Worst fighting in years broke out in capital Tripoli between forces loyal to rival govts, raising prospect of a return to full-blown war. Fighting 26-27 Aug raged across Tripoli as forces aligned with Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)-appointed PM Bashagha failed to take control of capital and oust Tripoli-based govt of PM Dabaiba; 32 people reportedly killed and 159 injured. Flare-up followed days of escalating tensions between rival factions. Smaller-scale clashes 5-6 Aug opposed Bashagha-aligned forces and militia loyal to Dabaiba near airport road in Tripoli. Amid build-up of forces outside Tripoli, UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 23 Aug called for “immediate de-escalation”, warned that “current political stalemate [...] cannot be resolved through armed confrontation”. Bashagha 24 Aug called on Dabaiba to step down and peacefully hand over power to avoid bloodshed; Dabaiba rejected call, denounced “threats to ignite war” and vowed that no one would be allowed to meddle with security of Tripoli. Dabaiba 25 Aug urged head of Tripoli-based consultative High State Council, Khalid Al-Mishri, and HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh to approve constitutional basis for elections. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 18 Aug announced decision to reactivate its Constitutional Chamber, which had been inactive since 2016. Dabaiba same day welcomed move, saying it could act as “deterrent” to “abuses and violations” of 2015 power-sharing agreement. Opponents however denounced political manoeuvring in reaction to HoR session held 16 Aug, during which lawmakers voted on amending statutes of Supreme Court and ruled it could appoint advisers to top court. After Dabaiba in July changed oil leadership, Central Bank 2 Aug reportedly disbursed 8.5bn dinars to National Oil Corporation as part of 15bn “urgent and temporary financial arrangement” concluded in mid-April. Libya’s envoy to UN, Taher El-Sonni, 15 Aug said Dabaiba’s govt had rejected UN proposal to appoint Senegalese former Minister Abdoulaye Bathily as new head of UNSMIL; move came after UN Security Council late July extended UNSMIL’s mandate for only three months amid Russian insistence that new UN mission head is chosen before it agrees to longer extension.

Wave of protests highlighted popular frustration with political standoff; deadly clashes erupted between rival factions in capital Tripoli; and oil exports resumed after controversial oil leadership change. Series of spontaneous demonstrations – driven by difficult living conditions, including recurring electricity cuts, and political actors’ inability to form consensus on elections – early July rocked several cities across country. Notably, protesters 1 July stormed and set fire to House of Representatives building in eastern city of Tobruk. Under pressure from popular mobilisation and shrinking prospect of any political breakthrough, Sirte-based PM Bashagha 8 July said his govt would in following days attempt to take office in Tripoli with support of loyal armed forces; military commanders of Western region 13 July reiterated Tripoli is “a red line”, vowed to confront any attempts to sow discord among security components in capital. Deadly fighting between rival factions 21-22 July broke out in several Tripoli neighbourhoods, with 16 people reportedly killed; in response, Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 22 July suspended Interior Minister Khaled Mazen, replacing him on an interim basis with local govt Minister Bader Eddine al-Toumi. Meanwhile, Dabaiba 12 July dismissed National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman Mustafa Sanalla, replaced him with former Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengdara. Sanalla next day rejected decision, said Dabaiba’s mandate to govern had expired. Militia loyal to Dabaiba 14 July deployed outside NOC headquarters in Tripoli and installed Bengdara as chairman. NOC’s new leadership 15 July lifted force majeure which was declared in April at several oil facilities, enabling oil production and exports to resume in following days; NOC 31 July said crude production had returned to pre-force majeure levels of 1.2mn barrels per day. Arabic language media outlets Al Jazeera Arabic and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed in July reported growing convergence between Dabaiba and eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Notably, Lt-Gen Abdelrazzak Al-Nadhouri, second in command of Haftar-led forces, 18-19 July reportedly met with Lt-Gen Muhammad Al-Haddad, chief of staff of Libyan army, to discuss unification of military institution. Meanwhile, U.S. judge 29 July found Haftar liable for war crimes over alleged extrajudicial killings and torture in Libya, paving the way for plaintiffs to seek compensation.

