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Looming Dangers One Year after Nagorno-Karabakh Escalation
Looming Dangers One Year after Nagorno-Karabakh Escalation
Troops in Nagorno-Karabakh on the first line of defense near a makeshift church on 8 April 2016. SPUTNIK/Ria Novosti

Looming Dangers One Year after Nagorno-Karabakh Escalation

One year after Nagorno-Karabakh’s violent flare-up in April 2016, the danger of even more perilous fighting remains real. Further hostilities risk a larger regional conflagration with far-reaching humanitarian consequences. Crisis Group’s Europe and Central Asia Program Director, Magdalena Grono, assesses risks in the region.

BAKU, Azerbaijan — The room housing refugees in the former Soviet sanatorium just outside Baku was getting a much-needed facelift: new black-and-silver floral wallpaper “to make it more attractive to the future in-laws of my daughter who are not displaced like us”, said Bayram, an Azeri veteran of the 1988-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Bayram remained steadfast in his support for Azerbaijan’s role in last spring’s violent clash with Armenia. “Of course I know what war is and what the consequences can be”, he explained. He pointed to his leg, maimed by artillery fire almost 25 years ago, and to the poor conditions of the refugee shelter where his family has lived for over twenty years. “But I have sent my eldest son to the army anyhow. He is an officer, and I have told him to fight – to take care, but to fight for his homeland.”

Last year’s escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in the early hours of 2 April, killed up to 200 people. However, like many Azerbaijanis whose families have been displaced by the conflict, Bayram’s patriotic pride overtook his concern for lost lives. Bayram had hoped the fighting would result in the return to Baku’s control of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding districts – held by ethnic Armenian forces since the 1994 ceasefire – so he could go back home.

Across the Line of Contact (LoC), the militarised zone that has separated Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since 1994, conversations in Armenia’s capital Yerevan were like stepping through a mirror. “Don’t you understand that Baku lost last April?” a prominent Armenian expert remarked, challenging the mainstream analysis that Baku’s gaining control over two strategic heights was a significant first since 1994, if not in military terms, then certainly in terms of Azerbaijan’s posture. “We are now prepared and ready to inflict major harm on the Azerbaijanis if they attack, so they do not feel they can get away with this”, another Armenian analyst said. Such sentiments are even more sharply expressed in Nagorno-Karabakh itself, where people are deeply concerned for their security.

Conversations on both sides of the divide reveal a new and dangerous situation: that renewed appetite for confrontation has engulfed a conflict once considered frozen but which –  with  clashes escalating since at least 2012 – is particularly dangerous now given both countries’ more powerfully equipped armies, and Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s respective military commitments with Russia and Turkey. In 2015, Azerbaijan spent $3 billion on its military, strategically diversifying acquisitions, with weapons systems purchased from Russia, Turkey, Israel and Pakistan, among others. This sum was more than Armenia’s entire national budget that year, yet Yerevan still sought to catch up, benefiting from more advantageous tariffs and a credit from Russia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan each finds the current status quo unacceptable for different reasons. Before committing to talks, Yerevan urgently wishes to see improved security, including for people whose daily lives are severely impacted by ongoing escalations along the LoC and the international border between the two countries. Baku wants to have guarantees that there will be substantive progress in settlement talks, including the return of districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as a first step. The prevailing dynamic, compounded by an absence of confidence between the sides or in the settlement process, lends itself to further violent flare-ups that contain grave local and regional risks.

There is a long-standing conflict settlement mechanism, the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But in the absence of a re-invigorated process with high-level backing from the three Minsk Group co-chairs – Russia, the United States and France – the conflict will remain a dangerous tinderbox in the heart of the South Caucasus, between Russia, Turkey, Iran and what the EU considers its Eastern Neighbourhood.

The Frozen Settlement Process

Bayram, the Azeri veteran, said he was disappointed when a ceasefire was brokered by Moscow four days into the April 2016 fighting. Like many displaced people and other ordinary citizens in Azerbaijan, he felt elated that some small but strategically significant land fell into Baku’s hands as a result of the fighting, and that the widespread post-1994 myth of Armenian forces’ invincibility was broken. But he and others in Azerbaijan were also frustrated not to see “more progress”, even if it were to come with a much higher death toll and other costs.

The high pain threshold of both parties in the quest for their desired outcome in the settlement of the conflict bodes ill for finding a political solution. Russia-led attempts to broker a deal last year revealed that a zero-sum logic continues to dictate not only the approach to the substance of the settlement process but also to the process itself. The gulf between Azerbaijani society on the one hand, and the Armenian and Armenian-Karabakh societies on the other, is widened by the lack of contact between parties. Only isolated civil society actors seek the construction of cultural or political bridges. In the year that has elapsed since April 2016, space for discussing mutual concessions has by and large closed.

Yet last year’s conflict did briefly revive the all but moribund settlement process, as detailed in Crisis Group’s July report, “New Opening, or More Peril?”. Summits in Vienna last May and St. Petersburg in June agreed on an investigative mechanism and an increase in the number of OSCE monitors, as well as on proceeding with substantive talks. Yet by late summer, the process ground to a halt and deadly incidents have recurred with varying degrees of intensity.

“We cannot talk when we are being attacked”, explained an official in Yerevan. “The only way to get to substantive talks is to have months of quiet on the Line of Contact”. Beyond the security imperative, Yerevan is reluctant to return lands around Karabakh unless other aspects of the settlement – including Nagorno-Karabakh’s future status – are clarified, guided by a principle of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. Armenians fear losing strategic advantage if they do not secure their desired political outcome on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, namely its self-determination outside of Azerbaijan. Indeed, the return of even some of the districts around the contested heartland would make Karabakh much harder to defend for the Armenians.

For its part, Baku resents the current status quo on the ground and fears that any security arrangements insisted upon by Yerevan would only cement it. Officials in Baku say the increased number of monitors and the investigative mechanism agreed upon last summer are only acceptable if linked to broader substantive progress in the talks.

With frustrations mounting on both sides and the process stalled, incidents along the LoC will likely intensify. Baku in particular shows public readiness to use force to achieve its goals. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials explain that Baku has renounced the use of force if the conflict is settled within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Failing that, Azerbaijani analysts say, the threat of violence continues to be a legitimate means to put pressure on the adversary.

