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A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army
A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Interpreting the U.S. Talks with the Taliban
Interpreting the U.S. Talks with the Taliban
Report 190 / Asia

A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army

Although the Afghan National Army could help stabilise the country, many challenges remain, including lack of leadership, low literacy, and poor logistics capabilities.

Executive Summary

For nearly a decade, the Afghan military has been promoted as the cornerstone of counterinsurgency in the country. Billed as a rare success story in a conflict with few bright spots, the Afghan armed forces will undoubtedly prove pivotal to stabilising Afghanistan. Yet nine years after the fall of the Taliban, there appears to be little agreement between the government of President Hamid Karzai and its international backers on what kind of army the country needs, how to build it or which elements of the insurgency the Afghan army should be fighting. Persistent structural flaws meanwhile have undermined the military’s ability to operate independently. Ethnic frictions and political factionalism among high-level players in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the general staff have also stunted the army’s growth. As a result, the army is a frag­mented force, serving disparate interests, and far from attaining the unified national character needed to confront numerous security threats. There is a strong need to strength­en civilian input into military development, confront corruption and factionalism within the MOD and general staff and to place sustainability of the armed forces at the forefront of Afghanistan’s national security strategy.

The Afghan National Army’s (ANA) strategic role in stabilising Afghanistan should not be underestimated. History has shown that failure to build a cohesive national army has often led to the diffusion of state force among disparate actors, hastening the collapse of governments in Kabul. The push to build a unified national military in service of a civilian government has frequently clashed with the tendency to create militias in a bid to insulate the state from internal and external threats. The tension between these polar conceptions has had far reaching implications not only for internal security but also for Afghanistan’s relationships with external actors.

ANA development and deployment have dragged under these tensions as well as patchwork command structures, with little coordination between NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. forces and the MOD in the early years of army development. The lack of consensus between Kabul, Washington and Brussels has hobbled the Afghan military’s capacity to respond effectively to threats confronting the state. Failure to develop a sustainable, comprehensive long-term defence posture could risk the army’s disintegration after the withdrawal of international forces. Similarly, tensions between the Afghan military’s historical roots in Soviet-style over-centralised and top-heavy command and control structures and the more fluid organisation of Western militaries has often pitted the U.S. and NATO against the very Afghan officials they seek to influence and support.

Despite billions of dollars of international investment, army combat readiness has been undermined by weak recruitment and retention policies, inadequate logistics, insufficient training and equipment and inconsistent leadership. International support for the ANA must therefore be targeted not just toward increasing the quantity of troops but enhancing the quality of the fighting force. Given the slow pace of economic development and the likelihood of an eventual drawdown of Western resources, any assessment of the future shape of the army must also make fiscal as well as political sense. Although recent efforts to consolidate the training command structure under the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) are encouraging, the U.S. emphasis on rapid expansion of the army, in response to the growing insurgent threat, could strain NTM-A resources and outpace the capacity of Afghan leaders to manage an inherently unwieldy system.

These shortcomings, combined with the international community’s haphazard approach to demobilisation and reintegration (DR) has undermined the army’s professionalism and capacity to counter the insurgency. The proliferation of weaponry provided by Kabul’s international backers also feeds an illicit shadow economy, which further empowers patronage networks within the military. Kabul powerbrokers are distributing the spoils of increased NATO spending on army development among their constituents in the officer corps, fuelling ethnic and political factionalism within army ranks.

These developments are all the more problematic in light of current proposals to reintegrate and reconcile elements of the insurgency. Limited progress on dissolution of illegal armed groups and reintegration of insurgents has given Kabul wide berth to continue its time-honoured tactic of exploiting divisions to consolidate the government’s hold over power. Government-backed reintegration programs have emerged as little more than distribution of patronage by a few Afghan elites. With Taliban groups in control of large swathes of the country since around 2007, many Afghan military leaders believe that in the current climate of high instability, the time is not right for negotiating with the insurgents, and that to do so would be from a position of weakness and not strength. Most also strongly reject proposals to reintegrate the Taliban into the ANA.

Where the Afghan government might once have had limited potential to be a legitimate guarantor of a broad negotiated peace, the Karzai regime’s unrestrained pursuit of power and wealth has bankrupted its credibility. Under these conditions, reconciliation and reintegration, as currently conceived by Kabul and the U.S.-led coalition, does not represent a route to a permanent peaceful settlement of the conflict. Nor is it an exit strategy. Rather, it is an invitation for the country to descend further into the turmoil that led the Taliban to give succour to al-Qaeda and other violent extremists in the first place. The current debate on reconciliation with the Taliban also threatens to widen factionalism within the army.

Greater civilian control of and input into the Afghan military is imperative. The Afghan government must be encouraged to strengthen its Office of National Security Council (ONSC) and to forge more dynamic institutional links between its members, the defence ministry and parliament. Failure to increase civilian input in shaping the army will heighten Afghanistan’s historic dependence on external actors and make it a permanent pawn of regional and international power games.

