Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Youtube
Rohingya Deserve Non-violent Leadership
Rohingya Deserve Non-violent Leadership
Smouldering debris of burned houses is seen in Warpait village, a Muslim village in Maungdaw located in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, 14 October, 2016. AFP/Ye Aung Thu
Report 283 / Asia

缅甸:若开邦新出现穆斯林动乱

近期,在流亡势力的领导下,罗兴亚士兵发起了袭击。这预示了局势的恶化。罗兴亚人对现状强烈的不满是暴力的主要根源,若要根除暴力,缅甸政府应扭转穆斯林少数民族长期受到歧视的局面、缓和其军事策略、并寻求其穆斯林盟友的援助。

  • Share
  • Save
  • Print
  • Download PDF Full Report

执行摘要

自2016年10月9日起的数日里,缅甸北部若开邦的边防守卫警察(BGP)便连遭恶性袭击,11月12日局势严重升级,并导致一名高级军官丧生,这均表明若凯邦新出现了穆斯林动乱。目前的暴力本质上有别于近几十年的状况,其不仅严重威胁到若开邦稳定发展的前景,还严重影响了整个缅甸。在巨大挑战之下,政府需要调整并整合其政治、政策和安全对策,确保暴力不再升级,使族群之间的紧张局势得到控制,并应适当考虑若开邦佛教徒的不满及恐慌情绪。

如无法成功控制局势,政府将面临巨大的风险。政府虽肩负着维护安全并以行动阻止攻击者的明确义务,但若要行动产生实效,政府则需更审慎地使用武力,并将重点放在政治和政策手段上。政府应首要解决民众的悲观绝望情绪,且这也是若开邦众多穆斯林愤怒的根源。而令局面复杂的则是,昂山素季虽对军队有一些影响力,但据宪法,她并不能直接控制军队。

该叛乱组织自称Harakah al-Yaqin(“坚定信仰运动”,HaY)。其由流亡于沙特阿拉伯的某罗兴亚委员会领导,地面指挥则由经过国际训练并具备现代游击战经验的当地罗兴亚人负责。该组织得益于地方和国际穆斯林教令(宗教司法意见)对其合法性的承认、和若凯邦北部穆斯林民众高度的同情和支持,并已在当地招募训练了数百名新兵。

缅甸政府虽正致力于应对在若开邦的复杂挑战,包括对穆斯林人口的长期歧视和对公民权利的剥夺及损害,但这个组织良好、看似资金充足的团体的出现却改变了局势。政府目前虽使用了大规模军事力量来应对袭击,却未能充分地区分武装分子与平民,再加之其拒绝向极弱势群体提供人道主义援助,并缺乏总体的政治战略。政府无法为民众带来希望,因此也不太可能驱逐该组织,甚之还或会造成暴力升级和民众大规模的流离失所。

若非一些地方领袖和社区的参与,坚定信仰运动也不会在当地立足并对战斗准备充分。但此地从不是激进分子的聚集区,当地大多数居民、长老及宗教领袖此前都在回避暴力手段,并认为暴力只会适得其反。而今逾多人拥护暴力行为的事实则反映出了动乱非必然,而是多年来在政策上彻底的失败。

政府强硬的安全手段违反了“同等规模反击”和“区别对待”的基本原则,这不仅有悖国际准则,而且适得其反。

政府的对策之关键应是着手于了解若凯邦部分穆斯林为何开始诉诸于暴力。当地民众已意识到其权利被不断侵蚀和践踏,并在社会和政治生活中被逐渐边缘化。自2012年若开邦出现反穆斯林暴力行动以来,矛盾愈发尖锐。穆斯林在2015年大选前被剥夺了选举权,而这也截断了他们联系和影响政治的最后的渠道。同时,马来西亚海上移民路线的中断堵住了对其至关重要的一条逃生途径,尤其对年轻人而言,他们仅此一线的希望也破碎了。正是日益增长的绝望感迫使更多人考虑暴力手段,但对政府来说,亡羊补牢,犹未晚矣——暴力趋势还尚存扭转余地。

政府首先应认识到,这些民众在该地区已生活了数辈,并将继续生活下去。因此,政府必须设法在国民生活中给他们提供一席之地。违背“同等规模反击”和“区别对待”等基本原则的强硬做法不仅有悖国际准则,且会适得其反。这样或会加剧绝望和仇恨心理,引发更多对坚定信仰运动的支持,并进一步地加剧暴力。国际经验已表明,强硬的军事行动,特别是在缺乏更广泛的政策框架的情况下,对遏制武装团体的效果甚微,并可能急剧恶化事态。