Meanwhile, Armenian and de facto Armenian-Karabakh forces – two intertwined structures – have focused on new fortifications systems on the Armenian-controlled side of the LoC, as well as on an internal overhaul of command structures. Some Armenian voices, including inside Nagorno-Karabakh, even speak of seizing more territories if they are attacked, in order to increase the security belt and have more to trade in future negotiations.

With both sides now poised to retaliate quickly to any escalation, and without the element of surprise, renewed fighting would likely exceed the unprecedented levels seen last year.

Moscow’s Uncertain Role

On the international diplomatic front, for the last decade, Moscow has de facto been the prima inter pares in the Minsk Group, and it was Moscow that brought about a cessation of hostilities in April 2016. Moscow is the only one of the three co-chair countries which currently seems to have the bandwidth and interest to invest high-level political capital into the conflict.

Diplomats talk about another push for progress in the talks, which Moscow is ostensibly preparing in the foreseeable future. A meeting of Foreign Ministers after the Armenian parliamentary elections on 2 April – coincidentally, the first anniversary of the escalation – should ideally lay the groundwork for a summit of the two Presidents. One desirable approach that is apparently being considered by the Minsk Group co-chair countries would include a combination of a possible declaration of both parties; an expression of support by the Minsk Group co-chairs; and a potential UN Security Council Resolution, according to diplomats based in the region. However, agreement on the details would still be needed at the Presidential level.

With Russia’s long history of rule over the Caucasus region, and a continued sense that the South Caucasus is a sphere of privileged Russian interest, Moscow’s influence has many facets. Russia is the leading supplier of weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia also has close cooperation with Armenia through the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Armenia is a member. While Moscow has not formally said it is interested in having peacekeepers in the region, a Russian official informally said that “of course [sending peacekeepers is in] our interest and we are pursuing it”. According to a gentlemen’s agreement in the context of the settlement process no co-chair or neighbouring country should provide peacekeepers.

Baku and Yerevan share a deep reluctance to accept Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh. Both see this scenario as the ultimate loss of sovereignty and a return to their once subservient role within the Soviet Empire. “We have been able to keep Russia out of our domestic politics”, a former Azerbaijani politician said. “Having their boots in Karabakh would mean they would have a very different say over our internal issues”. Likewise, an opposition-minded figure in Yerevan pointed out it was a paradox that while Armenia hosts a Russian military base, no one in Armenia wants to see Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh itself.

A decade or more ago, Armenian analysts often referred to the Balkans – where Operation Storm restored Croat control over Srpska Krajina though it violated the mandate of the UN peacekeepers deployed on the ceasefire line – as an example for why international security arrangements may not be reliable. Today, notwithstanding the role of Russia as Armenia’s primary strategic partner, Crimea’s 2014 annexation by Russia is causing concern that the use of force cannot be excluded, even if international guarantees are in place.

Baku, on the other hand, has seized on the biting sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its European partners on Russia to pursue in various international fora Azerbaijan’s de jure claim to the territory it sees as occupied, referring also to UN Security Council resolutions of the early 1990s. “After Crimea, the international community’s reluctance to use the term occupation and impose sanctions against Armenia is becoming untenable,” a pro-government Azerbaijani analyst said.

No Alternative to Political and Diplomatic Solutions

A year on from the April 2016 flare-up, positions have significantly hardened. Both sides seem prepared to engage only on their own terms and neither society is ready to consider mutual concessions. Any discussion in Baku of the settlement process and its basic principles automatically assumes the determination of the future political status of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan – something Armenians say is unacceptable. On the other hand, discussions in Armenia over the return of lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan have been difficult and, since last April, have become a non-starter. Although, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in the past has said this remained a negotiating chip.

In fact, the distinction between Nagorno-Karabakh proper and the surrounding districts held by Armenians has been largely effaced in the discourse, especially in the months since April 2016. Armenia’s former president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, remains a lone voice urging Armenians to proceed with the return of the districts around Nagorno-Karabakh, but few agree with him. The Karabakhi activist living in Yerevan explained simply: “This would lead to civil war”.

Against the backdrop of political deadlock, risks of escalation on the battlefront are growing dangerously. Most Western diplomats agree that the risks are high, yet they also stress that none of the regional powers are interested in a conflict that could ultimately ensnare them. Russia and Turkey's current geopolitical cooperation regarding the war in Syria increases the chances that they would work to minimise any misunderstandings that might lead to a wider conflagration in the Caucasus theatre.

Even a medium-scale intensity conflict between Baku and Yerevan is likely to have disastrous humanitarian consequences. Given the close proximity of civilians to the front lines, heavy casualties would be likely from shelling or other military deployments. Both sides alleged that the other engaged in atrocities during the April 2016 escalation, which Minsk Group co-chairs condemned in their December 2016 statement. Humanitarian agencies in the region are beefing up their capacities and developing contingency plans.

The destructive potential of renewed conflict should compel both parties back to the negotiating table. If the mooted new meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan materialises, it could help inject new impetus into the stalled process. Baku and Yerevan have already, in theory at least, committed to the basic principles for the settlement developed by the OSCE Minsk Group. The elements, as formulated by Minsk Group co-chairs countries, include: “the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation”.

In spite of divergent interpretations of a number of those elements by each party, the OSCE Minsk Group should redouble its efforts to galvanise substantive talks while pushing for implementation of the measures agreed in Vienna. Russia will likely play a leading role in this, but needs the support of the U.S. and France. Washington and Paris should back up these efforts at highest levels, despite the Trump presidency’s apparent disengagement from the region and France’s electoral preoccupations. The EU should use its bilateral relations with each of the countries to reiterate not only the unacceptability of the status quo, but also the unacceptability of a repeat of last April’s hostilities. The EU has long sought to support pro-peace discourses in both societies. This kind of investment should be a renewed priority so that people like Bayram, as well as his Armenian counterparts, do not depersonalise each other.

A lasting settlement will mean living side by side, taking into account the needs of both parties. For now though, there is a wide gap between what outside mediators see as a fair formula and what seems acceptable to local communities. Until this gap closes, the risks of war will remain very high.

Displaced Qimant people, an ethnic minority pursuing greater autonomy within Ethiopia's Amhara region, during an interview with Crisis Group analysts in West Gondar Zone, Amhara region on 15 November 2019. SOURCE: CRISISGROUP/William Davison
Briefing 156 / Africa

Bridging the Divide in Ethiopia’s North

As Ethiopia’s 2021 election nears, a territorial dispute has flared between Amhara and Tigray, two northern regions. It could turn ugly amid rising ethnic nationalism. To heal the rift, the federal government should convene regional leaders in pursuit of guarantees for minority rights.

