13 people, taken under custody for their suspected links to the terrorist organization Daesh, are sent to court beside an accused, captured in an operation carried out by Turkish National Intelligence and Provincial Security Directorate, in Mersin, Turkey Sezgin Pancar Anadolu Agency via AFP Chronology 29 June 2020 A Timeline of ISIS Attacks in Turkey and Corresponding Court Cases This timeline was published as an appendix to a Crisis Group report on Turkey's ISIS returnees Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print 20.03.2014 Target: State Event: Niğde; three ISIS militants, who reportedly were travelling to Istanbul from Hatay, opened fire on a Turkish gendarmerie patrol that tried to stop their car. Fatalities: Two state security force members, one civilian (Turkish citizen) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Three people (all foreign nationals) were convicted on 15 June 2016. Benyamin Xu (German national), Çendrim Ramadani (Swiss national) and Muhammed Zakiri (Macedonian national) were all sentenced to life imprisonment. View More 06.01.2015 Target: State Event: Istanbul, Sultanahmet; a suicide attack hit a police station in Istanbul’s historical Sultanahmet district. Diana Ramazova, a Russian citizen reportedly from Dagestan, committed the suicide attack. Fatalities: One state security force member Accused/convicted perpetrators: According to news reports dated 14 April 2016, two of the five foreign national arrestees were released pending trial: Abdula Abdulaev (Azerbaijani national) and Yakup İbragimov (Russian national). Both are charged with human trafficking and membership in a terrorist organisation. No further information was reported. View More 05.06.2015 Target: Kurdish movement and/or left-leaning opposition Event: Diyarbakır; a bombing took place 48 hours before the June 2015 general election, two separate bombs were detonated at a pro-Kurdish HDP electoral rally in Diyarbakır. Fatalities: Four civilians (all Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Five Turkish citizens (Mustafa Kılınç, İsmail Korkmaz, Orhan Gönder, Burhan Gök, İlhami Balı) are tried on charges of attempting to abolish the constitutional order, murder, attempted murder and unauthorised possession of hazardous materials. Orhan Gönder, Mustafa Kılınç and İsmail Korkmaz were sentenced to a total of 3,336 years of imprisonment on charges of “attempting to intentionally kill 104 people” and “injuring 112 others”. Meanwhile, Burhan Gök, who had been apprehended together with Brussels-bomber İbrahim el-Bakraoui in a park in Gaziantep in June 2015 (he was on trial without arrest) was acquitted of all crimes by majority vote. The fugitive defendant, İlhami Balı will be considered as part of a separate case. View More 20.07.2015 Target: Kurdish movement and/or left-leaning opposition Event: Şanlıurfa, Suruç; a suicide attack hit a municipal cultural centre killing 33 mostly pro-Kurdish youth activists as they were making a press statement before their planned visit to the Syrian border town of Kobani to aid reconstruction and help civilians. Abdurrahman Alagöz, a Turkish citizen returnee, reportedly committed the suicide attack. He was the brother of Yunus Emre Alagöz, who in October 2015 would be one of the suicide bombers in the ISIS attack in Ankara (see item 6 below). Fatalities: 33 civilians (mostly pro-Kurdish movement youth activists) Accused/convicted perpetrators: One Turkish citizen, Yakub Şahin, remains under arrest in this ongoing case. Even if he is not convicted in this case, Şahin will serve a life sentence for his involvement in the 10 October Ankara railway station bombing case (see item 6). Two Turkish citizen fugitives (İlhami Balı and Deniz Büyükçelebi) are also charged in this case. View More 23.07.2015 Target: State Event: Kilis, Elbeyli; ISIS militants conducted a cross-border shooting attack targeting a Turkish border outpost in Kilis, killing one soldier. Fatalities: One state security force member Accused/convicted perpetrators: One of the alleged assailants was killed by the security forces returning fire. The other four reported attackers escaped. View More 10.10.2015 Target: Kurdish movement and/or left-leaning opposition Event: Ankara; a twin suicide bombing took place three weeks prior to the 1 November repeat general election. Two bombs were detonated