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Yemen’s Terrible War Is About to Get Worse
Yemen’s Terrible War Is About to Get Worse
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union

Yemen’s Terrible War Is About to Get Worse

Originally published in Foreign Policy

The bombing of a funeral has empowered the country's worst forces and could drag America into the fray.

On Saturday, Oct. 8, an airstrike from the Saudi-led coalition ripped through a crowded funeral in the heart of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. At least 140 mourners were killed and more than 500 injured. The unprecedented strike has killed peacemakers, empowered militants, and fueled the desire for revenge, making the prospects for peace in this conflict ever dimmer.

Yemenis are no strangers to horrific attacks on civilians. After 18 months of war, both the U.S.-supported, Saudi-led coalition and its adversaries, a combination of Houthi rebels and fighters loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, stand accused of flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, perpetrated seemingly without consequence. The United Nations estimates the war has claimed more than 10,000 lives, including 4,000 civilians, with the majority of deaths caused by coalition airstrikes. Yet this strike stands out.

The attack is likely the single-most costly strike, in terms of civilian casualties, during the course of the war. While other violations have been shrouded in a fog of war, this one happened in the capital at a well-known landmark, reducing the chances of deniability or ambiguity about its legitimacy as a target. Many killed in the community hall were among the country’s political, tribal, and military elite, and their deaths have had significant political and social repercussions. It was also a clear violation of traditional norms that protect the sanctity of funerals, even between bitter enemies and warring parties.

As shock and sadness engulfs Sanaa, some Yemenis are hoping against all odds that the event could serve as a spur for a peace agreement. But this hope is likely misplaced. The bombing killed a number of important political and military personalities supporting a peace deal, among them the mayor of Sanaa, two Yemeni members of the U.N. cease-fire monitoring team, and a general expected to play an important post-conflict security role. Their deaths empower hard-liners over peacemakers while undercutting capacity to implement any future accord.

Yes, the carnage has drawn international condemnation from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has called for an international investigation. It also pushed the U.S. government, which has sold Saudi Arabia approximately $22.2 billion in weapons since the war began, to launch a review of its support to the coalition.

But it is not clear what impact, if any, these statements will have. The U.N. has thus far been a helpless bystander, unable to broker peace or even secure an independent investigation into violations of international humanitarian law by both sides. The United States and Britain, both coalition supporters and arms suppliers, have repeatedly demonstrated a high level of tolerance for potential war crimes by their allies. It is unclear what red lines they have.

The U.N. has thus far been a helpless bystander

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the country is poised to spiral further into chaos. Since U.N. peace talks collapsed in August, both sides have engaged in a series of tit-for-tat escalations. Houthi fighters, along with those loyal to Saleh, have increased cross-border rocket attacks and raids into Saudi territory. On Oct. 1, they attacked an Emirati vessel in the Red Sea off the coast of Mokha, approximately 50 miles north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which millions of barrels of oil pass daily. The Saudi-backed government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, meanwhile, moved to put the financial squeeze on his opponents by announcing it would move the Central Bank of Yemen from rebel-controlled Sanaa to the government’s temporary capital in Aden. Only days before the funeral attack, Hadi-aligned forces launched a major military offensive northeast of Sanaa, at which their highest-ranking military commander to date was killed.

Now the funeral attack will likely produce an even more significant military escalation by Houthi forces along the Yemeni-Saudi border. This, in turn, will confirm Riyadh’s worst fears and secure U.S. support in defense of Saudi territorial integrity. Already Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and Saleh have issued impassioned calls for mobilization along the border — a call that is being met by enraged tribesmen throughout the north. Their forces have already fired two ballistic missiles — one toward Saudi Arabia’s Jizan province and the other, for the first time, deep into the kingdom, toward the city of Taif in Mecca province. It remains to be seen if they have the ability to make good on their threats to push into Saudi territory, especially into Jizan, Asir, and Najran provinces, mostly mountainous areas that many Yemenis consider part of historic Yemen.

The growing violence may endanger American lives as well.