Crisis of two govts dragged on as UN-led talks failed to forge consensus on constitutional basis for elections. House of Representatives (HoR) 15 June passed Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha’s proposed govt budget. Bashagha unlikely to be able to tap into state funds, however, as Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) immediately rejected budget, and Central Bank of Libya Governor Siddiq Elkebir, who is in charge of making disbursements into govt accounts, did not signal he would recognise budget. Bashagha’s efforts to win international support remained unsuccessful. UN Sec-Gen office 23 June said UN would continue to recognise Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba as legitimate PM until elections are held. Delegates of HoR and Tripoli-based High State Council 12-20 June met in Egypt’s capital Cairo for third round of UN-sponsored political talks, failed to find agreement on constitutional basis for elections; new UN-convened talks between rival assemblies’ chairmen 28-29 June took place in Switzerland, failed to make breakthrough. Simultaneously, some politicians in recent weeks tried to forge consensus for “third” govt to replace both Bashagha and Dabaiba-led executives, while eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and Dabaiba aides in June allegedly met outside Libya to negotiate deal aimed at persuading Haftar to drop support for Bashagha in favour of Dabaiba. Politically driven closures of oil sector throughout June persisted, with production fluctuating between 600,000-900,000 barrels/day, equivalent to 50-75% of country’s total oil production before closures; National Oil Corporation 30 June declared force majeure on oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf in Gulf of Sirte region due to shutdown of oilfields. Meanwhile, security situation in capital Tripoli remained tense. Notably, rival western militias 10 June clashed in Souk el-Tlath neighbourhood, leaving at least one dead; UN Support Mission in Libya next day expressed concerned and urged restraint, also reported mobilisation of armed groups from areas surrounding Tripoli. Heavy fighting between rival GNU-affiliated militias 22 June left three combatants and one civilian dead in Zawiyet Al-Dahmani neighbourhood. Pan-Arab media 23 June reported clashes at military base in Tripoli as 22 June transitional phase deadline set by 2020 roadmap passed.

Political crisis took violent turn as forces loyal to rival govts clashed in capital Tripoli amid lack of substantial progress in UN-led negotiations; oil and gas fields and export terminals remained closed. Tobruk-based PM Fathi Bashagha 17 May entered Tripoli in bid to install his govt in capital city; armed groups loyal to Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba mobilised and opened fire, leaving one person killed; Dabaiba’ camp reportedly granted Bashagha safe passage out of Tripoli following mediation by local actors and members of 5+5 Joint Military Commission – comprising representatives of Libya’s two rival military coalitions. In televised addresses same day, Dabaiba condemned “coup project”, said Bashagha “committed suicide politically”, while Bashagha said his govt would be based in central city of Sirte but claimed Dabaiba had “lost control” of Tripoli. Reports in following days emerged that Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aghela Saleh and head of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) Khaled Mishri mid-May met in Egypt, agreed to work together toward “third way” including new govt that would replace Dabaiba and Bashagha’s; latter’s entourage however denied Saleh had dropped his support for Bashagha. UN-led negotiations made little substantial progress in charting way out of political impasse. UN Acting Special Representative for Libya Stephanie Williams 15-20 May convened second round of talks between representatives of rival assemblies in Egypt’s capital Cairo; participants reviewed 2017 draft constitution and found consensus on two thirds of articles, but failed to concretely discuss roadmap to elections and crisis of two rival govts; talks to resume 11 June. Oil and gas fields and export terminals – shut down in mid-April by pro-Libyan National Army head, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and pro-Bashagha constituencies to weaken Dabaiba’s access to oil revenues – remained closed; crude oil exports down to approximately 700,000 barrels/day, one third less than normal, with estimated $40mn daily loss of foregone oil sales revenues. As part of U.S. efforts to persuade rival authorities to accept “financial mechanism” to oversee disbursement of govt funds, U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, 26 May met in Tunisia with various state institution representatives.