outside the central railway station during the “Labour, Peace and Democracy” rally organised by the HDP, the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey and some other left-leaning organisations. Yunus Emre Alagöz reportedly was one of the suicide bombers, while the second bomber remained unidentified. Yunus Emre Alagöz was the brother of Abdurrahman Alagöz (suicide bomber of the 20 July 2015 Suruç attack – see item 4 above). Fatalities: 103 civilians (mostly left-leaning pro-opposition activists) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Eighteen convicted (all Turkish citizens). Individuals sentenced to life imprisonment on 3 August 2018: Abdülmubtalip Demir, Talha Güneş, Metin Akaltın, Yakub Şahin, Hakan Şahin, Halil İbrahim Alçay, Resul Demir, Hacı Ali Durmaz and Hüseyin Tunç. Sentences on terrorism-related charges of Burak Ormanoğlu, Suphi Alpfidan, Mehmedin Baraç, Nihat Ürkmez, Yakup Karaoğlu, Esin Altıntuğ, Hatice Akaltın, Yakup Yıldırım and Abdulhamit Boz ranged between seven and 32 years. Meanwhile, sixteen fugitives charged included İlhami Balı, the so-called border emir of ISIS. The other Turkish citizen suspects, Mehmet Kadir Cabael, ISIS’ so-called Gaziantep emir, and Yunus Durmaz, allegedly one of the main plotters of the Ankara railway station bombing, would later be killed during police raids on 16 October 2016 and 19 May 2016 respectively (see items 13 and 14 below). View More 12.01.2016 Target: Tourism Event: Istanbul, Sultanahmet; an ISIS suicide attack targeted tourists in the historical district of Istanbul. Nabil Fadli, a Saudi national, committed the suicide attack. Fatalities: Twelve civilians (eleven of them German, one Peruvian) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Two Syrians, one Turkish citizen convicted. Atala el-Hasan el-Mayyuf (Syrian national), who brought the bomb to Şanlıurfa, Fevzi Muhammed Ali (Syrian national), who brought the bomb to Istanbul, and Halil Derviş (Turkish citizen), who facilitated Nabil Fadli’s arrival to Istanbul, were sentenced to life imprisonment on 31 January 2018. View More 19.03.2016 Target: Tourism Event: Istanbul, Beyoğlu; a suicide attack targeted tourists on Istiklal street, Istanbul’s main shopping alley. Mehmet Öztürk, a Turkish citizen returnee who went to Syria and joined ISIS in 2013, committed the suicide attack. Fatalities: Five civilians (three of them Israeli, two Iranian) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Four Turkish citizens convicted. On 5 April 2019, Ercan Çapkın and Hüseyin Kaya were convicted to life imprisonment on charges of murder and attempting to abolish the constitutional order. Mehmet Mustafa Çevik and İbrahim Gürler were sentenced to 15 years in prison on terrorism-related charges. View More 22.04.2016 Target: Unknown Event: Kilis; projectiles fired by ISIS hit the border province of Turkey. Fatalities: None Accused/convicted perpetrators: Unknown View More 24.04.2016 Target: Unknown Event: Kilis; projectiles fired by ISIS wounded sixteen people, six of whom were Syrian nationals. Fatalities: None Accused/convicted perpetrators: Unknown View More 28.04.2016 Target: State Event: Gaziantep, Karkamış; ISIS fired projectiles targeting a military border post in the south-eastern province of Gaziantep. Fatalities: None Accused/convicted perpetrators: Unknown View More 29.04.2016 Target: Unknown Event: Kilis; projectiles fired by ISIS hit the border province of Turkey. Fatalities: None Accused/convicted perpetrators: Unknown View More 01.05.2016 Target: State Event: Gaziantep; a vehicle-borne suicide attack carried out by Turkish citizen İsmail Güneş targeted the province’s police headquarters. Fatalities: Three state security force members Accused/convicted perpetrators: Two Turkish citizens, Emin Kepel and Hanifi Küplü, were convicted to 8 years and 9 months, and 7 years and 6 months in prison respectively on membership in a terrorist organisation charges on 5 August 2016. Yunus Durmaz, allegedly the plotter of the attack, was killed during a police raid on 19 May 2016 carried out in connection to the attack. View More 20.06.2016 Target: Kurdish movement and/or left-leaning opposition Event: Gaziantep, Şahinbey; a suicide attack apparently executed by a child (identity unknown) wearing a suicide vest targeted the wedding of a pro-HDP Kurdish family. Fatalities: 57 