What’s new? Tigray and Amhara, the powerhouse regions of northern Ethiopia, are locked in a bitter land dispute exacerbated by national politicking that pits their elites against each other. Given dim prospects for a comprehensive settlement, the dispute could escalate into conflict.

Why does it matter? Ethiopia’s delayed elections will likely be sometime in 2021. Amhara nationalists could stoke sentiment against Tigray’s ruling class during the campaign. Tigray’s government is arming itself as hardliners promote secession. Confrontation between the regions would draw federal military intervention, potentially exposing ethno-regional cracks in the army’s cohesion.

What should be done? Federal leaders should provide incentives to Tigray’s ruling party to come to the table. They should urge Tigrayan and Amhara factions to temper provocative stances and explore compromise. The parties could consider an outcome in which Tigray guarantees political representation and language rights to minority populations in the disputed territories.

I. Overview

Tigray and Amhara, Ethiopia’s two powerful northern regions, are locked in a dangerous standoff. The tensions over Amhara claims to land administered by Tigray sparked proxy violence in 2018 and could do so again given the lack of appetite for compromise. The dispute came into focus in 1991, when Tigrayan rebels seized national power as the heart of a multi-ethnic coalition and, as the Amhara see it, also annexed historical Amhara land to their own region. It remains a flashpoint under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, whose ascent was presaged by Amhara protests over the territories and Tigrayan political domination. Federal authorities should convene political, academic and religious leaders from both regions to start healing the rift. Addis Ababa should offer concessions to politically isolated Tigray to come to the table. Both Tigray and Amhara factions should concede ground by dropping hardline stances on the dispute. The regions should instead strike a deal whereby Tigray grants political representation and language rights to native Amharic-speaking communities in the disputed areas.

The dispute between Amhara and Tigray is arguably the bitterest of these contests, fuelled in part by rising ethnic nationalism in both regions.

Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, is undergoing a volatile transition that began in 2015 with widespread anti-government unrest. The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, drove the protests with their complaints of political and economic marginalisation, but the Amhara, the second largest, also participated, airing similar grievances. The appointment of Abiy, an Oromo, heralded the end of Tigrayan pre-eminence in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition, now dissolved, that ruled since 1991. It also brought a long-overdue relaxation of repressive measures. But greater freedoms contributed to intensified competition among ethno-regional elites and other factions across the country who are keen to press claims for a fairer share of resources, greater autonomy and an end to perceived injustices.

The dispute between Amhara and Tigray – whose people are bound together by various factors, including the predominant Orthodox Christian religion, language and culture – is arguably the bitterest of these contests, fuelled in part by rising ethnic nationalism in both regions. Neither side looks ready for compromise. This is particularly true of Tigray, which rejects the constitutional legitimacy of a federal boundary commission the central government set up in December 2018 to resolve this and other territorial quarrels. But it also is the case in Amhara, where, in 2016, activists and officials mobilised protesters partly by highlighting their grievances about the disputed territories, lending widespread popular support to the claim that they had been illegitimately annexed.

Tensions have already led to violence. In late 2018, in north-western Amhara, local Amhara killed hundreds and displaced thousands of Qimant, an ethnic minority pursuing greater autonomy within the region, amid regional officials’ claims that Tigray’s ruling party is funding the self-rule campaign. Some senior federal officials fear further escalation. Should that occur, and inter-regional hostility spiral, the national army would likely be pulled into the fray, but how it would handle the situation is a significant question, given Tigrayans’ still heavy presence in the officer corps.

The current political climate poses additional risks. An Amhara nationalist opposition party has emerged to compete with pro-Abiy ruling-party figures in Amhara. As a result, Amhara politicians will likely try to outbid one another in whipping up sentiment against Tigray’s ruling elite during the campaign. For its part, Tigray’s governing party now sits as the only opposition bloc in the federal parliament; meanwhile, its regional government is busy bolstering its own security force, against the backdrop of increasingly determined talk of secession among Tigrayan activists. Recently, Tigray’s ruling party has said it would consider plans to independently hold regional elections, potentially in defiance of the federal government, which has delayed polls set for August due to the COVID-19 outbreak, raising fears of a constitutional crisis as the vote will not be held before the government’s term ends.

In this dangerous climate, federal officials and elders should encourage influential regional actors to eschew provocative stances, so that the two regions’ leaders can hold talks in a more temperate political atmosphere. To kickstart such a process, federal officials should mend ties with Tigray leaders, perhaps first by offering guaranteed representation in federal institutions and involving them fully in discussions about the election delay. Such compromises could nudge Tigray to participate in talks with Amhara.

If the two sides can be brought together, they should focus their energies on finding a compromise solution for the contested areas. Tigray could pledge not to pursue a secessionist course that could inflame Amhara concerns over the disputed territories Tigray would take out of Ethiopia in that scenario. In return, Amhara could ease off irredentist claims over the disputed lands. Were Tigray willing to instead grant political representation and language rights to minority populations in the territories, some Amhara officials have suggested this could help lead to an acceptable outcome. In order to facilitate such a compromise solution, the national boundary commission could devote its efforts to assessing the demographic reality. Because Tigray’s leaders presently distrust the commission, perceiving it as overly deferential to Abiy and Amhara interests, they could request – and federal authorities should agree – that it report exclusively to the upper house of parliament rather than also to the prime minister. Under those conditions, Tigray should have no reason not to cooperate with it.

II. Territory and Violence

The contemporary origins of the Amhara-Tigray dispute lie in the Ethiopian empire’s dismantlement by a socialist junta known as the Derg after the 1974 revolution. A year later, Tigrayans mounted a rebellion, eventually helping topple the military regime in 1991, and forming a new ruling coalition by co-opting elites from other areas including Amhara, the country’s second most populous region.

Resentment runs deep in Amhara and among activists from the disputed areas.