Political feud engulfed country’s economic and financial institutions as rival authorities sought to secure access to oil revenues; UN efforts to negotiate way out of political impasse remained vain. Five military officers loyal to eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 9 April withdrew from UN-backed so-called 5+5 Joint Military Commission (comprising representatives of country’s two rival military coalitions), urged Haftar to shut down oil production to prevent Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba from accessing oil revenues; move came after National Oil Corporation (NOC) transferred oil sales revenues to Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL), whose governor has remained loyal to Dabaiba, despite promising in March to abide by Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) order not to do so. NOC mid-April declared force majeure and suspended operations at Al-Feel and Sharara oil fields, Zuwetina and Brega oil terminals, after local protesters allegedly backed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) entered sites; all sites remained closed by month’s end. Clashes between two rival militias allied with Dabaiba’s govt 22 April disrupted operations in Zawiya oil facility (west). Meanwhile, delegates from HoR and rival Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC) 13-18 April attended UN-backed political talks on legal framework for elections in Egypt’s capital Cairo; participants failed to make breakthrough but agreed to resume talks in May (after Muslim holy month of Ramadan). HoR-appointed PM Fathi Bashagha 21 April presided over his first cabinet meeting in Sebha city (south); govt renewed commitment to pursuing “peaceful option” to assume duties in Tripoli. Meanwhile, Islamic State (ISIS) 19 April claimed responsibility for previous night car bomb attack targeting LNA camp in Umm al-Aranib town (south); no casualties reported. LNA said it repelled 25 April attack by armed group, reportedly affiliated with ISIS, in Ghadwa area near Sabha city. British daily newspaper Financial Times 28 April reported some 1,000 pro-Moscow Syrian mercenaries and about 200 operatives from Russian private military company Wagner Group, who had been stationed alongside Haftar-led forces, pulled out of Libya in recent weeks; also said some 5,000 pro-Moscow mercenaries allegedly remain in country.

Crisis of two rival govts raised spectre of renewed localised clashes and tug of war over control of state’s resources, putting 2020 ceasefire at risk. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 1 March endorsed PM Fathi Bashagha’s 39-member cabinet in controversial vote of confidence marred by procedural shortcomings. Bashagha same day vowed to install his govt in capital Tripoli “peacefully and securely”. Tripoli-based incumbent PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba immediately condemned “fraudulent vote”, refused to cede power and said he will “hold accountable anyone who dares to approach any government building” in Tripoli. Armed groups loyal to Tripoli-based govt 3 March shut down airspace and detained two ministers of Bashagha-led govt to impede them from attending swearing-in ceremony in Tobruk city (east); ministers released next day, domestic flights between east and west resumed 22 March. Pro-Bashagha forces 10 March deployed on eastern edges of Tripoli, raising fears of confrontation with pro-Dabaiba forces. U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland immediately warned against escalation, while UN mission same day called on parties to “refrain from any action that could lead to armed clashes”. Bashagha next day said forces had withdrawn and assured “there will not be a war”. Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s forces 15 March stormed Dabaiba’s Government of National Unity (GNU) headquarters in Benghazi city (east) and dismissed all employees; later handed building over to Bashagha’s govt deputy PM Salim Al-Zadma. UN Under Sec-Gen for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo 16 March warned Security Council that “political polarization” in Libya “risks dividing the institutions once again”; also highlighted recent increase in human rights violations, hate speech and political violence. After UN Special Adviser on Libya Stephanie Williams 4 March asked HoR and Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC) to nominate six delegates each to form “joint committee” to resolve political impasse, HSC 15 March nominated representatives, but HoR failed to appoint representatives and did not attend UN-backed HoR-HSC Joint Committee talks in Tunisia 22-24 March. Bashagha 22 March banned implementation of GNU-issued decrees or instructions; next day accused GNU of usurping power and occupying state institutions’ headquarters in Tripoli; 26-28 March repeatedly vowed to enter Tripoli in next few days.