迄今为止,虽有迹象表明坚定信仰运动开展了军事训练且其组织团结,但跨国圣战主义或恐怖主义似乎还未被其提上章程。但危险的是,大规模的政府军力已经迫使成千上万的人民逃离家园或跨境进入孟加拉国,若政府处理不当,包括继续大举兴兵,那这将可能造成罗兴亚人愈发激进,而跨国圣战者则有可能乘机在缅甸推进自己的目标。为避免这种情况,政府应将其军事安全回应措施降级并纳入其详定的总体政治战略——在国家和穆斯林群体间建立更稳固、更积极的关系,并与区域各国开展更密切的合作和情报共享。

仰光/布鲁塞尔,2016年12月15日

Op-Ed / Asia

Rohingya Deserve Non-violent Leadership

Originally published in Asia Times

In August 2017, the flight of 700,000 Muslim Rohingya from Myanmar produced the world’s newest refugee crisis – and one of its worst. Now stuck in miserable camps in Bangladesh, the Rohingya have little prospect of returning to their homes any time soon.

Their suffering is primarily a grave humanitarian concern and the Bangladeshi government and its foreign partners should focus their response on protecting the well-being of those displaced and assisting host communities. But the Rohingya’s plight also raises a so far unspoken question: Will they wait patiently to return in a safe and dignified manner – for now an unrealistic goal – or will the main militant organization in their midst lead them to pursue their goals with violence?

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) formed in 2012 in the wake of strife among Buddhists and Rohingya in Myanmar’s underdeveloped and conflict-ridden northern Rakhine state. The group leveraged the anger and desperation of Rohingya facing daily oppression as an ethnic and religious minority. Through communal leaders, ARSA propagated a message of hope while in fact bolstering its position via a combination of claims to religious legitimacy and fear.

The militants are now attempting to re-establish themselves as a political voice in the Bangladesh camps. But it’s not too late for the refugees to establish non-militant leadership and self-governance.

ARSA does have sympathizers in the camps, but its authority is less clear than before the mass exodus. In the view of many Rohingya, it was ARSA’s attacks on Myanmar police that provoked the country’s brutal, indiscriminate military campaign forcing them into exile. Foreign governments and human-rights organizations have branded this campaign as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and possibly genocide.

Not all refugees hold ARSA responsible for the calamity that befell them. Some adopt the view that, whether or not ARSA’s attacks had taken place, the Myanmar authorities would have found a way to drive the Rohingya from their land.

The Rohingya’s plight is likely to worsen before it improves ... While Bangladesh has thus far been hospitable to the refugees, the political climate could easily turn against them, particularly in the event of ARSA violence on Bangladeshi soil.

But ARSA was also responsible for killings of civilians, both Rohingya and their Hindu neighbors, as it sought to eliminate perceived informants. After careful analysis, Amnesty International concludedthat ARSA massacred dozens of Hindu villagers in August 2017. The group exposed Rohingya civilians to Myanmar’s massively disproportionate response. Its militants did not wear uniforms or do anything else to distinguish themselves from the civilian population, and they launched attacks from the cover of villages.

Since the refugee exodus, ARSA has continued its insurgency, claiming responsibility for an attack on a Myanmar convoy in January. It has also been linked to several killings in the camps.

In October last year, 47 Rohingya religious scholars issued a fatwa condemning any act of jihad, even for self-defense, against Myanmar. But Crisis Group’s May report suggests that this ruling does not necessarily mean the Rohingya have abandoned ARSA or the idea of violent resistance. First, it was issued at the height of the exodus, when the scholars sought to reassure Bangladesh that the refugees were not a security threat. Second, it did not categorically reject violence, but rather denounced particular tactics the signatories viewed as premature or misguided.

Factors other than opposition to violence could hinder ARSA from representing the Rohingya. Village populations that once backed the militants are now scattered across the camps, new leaders (majhis) are emerging and the “common enemy” that ARSA rallied against – the Myanmar security forces – is far away across the border. Most refugees are preoccupied with the daily struggle to establish basic standards of living in the camps.

Nor does it appear that transnational jihadist groups – that is, groups such as al-Qaeda in the South Asian subcontinent, Islamic State (ISIS) or their Bangladeshi affiliates – have been able to exploit the Rohingya crisis to mobilize or recruit in the camps. While concerns this might happen are legitimate given the security landscape in Bangladesh, there is no evidence that it is occurring, nor that a counterterrorism lens is useful for understanding the evolving situation in the camps.

The Bangladeshi authorities appear to share this assessment. Moreover, ARSA itself has always sought to distance itself from transnational groups.

But the Rohingya’s plight is likely to worsen before it improves. The monsoon season has arrived, threatening the camps with flooding. While Bangladesh has thus far been hospitable to the refugees, the political climate could easily turn against them, particularly in the event of ARSA violence on Bangladeshi soil.

The Rohingya need a non-violent leadership who can work to ensure their safe and voluntary return to their homeland.