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Statement on the UN Sri Lanka Investigation Report
Statement on the UN Sri Lanka Investigation Report
Buddhist Militancy Rises Again in Sri Lanka
Buddhist Militancy Rises Again in Sri Lanka
Statement / Asia

Statement on the UN Sri Lanka Investigation Report

The release on 16 September of the long-awaited report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on its Sri Lanka investigation (OISL) is a dramatic advance that can help the country respond to its painful legacy of war. The report is a compelling examination of the abuses committed by all sides during the lengthy civil conflict and the steps required to pursue justice, accountability and reconciliation as part of democratic recovery. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC), which mandated the report, should demonstrate the same leadership by endorsing and supporting its conclusions and recommendations at the present session.

The report found a “horrific level of violations and abuses” between 2002 and 2011 and presents evidence of violations by government forces, pro-government paramilitaries and the separatist Tamil Tigers (LTTE) “that are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”. These include indiscriminate shelling, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence, recruitment of children and the denial of humanitarian assistance. The report confirms accounts from victims and survivors of systematic war crimes committed during the final, brutal months of the civil war and immediate aftermath.

Particularly notable is the clear finding that the Sri Lankan criminal justice system remains incapable of conducting credible investigations and prosecutions of these sensitive matters. Arguing that “a purely domestic court procedure will have no chance of overcoming widespread and justifiable suspicions fuelled by decades of violations, malpractice and broken promises”, the report calls for establishment of a “hybrid special court, integrating international judges, prosecutors, lawyers and investigators”. This recommendation merits particular endorsement by the Human Rights Council, given that the government’s resistance to international participation in investigations, witness protection or trials invites doubts about its ability to achieve its own stated goals of justice, accountability and reconciliation and undermines the trust of survivors and witnesses whose testimony will be crucial.

The report comes two days after Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera acknowledged to the Council the institutional challenges Sri Lanka faces. His speech was a welcome departure from the aggressively nationalist and authoritarian policies of the former government and highlighted important points of convergence “on the fundamental need to address the disputed legacy of Sri Lanka’s brutal civil war”. The foreign minister described the ambitious proposals he laid out – including a truth and reconciliation commission, offices for missing persons and reparations, a “judicial mechanism with a special counsel” and a new constitution – as designed to respect “the right of victims to a fair remedy and … to address the problem of impunity for human rights violations suffered by all communities”. However, missing from his welcome recognition of the magnitude of the challenges was acceptance of the compelling need for outside independent international participation in this crucial judicial process, particularly in investigations, development of prosecutions, and witness protection. Such participation, as the report recommended, would add important guarantees to all concerned.

Combined with implementation of key reforms the government proposes (some of which would receive support and advice from South Africa and the International Committee of the Red Cross), effective judicial prosecution of those most responsible for the most serious crimes committed by all sides in the war would promote the genuine reconciliation necessary for a sustainable peace.

Sri Lanka has seen decades of failed investigations and prosecutions, with fewer than half a dozen successful prosecutions of (low- and mid-level) military personnel for hundreds of serious human rights cases. No senior commander has ever even been charged with a war-related crime, and the military retains significant autonomy from civilian oversight. Witnesses and rights activists in the Tamil areas of the north and east continue to be threatened. Police investigations into a few high-profile cases from the Rajapaksa era reportedly face resistance from military leadership. Legislation parliament approved for a witness- and victim-protection system in February has yet to be implemented and lacks provision for protection units independent of the police and testimony of the many witnesses outside the country.

The government’s announced commitment to discover truth, give victims justice, end impunity and reestablish impartial judicial institutions argues for it to accept substantial international participation at all stages of the truth, reconciliation and accountability processes. Reforms will also be needed to enable Sri Lanka’s legal framework to deal with the kinds of international crimes the report details. Doing so will require carrying through on the government’s promise to criminalise enforced disappearances, as well as establishing command responsibility as a form of criminal liability and incorporating war crimes and crimes against humanity into domestic law.

This agenda needs leadership from President Sirisena, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and other top government officials, with the support of politicians and civil society leaders from all communities: Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim. The case must be made that involvement of foreign judges and investigators is not an infringement on sovereignty, but crucial for helping all communities escape the scourge of impunity. Framed properly, this argument should resonate with the demands to restore rule of law, end politicisation of the police and judiciary and hold powerful politicians accountable for abuses of power that were central to President Sirisena’s election in January and the victory of the broad coalition that won August’s parliamentary elections.

Pursuing cases against former LTTE leaders who worked closely with the Rajapaksa government, such as K. Pathmanathan (“KP”) and V. Muralitharan (“Karuna”), and any other senior LTTE leaders who may be overseas, will be important to address Sinhalese perceptions that accountability is biased against the military. The announcement by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) that it will use the OHCHR report to initiate “introspection into our own community’s failures and the unspeakable crimes committed in our name” is a powerful gesture that other political parties and Tamil and Sinhala diaspora groups should reciprocate.

