Nadnica za grijeh: sučeljavanje sa Republikom Srpskom u Bosni
Nadnica za grijeh: sučeljavanje sa Republikom Srpskom u Bosni
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Report 118 / Europe & Central Asia

Nadnica za grijeh: sučeljavanje sa Republikom Srpskom u Bosni

Priznavanjem Republike Srpske (RS) kao legitimnog i ustavotvornog entiteta nove Bosne, Dejtonski Mirovni sporazum iz 1995.

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Priznavanjem Republike Srpske (RS) kao legitimnog i ustavotvornog entiteta nove Bosne, Dejtonski Mirovni sporazum iz 1995. je time prihvatio i protivrječnost, jer je RS započeta kao korak ka 'Velikoj Srbiji' i iskovana u zločinima - i masovnim progonstvima - nad ne-Srbima.

Prije deset godina, Radovan Karadžić izveo je članove svoje Srpske demokratske stranke (SDS) iz Skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosne):  ubrzo poslije toga, u januaru 1992. oni proglašavaju 'Republiku Srpsku', kao dio strategije za podrivanje integriteta Bosne i da spriječe njenu nezavisnost.  U početku kao ideja a zatim kao činjenica, RS je odricala istoriju, demografiju  i integritet Bosne.

Srećom, međunarodna zajednica je takođe Dejtonskim sporazumom dobila značajna ovlašćenja da podstiče i nametne reforme u oba entiteta, da odlučno sprovodi integrativne odredbe sporazuma i da njeno prisustvo postane suvišno sa ulaskom Bosne u Evropu.  Jedina nada u rješavanju ove protivrječnosti leži u energičnom izvršavanju ovih civilnih i vojnih ovlašćenja kako bi reformisali RS.

Skoro je šest godina nakon Dejtona, a ove su nade ostale neispunjene i djelimično zaboravljene.  Nerekonstruisana RS i njena politička elita ostale su glavna prepreka uspostavljanju funkcionalne, stabilne i solventne države Bosne.  Sadašnja koaliciona Vlada RS, osnovana poslije izbora u novembru 2000. pod vođstvom još jednog pseudo umjerenjaka i reformatora, Mladena Ivanića, će vjerovatno ponoviti prethodna iskustva, ali s tom razlikom što je sada SDS stvarno na vlasti. Na izborima u novembru 2000. ona je dobila predsjednička i potpredsjednička mjesta kao i najveći broj mjesta u Narodnoj skupštini.

Uznemireni izgledima ponovnog sukoba sa SDS-ovim ukopavanjem i izvrdavanjem, međunarodni predstavnici zaprijetili su uvođenjem embarga na svu pomoć namijenjenu RS ako SDS uđe u Vladu.  Ali kada je njen novi miljenik, Ivanić, insistirao da ne može da formira plodotvornu Vladu bez SDS-a, međunarodna zajednica se povukla i omogućila stranačkim pristalicama da dobiju portfelje kao 'nezavisni eksperti'.

Otkako se vratila na vlast, SDS je konsolidovala svoju vlast: u javnom sektoru i sivoj ekonomiji, u medijima, u policiji i sudovima, u vojsci i službi bezbjednosti, u zabačenim dijelovima istočne RS, prosvijećenoj Banja Luci, i u posljednje vrijeme u srpskoj prijestonici, Beogradu.

Ivanić i dalje ozbiljno govori o primjeni ekonomskih reformi koje je obećao biračima - i političkih reformi koje očekuje međunarodna zajednica - ali biva uglavnom osujećen jer su  njegovi saučesnici odlučni u tome da RS ostane nereformisana.

U stvari, SDS je uspjela da (uz pomoć nesmotrenosti međunarodne zajednice) da ima i jedno i drugo.  Pošto zvanično nije u Vladi, ona ne može da odgovara za Ivanićeve neuspjehe da sprovede promjene.  Ali pošto je, u praksi,  ona stranka na vlasti, može da se hrani na državnim jaslama dok prati kako Ivanićeva popularnost slabi i da ga spremno odbaci u korist nekog drugog čelnika prihvatljivog za strance, taman na vrijeme za sljedeće izbore u 2002. godini.