The Amhara claim that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), both then and now Tigray’s ruling party, began to occupy some of their lands during its campaign to depose the Derg. They want these lands returned. Specifically, they assert that the TPLF should return the districts of Welkait, Humera, Tsegede and Tselemte (in Amharic, the last two are Tegede and Telemte) in West Tigray and North West Tigray Zones, as well as the Raya-Akobo area in South Tigray Zone.[fn]Some people living in these districts, for example the Raya, claim they are a distinct community and want self-rule within Amhara. Some Amhara nationalists say the Raya are, in fact, Amhara. Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar, November 2019.Hide Footnote  The Amhara argue that before 1991, the old provinces of Gondar and Wollo, now mostly part of Amhara, administered these chiefly rural districts, some of which produce export-grade sesame.[fn]Tewodrose G. Tirfe, “Democracy Under Threat in Ethiopia”, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, 9 March 2017.Hide Footnote  They say the historical south-western border of the old Tigray province was the Tekeze river, which lies well inside Tigray. “It is our historical land”, said a senior federal official from Amhara. “We have to get it back”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, December 2019.Hide Footnote

Resentment runs deep in Amhara and among activists from the disputed areas.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Raya activist, Addis Ababa, July 2019.Hide Footnote  Many in Amhara complain that their politicians did not speak out against what they perceive as a TPLF land grab in the early 1990s because they were subservient to their Tigrayan coalition partners and remained so until protests broke out in 2016. “They are gangsters”, seethes an Amhara official, in reference to the TPLF.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior Amhara official leader, Bahir Dar, November 2019.Hide Footnote  The Amhara not only assert historical ownership of the land but also charge that TPLF rebels killed and uprooted Amhara in the disputed areas, thus altering the demographic balance in favour of Tigrinya speakers and laying the basis for a TPLF claim to the lands under Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system.[fn]The TPLF staunchly supports the constitution it helped put in place in 1995. That charter enshrines self-rule for Ethiopia’s diverse communities, but many Amhara reject the system, which demarcates administrative boundaries according to ethno-linguistic patterns, arguing that it reduces the Amhara region’s importance and disadvantages Amhara living across Ethiopia. For background, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°s 283, Keeping Ethiopia’s Transition on the Rails, 16 December 2019; and 153, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, 4 September 2009.Hide Footnote  Welkait activists in Gondar told Crisis Group that when TPLF rebels arrived in the 1980s, they killed and evicted Amhara and took local wives, leading to the demographic shift.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Gondar, November 2019.Hide Footnote  “The only solution is returning the districts to their historic province before 1991 and making the TPLF accountable” for abuses it committed, says Achamyeleh Tamiru, an activist who argues that the disputed areas have always been majority-Amhara.[fn]Achamyeleh Tamiru, “Wolqait-Tegede Forceful Annexation, Violation of Human Rights and Silent Genocide: A Quest for Identity and Geographic Restoration”, posted at welkait.com. Crisis Group telephone interview, Achamyeleh Tamiru, May 2020.Hide Footnote

Conversely, most Tigrayans support their region’s claim to the territories on the basis of ethno-linguistic patterns, which are used to form administrative areas in Ethiopia’s federal system. They acknowledge that much of current West Tigray Zone and some of North West Tigray Zone were not part of the old Tigray province, but add that Tigrinya speakers constituted a majority of the population in these areas long before the TPLF’s rebellion began in 1975. Most Tigrayan opposition actors share this position, making any putative concession to the Amhara politically costly. A senior Tigrayan opposition leader, who explained that Welkait was inhabited predominantly by Tigrinya speakers in the 1970s, said: “They [Amhara] think it is easy to grab land. But that is not going to happen. Everyone, including me, would stand up if they try to take it by force”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Addis Ababa, December 2019.Hide Footnote

At the same time, Tigrayan political dynamics are raising the stakes for the Amhara. As the TPLF has lost its grip on the federal government, some Tigrayan groups have gone as far as to support Tigray’s secession from the federation, which the constitution expressly permits.[fn]Formalised in 1995, the federal settlement created administrative areas based around ethno-linguistic settlement patterns and promoted self-determination, including the right to become an independent nation state.Hide Footnote  If Tigray seceded, it would take the disputed territories out of Ethiopia, a prospect Amhara might well resist with force.[fn]Crisis Group interview, opposition leader, Mekelle, November 2019.Hide Footnote

The dispute has mainly translated into a proxy conflict between the Amhara and Qimant.

Tigray leaders also accuse federal authorities of siding with Amhara in the dispute. They charge the central government with supporting the Amhara claims by creating the federal boundary commission – which they describe as unconstitutional – to look into inter-regional disputes. They were outraged at the displacement of Tigrayans from Amhara’s Gondar area during protests in 2016, as they are today by what they see as the federal government’s lethargy in clearing Amhara protesters who since 2018 have blocked the main road from the capital Addis Ababa to Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle, the key transport corridor into Tigray.[fn]“Blocking roads and prohibiting grains from coming to Tigray is a grave crime”, The Reporter, 15 June 2019.Hide Footnote  The TPLF views the blockade as the Amhara activists’ attempt to pressure Mekelle into altering its stance on the territorial dispute.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, TPLF figures, Nairobi, October 2019.Hide Footnote

So far, the dispute has mainly translated into a proxy conflict between the Amhara and Qimant, an ethnic minority community who were formerly widespread but now reside only in patches of north-western Amhara, and who are believed by many Amhara to be backed by the TPLF. The Qimant have been agitating for an autonomous zone within Amhara for a decade, a claim based on Ethiopia's constitution that grants self-determination rights to ethnic communities.[fn]Ethiopia’s constitution offers self-determination for any “group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory”. Some Amhara activists claim that the Qimant are not such a community, according to the constitutional definition, as they no longer speak their own language and instead use Amharic.Hide Footnote  In 2017, following referendums and bouts of Amhara-Qimant violence, Amhara authorities granted self-rule by authorising the formation of an administrative zone based on 69 Qimant village districts. But Qimant campaigners demanded that the zone also include three Qimant-majority village areas near the Sudan border but discontiguous with the designated districts. Partly because of local Amhara opposition, the Qimant zone has not been formed, and there is increasing Amhara impatience with Qimant activism.[fn]Crisis Group interview, zonal official, Genda Wuha, November 2019.Hide Footnote  Senior Amhara officials are among those who believe that the TPLF runs the Qimant autonomy campaign.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Bahir Dar, November 2019.Hide Footnote

The violence among Amhara, Qimant and Tigrayans drew in the national military, leading local Amhara to accuse some units of siding with the latter two groups against them.

