Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak Akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal
Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak Akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 26 / Asia

Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak Akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal

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RANGKUMAN IKHTISAR

Hampir selama 50 tahun terakhir Aceh memberontak terhadap kegagalan serentetan pemerintahan Indonesia untuk mengakui aspirasi politik dan ekonomi rakyat Aceh. Asal-usul sejarah dan belahan- belahan sosial bangsa Aceh yang khas tidak pernah tercermin dalam struktur politik daerah tersebut,  dan hak ekonomi mereka telah didistorsi oleh pengendalian terhadap pengembangan dan pemanfaatan sumberdaya yang terpusat di Jakarta. Tanggapan militer yang tidak terkendali terhadap perlawanan, terutama sejak akhir dasawarsa 1970an, juga telah menimbulkan sakit hati pada banyak orang Aceh serta memperdalam rasa diperlakukan tidak adil oleh pemerintah pusat. Ketika Orde Baru pimpinan Soeharto runtuh, rasa frustrasi mereka diekspresikan melalui tuntutan akuntabilitas atas kejahatan- kejahatan yang dilakukan dimasa lalu, melalui tuntutan untuk otonomi yang lebih besar, dan melalui tuntutan yang kian tumbuh untuk kemerdekaan. Ini semua dibarengi gelombang perlawanan bersenjata ketika Jakarta gagal meraih peluang yang timbul sekilas untuk menyelesaikan konflik.

Rencana berbutir enam yang diumumkan pemerintahan Wahid pada tanggal 11 April 2001 dibalut dalam bahasa yang menawarkan solusi komprehensif menyangkut langkah-langkah politik, ekonomi dan sosial, akan tetapi dampaknya tidak akan terasa sementara 80 persen propinsi tersebut secara efektif berada diluar kendali pemerintah. Memperoleh kembali kendali membutuhkan operasi keamanan yang berhasil atau kesepakatan perdamaian dengan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM).1 Peningkatan operasi keamanan bisa memulihkan kendali pemerintah atas areal yang luas dan memberi pukulan yang keras terhadap sayap bersenjata GAM (AGAM)2 akan tetapi masih akan tertinggal suatu pasukan belakang yang alot,  dan sementara  itu rakyat Aceh menjadi semakin terpojok.

Solusi militer akan gagal sepanjang pasukan keamanan tidak dapat mengendalikan diri untuk mencegah perilaku yang memusuhi orang Aceh biasa. Masih banyak digunakan praktek-praktek masa otoriter lalu. Kadang kala sistim intelijen seperti dipengaruhi agenda tersembunyi yang sumbernya internal maupun eksternal. Tindakan brutal dan pembalasan terhadap orang sipil yang tidak bersenjata dan harta benda mereka kebanyakan berlalu tanpa ada sangsi hukuman. Kecuali pada dua kasus yang meragukan, tidak terlihat tanda-tanda bahwa mereka yang bertanggung jawab atas pelanggaran hak asasi manusia telah, atau akan, dihadapkan ke pengadilan.

Kegagalan menerapkan disiplin dan kendali, sebagian bersumber dari kenyataan bahwa hanya 25 persen dari anggaran keamanan disediakan oleh negara. Artinya baik pasukan militer maupun polisi yang bertugas dilapangan, di Aceh atau tempat lain, harus melakukan berbagai kegiatan yang legal maupun ilegal untuk mendanai kebutuhan operasi dan pribadi lainnya. Penjarahan terhadap ekonomi tersebut dimungkinkan dengan menggunakan atau ancaman menggunakan kekerasan.

