The Sudan peace process is in its endgame. One year ago, the parties signed the Machakos Protocol, a provisional “grand bargain” that effectively traded a southern self-determination referendum for Sharia in the North. It is time for a second “grand bargain” on the remaining issues such as the status of the national capital, the presidency and the security arrangements to close the deal. This requires major tradeoffs – or new solutions – to meet the bottom lines of the parties and protect the original Protocol as well as incentives for implementation. Commitments on the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship and assurances that the U.S. will remain closely involved in the post-agreement process are the glue without which a deal is unlikely to stick. With them, peace has a chance.

The mediators will put forth a draft framework document in mid-July on which they will seek agreement by mid-August from the government of Sudan and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (hereafter SPLA) to end a civil war that has already lasted more than 20 years. The process, under the auspices of the regional African organisation, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), has come closer than any of its predecessors to peace. However, the last steps will be the most difficult, and a misstep could plunge the country back into full scale civil war.

The manner in which the final text is structured, namely whether unity is prioritised to the maximum extent possible and how the issues of the conflict areas outside the South are addressed, will have a critical impact on whether an agreement is sustainable. A minimalist deal can be reached that stops the war for now and puts the South on a fast track to independence. However, such an agreement likely would be systematically undermined by key actors in the ruling party in Khartoum and thus lead to resumption of war. Therefore, all efforts should be directed toward getting a comprehensive pact that promotes the unity of the country but with radically restructured governing arrangements that promote equal rights and equal opportunities for all Sudanese.

Despite the imperative to stress unity, independence for the South must remain a valid and acceptable possible outcome of the referendum, as a fundamental confidence building measure for southerners to give a unified state a chance. In order to avoid future conflict, the parties should also agree on provisions now that would come into effect should the South vote for independence after the interim period. By agreeing to extend modalities on certain issues beyond the six-year interim period – for example, on sharing oil revenue – the referendum would cease to be a zero-sum affair.

A second element that would help insure sustainability of an agreement would be mechanisms for broadening participation in its implementation throughout the interim period beyond the current ruling party and the SPLA. This could best be achieved by free and fair but staggered elections at the local, regional, and national levels, as well as a broadly inclusive constitutional review process. SPLA and government must both recognise that their interests are ultimately served by broadening participation, and therefore make every effort to accommodate other voices. In particular, the devolution of state powers within the federal framework should give marginalised areas in the North a meaningful role in running their affairs.

The parties have each made significant sacrifices, and the international community has put a tremendous amount of effort and resources into support of the process. As the talks reach their final stage, senior political leadership from neighbouring IGAD countries and the international observer countries should elevate their involvement to the highest levels possible. However, the process should not be jeopardised by artificial deadlines. The goal of having a comprehensive agreement by the end of the summer is admirable, but the mediators should be flexible enough to allow the talks to be extended if one or both of the parties are not quite ready to finalise the peace.

Nairobi/Brussels, 7 July 2003