In the final quarter of 2018, displaced Qimant say, Amhara groups attacked them in villages where they were a minority, forcing them to flee to Qimant-dominated enclaves. Amhara officials acknowledge the attacks but claim that they came in retaliation for Qimant banditry and militia hit-and-run operations.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Amhara zonal and regional officials, November 2019. Officials make similar claims about the Amhara violence against Gumuz people in western Amhara.Hide Footnote  An Amhara administrator admitted that Amhara assailants killed more than 200 Qimant, destroyed 3,398 houses and displaced 26,346 from villages and towns, including fired civil servants.[fn]Crisis Group interview, zonal official, Genda Wuha, November 2019.Hide Footnote  “We tried, but we couldn’t stop it”, he said. UN reports corroborate the scale of the violence.[fn]“Interagency Rapid Protection Assessment – Gondar, Amhara Region”, Global Protection Cluster, 14 March 2019.Hide Footnote These attacks were paralleled by mostly Amhara groups chasing Tigrayan traders out of the Metemma area bordering Sudan.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, government workers, Genda Wuha, November 2019.Hide Footnote

The violence among Amhara, Qimant and Tigrayans drew in the national military, leading local Amhara to accuse some units of siding with the latter two groups against them. In January 2019, soldiers killed eight Amhara civilians in Genda Wuha town near Metemma. The Amhara were trying to prevent the military from evacuating a Tigrayan-owned construction company; they said the firm was providing Qimant activists with logistical support.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, government workers, Genda Wuha, November 2019.Hide Footnote  Qimant sources said the military’s intervention saved the construction workers’ lives and their own. A 27-year-old displaced Qimant civil servant in Meka village told Crisis Group: “The only reason that all the Qimant have not been killed is the army”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, West Gondar Zone, November 2019.Hide Footnote  After the Genda Wuha incident, army units in the area, believed by locals to be pro-TPLF, were replaced by another division.[fn]The army’s 33rd Division replaced the 24th. Locals believed that the 24th was partial to Tigray as it was Tigrayan-commanded. Crisis Group interview, government worker, Genda Wuha, November 2019.Hide Footnote

There was at least one other major violent incident in Metemma around the same time. In late May 2020, Amnesty International reported that on 10-11 January 2019 local Amhara officials and militiamen killed at least 58 Qimant people in the area.[fn]“Beyond Law Enforcement: Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia”, Amnesty International, 29 May 2020.Hide Footnote

While the violence has subsided in recent months, the situation remains volatile.[fn]“Violent Qemant dispute fuelling explosive Amhara-Tigray divide”, Ethiopia Insight, 16 December 2019.Hide Footnote  In October 2019, assailants reportedly from Amhara and disguised as shepherds staged a cross-border attack on Tigrayan militia, killing several in an isolated incident.[fn]Crisis Group interview, former intelligence official, Mekelle, November 2019.Hide Footnote The May 2020 Amnesty International report contains accounts of fatal violence – including Qimant reprisals – in September and October 2019 in the wider Gondar area, although not in the Amhara-Tigray borderlands.[fn]“Beyond Law Enforcement”, op. cit.Hide Footnote  Crisis Group visited the Qimant areas to Gondar’s west the next month, finding the occasional torched building but relative calm amid heavy deployments of federal soldiers and regional police. The foreign affairs ministry has said disorder had abated in West and Central Gondar Zones in 2020 after federal and regional security forces created space for community-led peacebuilding.[fn]“Response to Amnesty International’s report on Ethiopia”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 May 2020. Meanwhile, the Amhara Association of America said Amnesty International failed to record several fatal 2019 attacks by the Qimant Identity Committee and its militia that triggered Amhara responses, while also ignoring the TPLF’s alleged support for the Qimant movement and falsely accusing the Fano militia of culpability. “Statement on the Gaps and Omissions in the Latest Amnesty International Report”, Amhara Association of America, 30 May 2020.Hide Footnote

As yet, there has been no confirmed clash between regional security forces, but renewed violence, either locally sparked or provoked by elites, could draw the federal military in further, at the risk of stretching its cohesion. At worst, some senior Ethiopian politicians warn, such a scenario could lead to “war”, pitting the Tigray region and its supporters in the federal army against the Amhara region and possibly the central government itself.[fn]Crisis Group interview, federal deputy minister, Addis Ababa, February 2020.Hide Footnote  The possibility of conflict increased in May with the TPLF’s claim that it may hold its own regional elections, which earned a warning from Abiy:

Unconstitutional attempts to undertake illegal elections will result in harm to the country and the people. Therefore, the government will be forced to take any measures to assure the safety of the people and the country.[fn]A message on current affairs”, video, YouTube, 7 May 2020.Hide Footnote

III. Protests, Politics and Polarisation

Both Amhara and Tigray regions experienced major upheaval when protests swept the country from 2015 onward against a regime many Ethiopians considered repressive and dominated by the TPLF. In 2018, Amhara and Oromo ruling coalition members outmanoeuvred Tigrayans to hand the prime minister’s post to the new leader of Oromia’s regional party, Abiy Ahmed. Tensions rose as Abiy embarked on far-reaching reforms, continuing to release political prisoners, dismissing many senior TPLF figures from federal institutions and, the following year, transforming the EPRDF coalition into his own new Prosperity Party. The last move in particular disturbed the TPLF, which had founded the EPRDF in 1989 and controlled it ever since.

Amid the national turmoil, political elites in the two regions, keen to press for political advantage or mobilise ethno-nationalist sentiment ahead of the now-postponed elections that were scheduled for 29 August, have adopted increasingly hardline stances toward each other. The frosty relationship between the TPLF and Abiy has also put on ice the prime minister’s high-profile 2018 peace deal with Eritrea, which shares a long border with Tigray, whose elites are hostile to President Isaias Afwerki.

A. Amhara Nationalism

Tensions fuelling the Amhara-Tigray standoff ramped up in July 2016 when crowds in Gondar demonstrated against TPLF control of the disputed territories. The protests appeared to be backed by Amhara’s government and came in response to the arrest of Welkait campaigners for self-rule within the region. Organisers mobilised large numbers in opposition to perceived TPLF dominance in Addis Ababa; this came atop anti-government demonstrations in Oromia that began the previous year. Similar protests, linking the fate of the disputed territories to the broader hostility toward the ruling coalition, occurred sporadically in Amhara region until Abiy’s accession in 2018, occasionally turning violent.

Amid the unrest, in early 2018, federal authorities released figures accused of trying to oust the TPLF-dominated government, including those promoting Amhara irredentism. One of them, Asaminew Tsige, an Amhara brigadier general, had been sentenced to life in prison in 2009 for involvement in a coup plot.[fn]“Ethiopian Supreme Court imposes life sentence on two Ginbot 7 defendants”, Ezega, 13 November 2010.Hide Footnote  He had also called for the end of Tigrayan rule over what he considered Amhara territory.[fn]“Violent Qemant dispute fuelling explosive Amhara-Tigray divide”, op. cit.Hide Footnote  Less than a year after his February 2018 release, Amhara’s ruling party nominated him as regional security chief. He recruited Brigadier General Tefera Mamo, who had been jailed with him in 2009, as head of Amhara special forces.

