Op-Ed / Middle East & North Africa 2 March 2015 Missing the point on Iran’s nuclear breakout time Originally published in Al Jazeera America Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print One reason for the urgency behind Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial speech to Congress on Tuesday is the fact that a nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers is reportedly taking shape in Switzerland. The parameters of the agreement under discussion — and, indeed, of any deal that can plausibly be reached right now —will leave Iran with infrastructure that could potentially be repurposed toward weaponization. So, the key metric by which the U.S. Congress will judge any agreement will be breakout time, the minimum period required for Iran, using that infrastructure, to produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. That would be enough for a single bomb, should Tehran decide to build one. The timescale for Iran to produce a bomb’s worth of fissile material is an appealingly simple criterion in light of the technical complexity of the negotiations. But it’s also a deceptively simple one. Five common misperceptions make breakout time a misleading gauge of the potential threat: Misperception No. 1: Breakout time measures the time needed to build a nuclear weapon Not really. Breakout time measures the time needed to produce fissile material for a bomb, not the bomb itself. After enriching enough weapons-grade uranium hexafluoride gas, Iran would have to turn the gas into powder form, convert the powder into a metallic core, assemble explosives around the core and finally integrate a miniaturized weapons package into the nose cone of a missile. Those steps would require a further 6 to 18 months after creating the fissile material, depending on how far Iran progressed in its alleged weaponization research that U.S. intelligence concluded had been shelved in 2003. Even if Iran got everything right on a first attempt, it would still need to test its bomb — as every nuclear-armed country has done — which would require more than one device and lengthen the time frame. (See Misperception No. 2.) Misperception No. 2: Breakout time is measurable Far from it; breakout time is estimated rather than calculated. Different experts using the same numbers come up with different time frames, even among the countries negotiating with Iran. They differ on assessments of average centrifuge efficiency and the time required to chemically covert uranium into feedstock, reconfigure centrifuge cascades and recycle waste. Breakout estimates, moreover, usually assume that an Iranian dash for the bomb would face none of the technical challenges that have plagued the program over the past decade. More importantly, the breakout capacity measure ignores the reality that a single bomb does not make a nuclear deterrent. Assuming that Tehran would at minimum need two bombs’ worth of material in order to test one, the breakout time estimate doubles; assuming that Iran, like other nuclear-armed countries, would want a small arsenal, the time frame increases several times over. Finally, while the number of centrifuges attracts disproportionate congressional attention, it is only one factor in the complex equation that determines breakout time. Other elements include the type and efficiency of centrifuges, the configuration of interconnected machines, the level of enrichment and the amount of stockpiled enriched material. And some of these elements are inversely correlated. Misperception No. 3: Breaking out is Iran’s most likely path to weaponization That’s a misguided assumption. The U.S. intelligence community has long concluded that Iran will not, in fact, use the intrusively monitored nuclear facilities under discussion in the current talks to pursue a nuclear weapon. Washington believes that should Iran decide to build nuclear weapons, it would be more likely to try to “sneak out” in a clandestine facility. Over the past three decades, this has been the route chosen by virtually every country dreaming of nuclear weapons, including North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Romania, with varying degrees of success. Both Iranian enrichment facilities, in Natanz and Fordow, were built covertly and declared only after being exposed by Western intelligence agencies. Fixation on a possible breakout distracts from the greater risk of a sneak-out and therefore from the two main safeguards for preventing one: transparency and monitoring. Misperception No. 4: A shorter breakout time reduces Washington’s ability to prevent an Iranian sprint to nuclear weapons Incorrect. Under all conceivable agreements — and even under the status quo inspection regime — the discovery of any trace of uranium enriched beyond civilian-grade would trigger an alarm. Skeptics counter that such evidence would likely be ambiguous and require time-consuming analysis, which combined with the West’s aversion to confrontation may prevent the mobilization of forceful action in time. But the scale of enrichment activity required to produce bomb material would require a brazen breakout, significantly increasing the prospects for speedy detection under a watchful monitoring regime. Such evidence would prompt and in the eyes of world powers legitimize a firm response, for which the U.S. and Israel probably already have extensive contingency plans. Given the extensive long-term U.S. deployments in the Persian Gulf, air strikes could be launched — with or without international blessing — in a matter of days. And that capacity to strike means there’s little practical difference between six, 12 or 24 