Preobražena u Dejtonsku ustavotvornost i ojačana izborom uvaženog nacionaliste za jugoslovenskog predsjednika u Beogradu, prefarbani SDS i dalje ne želi da definiše svoju 'državu' kao zakonit dom svih Bosanaca bez obzira na vjeru.  Organizovane pobune u maju 2001. radi sprječavanja rekonstrukcije istorijskih džamija porušenih tokom rata i stalno odbijanje Vlade da sarađuje sa Hagom, čak i poslije izručenja Miloševića Međunarodnom tribunalu u Hagu juna mjeseca, jasno ukazuju da RS ostaje vjerna svom ratnim liku.  Neodređene međunarodne prijetnje da će RS biti kažnjena zbog obje stvari dovele su samo do simboličnih ustupaka od strane vlasti.

Napadi, zastrašivanje i diskriminacija nesrpskih povratnika u RS nastavljaju biti češći i ozbiljniji od onih u drugom bosanskom entitetu, Federaciji.  Napadi u istočnoj RS, gdje su se desili neki od najgorih ratnih zločina, naročito su bili oštri. Policija, sudovi i lokalne vlasti su obično ravnodušni i često saučesnici.  Suprotstavljanje reintegraciji takođe podupire politiku vladinog ministarstva za izbjeglice, koje štiti ratna dostignuća etničkog čišćenja.

Isto tako štetna za budućnost Bosne je rušilačka uloga koju imaju predstavnici RS u državnom Parlamentu, Savjetu ministara i drugim zajedničkim institucijama.  Smatrajući sebe - a za to ih smatraju i njihovi politički gospodari - delegatima sa ovlašćenjem da sačuvaju preimućstva koja ima entitet a da osakate ona koja pripadaju bosanskoj državi, predstavnici i ministri RS u Sarajevu nastavljaju da se suprotstavljaju bilo kom zakonu koji može da poveća ili čak definiše nadležnost države. 

U odsustvu bilo kakvog osnovnog zakonodavstva za sve, počev od ljudskih prava, do težina i mjera, do železnice, Bosanci mogu samo da sanjaju o integraciji u Evropu dok sve više zaostaju iza svojih susjeda u trci za uključivanje u Evropu.  U međuvremenu, međunarodna zajednica gubi svoju izlaznu strategiju.

Međunarodna zajednica je potrošila stotine miliona dolara od 1997. u pokušaju da održi pseudo umjerenjake i reformiste u RS - kao i da spriječi da SDS dođe na vlast.  Sav ovaj novac koji je uložen da održi RS iznad vode i njene 'umjerene' političare na vlasti nije uspio da reformiše RS ni ekonomski ni politički.

Ovaj zaprepašćujuće mali učinak može se objasniti:  nije bilo udruženog truda da se iskoristi ova pomoć i podrška kako bi se podstakla saglasnosti sa glavnim stavkama programa rada države i izgradnje mira. Političko uslovljavanje uz ozbiljan i integrisan način nikada nije pokušano u Republici Srpskoj. Embargo na pomoć RS je donijet 1996-1997, kako bi podstakao izručenje Karadžića Hagu, ali ovaj uslov odbačen čim je Dodik došao na vlast.

Privreda RS je na ivici propasti.  Da nema stalnog priliva direktne međunarodne podrške i povoljnih zajmova, Vlada RS bi bankrotirala.  Dok svijetu Bosna postaje sve dosadnija (a Bosancima međunarodni nadzor), dok presušuju fondovi za pomoć, dok se SFOR povlači, i dok mandat UN ističe, međunarodna zajednica gubi ono što bi se moglo pokazati kao posljednja prilika da naplati životno neophodne subvencije i zajmove strogo uslovljvanjem pristankom RS-a na povinovanje kako bi pristala na dosad neispunjene zahtijeve.

Logičko rešenje bilo bi raspuštanje Republike Srpske zbog svoje iskazane nereformske politike i neusaglašenosti sa osnovnim demokratskim razvojem bosanske države.  Međutim, ovako radikalan korak trenutno nije ni moguć ni poželjan.   On nije moguć zato što više nego ikad prije međunarodna zajednica nije voljna da ponovo razmotri svoje djelo u Dejtonu.  On nije poželjan jer bi, obzirom na nedostatak međunarodne želje da se upusti u teške izazove u Bosni, bilo koji 'Dejton II' vjerovatno imao ishod još štetniji po državnost Bosne.  Zato logika i pravda mora da se usklade sa stvarnošću.  Put koji nas čeka jeste  zahtijevati više, mnogo više od RS.