The growing violence may endanger American lives as well. On Oct. 9, the U.S. military reported two missiles were fired at the guided-missile destroyer USS Masonfrom Houthi-controlled territory just north of Bab el-Mandeb. U.S. official claimed that the USS Mason was targeted again in a failed missile attack on Oct. 12. The Houthis denied the Oct. 9 strike, and the United States has yet to confirm their responsibility, but if confirmed, it constitutes a major escalation near the strategic strait.

The anger and hostility directed toward the Saudi-led coalition in the aftermath of the funeral hall strike will make it harder to contain the regional rivalries unleashed across the Middle East and to convince Yemen’s domestic parties to reach a negotiated settlement. Indeed, the premonitions of Abdul-Qader Hilal, the Sanaa mayor who was killed in Saturday’s attack, are ones that deserve our attention now.

Two and a half years ago, I sat with Hilal in his home on the outskirts of Sanaa as he received rounds of Salafi, tribal, and Houthi mediators in an attempt to solidify a truce between warring factions in Yemen’s north. A politician with connections to all sides of the country’s complicated political and tribal mosaic, he predicted a conflagration if violence in the north was not contained by integrating the Houthis into the political system. When the military tide was unleashed, he warned, it would be hard to stop. “If the Houthis take Amran [a city north of Sanaa], they will take Sanaa,” he said. “If they take Sanaa, we will be talking about [stability in] Riyadh a year later.”

At the time, his concerns seemed inflated, even outlandish. In light of recent developments, they appear ever more prescient.

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union

Despite suffering significant blows in Syria and Iraq, jihadist movements across the Middle East, North Africa and Lake Chad regions continue to pose significant challenges. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2017 – First Update early-warning report for European policy makers, Crisis Group urges the European Union and its member states to prioritise conflict prevention at the heart of their counter-terrorism policy and continue investment in vulnerable states.

This commentary is part of our Watch List 2017 – First Update.

Over the past few months, military operations have eaten deep into the Iraqi and Syrian heartlands of the Islamic State (ISIS). Much of Mosul, the group’s last urban stronghold in Iraq, has been recaptured; Raqqa, its capital in Syria, is encircled. Its Libyan branch, with closest ties to the Iraqi leadership, has been ousted from the Mediterranean coastal strip it once held. Boko Haram, whose leaders pledged allegiance to ISIS, menaces the African states around Lake Chad but has split and lost much of the territory it held a year ago. Though smaller branches exist from the Sinai to Yemen and Somalia, the movement has struggled to make major inroads or hold territory elsewhere.

ISIS’s decisive defeat remains a remote prospect while the Syrian war rages and Sunnis’ place in Iraqi politics is uncertain. It will adapt and the threat it poses will evolve. But it is on the backfoot, its brand diminished. For many adherents, its allure was its self-proclaimed caliphate and territorial expansion. With those in decline, its leaders are struggling to redefine success. Fewer local groups are signing up. Fewer foreigners are travelling to join; the main danger they represent now is their return to countries of origin or escape elsewhere.

Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, is increasingly potent. It, too, has evolved. Its affiliates, particularly its Sahel, Somalia, Syria and Yemen branches, are more influential than the leadership in South Asia. Osama bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, inspires loyalty and offers guidance but has little say in daily operations. Al-Qaeda’s strategy – embedding within popular uprisings, allying with other armed groups and displaying pragmatism and sensitivity to local norms – may make it a more durable threat than ISIS. Its strategy also means that affiliates’ identities are more local than transnational, a shift that has sparked debate among jihadists. Although Western intelligence officials assert that cells within affiliates plot against the West, for the most part they fight locally and have recruited large numbers of fighters motivated by diverse local concerns.

U.S. national security policy looks set to change too. Much about new President Donald Trump’s approach remains uncertain, but aggressive counter-terrorism operations for now dominate his administration’s policy across the Muslim world. Protecting U.S. citizens from groups that want to kill them must, of course, be an imperative for American leaders. But since the 9/11 attacks a decade and a half ago, too narrow a focus on counter-terrorism has often distorted U.S. policy and at times made the problem worse.

The roots of ISIS’s rise and al-Qaeda’s resurgence are complex and varied. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country ... though war and state collapse are huge boons for both movements.