Another of those released was the chairman of the Welkait group that helped mobilise the Gondar protests, Colonel Demeke Zewdu; his arrest had provoked the killing by him or his loyalists of several federal security personnel when they tried to detain him in Gondar.[fn]“Several killed as Ethiopian police force attempt to arrest individuals, sparking citywide protest in Gondar”, Addis Standard, 14 July 2016.Hide Footnote  Demeke’s amnesty, two months before Abiy took office, angered the beleaguered TPLF.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior TPLF official, Mekelle, July 2019.Hide Footnote  A former Tigrayan intelligence officer alleges that Demeke is now orchestrating violence in border areas, while an Amhara activist said he is leading Amhara resistance to Abiy’s government, Oromo nationalists and the TPLF.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Mekelle, November 2019.Hide Footnote

A slew of violent acts with ethnic overtones would soon take place. Asaminew’s rise gave political oxygen to Amhara nationalists who criticised the TPLF-designed federal system and accused the Amhara elites of complicity. Following his appointment, he began building up Amhara security forces while deploying fierce rhetoric against the TPLF. On 22 June 2019, assassins shot Amhara’s president Ambachew Makonnen and two other regional leaders in the Amhara capital, Bahir Dar. Hours later, in Addis Ababa, a bodyguard killed the military chief of staff, who hailed from Tigray, allegedly on Asaminew’s behalf, according to federal officials.[fn]Crisis Group Statement, “Restoring Calm in Ethiopia after High-profile Assassinations, 25 June 2019.Hide Footnote  Security forces caught up with Asaminew a day later and killed him.

The deadly attacks led to competing accusations. The federal government blamed Asaminew for planning the assassinations.[fn]“Attorney general says June 22 Amhara region senior leaders, army chief Gen. Seare assassinations led by Brig. Gen. Asaminew Tsige”, Addis Standard, 13 November 2019.Hide Footnote  A November federal investigation concluded that Asaminew had sought to mount a regional coup d’état. Likewise, in July 2019, the TPLF blamed Amhara authorities for the law and order breakdown. The Amhara regional government shot back, with some officials accusing the TPLF of being behind the assassinations.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, federal and regional officials, Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar, November 2019. “Attorney general says June 22 Amhara region senior leaders, army chief Gen. Seare assassinations led by Brig. Gen. Asaminew Tsige”, op. cit. “War of words”, The Reporter, 13 July 2019. In a 14 February 2020 speech in Dubai, Abiy denied that the federal government was responsible, adding that he had tried to prevent Asaminew’s 2009 jailing and incorrectly claiming that he pardoned Asaminew in 2018. “PM Dr Abiy Ahmed Full speech at UAE”, video, YouTube, 14 February 2020.Hide Footnote  Several Amhara politicians, as well as other government and opposition figures, more broadly suspect the TPLF of seeking to sabotage the transition. “The TPLF sponsors every conflict in Ethiopia”, said a federal minister from Amhara.[fn]Such allegations are rarely backed by evidence and appear to be, at best, overblown. Crisis Group interview, non-TPLF federal ministerial adviser, Addis Ababa, January 2020.Hide Footnote

Tensions fuelling the Amhara-Tigray standoff ramped up in July 2016 when crowds in Gondar demonstrated against TPLF control of the disputed territories.

Subsequent events further polarised the situation. After the assassinations, the federal government arrested 260 people, including a leader and dozens of members of Amhara’s opposition party, the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA).[fn]“Amid Ethiopia unrest, Amhara political party spokesman arrested”, Reuters, 28 June 2019. The federal government dropped charges and released the NaMA spokesman on 25 February 2020. NaMA, formed in June 2018, presents itself as a standard bearer of Amhara interests. In addition to pressing territorial claims against Tigray, NaMA wants to alter the ethnic federal system and act against “Amharas annihilation and marginalization in every walk of life”, NaMA official Facebook page.Hide Footnote  The ethno-nationalists are a relatively potent political force, even as relations with the authorities are deteriorating. For example, Ambachew’s successor as Amhara president is Temesgen Tiruneh, Abiy’s former national security adviser. He has drawn Amhara nationalist ire for rejecting the notion of using force to resolve territorial disputes.[fn]“A new president in Amhara region takes the helm, cautiously”, Addis Standard, 30 July 2019.Hide Footnote  Temesgen’s removal in February of two Amhara hardliners from prominent regional positions further raised tensions.[fn]“Ethiopia’s Amhara regional state controversial leadership changes”, Borkena, 18 February 2020.Hide Footnote  In April, Amhara and federal forces moved against Amhara nationalist community-defence militias known as Fano that had once been part of the 2016-2018 protests supported by Amhara’s government. The offensive involved arrests and killings of Fano militants, further increasing public anger, according to NaMA.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, NaMA leader, April 2020.Hide Footnote

As the country gears up for elections, now slated for 2021, Amhara ethno-nationalists such as NaMA are positioning themselves against rivals in a regional government monopolised by Abiy’s Prosperity Party. Public opposition to the TPLF-installed federal system was on open display in Gondar in late 2019; even upmarket hotels flew the old Ethiopian tricolour rather than the loathed post-1991 flag whose nine-pointed star represents the federation’s semi-autonomous regions. The Prosperity Party, formed in December 2019 as a merger of all regional ruling parties except Tigray’s, may struggle to appeal to hardline ethno-nationalists in Amhara. Jostling among Prosperity Party sub-regional factions ahead of the elections is already visible. The competition could generate instability within Amhara as more combative members vie for prominence within the party.[fn]Crisis Group interview, former senior federal official, Addis Ababa, February 2020. The former official stated that manoeuvring among factions from the provinces of Gondar, Gojjam, Shewa and Wollo was noticeable throughout the Amhara government.Hide Footnote