House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha as new PM, increasing polarisation and raising risk of institutional division; vote of confidence in new govt could result in two rival govts vying for power. Unidentified gunmen 10 Feb attacked incumbent PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba’s convoy in capital Tripoli; sources close to Dabaiba denounced “assassination attempt”. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) hours later appointed former Tripoli-based Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as PM-designate and tasked him with forming new govt by late Feb. HoR same day postponed elections indefinitely by passing new political roadmap stipulating HoR and rival Tripoli-based assembly, High State Council, will task experts committee with amending never-adopted 2017 draft constitution; amendments to be subjected to referendum prior to elections. Bashagha’s appointment follows 2021 deal with his past foe, Libyan National Army head Khalifa Haftar, providing that in case of failure to hold presidential election in Dec 2021, Haftar would support Bashagha as head of new govt in return for concessions in cabinet line-up and on condition that Bashagha increase funds allocated to Haftar-led military forces. Dabaiba immediately rejected HoR’s move, vowed to remain in post until national elections are held. Hundreds 11 Feb demonstrated in Tripoli and Misrata city against HoR; military brigades loyal to Dabaiba next day converged on Tripoli from other towns to “secure the government headquarters and key sites in the capital”. Dabaiba 21 Feb announced multi-track plan leading to parliamentary elections in June and postponing constitutional review and presidential election to after new parliament is seated; also reiterated elections “sole solution” to political crisis. HoR 28 Feb postponed vote of confidence in Bashagha’s proposed govt citing need for more consultations on cabinet line-up. Foreign powers remained divided on way forward, with several foreign capitals adopting wait-and-see attitude while Egypt and Russia supported Bashagha’s bid to premiership. Dabaiba’s Govt of National Unity 17 Feb criticised UN Special Adviser Stephanie Williams for allegedly making contradictory statements on political crisis.

Following failure to hold presidential election in late Dec, parliament and others manoeuvred to postpone polls indefinitely. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh 17 Jan called for replacing interim Govt of National Unity (GNU) with new govt, contending PM Dabaiba’s mandate expired 24 Dec, and proposed new constitutional drafting process. High National Election Commission (HNEC) same day said six to eight months needed to resume electoral process (constitutional drafting process notwithstanding), 20 Jan set up committee to review presidential candidacies submitted in Nov. Dabaiba 23 Jan also called for adoption of new constitution before elections, but denied his mandate expired on 24 Dec, insisting new govt can only be appointed following elections. UN Special Adviser Stephanie Williams 24 Jan insisted “Libya does not need another prolonged transitional period”; comment came after Williams 16 Jan said holding elections by June, in line with UN-brokered 2020 roadmap, was “very reasonable and possible”. Dabaiba 31 Jan announced applications for interim PM would open next day and said HoR would meet 8 Feb to vote on new PM; several politicians throughout month appeared to campaign for PM position, including former Tripoli-based Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and Tripoli-based High State Council Chair Khaled Mishri, both of whom recently made important overtures to eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated combatants 24 Jan claimed having killed two security personnel near southern town of Sabha one week earlier; new attack in same area 26 Jan reportedly killed another three. Meanwhile, French govt 4 Jan said around 300 mercenaries had left eastern Libya, hailing start of phased withdrawal of thousands of foreign forces in line with 2020 ceasefire. Central Bank Governor Saddek Omar Elkaber 20 Jan announced launch of bank’s reunification process. Brussels Prosecutor’s Office 21 Jan said it had issued international arrest warrant against Libyan Investment Authority Chairman Ali Mahmoud Hassan on corruption and embezzlement charges as part of investigation into management of Libyan assets frozen in Belgium after fall of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.