civilians (all Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Ten people (nine of them Turkish citizens, one foreign) were convicted on 14 March 2019. Mehmet Şahin Erğan, Mehmet Çalıkuşu, Ahmet Köşgeroğlu, Ali Çalıkuşu, Hacı Polat, Hasan Uzun and Mehmet Karakurt received life sentences for murder and violation of the constitution. Enes Karataş and Yunus Sarı were sentenced to 10 years in prison for membership in a terrorist organisation. The only foreign perpetrator, Abdurrahman el-Najjar, was also sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of murder and violation of the constitution. El-Najjar was apprehended in a police raid on 16 October 2016 in the Güneykent district of Gaziantep, during which an explosion killed three police officers. During another anti-terror raid following the attack, on 16 October 2016, Mehmet Kadir Cabael, a Turkish citizen and the so-called Gaziantep emir of ISIS, was killed in clashes with police. View More 28.06.2016 Target: Tourism Event: Istanbul, Atatürk Airport; three gunmen armed with automatic weapons and suicide belts staged an attack at the international terminal. Rakim Bulgarov (Kyrgyz national), Vadim Osmanov and Akhmed Osmanov (Russian nationals from Chechnya) carried out the attack. Two assailants blew themselves up, while one was reportedly shot dead by state security forces before being able to detonate his suicide belt. Fatalities: 30 civilians (nine of them Turkish, six Saudi, three Jordanian, three Palestinian, two Iraqi, one Tunisian, one Iranian, one Ukrainian, one Uzbek, three undisclosed) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Ten people (among them seven Turkish citizens) convicted on 16 November 2018: Turkish citizens Rıza Coşkun, Levent Uysal, Ahmet Kaplan, Eyüp Demir, Ahmet Dizlek and foreign national Djamel Slimani (reportedly Algerian) were sentenced to aggravated life sentences on charges of murder, membership in a terrorist organisation, violation of the constitution and damaging property. Djamel Slimani was also sentenced to three years and nine months in prison for forging official documents. The other two foreign defendants, Anzor Davitiani and Artur Tengizov (nationalities not reported), were sentenced to nine years of imprisonment for membership in a terrorist organisation. Seyhun Ali Akçay and Cuma Güneş, both Turkish citizens, were sentenced to twelve years in prison on the same charges. View More 01.01.2017 Target: Tourism Event: Istanbul, Ortaköy; a gunman opened fire on a crowd in the Reina nightclub in the Ortaköy neighbourhood of Istanbul, during new year celebrations. This was the only attack among those listed here that ISIS claimed. All other attacks were attributed to the group. Fatalities: 39 civilians (twelve of them Turkish, seven Saudi, three Iraqi, three Lebanese, two Jordanian, two Moroccan, two Indian, one Kuwaiti, one Libyan, one Israeli, one Tunisian, one Tunisian-French, one Canadian, one Syrian, one Russian) Accused/convicted perpetrators: Seven people (six foreign, one Turkish citizen) are still on trial, with the accused including shooting assassin Abdulkadir Masharipov (Uzbek national) and Abdurrauf Sert (Turkish citizen), who is accused of plotting the attack and was apparently tasked with securing safe houses for ISIS operatives in Istanbul as a so-called "deputy emir”. On 27 January 2020, the prosecutor demanded consecutive aggravated life sentences for the accused. The trial is ongoing. View More See more * ISIS only claimed the 1 January 2017 shooting attack that killed 39 civilians. The other fifteen attacks were attributed to the group. ISIS also claimed a car bombing in Diyarbakır’s Bağlar district in November 2016, but so did the PKK-affiliated Kurdistan Freedom Falcons. Turkish officials attributed this attack to the PKK and a court case against six accused for PKK-related terrorism charges in connection to the attack is pending. More for you Statement / Middle East & North Africa Bringing the U.S. and Iran out of Suspended Animation Podcast / Middle East & North Africa A Dangerous New Turn in Yemen’s War Up Next Op-Ed / Africa Why the World’s Newest Country Has Only Known Conflict Originally published in World Politics Review
