Photo shows Tajik border guards checking identification documents of people crossing the Tajik-Afghan border on a bridge across the Panj River outside the city of Panj, August 2010. AFP PHOTO Briefing 78 / Europe & Central Asia 11 January 2016 3 minutes 塔吉克斯坦预警:内部压力和外部威胁 塔吉克斯坦如今正处于危险的重负之下——因其受暴力、腐败和经济困难所扰,苦其与阿富汗边境之漫长而不安全。拉赫蒙总统的专制破坏了1997年签署的和平协议,并助长了境内伊斯兰激进主义的发展。随着其国家愈加脆弱、且或波及周边列国,塔吉克斯坦应成为冲突预防中的优先对象。 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Also available in English Chinese, Simplified English 概述 塔吉克斯坦数中亚贫困之最;于内于外,它都面临着巨大的压力。埃莫马利•拉赫蒙总统23年以来的统治充满了暴戾、问责制的缺失、腐败和大规模的移民返乡。劳工转汇和贩毒是国家收入的主要来源。他对宗教和反对派的控制——包括禁止温和的塔吉克斯坦伊斯兰复兴党(IRPT)——则助长了民怨。塔吉克斯坦与阿富汗所接壤的边境线长达1400公里,而沿线的安全即使在在最佳时期也难以保持一致;此外,阿富汗北部局势日益不稳,且中亚武装分子在此地和塔利班结盟,并对塔吉克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦造成了新的威胁。俄罗斯对塔吉克斯坦的支持是区域安全的一个重要组成部分,但莫斯科方面对塔吉克斯坦内部反对拉赫蒙一事则愈感担忧。欧盟和美国对塔吉克斯坦政府的影响甚微,但欧美、俄罗斯以及其他的国家却都应对拉赫蒙的领导方向、国家失败的风险和伊斯兰极端分子乘机而入的可能性保持警惕。 1997年的和平协议仅是掩盖了——但并为解决——其残酷内战后产生的紧张局面;而这一协议亦正在被瓦解。和平协议的核心是让伊斯兰复兴党能在议会中代表战争反对派,然而在2015年3月那场充斥着违规的选举后,拉赫蒙剥夺了该党的议会席位;同年8月拉赫蒙禁止了其参会权;并于9月宣布伊斯兰复兴党为恐怖主义组织。伊斯兰复兴党的命运和该国对宗教表达的限制都充满体现了塔吉克斯坦对政治多元化的蔑视。腐败和任人唯亲之行径四处蔓延,而这似乎在向伊斯兰主义者和世俗公民传递着一个信息:任何试图挑战拉赫蒙的政治进程都会被终止。 2016年5月,时任特警部队头领的Gulmurod Khalimov将军投诚了叙利亚的伊斯兰国(IS);他的叛变则揭露了安全部队精英内部的分裂,也暗示着拉赫蒙可能不再知道谁才值得被信任;同时这也反映了伊斯兰中暴力激进教派在塔吉克斯坦境内与日俱增的吸引力。拉赫蒙总统对此的回应主要是谈论他劫后余生之想,而非试图扭转民众对政府已在政治上和道德上破产的看法。 塔吉克斯坦的经济已陷入瘫痪,而俄罗斯的经济低迷更是雪上加霜;这是因为劳工汇款占塔吉克斯坦国内生产总值的40%以上,与此同时,在2015年,有三十至四十万劳工因就业难而返回故土。然而,如此恶劣的经济环境实则基本上是由政府一手所致:多年的地方性腐败榨干了当地企业,发展援助所产生的影响亦是寥寥无几。同时,来自阿富汗的毒品走私日益增多。尽管塔吉克斯坦获得了来自俄罗斯、欧盟和美国的资助和技术援助,其边境安全问题仍充满不确定性;这则一方面是出于塔吉克斯坦多山的地理环境,而另一方面则是因为非法贸易已腐蚀了塔吉克斯坦的安全结构。 鉴于其存在的问题,塔吉克斯坦应当被国际社会列为冲突预防的优先对象。尽管务实性对策应将重点放在防止进一步的压制、并鼓励在2020年拉赫蒙任期结束之时进行有序的政权交接之上,但在考虑政策之时,国际社会也应将塔吉克斯坦将持续暴戾——且其视正规政治进程于无物的——独裁制度的风险考虑在内。在经济危机和政治停滞的压力下,国家力量会被进一步削弱;这或许对边界问题的影响不大,但国家于内于外的脆弱或会导致不稳定,并最终对边界问题产生影响。边界安全薄弱使得塔吉克斯坦沦为伊斯兰武装分子夺取中亚其他地区的中转站。乌兹别克斯坦边境实力虽比较强大,但与吉尔吉斯斯坦相比则又显得薄弱。 对俄罗斯、由莫斯科领导的集体安全条约组织(CSTO)中的其他成员国,和中国——其不安宁的新疆省与塔吉克斯坦接壤,且长达414公里——而言,无论何种成因导致的塔吉克斯坦国家失败都将是个头疼的麻烦。集体安全条约组织的成员国身份以及俄罗斯在塔吉克斯坦的驻军都可被视为对入侵的威慑力量,然而集体安全条约组织却尚未能经实战考验。乌兹别克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和哈萨克斯坦,在维护塔吉克斯坦的和平与安全方面,都有着明确的利益,它们应优先保护各自与塔吉克斯坦接壤处的安全,而非仅仅关注塔阿边界的问题。 俄罗斯、欧盟和美国应当为增进边界和平提供支持。在参与该地区政治——包括正式的安全和人权对话框架——的过程中,欧盟及其成员国和华盛顿都应强调政治压迫、侵犯人权和长期不稳定性之间的紧密关系。俄罗斯、联合国和其他助力达成1997年和平协议的国家——包括美国和伊朗在内,则都应督促拉赫蒙为维持可持续稳定而遵守原则。否则,在北阿富汗和伊斯兰武装力量的煽动下,塔吉克斯坦和国际社会都将无力阻止昨日区域纷争的重现。 比什凯克/布鲁塞尔,2016年1月11日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English) I. Overview Tajikistan, Central Asia’s poorest state, is under dangerous pressure both internally and externally. President Emomali Rahmon’s 23-year rule is marred by violence, lack of accountability, corruption and mass migration. Remittances and drug trafficking are key sources of income. Controls on religion and political opposition, including a ban on the moderate Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), foster resentment. Security along the 1,400-km border with Afghanistan is inconsistent at best, and increasing instability in northern Afghanistan, where Central Asian militants are allied with the Taliban, poses a threat to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan alike. Russia’s support to Tajikistan is a major component in regional security, but Moscow’s concerns about internal opposition to Rahmon are growing. The European Union (EU) and U.S. have only modest ability to influence the Tajik government, but they, Russia and others should be alert to the increasingly worrying direction of Rahmon’s leadership, the risks of state failure and the potential for Islamist extremists to capitalise. The 1997 peace agreement masked rather than resolved tensions after a brutal civil war (1992-1997) and is unravelling. Its core was IRPT representation of the war’s opposition forces in parliament, but Rahmon deprived the party of its parliament seats after March 2015 elections that were riddled with irregularities, banned