Authorities postponed presidential election in last-minute move as tensions ran high around capital Tripoli. Amid disputes over eligibility of candidates, electoral timetable and scope of future president’s powers, High National Electoral Commission (HNEC) 20-22 Dec postponed first round of presidential election, initially scheduled for 24 Dec, for one month, as House of Representatives (HoR) committee tasked with monitoring election process 22 Dec said it was “impossible” to hold polls as planned. U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland immediately expressed “disappointment”. After British embassy 24 Dec expressed continued support for Govt of National Unity (GNU), said it would “not endorse the establishment of parallel governments or institutions”, HoR Foreign Affairs Committee next day accused UK of “interference”, said only HoR could decide on formation of new govt or continuation of GNU. Elections unlikely to take place in Jan as HoR election committee 27 Dec recommended laying out “new, realistic and applicable roadmap … rather than fixing new dates and repeating the same errors”; HoR next day suspended session on political roadmap. Earlier in month, several controversial presidential candidates cleared to run: Tripoli Appeals Court 1 Dec upheld PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba’s presidential bid; Sebha Appeals Court next day reinstated Saif al-Islam Qadhafi as candidate; Tripoli Appeals Court 6 Dec overturned Zawiya court ruling barring Khalifa Haftar from running. Run-up to tentative polls marred by tensions. HNEC 2 Dec said electoral centres subjected to armed robbery and voter cards theft; militiamen 8 Dec entered HNEC’s Zawiya premises to demand postponement of elections until adoption of new constitution. Forces affiliated with different armed groups 16-21 Dec took up positions in and around Tripoli in possible protest at Presidential Council’s 15 Dec decision to replace Tripoli Military Zone Commander Gen Abdelbasit Marwan with Gen Abdelkader Mansour; Council 21 Dec suspended appointment, while UN mission (UNSMIL) same day said mobilisation “creates tensions and increases the risk of clashes that could spiral into conflict”. Following Nov resignation of UN Envoy Ján Kubiš, UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 6 Dec appointed Stephanie Williams – who served as Acting Special Representative in March 2020-Jan 2021 – as new Special Adviser on Libya.

Registration of polarising presidential hopefuls amid heated controversy over electoral framework could presage mobilisation of rival forces around 24 Dec polls. Several controversial figures submitted presidential candidacies to electoral commission throughout Nov: son of late dictator Muammar Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, who is wanted by International Criminal Court, 14 Nov; eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar 16 Nov; and PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba 21 Nov. Election commission 24 Nov disqualified 25 out of 98 registered candidates, including Qhadafi. Qhadafi’s lawyer late-Nov tried to appeal decision, but Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces impeded access to Sebha courthouse where appeal should be filed; LNA 30 Nov reportedly withdrew. Tripoli court 28 Nov accepted appeal submitted by presidential hopefuls against Dabaiba’s candidacy, while Benghazi court same day rejected appeal against Haftar’s candidacy. Electoral Commission expected to release final list of presidential candidates in early Dec. Meanwhile, several Tripoli-based anti-Haftar and anti-Qadhafi constituencies voiced opposition to presidential and parliamentary election laws unilaterally adopted by House of Representatives (HoR) in Sept-Oct. Notably, some 25 mayors 9 Nov signed petition against electoral framework; in following days, some 40 HoR members, and separately military coalition of anti-Haftar forces, endorsed petition. French President Emmanuel Macron 12 Nov hosted international conference for Libya; world powers reaffirmed need to hold elections on time and vowed to push for sanctions against anyone who disrupts electoral process, but some cracks appeared among foreign stakeholders and within UN over current electoral framework. Both UK and Italy’s representatives stressed need for consensus on election legislation, while Egypt and France did not express any concern on current electoral framework. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres same day urged Libyans “to come together in a spirit of national unity” and “forge a consensus on the legal framework for the elections”; statement departed from line of UN Envoy Ján Kubiš, who in recent weeks rubberstamped HoR’s electoral laws; Kubiš 23 Nov offered his resignation which Guterres accepted. UN Security Council next day threatened sanctions against those “obstructing or undermining the elections”.