Op-Ed / Africa 2 March 2021 Why the World’s Newest Country Has Only Known Conflict Originally published in World Politics Review Few nations have seen their dreams and hopes dashed as quickly and ruthlessly as South Sudan. As the country approaches its 10-year anniversary, the risk of a return to full-blown conflict is never far away. Share Facebook Twitter Email Save Print Few nations have seen their dreams and hopes dashed as quickly and ruthlessly as South Sudan. A mere two years after thousands thronged the streets of the capital, Juba, to celebrate independence from Sudan’s autocratic rule, the country descended into a brutal civil war. The fallout between President Salva Kiir and Vice President-turned-rebel Riek Machar, and the subsequent fighting, exerted a terrible toll. Between 2013 and 2018, up to 400,000 people were killed and 4 million—a third of the country’s population—displaced, amid numerous reports of ethnic-based atrocities like rape and massacres. The world’s youngest country is now approaching its 10-year anniversary, and while the war has quieted thanks to a fragile 2018 peace deal, the risk of a return to full-blown conflict is never far away. South Sudan still faces an insurgency in the south of the country and rampant localized violence elsewhere. Ethno-political tensions remain high and could be unleashed again by the next presidential election, which was originally scheduled for 2022 but is likely to be delayed. Moreover, amid the constant efforts to halt violence, avoid the further deterioration of a dire humanitarian situation and keep the sputtering peace deal on track, both external partners and many South Sudanese themselves seem to have lost sight of any vision for longer-term stability. Maintaining the peace deal and getting the country past the presidential poll—which would likely pit Kiir against Machar, who has returned to the position of vice president under the terms of the 2018 agreement—are the most immediate hurdles. But any hope for stability demands a reset of South Sudan’s ill-suited, winner-take-all political system that fuels the ongoing tensions among elites. Despite the fact that its divisions and vulnerabilities were apparent at independence a decade ago, both South Sudanese and outsiders downplayed the new country’s political woes, and especially its ethnic cleavages. South Sudanese had fought a long war against Sudan, but also, more often than not, against each other. Kiir and Machar, for example, fought on rival sides between 1991 and 2002, mobilizing fighters from their respective Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. At independence, the country’s political system, which vests enormous power in the presidency, offered few mechanisms for the inclusion of rivals. This meant those locked out of power had few incentives to believe in the new state rather than rebel against it. The scramble for power and resources dominated politics in Juba and, as Kiir and his clique monopolized both, the scars of decades of infighting reopened. Conflict soon flared, while several peace agreements and cease-fires collapsed—notably in 2016 when Machar, then vice president, fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo on foot after fighting erupted in Juba—before the 2018 pact brought a bit of respite. Kiir and Machar finally formed a unity government in February 2020. But they have achieved little beyond a delicate cease-fire, as most of the provisions of the agreement languish unfulfilled. These include the unification of forces supporting the two rivals into a single national army, the establishment of a new National Assembly, the creation of a transitional court of justice, and economic reforms. On top of all that, South Sudan still has to deal with the insurgency in its southern Equatoria region led by Thomas Cirillo, a former senior military officer who has not signed the peace agreement. Localized violence in other places rages unabated. With this uneasy arrangement in place and ethno-political tensions so deeply rooted, the risk of a new collapse exists at every turn of the road. No turn looks more dangerous than the next presidential election, whenever it is held. Even if they seem to have lost the confidence of a significant part of their respective support bases, Kiir and Machar still look intent on facing off. The poll, if it ever occurs, could be a fatal blow to the peace agreement, given that the winner could lock the loser and his coalition out of any share of power. Ultimately, the