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孟加拉国的政治冲突、极端主义和刑事司法
孟加拉国的政治冲突、极端主义和刑事司法
Rohingya Deserve Non-violent Leadership
Rohingya Deserve Non-violent Leadership
Protesters march in Dhaka during a general strike, held in response to the recent murder of Faysal Arefin, a publisher of books by critics of religious militancy in Bangladesh, 3 November 2015. REUTERS/Ashikur Rahman
Report 277 / Asia

孟加拉国的政治冲突、极端主义和刑事司法

政治镇压在孟加拉国进一步升温,政府为了政治目的滥用法治,而其所营造的不公正气氛则让反政府极端组织有机可乘。近日,某世俗派博主惨遭极端组织的毒手,而该惨案正是这些组织实力壮大且肆无忌惮的恶果。

执行摘要

随着人民联盟(AL)控制下的政府与孟加拉国民族主义党(BNP)的政治对抗不断升级,政府的压迫手段也再创新高。与此同时,一个高度政治化、运转不周的司法体系正在削弱而非加强法治。高压政策使政府的合法性受到质疑,同时,政府的强硬手段还适得其反地引发暴力反抗,并令暴力党派和极端组织坐收渔利。政府需要认识到改变现状符合其自身利益,否则它抑制暴力极端主义、或应对政治上的威胁。更关键的则是要去政治化,并加强刑法体系在各方面的建设,司法机构也不例外;如此为,孟加拉国才能应对其国内众多的法制挑战,并避免民主制度崩塌。

人民联盟和孟加拉国民族主义党之间的政治冲突已导致了众多暴力事件和政府的残酷镇压。为打压反对派和批判者,政府采取了强迫失踪、严刑逼供和法外处决等过激手段。不仅警察被授意针对政敌,司法机构沦为迫害反对派领袖和社运分子的工具,暴力极端分子也对他们发起了新一轮的威胁。然而,目前的法律环境却为极端团体创造了重组的机会,这则体现在对世俗派博主和外国人的谋害、以及2015年对宗派和宗教少数派的袭击上。为应对不断上升的极端主义势力,政府对部分嫌疑人实行了抓捕和审讯,但因其流程不正规且缺乏透明度,这进而加剧了政治疏离感,且让极端组织有了更多的可乘之机。

若要与反对派和解并恢复社会稳定,政府需做出政治妥协,不再利用执法部门镇压异己、并停止滥用法庭。政府为了禁言政治异见,而利用警察和特别部队——尤其是快速行动营(RAB)——打压的行为正在为将来的暴力反抗埋下伏笔。因为要集中打压反对派,警方无暇遏制犯罪行为;对反对派领袖和社运人士的大规模抓捕使得监狱系统不堪重负;司法机关的信誉亦是——因其被认为在审判和量刑上效忠于党派的政治利益——每况愈下。如此一来,司法系统便在两个极端间摇摆不定——即,办理普通案件时效率极其低下,且运作不周;而在处理政治指控时,其则断案神速,并略过了正当的诉讼程序。

除非能剔除司法中的政治影响,任何——单靠增加培训,加强警力装备,和实现公安、公诉和司法部门现代化的——改革努力都难以解决司法系统失调的问题。数年来分帮结派式的招募、升迁和委任导致体制内分化严重,以至于官员都不再掩饰各自的派系忠诚。投诉如何定性和上报、而上报案件的轻重缓急由如何划分;这些都取决于司法官员的党派偏见,他们甚至还会提前透露判决结果。

孟加拉国的法治问题并不止步于此,其还诉诸司法手段来禁言公民社会、阻碍媒体监督,并在处理政治案件时,以不公平程序取代正当程序。法制机构若沦为服务政治的工具,其将百害无利,而漏洞百出的国际犯罪法庭(ICT)则着重印证了这一点。该法庭成立于2010年,其本是为了起诉那些在1971年解放战争中犯下暴行的战犯而设,然而其缺乏公正的形象令极端势力有机可乘,并对政治冲突火上浇油。

为纪念具争议的2014年大选,孟加拉国民族主义党及其盟友伊斯兰大会党(Jamaat-e-Islami)组织了大规模的盲目暴力袭击和交通封锁,而政府亦是以暴制暴。如今,孟加拉国民族主义党似乎已不太愿意诉诸于武力政变了,并决定回归主流政治,而政府应抓住机会,尽快恢复和反对党对话。为表诚意并作出表率,政府应率先停止用司法手段攻击对手和异见者。接受合法的政治参与及批判渠道亦有助于政府收复部分合法性,并重拾公民对国家司法和安全的信任。只要一日没有司法独立和裁决公正,那各利益攸关方就可能会将争端诉诸于街头,然而一个中立——即,能坚守基本原则、防止行政过度干涉——的司法提携则将有助于缓和紧张局势。国际社会亦能促进孟加拉国的政治和解。美国和欧盟可以利用经济筹码向达卡当局施压,以此要求政府尊重公民权和政治权。印度则可以借助它与孟加拉国的密切联系,并敦促人民联盟向反对党开放合法的政治表达和参与通道。事不宜迟,如果政府继续封锁表达异见的主流渠道,那将会有更多的反对派将暴力和加入暴力组织视为其唯一的出路。