months of breakout time. Misperception No. 5: If the breakout time is short enough, Iran will dash to build a bomb This idea is not supported by the factual track record. Iran’s nominal breakout time over the past four years has, in fact, been less than six months but that did not prompt weaponization. Now it’s negotiating a deal that would extend the breakout time, by the same measures, to one year and subjects it to enhanced monitoring. Since 2007, the U.S. intelligence community has consistently assessed Iran to have the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so, but that no such political decision had been taken. In addition, U.S. National Intelligence Estimates have concluded that Iranian leaders’ decisions on whether to build nuclear weapons will be based on their perception of their threat environment and on a cost-benefit analysis. If leaders in Tehran believe that their survival requires the ultimate deterrent, they would likely be willing to endure even more punishing sanctions to acquire the bomb. Beyond technical parameters of a nuclear deal, the question facing Western powers is how to shape Tehran’s perception of its threat environment. By that logic, pursuing a more expansive engagement with Iran on economic, political and security questions may become even more important than lengthening breakout time. Related Tags Iran More for you Interactive / Middle East & North Africa Rough Seas: Tracking Maritime Tensions with Iran Video / Middle East & North Africa Iran Nuclear Talks: Close the Deal Up Next Open Letter / Middle East & North Africa Open Letter to the U.S. and Iranian Leadership about the Iran Nuclear Deal
Open Letter / Middle East & North Africa 26 April 2022 Open Letter to the U.S. and Iranian Leadership about the Iran Nuclear Deal Negotiating parties are now within touching distance of reinstating the JCPOA, but a period of stasis threatens to undo the progress made. In this open letter, over 40 former top European officials urge the U.S. and Iranian leadership to see the negotiations through to a successful outcome. Share Facebook Twitter Email Save Print Download PDF Full Report (en) This open letter has been signed by members of the European Leadership Network, Board members of the International Crisis Group and Council members from the European Council on Foreign Relations. We write to express our growing concern that negotiations to restore Iranian compliance with, and U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) appear to have entered a period of stasis that threatens to undo the real and welcome progress made in recent months toward reinstating a non-proliferation achievement that is crucial for international peace and security. At a time when transatlantic cooperation has become all the more critical to respond against Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, for U.S. and European leaders to let slip the opportunity to defuse a nuclear crisis in the Middle East would be a grave mistake. The JCPOA was a success. Persistent multilateral diplomacy, in which several of the undersigned were personally engaged, secured an agreement that advanced our shared non-proliferation goals. Preserving the benefits of a deal limiting Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, capping its levels of enrichment and extending the timeline for the accumulation of fissile material that could be used for a potential weapon, all under the watchful eyes of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is the reason why European governments rejected the Trump administration’s reckless decision to abandon the deal without a viable alternative and have worked hard to keep the deal alive following the 2018 U.S. withdrawal. The strategy that the U.S. followed for more than two years after this withdrawal, based on “maximum pressure” alone, yielded little but nuclear escalation, dangerous regional sparring and economic deprivation for the Iranian people. The legacy of this strategic error can today be measured in the tons of enriched uranium Iran has since accumulated, including uranium enriched to near weapons-grade; in the thousands of advanced centrifuges it is spinning; and in the rapidly dwindling timeframe for Iran to reach a breakout capability. President Biden rightly identified a mutual return, by the U.S. and Iran, to their respective commitments under the 2015 deal as a necessary course correction. Since April 2021, negotiations in Vienna have painstakingly but productively forged a draft document that will reverse Iran’s nuclear advances, in return for relief from U.S. sanctions imposed during the Trump administration that are inconsistent with the JCPOA. As the EU’s Josep Borrell put it over a month ago, “a final text is essentially ready and on the table”. There are two possible scenarios ahead. In one, the U.S. swiftly shows decisive leadership and requisite flexibility to resolve remaining issues of political (not nuclear) disagreement with Tehran. In the other, the parties enter a state of corrosive stalemate, serving neither side’s interests, that risks devolving into a cycle of increased nuclear tension, inevitably countered by the further application of coercive tools. We know that the politics of this issue are difficult, particularly on issues like the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which is reportedly the last lingering issue of contention. While the details are of course for U.S. policymakers to determine, we believe that there are ways to provide the counter-terrorism benefits of the current designation while still accommodating Iran's specific request, and consider it imperative