Da bi uspjela, politička uslovljenost mora da se primjeni na takav način da mogu da je koriste oni pragmatičari u RS koji vrlo dobro shvataju da Bosna ne može da postoji kao polu-sirotinjska i polu-evropska.  Uslovljenost mora da bude i vjerodostojna.  Potencijalne sankcije moraju da budu isto toliko bolne koliko su i koristi privlačne, i ne smije da bude sumnje da su obje stvari ostvarljive.  Isto je tako važno da darodavci i povjerioci, prokonzuli i ljudi na terenu, moraju da razviju i primjenjuju zajedničku strategiju.

Zainteresovane Vlade, međunarodne organizacije, finansijske institucije i, prije svih, Kancelarija Visokog predstavnika moraju da se suoče sa posljedicama do kojih će neizbežno doći ako i dalje pristaju na neuspjehe Republike Srpske.  Ukoliko se odlučnim i udruženim naporom ne nametnu specifični, ostvarivi uslovi za ostvarenje svake subvencije, donacija ili zajma, onda su izgubljeni izgledi da Bosna  postane plodotvorna država.

Sarajevo/Brisel, 8. oktobar 2001.

Executive Summary

By recognising Republika Srpska (RS) as a legitimate polity and constituent entity of the new Bosnia, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement embraced a contradiction. For the RS was founded as a stepping stone to a ‘Greater Serbia’ and forged in atrocities against – and mass expulsions of – non-Serbs.

Ten years ago, Radovan Karadzic led the members of his Serb Democratic Party (SDS) out of the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia): soon afterwards, in January 1992, they proclaimed ‘Republika Srpska’, as part of their strategy to undermine Bosnia’s integrity and preclude its independence.  First as an idea and then as a fact, the RS negated Bosnia’s history, demography and integrity.

Fortunately, Dayton also gave significant powers to the international community to promote and impose reforms on both entities, to push the integrative provisions of the agreement, and to make itself redundant as Bosnia moved towards Europe.  The only hope of resolving this contradiction lay in the vigorous exercise of these civilian and military powers to reform the RS.

Almost six years after Dayton, these hopes lie unfulfilled and partly forgotten.  The unreconstructed nature of the RS and its political elite remain the major obstacles to the establishment of a functional, stable and solvent Bosnian state. The current RS coalition government, formed after the November 2000 elections under the leadership of another professed moderate and reformer, Mladen Ivanic, looks likely to repeat the experience of previous years, but with the difference that the SDS is now effectively back in power.  It won the RS presidency and vice-presidency and secured the largest number of seats in the National Assembly in the November 2000 elections. 

Alarmed at the prospect of having to contend once more with the stonewalling and prevarication of the SDS, international representatives threatened to impose an embargo on all aid to the RS if the SDS were to be included in the government.  But when its new favourite, Ivanic, insisted he could not form a viable government without the SDS, the international community backed down, allowing party stalwarts to take portfolios as ‘independent experts’.

Since returning to power, the SDS has been consolidating its authority: in the public sector and black economies, in the media, in the police and courts, in the army and intelligence service, in the backwoods of eastern RS, in enlightened Banja Luka, and latterly in the Serbian metropolis of Belgrade. 

Ivanic continues to talk earnestly about implementing the economic reforms he promised the electorate – and the political reforms expected by the international community – but has been stymied most of the time by his partners’ determination that the RS should remain unreformed. 

In fact, the SDS has contrived (with the inadvertent assistance of the international community) to have it both ways.  Since it is not officially in government, it cannot be held responsible for Ivanic’s failures to deliver change.  But since it is, in practice, the ruling party, it can gorge at the public trough while watching Ivanic’s popularity wane and preparing to ditch him in favour of another front man acceptable to the foreigners in time for the next elections in 2002.

Converted to Dayton constitutionalism, and fortified by the election of a respectable nationalist to the Yugoslav presidency in Belgrade, the rebranded SDS remains as unwilling as ever to define its ‘state’ as the rightful home of Bosnians of all faiths.  The riots organised in May 2001 to prevent the reconstruction of historic mosques razed during the war and the government’s continuing refusal, even after Milosevic’s transfer to the ICTY in June, to cooperate with The Hague ought to have made plain that the RS remains true to its wartime self.  Vague international threats to punish the RS on both scores led only to token concessions by the authorities.

