategy. This would require them to connect high-level discussions abroad with local ones on the ground. To do this effectively both Konaré and the AU5 will need full-time staff able to travel frequently throughout South Sudan.

Addis Ababa/Nairobi/Brussels, 17 January 2018

Appendix A: Map for the African Union’s Priorities 2018