布鲁塞尔,2016年4月11日

Op-Ed / Asia

Rohingya Deserve Non-violent Leadership

Originally published in Asia Times

In August 2017, the flight of 700,000 Muslim Rohingya from Myanmar produced the world’s newest refugee crisis – and one of its worst. Now stuck in miserable camps in Bangladesh, the Rohingya have little prospect of returning to their homes any time soon.

Their suffering is primarily a grave humanitarian concern and the Bangladeshi government and its foreign partners should focus their response on protecting the well-being of those displaced and assisting host communities. But the Rohingya’s plight also raises a so far unspoken question: Will they wait patiently to return in a safe and dignified manner – for now an unrealistic goal – or will the main militant organization in their midst lead them to pursue their goals with violence?

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) formed in 2012 in the wake of strife among Buddhists and Rohingya in Myanmar’s underdeveloped and conflict-ridden northern Rakhine state. The group leveraged the anger and desperation of Rohingya facing daily oppression as an ethnic and religious minority. Through communal leaders, ARSA propagated a message of hope while in fact bolstering its position via a combination of claims to religious legitimacy and fear.

The militants are now attempting to re-establish themselves as a political voice in the Bangladesh camps. But it’s not too late for the refugees to establish non-militant leadership and self-governance.

ARSA does have sympathizers in the camps, but its authority is less clear than before the mass exodus. In the view of many Rohingya, it was ARSA’s attacks on Myanmar police that provoked the country’s brutal, indiscriminate military campaign forcing them into exile. Foreign governments and human-rights organizations have branded this campaign as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and possibly genocide.

Not all refugees hold ARSA responsible for the calamity that befell them. Some adopt the view that, whether or not ARSA’s attacks had taken place, the Myanmar authorities would have found a way to drive the Rohingya from their land.

The Rohingya’s plight is likely to worsen before it improves ... While Bangladesh has thus far been hospitable to the refugees, the political climate could easily turn against them, particularly in the event of ARSA violence on Bangladeshi soil.

But ARSA was also responsible for killings of civilians, both Rohingya and their Hindu neighbors, as it sought to eliminate perceived informants. After careful analysis, Amnesty International concludedthat ARSA massacred dozens of Hindu villagers in August 2017. The group exposed Rohingya civilians to Myanmar’s massively disproportionate response. Its militants did not wear uniforms or do anything else to distinguish themselves from the civilian population, and they launched attacks from the cover of villages.

Since the refugee exodus, ARSA has continued its insurgency, claiming responsibility for an attack on a Myanmar convoy in January. It has also been linked to several killings in the camps.

In October last year, 47 Rohingya religious scholars issued a fatwa condemning any act of jihad, even for self-defense, against Myanmar. But Crisis Group’s May report suggests that this ruling does not necessarily mean the Rohingya have abandoned ARSA or the idea of violent resistance. First, it was issued at the height of the exodus, when the scholars sought to reassure Bangladesh that the refugees were not a security threat. Second, it did not categorically reject violence, but rather denounced particular tactics the signatories viewed as premature or misguided.

Factors other than opposition to violence could hinder ARSA from representing the Rohingya. Village populations that once backed the militants are now scattered across the camps, new leaders (majhis) are emerging and the “common enemy” that ARSA rallied against – the Myanmar security forces – is far away across the border. Most refugees are preoccupied with the daily struggle to establish basic standards of living in the camps.

Nor does it appear that transnational jihadist groups – that is, groups such as al-Qaeda in the South Asian subcontinent, Islamic State (ISIS) or their Bangladeshi affiliates – have been able to exploit the Rohingya crisis to mobilize or recruit in the camps. While concerns this might happen are legitimate given the security landscape in Bangladesh, there is no evidence that it is occurring, nor that a counterterrorism lens is useful for understanding the evolving situation in the camps.

The Bangladeshi authorities appear to share this assessment. Moreover, ARSA itself has always sought to distance itself from transnational groups.

But the Rohingya’s plight is likely to worsen before it improves. The monsoon season has arrived, threatening the camps with flooding. While Bangladesh has thus far been hospitable to the refugees, the political climate could easily turn against them, particularly in the event of ARSA violence on Bangladeshi soil.

The Rohingya need a non-violent leadership who can work to ensure their safe and voluntary return to their homeland.