B. Tigray’s Isolation

Elites from Tigray, which account for some 6 per cent of Ethiopia’s population, have watched in dismay as Abiy has diluted the power they held for over a quarter-century. Tigray leaders accuse Abiy’s government of applying selective justice in prosecuting high-profile members of their ethnic group for graft and rights abuses but not former top officials from other regions, including Amhara, whom they see as equally guilty.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior Tigray government official, July 2019.Hide Footnote  They baulked at the release and promotion of Asaminew, whom they saw as more deserving of prosecution than TPLF intelligence officials.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote  The TPLF has not assisted with a federal arrest warrant for former long-time national intelligence chief Getachew Assefa, a TPLF politburo member charged in absentia with overseeing prisoner abuses including torture.[fn]“Ethiopian police orders third arrest warrant for Getachew Assefa”, Ezega, 25 May 2019.Hide Footnote  The region’s parliament has also rejected the federal boundary commission created in December 2018 to resolve territorial disputes, deeming it unconstitutional.[fn]“Parliament approved candidates to Boundary and Identity Commission Members”, Borkena, 5 February 2019.  The TPLF contends that, as the upper house of parliament has sole responsibility for handling inter-regional disputes, the executive should not be involved.Hide Footnote

“Parliament approved candidates to Boundary and Identity Commission Members”, Borkena, 5 February 2019.  The TPLF contends that, as the upper house of parliament has sole responsibility for handling inter-regional disputes, the executive should not be involved.Hide Footnote

Options for de-escalation between Tigray and the federal government appear limited unless attitudes shift.

Tigray elites extol their regional security forces’ prowess as well as their loyalists’ clout in the federal army, sowing further suspicion and acrimony among Amhara politicians.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Tigrayan activist, Addis Ababa, February 2020.Hide Footnote  As noted, the TPLF was alone among the four regional parties constituting the EPRDF to reject merger into the Prosperity Party, saying the process was illegal and that the party was not adequately consulted.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Keeping Ethiopia’s Transition on the Rails, op. cit; Crisis Group telephone interview, TPLF Central Committee member, November 2019.Hide Footnote  TPLF leaders now say they may hold regional elections in advance of national polls, which would further increase tensions with Abiy’s government.[fn]“Ethiopia’s Tigray region eyes election in challenge to national unity”, Reuters, 7 May 2020.Hide Footnote  Radical Tigrayan activists go so far as to back the idea of secession, though some TPLF veterans reject this course. It almost certainly would be highly destabilising.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Tigrayan activist, Addis Ababa, February 2020. “Sebhat Nega trashes ‘Tigray secessionists’ as ‘banda’”, Borkena, 4 April 2020.
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Options for de-escalation between Tigray and the federal government appear limited unless attitudes shift. Reports that the prime minister may have told a meeting of Tigrayan businessmen in December 2019 that the region could face economic sanctions absent greater cooperation with the federal government further soured the atmosphere, as have suggestions the federal government might reduce Tigray’s budget.[fn]“PM Abiy Ahmed has always been bullish about winning the next election”, Fortune, 14 December 2019. Crisis Group interview, TPLF-linked activist, Addis Ababa, December 2019. “In-depth analysis: towards Tigray statehood?”, Addis Standard, 14 May 2020. A prime minister’s adviser said the budget cut could be justified because Tigray was using the funds for security operations that were hostile to the federal government. Crisis Group interview, 9 December 2019, Addis Ababa. A top Tigray official said “very senior” federal leaders had threatened to withhold Tigray’s grant, which he said would be a “grave mistake”. Crisis Group telephone interview, June 2020.Hide Footnote  The February 2020 announcement by TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael that his party and the Prosperity Party had formed a committee to discuss cooperation looked like it could provide an entry point for dialogue, but that has not materialised.[fn]“Prosperity Party, TPLF form a committee to discuss the way forward”, Capital, 24 February 2020. A ruling-party official, however, said the committee will only deal with party matters, such as negotiations over dividing the assets of the former ruling coalition. Crisis Group interview, Addis Ababa, February 2020.Hide Footnote  The TPLF is likely to maintain its uncooperative stance at least until after the elections, at which point it can be expected to negotiate with the eventual winners at the national and regional levels. Meanwhile, tensions between TPLF and Amhara elites on the one hand, and between Mekelle and Addis Ababa on the other, are likely to persist and could escalate.[fn]Fears of intensified conflict were voiced by many. Crisis Group interviews, former senior federal official, TPLF and Amhara politicians, Ethiopian opposition politicians, Addis Ababa, February 2020.Hide Footnote

C. Eritrea’s Role

Tensions among the TPLF, federal authorities and Amhara have been sharpened by Abiy’s July 2018 rapprochement with neighbouring Eritrea, which shares a long border with Tigray and fought a devastating war with the TPLF-led government between 1998 and 2000 after achieving independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki, formerly allied with the TPLF, became its archenemy in the 1990s. He has publicly sided with Abiy, blamed Ethiopia’s internal conflicts on the Tigray party and pointedly criticised ethnic federalism, the system the TPLF was key to instituting.[fn]“Game over for ethnic federalism: Isaias”, Ethiopia Insight, 12 February 2020.Hide Footnote  After the détente between the two countries, their main border crossings were opened, but Asmara began closing them before the end of 2018, citing the need to regulate trade and immigration.[fn]“Eritrea closes border crossing to Ethiopians, official and residents say”, Reuters, 28 December 2018.Hide Footnote  An Ethiopian opposition figure with close ties to Asmara said Isaias was aiming to suffocate the already ailing Tigrayan economy.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Ethiopian opposition leader close to Eritrean leadership, London, September 2019.Hide Footnote A senior leader in Mekelle said:

He [Isaias] was looking to sideline the TPLF by allying with the federal government. It was the TPLF factor that brought them [Abiy and Isaias] together, not the peace (deal) we had already decided (to pursue) as the EPRDF.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Mekelle, July 2019.Hide Footnote

Meanwhile, adding to Tigrayan fears of encirclement, Amhara protesters have blocked roads leading south from Tigray to Amhara since at least 2018. Many Tigrayan-registered vehicles, including public transport, now avoid travelling through Amhara for fear of harassment and extortion.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, senior TPLF official, tour operator, December 2019.Hide Footnote

IV. Healing the Rift

The Amhara-Tigray dispute illustrates how Ethiopia’s always contested post-1991 political settlement’s collapse uncorked other dangerous pressures.