Some early signs are troubling. Past months have seen a spike in civilian casualties resulting from U.S. drone and other airstrikes. The degree to which the administration will factor in the potential geopolitical fallout of operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda is unclear. U.S. allies could misuse counter-terrorism support against rivals and deepen chaos in the region. Nor it is clear that the U.S. will invest in diplomacy to either end the wars from which jihadists profit or nudge regional leaders toward reforms that can avert further crises. The new administration may also escalate against Iran while fighting jihadists, creating an unnecessary and dangerous distraction.

Though the influence of European leaders and the European Union (EU) on Arab politics and U.S. counter-terrorism policy has limits, they are likely to be asked to bankroll reconstruction efforts across affected regions. They could use this leverage to:

  1. Promote a judicious and legal use of force: Campaigns against jihadists hinge on winning over the population in which they operate. “Targeted” strikes that kill civilians and alienate communities are counterproductive, regardless of immediate yield. Indiscriminate military action can play into extremists’ hands or leave communities caught between their harsh rule and brutal operations against them. European leaders should press for tactical restraint and respect for international humanitarian law, which conflict parties of all stripes increasingly have abandoned.
     
  2. Promote plans for the day after military operations: Offensives against Mosul, Raqqa or elsewhere need plans to preserve military gains, prevent reprisals and stabilise liberated cities. As yet, no such plan for Raqqa seems to exist – it would need to involve local Sunni forces providing security, at least inside the city. As operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda linked groups escalate, the EU could seek clarity on what comes next and how operations fit into a wider political strategy.
     
  3. Identify counter-terrorism’s geopolitical side effects: The fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda intersects a tinderbox of wars and regional rivalries. Frank discussion of the potential consequences of military operations could reduce risks that they provoke a wider escalation. The Raqqa campaign, for example, should seek to avoid stimulating fighting elsewhere among Turkish and Kurdish forces and their respective allies. Success in Mosul hinges on preventing the forces involved battling for territory after they have ousted ISIS. European powers’ own counter-terrorism support should not result in allies being more resistant to compromise.
     
  4. Reinforce diplomatic efforts to end crises: From Libya to Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, no country where ISIS or al-Qaeda branches hold territory has a single force strong enough to secure the whole country. Unless the main non-jihadist armed factions in each country can arrive at some form of political accommodation among each other, there is a risk they either ally with jihadists against rivals or misuse counter-terrorism support for other ends. European powers should step up support for UN-led diplomacy if the U.S. neglects such efforts.
     
  5. Protect space for political engagement: Over recent years, as jihadists have gathered force on today’s battlefields, Western powers have tended to draw a line between groups they see as beyond the pale and those whom they envisage as part of settlements. The EU should keep the door open to engagement with all conflict parties – whether to secure humanitarian access or reduce violence. It should be made clear to groups on the wrong side of the line how they eventually can cross it. Al-Qaeda affiliates’ increasingly local focus makes this all the more vital.

  6. Warn against confronting Iran: Such a confrontation would be perilous. Militarily battling Tehran in Iraq, Yemen or Syria, questioning the nuclear deal’s validity or imposing sanctions that flout its spirit could provoke asymmetric responses via non-state allies. Iran’s behaviour across the region is often destabilising and reinforces the sectarian currents that buoy jihadists. But the answer lies in dampening the rivalry between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, not stimulating it, with the attendant risk of escalating proxy wars. This will mean resuming a tough but professional senior-level U.S.-Iranian channel of communication, something the U.S. administration seems reluctant to do but that Europe could encourage. And, for the EU and its members states (notably France, Germany and the UK), it means clearly signalling to the U.S. administration that any step to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – in the absence of an Iranian violation of the deal – will leave Washington isolated and unable to recreate an international consensus to sanction Iran.

The roots of ISIS’s rise and al-Qaeda’s resurgence are complex and varied. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village and individual to individual. Clearly, though, war and state collapse are huge boons for both movements. Both groups have grown less because their ideology inspires wide appeal than by offering protection or firepower against enemies, or rough law and order where no one else can; or by occupying a power vacuum and forcing communities to acquiesce. Rarely can either group recruit large numbers or seize territory outside a war zone. The EU’s investment in peacebuilding and shoring up vulnerable states is, therefore, among its most valuable contributions against jihadists. European leaders must do everything within their power to disrupt attacks, but they should also put conflict prevention at the centre of their counter-terrorism policy.