Ada petunjuk bahwa TNI, terutama angkatan darat, mengambil manfaat dari konflik berkepanjangan di Aceh sekalipun bukan merupakan hasil kebijakan eksplisit. Pertempuran yang berkepanjangan di Aceh memberi peluang bagi TNI untuk memerankan diri sebagai satu-satunya kekuatan yang mampu mencegah disintegrasi Indonesia, dan oleh karenanya pengaruh politiknya dapat dipertahankan.  Upaya angkatan darat untuk merebut kembali wewenang atas keamanan dalam negeri dari polisi dengan demikian juga tertolong, yang pada gilirannya memberi justifikasi untuk mempertahankan sistim  teritorial angkatan darat yang merupakan sumber pendanaan diluar pemerintah. Pengaruh politik membantu TNI untuk mempertahankan kemandirian lembaganya dan menggagalkan usaha menyeret perwira tingginya ke pengadilan atas pelanggaran-pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di masa lalu.

Presiden Wahid telah berhasil menangkis tekanan untuk mengumumkan keadaan darurat, akan tetapi ia telah mengesahkan pembentukan sebuah komando operasional dibawah pimpinan polisi serta pengiriman bantuan pasukan angkatan darat. Dengan keadaan saat ini penambahan pasukan serta perluasan operasi yang tersamar sebagai upaya pemulihan ketertiban dan hukum tidak urung akan berakibat pada penjarahan yang lebih banyak lagi dan menghalangi tujuan merebut hati dan pikiran rakyat Aceh, apalagi penyelesaian permasalahan politik yang mendasar.

Strategi yang lebih tepat digunakan adalah dengan mempertahankan status quo sementara rundingan berjalan untuk menangggulangi rintangan substantif terhadap perdamaian. Yang  menjadi  masalah pokok dalam rundingan ini adalah seberapa jauh Jakarta akan memberi otonomi yang luas kepada Aceh. Sementara itu, agar upaya-upaya tidak digagalkan oleh tindakan yang salah kaprah dilapangan di Aceh, dibutuhkan langkah pengendalian yang efektif baik dari pemerintah maupun dari pasukan keamanan.

Apabila pemerintah Indonesia bersedia memberi konsesi yang wajar atas otonomi daerah, maka komunitas dunia dapat berperan dalam menerangkan kepada pimpinan GAM diluar negeri dan di Aceh mengenai keuntungan dan kerugian berbagai opsi, dalam rangka membantu perundingan dan memantau tercapainya penyelesaian. Indonesia tidak mungkin menerima kehadiran pasukan perdamaian, dan jaminan terbaik bagi suatu penyelesaian yang kekal adalah berhasilnya peralihan kearah demokrasi di negara ini.

Laporan ini terutama membahas mengapa penggunaan operasi militer untuk mencapai penyelesaian tidak mungkin menghasilkan perdamaian kekal. Laporan berikutnya akan meneliti usulan-usulan bagi otonomi dan prospeknya untuk diterima sebagai alternatif kemerdekaan.

Jakarta/Brussels, 12 Juni 2001

I. Overview

In June 2001, ICG wrote of the situation in Aceh: “The military solution is certain to fail as long as the security forces are incapable of exercising the degree of control and discipline over their troops necessary to prevent behaviour that alienates ordinary Acehnese”[fn]ICG Asia Report N°17, Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, 12 June 2001.Hide Footnote

As the 12 May 2003 deadline set by the Indonesian government for the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) to accept Indonesian sovereignty or face all-out war draws closer, nothing has changed. Military reform has stalled over the last two years, and there is no reason to believe that the planned offensive will be conducted any more carefully than those in the past. It will only be bigger. The Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) is not using the phrase “shock and awe”, but the stream of reports on the number of troops, tanks, and weapons being prepared for Aceh is designed to have the same effect.

At the same time, the insurgency in Aceh poses a genuine security threat, and the Indonesian government’s options are limited. This briefing explores some of those options and suggests that if an offensive cannot be prevented, opportunities for resumption of negotiations should at least be continuously explored and all possible effort made to ensure that military operations are kept as limited, as transparent, and as short as possible. The move toward war in Aceh also underscores the urgent need for military reform to get back on track, and for domestic and international pressure to be exerted toward that end.

Jakarta/Brussels, 9 May 2003

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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