To make the most of the opportunity to begin genuine reconciliation and accountability and prove wrong those who dismissed earlier resolutions as mainly designed to support regime change, Human Rights Council members should seek consensus on a new resolution that:

  • endorses a Sri Lankan government commitment to make the legal reforms needed to effectively prosecute international crimes, including by incorporating war crimes, crimes against humanity and command responsibility into domestic law;
     
  • endorses reforms and confidence-building measures promised in the Sri Lankan foreign minister’s 14 September speech, as well as a commitment to immediately cease all harassment of victims and activists by security forces;
     
  • mandates significant international participation in all stages of the domestic accountability processes as recommended by the OHCHR report: investigation, prosecution, trials and appeals, protection of witness and victims and preservation of evidence;
     
  • establishes a well-resourced and staffed OHCHR office in Colombo to support, in coordination with the UN Special Rapporteur on Truth and Justice, the government’s promised public consultation process and to advise on the implementation of the government’s package of transitional justice mechanisms; and
     
  • mandates formal Council review of the implementation and effectiveness of all domestic truth, reconciliation and accountability mechanisms in September 2016 and 2017, in addition to reporting by the High Commissioner in March 2016 on the government’s initial actions.
     
  • The OHCHR report, the adoption of its major recommendations by the Council and, most importantly, their acceptance by the government and strong follow-through by the president and prime minister can be a path-breaking moment in Sri Lanka’s democratic recovery and its emergence as a more stable and inclusive state.

Brussels

Sri Lanka's Buddhist monk Akmeemana Dayarathana, who led hardline nationalists in an unruly protest against 31 Rohingya Muslim asylum seekers, is escorted to prison bus by prison and police officers at a court in Mount Lavinia, Sri Lanka 2 October 2017. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawatte
Commentary / Asia

Buddhist Militancy Rises Again in Sri Lanka

An upsurge of attacks against Muslims by Sinhala Buddhist militants in Sri Lanka has raised fears of a new round of communal violence. In this Q&A, Crisis Group’s Sri Lanka Senior Analyst Alan Keenan says the government needs to act urgently to prevent the violence from spinning out of control, by enforcing laws against hate speech and arresting and prosecuting those involved in organising the violence.

Sri Lanka has declared a state of emergency for ten days to rein in the spread of communal violence, a government spokesperson said on Tuesday, a day after Buddhists and Muslims clashed in the Indian Ocean islands central district of Kandy. What are the reasons behind this latest communal violence in the country?

There are many factors behind the recent upsurge of violence against Sri Lankan Muslims. The events of the last ten days have not been local “clashes” between Buddhists and Muslims, but organised and targeted attacks by national-level militant groups who are well known and have made their intentions clear through traditional and social media. The immediate cycle of violence began with the death on 3 March of a Sinhala Buddhist man in the central hill town of Teldeniya. He had been attacked ten days earlier by four local Muslim men, who were promptly arrested and detained. His death sparked anger and limited violence the next day by local Buddhists, 24 of whom were arrested and held by the police. Demanding the release of these men, leaders of radical Buddhist groups converged on the town with hundreds of their supporters from other districts, who later began attacking mosques and Muslim businesses and homes. Even after yesterday’s declaration of a state of emergency, violence continues against Muslims in the hills around the town of Kandy.

The ongoing violence [in Sri Lanka] marks the resurgence of militant Buddhist groups.

The violence this week came just days after a mosque and Muslim businesses were attacked in the south-eastern town of Ampara. There are indications the attack was planned and carried out mostly by Buddhist militants brought in from outside Ampara town, supported through rumours spread on social media. Government officials have acknowledged that the damage was aggravated by the slow response of the local police.

The ongoing violence marks the resurgence of militant Buddhist groups that first emerged in 2012-2014 with the support of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government. Having ceased during the first two years of the current coalition government, attacks on Muslims began again over a six-week period in April and May 2017 and for two days in November 2017, with militants apparently emboldened by the government’s failure to prosecute those responsible for violence and hate speech under the Rajapaksa regime.

Sri Lanka has grabbed international headlines in the past due to tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils. But how do you describe the relations between Buddhists and Muslims in Sri Lanka?

Muslims, who make up almost ten per cent of Sri Lanka’s population, live across the island, among both Sinhalese (75 per cent of the population and overwhelmingly Buddhist) and Tamils (about fifteen per cent and mostly Hindu). Relations between Muslims and Sri Lanka’s other communities are mostly harmonious. At the same time, there are longstanding and deeply rooted fears among many Sinhalese that the Sinhala and Buddhist character of the island is under threat and must be protected, even to the extent of using violence. While the threat has previously been seen as coming from colonial rulers and then Tamils, Muslims are now the primary worry for many Sinhalese. Narratives of insecurity, fed by global Islamophobic tropes, present Muslims as violent extremists, as increasing their population so fast as to pose a threat to the Sinhala Buddhist majority status, as misusing their economic power to weaken Sinhalese, and as using underhand means to reduce Sinhala Buddhist numbers such as secretly planting contraceptives in food eaten and clothes worn by Sinhalese. These fears and myths are widely promoted – along with calls for violence – through social media.