it in August, and declared it a terrorist organisation in September. The IRPT’s fate and restrictions on religious expression underscore the state’s contempt for pluralism. Widespread corruption and cronyism send the message to Islamist and secular citizens alike that the political process is closed to all who might challenge Rahmon. The defection of the head of the Special Assignment Police Unit (OMON), Gen. Gulmurod Khalimov, to the Islamic State (IS) in Syria in May revealed schisms within the security elite, suggested Rahmon may no longer know who can be trusted and reflected the growing appeal of violent radical Islam. The president’s responses are about his survival and do little to reverse the perception that the government is politically and morally bankrupt. The economy is crippled, with the downturn in Russia adding to the difficulties because remittances are more than 40 per cent of GDP, and some 300,000-400,000 migrants returned home in 2015 with little hope of finding work. The rough economic climate, however, is fundamentally of the government’s making: years of endemic corruption have bled local businesses dry and limit the impact of donor aid. Meanwhile, drug trafficking from Afghanistan is growing. Border security, despite investments and technical assistance from Russia, the EU and U.S., is at best haphazard, partly because of the mountainous terrain but also because the illegal trade has corrupted Tajik security structures. Given its problems, Tajikistan should be a conflict-prevention priority for the international community. While pragmatic engagement should focus on preventing further repression and encouraging an orderly transition when Rahmon’s term ends in 2020, the risks in sustaining a frightened autocrat with no interest in a credible political process must be factored in. Under the weight of economic crisis and political stagnation, the state may continue weakening, perhaps with little impact beyond its borders, but its internal and external fragility might also lead to instability that would resonate in the broader region. The border weaknesses increase Tajikistan’s potential as a staging post for Islamic militants with ambitions elsewhere in Central Asia. The Uzbek border is relatively strong but that with Kyrgyzstan is much weaker. State failure, due to whatever factors, would pose a major headache for Russia, other members of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and China, with whose restive Xinjiang province Tajikistan shares a 414-km border. CSTO membership and Russia’s military presence in the country is a deterrent against incursions, but the CSTO is untested. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which have clear interests in maintaining peace and security in Tajikistan, should prioritise the security of their respective borders with it, not least as insurance against weaknesses on the Tajik-Afghan border. Russia, the EU and U.S. should support efforts to increase regional border security. In their political engagement in the region, including their formal security and human rights dialogue formats, the EU and its member states and Washington should also highlight the strong link between political oppression and human rights abuses and longer-term instability. Russia, the UN and others who helped engineer the 1997 agreement, including the U.S. and Iran, should urge Rahmon to honour its principles in the interest of sustainable stability. Otherwise, there is little to stop a slide back into old conflict patterns, now aggravated by a restless northern Afghanistan and the appeal of militant Islam. Bishkek/Brussels, 11 January 2016 Related Tags More for you Commentary / Europe & Central Asia End the Weaponisation of Water in Central Asia Briefing / Europe & Central Asia Rivals for Authority in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Also available in Also available in Russian