that these be fully explored. For its part, Iran should not expect a nuclear deal to address broader areas of disagreement between Tehran and Washington. Both sides must approach this final phase of negotiation with an understanding that the strategic implications of failure would be grave and profound. Based on our long experience in diplomacy and statecraft, we see a deal as eminently possible. Having come within touching distance, we urge President Biden and the Iranian leadership to demonstrate flexibility in tackling an issue of vital significance to the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability, and see these negotiations through to a successful conclusion. Signatories: Czech Republic Jan Kavan, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, former President of the UNGA, and Chairman of the Board, Czech-Slovak-Iranian Chamber of Commerce (CSIOK) Denmark Mogens Lykketoft, former Foreign Minister and President of the UN 70th General Assembly France Gérard Araud, former Permanent Representative of France to the UN, former Director-General for Political and Security Affairs Michel Duclos, former Ambassador and Special Advisor, Institut Montaigne (Paris) Jean-David Levitte, former Permanent Representative of France to the UN Général d’armée aérienne (ret) Bernard Norlain, former Commander of Air Defence Command and Air Combat Command Germany Wolfgang Ischinger, former Ambassador and Chairman of the Munich Security Conference Joschka Fischer, former Foreign Minister and former Vice-Chancellor Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Karsten D. Voigt, former Chairman of the German-Russian parliamentary group in the Bundestag and former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly General (ret) Klaus Naumann, former Chief of Defence Germany and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Hungary Balázs Csuday, former Permanent Representative of Hungary to the UN (Vienna) Italy Giancarlo Aragona, former Ambassador and former Secretary-General of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) General (ret) Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Defence General Staff Admiral (ret) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence Dr Nathalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and former Special Advisor to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell Stefano Stefanini, former Ambassador and Executive Board of the European Leadership Network Carlo Trezza, former Ambassador for Disarmament and non-proliferation, Chairman of MTCR and UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Affairs Lithuania Vygaudas Usackas, former Foreign Minister and former EU Ambassador to Russia and Afghanistan Netherlands Prof Klaas de Vries, former Minister of Home Affairs Norway Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister and former Director-General of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Deputy Chair of The Elders Poland Bogdan Klich, former Minister of National Defence Andrzej Olechowski, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Prof Adam D. Rotfeld, Warsaw University and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Serbia Goran Svilanović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and former Secretary-General of the Regional Cooperation Council Spain Javier Solana, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and former NATO Secretary-General Sweden Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and former Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Hans Blix, former Foreign Minister and former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rolf Ekéus, former Chairman of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, and former Ambassador of Sweden to the United States Turkey Hikmet Çetin, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Vahit Erdem, former Under Secretary of the Defence Industry and former Vice President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Ahmet Üzümcü, former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO and former Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Tacan Ildem, former Assistant Secretary-General, NATO and former Ambassador United Kingdom The Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth, former Defence Secretary Sir Tony Brenton, former Ambassador to the Russian Federation Lord (Des) Browne of Ladyton, former Defence Secretary and Chairman of the European Leadership Network The Rt Hon Alistair Burt, former Minister of State for the Middle East at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Lord (David) Hannay of Chiswick, former Ambassador to the EU and to the UN The Rt. Hon Baroness (Pauline) Neville-Jones, former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism Sir Nick Harvey, former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for the Armed Forces Lord (John) Kerr of Kinlochard, Independent member of the House of Lords Lord (Tom) King of Bridgwater, former Defence Secretary Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown, President, Open Society Foundations, and former UN Deputy Secretary-General Madeleine Moon, former Member of Parliament and former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly General the Lord (David) Ramsbotham, retired British Army officer, former Adjutant General and ADC General to Her Majesty the Queen The Rt Hon Jack Straw, former Foreign Secretary The Rt Hon Lord (David) Triesman, former Parliamentary Under Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and former General Secretary of the Labour Party Related Tags Multilateral Diplomacy Iran United States