The fears are encouraged by Sinhala business interests to weaken their Muslim competitors.

The fears are also regularly encouraged by some Sinhala business interests to weaken their Muslim competitors. These rivalries play out at the local level with regular appeals to Sinhala Buddhist consumers to boycott Muslim shops, and with rioting that regularly targets Muslim-owned businesses. They also have a national character, with certain Sinhala business leaders widely believed to be key funders of Bodu Bala Sena and other militant groups. Criticisms of Muslims as gaining greater economic power through unfair means have particular resonance with Sinhalese facing economic difficulties, as the government struggles to control the cost of living and provide sustainable livelihoods, especially in rural areas and small towns.

How vulnerable are Sri Lankan Muslims to being drawn to violence?

Sri Lankan Muslims have been admirably restrained, disciplined and non-violent in their response to what is now five years of severe, sustained and often violent pressure. One can only hope that this continues to be the case, though continued violent provocations – and the failure of the police to protect Muslims – appears to be testing the patience of some, with reports of the first retaliatory violence against Sinhala businesses. Many in Sri Lanka now fear the current wave of militant Buddhist attacks may be designed in part to provoke a violent response from Muslims, which would then be used to justify wider-scale attacks on the community.

How has the Sri Lankan government tried to quell the tensions between Buddhists and Muslims and promote communal harmony?

The government has done very little to address either the underlying mistrust and misunderstandings between the two communities, or to rein in the small number of Buddhists who promote or use violence. Despite coming to power in January 2015 promising to end impunity for attacks on Muslims, the government has launched no proper investigations of past violence, and prosecuted no leaders of groups known to be involved in attacks on Muslims. Despite recent statements from the president, prime minister and other officials that the law will be strictly enforced and those engaging in violence will be arrested, key organisers of the ongoing violence remain free. Some of these have posted on social media information to help target Muslims for attack. Police, in a number of locations, have been credibly accused of siding with the mobs.

While government leaders are not believed to be supporting the violence against Muslims, they appear to be afraid of taking action against the perpetrators.

While government leaders are not believed to be supporting the violence against Muslims, they appear to be afraid of taking action against the perpetrators, especially those Buddhist monks thought to be involved, for fear of alienating Sinhala Buddhist voters by appearing to favour Muslims. This fear has grown since the poor showing of government candidates in the 10 February local elections, in which former President Rajapaksa led a successful campaign rooted in a strongly Sinhala Buddhist nationalist platform. The increasingly deep divide between the president and the prime minister, who is battling to hold on to his job, appears to have further paralysed the government.

What steps could or should the government take to curb further communal violence?

The government needs to adopt a three-pronged strategy, beginning with enforcing the law, including against hate speech, and arresting and prosecuting offenders. While the state of emergency the government imposed on 6 March appeared at first to reduce the violence, attacks have resumed, with the police and army often failing to stop the rioters. Should the government act decisively with arrests of key figures behind the violence and hate speech and explain the necessity of its actions to the Buddhist religious leadership and the general public, it can likely win the necessary support for those policies. Over the mid- to long term, the government must also work actively to correct the lies and disinformation about Muslims that are spread by radical Buddhist groups, especially on social media, such as the allegation that Muslim restaurants regularly put contraceptives in their food to sterilise their Buddhist customers and reduce their population. The impact of such rumours and “fake news” could be significantly reduced if the government used its media and information channels to combat them. Finally, over the long term, but beginning now, the government needs to more actively promote a pluralist vision of Sri Lanka, in which the country belongs to all communities equally, while still protecting the country’s unique Sinhala and Buddhist culture.

The government needs to more actively promote a pluralist vision of Sri Lanka, in which the country belongs to all communities equally.

How do you see the security and communal situation evolving in the country in the coming weeks? Will the Sri Lankan government be able to bring the situation under control?

The continued failure to make arrests of well-known Buddhist agitators and the instigators of recent attacks is not encouraging, and despite the state of emergency, the government still appears uncertain about how to respond to the violence. The chaos and infighting that has characterised the coalition government’s response to their defeat in the local government elections has continued and contributed to a sense of weakness that has been seized on by militant Buddhist groups. Strong, decisive and coherent action is urgently needed if Sri Lanka is to avoid tipping into a new and potentially crippling round of communal conflict.

A version of this Q&A was also published by Deutsche Welle.

The Sinhala translation of the commentary is available in PDF format here.