With Amhara’s nationalistic politics geared toward redressing perceived inequities and Tigray’s toward protecting its autonomy, there is little imminent prospect of harmonious relations. The problem is exacerbated by jockeying along ethno-regional lines for a greater share of power within federal institutions during a period of flux; the delay of elections due to COVID-19 notwithstanding, forthcoming polls are likely to intensify the competition. The Prosperity Party has replaced a broken coalition but has yet to heal ethno-regional rifts and, in the process, Tigray has become further alienated. Amhara demands for change from a political system they blame for leaving minority Amhara populations stranded and dividing Ethiopians remain unsatisfied.[fn]In Oromia and other regions, there are ethnic Amhara populations who cannot, for example, learn in Amharic, receive court services in Amharic or achieve political representation, as there is a requirement to know the relevant government’s language.
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Resolution of the Amhara-Tigray rivalry is unlikely to occur within months. Still, it should be possible to undertake measures to rebuild a modicum of trust between the regions as part of national political discussions that are needed to help shepherd the country through to delayed elections.[fn]Crisis Group Commentary, “Managing the Politics of Ethiopia’s COVID-19 Crisis, 15 April 2020.
 Hide Footnote

The Amhara-Tigray dispute illustrates how Ethiopia’s always contested post-1991 political settlement’s collapse uncorked other dangerous pressures.

The first step should be to renew formal interactions between segments of the Tigrayan and Amhara elites, such as political, business and religious leaders, as well as academics and journalists. The process began last year but fell to the wayside as Oromo-Amhara tensions escalated.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, participant in the meetings, February 2020. Some worried that Oromo elements could perceive Amhara-Tigray talks as an attempt by northern highlanders to form a common front against ascendant Oromo nationalists. For more on Oromo-Amhara tensions, see Crisis Group Report, Keeping Ethiopia’s Transition on the Rails, op. cit.
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Crisis Group telephone interview, participant in the meetings, February 2020. Some worried that Oromo elements could perceive Amhara-Tigray talks as an attempt by northern highlanders to form a common front against ascendant Oromo nationalists. For more on Oromo-Amhara tensions, see Crisis Group Report, Keeping Ethiopia’s Transition on the Rails, op. cit.

Hide Footnote  Federal officials should press political leaders to engage in regular dialogue about contentious issues, including the fate of the disputed territories and alleged abuses of native Amharic speakers in Tigray. Civil society groups should bring together influential traditional and social media personalities from both sides to discuss these differences and explore more constructive, peaceful ways to pursue their respective agendas. Participants in these talks should urge Amhara factions to leave roads to and from Tigray unobstructed, and Tigrayans and Tigrayan-registered vehicles unmolested when passing through Amhara. They could likewise encourage Tigray and Amhara media outlets to station reporters in Bahir Dar and Mekelle, respectively, to ensure that the other party’s perspective is fairly aired.

The issue of contested territories is the most sensitive, but it cannot be addressed in isolation.[fn]As on the contested Somali-Oromia regional border, referenda are the normal way to address such disputes in Ethiopia’s federal system, but Tigray rejects the Amhara viewpoint that former residents of the disputed areas must be allowed to vote, so there is little prospect of a successful process. Crisis Group telephone interview, senior Tigray official, June 2020.Hide Footnote  The TPLF’s uncompromising position on the matter is, in part, a reflection of Tigrayans’ broader sense of political marginalisation; assuaging their fears would be a way to induce greater flexibility. The Prosperity Party and TPLF ought to repurpose their joint committee toward that end. The TPLF – as the founder and pre-eminent party in the EPRDF throughout its quarter-century in power – could apologise for its officials’ role in overseeing past repression and pledge to cooperate in both the political transition and the Eritrea peace process. In turn, the Prosperity Party could agree to a fair representation of Tigrayan officials within federal institutions, even if the regional ruling party does not participate in the national governing coalition. The federal government could also do more to ease prosecutions of some former Tigrayan officials by instead addressing allegations against them as part of a national reconciliation process that needs revitalising.[fn]“Ethiopia’s Experiment in Reconciliation”, U.S. Institute of Peace, 23 September 2019.Hide Footnote

Such confidence-building measures could make it likelier for the TPLF to enter discussions with Amhara and reach compromises on the question of disputed territories. Once the parties get to the table, as part of reciprocal moves, Tigray’s leaders should reassure Amhara that they will not pursue secession. For their part, the Amhara could shift their campaign concerning the disputed areas away from irredentist narratives. Instead, they could press for political representation and language rights for those minorities within Tigray, which the TPLF has already promised for pockets of native Amharic speakers in Waja in South Tigray Zone and Tsegede district in the west.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, North West Tigray Zone official and TPLF politburo member, May 2020. The latter said granting minority rights was “long overdue”.Hide Footnote  Similar action could be taken by authorities in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, where Amhara have similar concerns. A top adviser to Amhara’s president said in May that pursuing minority rights could be fruitful:

Amhara people do not insist on the return of territory into this region as such. … The general population’s issue is not territorial occupation but the people who are Amharic-speaking and Amhara who are forced to speak Tigrinya, forced into Tigrinya schools, deprived of identity. That is what has exacerbated the problem.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, May 2020.Hide Footnote

The national boundary commission could facilitate this dialogue by providing the parties with information on the disputed territories’ current and former demographics. Rather than Tigray simply rejecting the commission as unconstitutional, it could call for the body to focus on assessing the territories’ demography and detailing the views of current and former residents. Since Tigray does not trust the commission as it is currently set up, it could also request that the body report solely to the House of Federation, parliament’s upper chamber, and not to the prime minister. Federal authorities should agree to these requests if they are made, which would leave Tigray with no reason not to cooperate with it. If it embraced this work, the commission would also help reassure disgruntled Amhara activists and officials that it can still perform a useful role.

V. Conclusion

Leading Ethiopian officials worry that rivalry between the two regions could spark wider confrontation. While violence so far has been fairly confined, omens are troubling.

Although the constitutional debate surrounding delayed elections has taken centre stage, the thorny Amhara-Tigray dispute remains a major political challenge. Leading Ethiopian officials worry that rivalry between the two regions could spark wider confrontation. While violence so far has been fairly confined, omens are troubling. Broader escalation is possible, especially in advance of elections, when Amhara nationalists jockey for power, the TPLF continues to defy central authority and Tigrayan hardliners flirt with secessionism. The fallout could be dangerous, opening fault lines far from the Amhara-Tigray border and, perhaps, undermining the national army’s cohesion. Tensions could also affect the progress of Ethiopia’s rapprochement with Eritrea. Full resolution of the Amhara-Tigray dispute is unlikely in the short term, but leaders at the federal and regional levels should seek to make the most of opportunities for de-escalation. The alternative is to let burn a fire that, at some point, could become a major conflagration.