Attacks on, intimidation of, and discrimination against non-Serb returnees to the RS remain both more common and far more serious than do their counterparts in Bosnia’s other entity, the Federation.  Attacks in eastern RS, where some of the worst wartime atrocities took place, have been especially severe.  Police, courts, and local authorities are usually indifferent and often complicit.  Opposition to reintegration also underpins the policies of the government’s refugee ministry, which protects the wartime achievements of ethnic cleansing.

Equally detrimental to Bosnia’s future is the wrecking role played by RS representatives in the state parliament, council of ministers and other common institutions.  Regarding themselves – and regarded by their political masters – as delegates mandated to preserve entity prerogatives by eviscerating those of the Bosnian state, RS deputies and ministers in Sarajevo continue to oppose any legislation which might enhance or even define the competencies of the state.

In the absence of fundamental legislation on everything from human rights, to weights and measures, to railways, Bosnians can only dream about European integration as they slip ever farther behind their neighbours in the race to the European mainstream.  Meanwhile, the international community loses its exit strategy. 

Hundreds of millions of international community dollars have been spent since 1997 in an effort to sustain would-be moderates and reformers in the RS – and to keep the SDS out of power. All this money invested in keeping the RS afloat and its ‘moderate’ politicians in power has failed to reform the RS economically or politically.

This startlingly poor return can be explained: there has been no coordinated effort to use this aid and support to induce compliance with the principal items on its state and peace-building agenda.  Political conditionality has never been tried in a serious and integrated fashion with Republika Srpska. An aid embargo was imposed on the RS in 1996-97, to encourage the delivery of Karadzic to The Hague, but this condition was abandoned as soon as Dodik came to power. 

The RS economy stands on the verge of collapse.  Were it not for a continuing flow of direct international budget supports and soft loans, the RS government would be bankrupt. As the world grows bored with Bosnia (and Bosnians become tired of international oversight), as aid funds dry up, as SFOR shrinks, and as the UN mandate expires, the international community is losing what could prove its last chance to make the payment of vitally needed subventions and loans strictly conditional upon RS compliance with its outstanding demands.

The logical solution would be the dissolution of Republika Srpska due to its manifest unreformability and its incompatibility with the basic democratic development of the Bosnian state. However, such a radical step is currently neither feasible nor even desirable.  It is not feasible because the international community is more than ever unwilling to reconsider its handiwork at Dayton.  It is not desirable because, given the lack of international appetite to tackle difficult challenges in Bosnia, any ‘Dayton II’ would likely produce an outcome even more detrimental to Bosnian statehood.  Logic and justice, therefore, must be tempered with realism.  The way ahead is to demand much, much more of the RS.

If it is to work, political conditionality must be applied in a form that can be exploited by those pragmatists in the RS who understand very well that Bosnia cannot exist half pauperised and half European.  It must also be credible.  The potential sanctions must be as hurtful as the benefits are alluring, and there must be no doubt that either will be forthcoming.  Just as importantly, donors and lenders, proconsuls and field staff, must develop and implement a joint strategy.

Interested governments, international organisations, financial institutions and, above all, the Office of the High Representative need to face the consequences that will inevitably follow if they continue to underwrite Republika Srpska’s failures.  Unless a determined and concerted effort is made to impose specific, achievable conditions in return for each and every grant or loan, then Bosnia’s chances of becoming a viable state will be forfeit.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 8 October 2001

Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Crisis Group expert Marko Prelec about the precarious situation in the Western Balkans, as Serb separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the frozen Kosovo-Serbia dispute continue to stoke regional instability.

The Western Balkans, a region defined in part by not being in the European Union, also contains several countries that were devastated by war in the 1990s. Now it faces new troubles, driven in part by the legacies of the old. Bosnia and Herzegovina is confronted with calls for secession in the autonomous Serb-dominated region, Republika Srpska, as well as the ongoing electoral grievances of its Croat minority. Meanwhile, efforts to resolve Kosovo’s dispute with Serbia over its independence have come to a standstill, leaving minority communities on both sides of the border vulnerable.

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Marko Prelec, Crisis Group’s Consulting Senior Analyst for the Balkans, about why ethnic tensions persist in the region and whether there is any risk of a return to conflict. They discuss the prospects for European integration, asking whether the promise of EU membership remains an effective incentive for resolving these longstanding disputes. They also consider what impact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had for stability in the Western Balkans, a region where painful memories of war are still very salient today.



Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

For more of Crisis Group’s analysis, make sure to check out our Balkans regional page and keep an eye out for our upcoming report on the risk of instability in the Western Balkans.

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