country will need to revisit its political model to avoid remaining stuck in cyclical bouts of conflict. Facebook Email Given the current level of tensions, rival factions will surely contest nearly every step in the leadup to the poll, so foreign diplomats in South Sudan should refrain from putting pressure on the government to rush into a potentially destabilizing election. Crucially, regional powers like Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, which are the main guarantors of the 2018 peace deal, will also need to push for some form of pre-election deal that ensures a share of power to the losers. Such an outcome could avert a violent breakdown around the vote, but it still would not resolve South Sudan’s many problems. Ultimately, the country will need to revisit its political model to avoid remaining stuck in cyclical bouts of conflict. The existing centralized state butts up against the harsh realities across the country. South Sudan still lacks roads or basic institutions, and peaceful governance is impossible without broad accommodation across its diverse patchwork of communities and groups. As the International Crisis Group argues in a recent report, instead of a king-of-the-hill system, South Sudan could evolve toward a more consensual form of governance. This would give the country’s notorious elites in Juba, as well as its beleaguered but divided population, a sense of shared interest. What would this look like? One way to begin solving exclusionary politics is by institutionalizing power-sharing at the heart of the state. Several options exist, including a presidency that rotates among ethno-political groups or regions, formally slotting government positions for runners-up or instituting diversity quotas at all levels of political and public life. None of these options would address all the challenges the country faces, but they may at least help reduce the deadly stakes of the central power struggle. Beyond power-sharing in Juba, devolving power and resources to regional and local authorities could also reduce the temperature of national politics. Decentralization, enshrined in South Sudan’s constitution but hardly implemented over the past decade, is increasingly back in fashion among the country’s thinkers and politicians. Striking the right balance will be critical if the country heads in this direction, as decentralization can also push conflict and corruption to the local level. But devolving power and resources could also help resolve raging local conflicts by empowering local officials and opening avenues for conflict resolution outside the political gridlock in Juba. The prospects of such changes happening soon are limited, though, to say the least. The challenge of reform lies less in imagining new options than in persuading self-interested elites to adopt them. This challenge goes beyond Kiir and Machar, although the two are likely to remain unconstructive actors at the center of the country’s political stage for some time to come. Yet even when these archrivals are finally out of the equation, the country will still likely lack state institutions and infrastructure, in addition to being bitterly divided, awash in guns and in need of broad consensus to avoid more rampant bloodshed. Faced with such grim prospects, other South Sudanese leaders and their external partners must seize every opportunity to push for improvements, even if gradual. Reform-minded South Sudanese politicians should push for constitutional reform and champion an inclusive national conference to chart a path away from the zero-sum politics that define the status quo. External partners should be ready to push in that direction and support such initiatives, including financially. If South Sudan’s peace deal again collapses, external mediators could also assess whether efforts to patch things back together again can also go some way to address these underlying structural questions and make peace more durable. For now, the scale of South Sudan’s challenges contrasts frighteningly with what seems politically possible to fix, and progress in that direction will undoubtedly be halting. But persistence toward a broader settlement is the only way for South Sudan to salvage the dreams that so animated its independence celebrations a decade ago. Related Tags From Early Warning to Early Action South Sudan