Kabul/Brussels, 12 May 2010

Afghan president Ashraf Ghani (C) talks with US special representative for Afghan Peace and reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad (top L) during a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace in Kabul. Handout / Afghan Presidential Palace / AFP
Q&A / Asia

Interpreting the U.S. Talks with the Taliban

Talks with the Taliban in the Qatari capital Doha have raised hopes that the U.S. could end its involvement in Afghanistan’s war. Our Asia Program Director Laurel Miller and Afghanistan analysts Borhan Osman and Graeme Smith break down what was achieved and what remains unresolved.

How significant were the U.S.-Taliban talks?

Last week’s six-day talks between the U.S. and Taliban were the clearest sign yet that the U.S. is intent on withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, and that the Taliban and its regional allies perceive that intent as an opportunity. It is early to draw conclusions but the signals from Doha inspire optimism about ending America’s longest war. A U.S. and NATO troop withdrawal has long been the Taliban’s top demand and the driving rationale for the insurgency. The Doha talks also were the first time that the U.S. has publicly acceded to the Taliban’s insistence that bilateral negotiations on terms for a troop withdrawal precede any peace negotiations involving other Afghans. The Taliban have made no evident concessions, but hints are emerging of some consensus on key issues. Ultimately, the significance of the talks depends on what happens next: if the framework of a deal reportedly sketched out in Doha leads to substantive negotiations among a wider array of stakeholders on future political and security arrangements, then these talks will have produced an important breakthrough.

What has been agreed upon?

U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad told The New York Times that the U.S. and Taliban have agreed in principle on a framework for a deal under which the Taliban would prevent Afghanistan from becoming a “platform for international terrorist groups or individuals” and that the U.S. would pull out troops. Khalilzad also said that, as the framework is further fleshed out, Taliban concessions will need to include a ceasefire and agreement to talk directly with the Afghan government. The Taliban appears now to be considering whether it is prepared to make such concessions.

How do you get all sides sitting around a table, after decades of war?

An exchange of commitments between the Taliban and U.S. on counter-terrorism and troop withdrawal may be enough to end American military involvement in Afghanistan, but without a more complete peace deal it will not end what is now the deadliest conflict in the world. At the moment, the U.S. reportedly is taking the position that a troop withdrawal would only be part of a bigger package including settlement of political and security issues among Afghans. Whether the U.S. sticks with that position will be important to watch.

What are the unresolved issues?

A major unanswered question is how to structure an intra-Afghan dialogue. How do you get all sides sitting around a table, after decades of war? Also unclear is what the Taliban is willing to accept on timing and sequencing of such dialogue – that is, do they see dialogue launching before a foreign troop withdrawal commences, or only later, after a troop withdrawal that diminishes Afghan government and U.S. leverage is underway? The Taliban have long been willing to negotiate openly with the U.S., as has now happened, and they have more vaguely indicated willingness to talk subsequently with other Afghans, but the specifics of an intra-Afghan negotiation format that can attract the support of all sides remains uncertain.

Details have not yet emerged regarding the counter-terrorism assurances the Taliban offered in Doha and how definitively acceptable they are to Washington. The U.S. may be looking for the Taliban to say something that goes beyond what they have declared in the past. Since at least 2010, the Taliban have promised that they will not let Afghanistan be used to threaten other countries, in a veiled reference to preventing transnational jihadist groups from sheltering in their territory. That kind of oblique language may or may not be sufficient in a peace agreement; its acceptability will depend in part on how anxious the U.S. is to exit Afghanistan. One question is whether the Taliban might be willing to go further now, committing for the first time to actively counter jihadist groups. From the Taliban perspective, they need to see a firm U.S. commitment on complete troop withdrawal with no ambiguity in the wording.

Taliban officials say the aim of the previous ceasefire was to show the world that if they want to stop fighting, they can.

Would the Taliban agree to a ceasefire?

A comprehensive ceasefire is, unfortunately, more unlikely than not at this early stage of negotiations. The Taliban worry about losing their battlefield momentum if they agree to a ceasefire, and their battlefield momentum has won them considerable leverage. A first, brief ceasefire in June 2018 was unusually successful, revealing a groundswell of popular support for an end to the conflict. The scenes of Taliban fighters celebrating in the streets with their opponents caught the insurgent leadership by surprise. Taliban officials say the aim of the previous ceasefire was to show the world that if they want to stop fighting, they can. Until now, however, a long-term ceasefire has been conceivable to the Taliban only in the context of an imminent transition to a negotiated peace involving other Afghan parties. The Taliban are undoubtedly aware that a ceasefire would be a significant political win for the government in Kabul and morale booster for government forces, and thus undoubtedly are disinclined to enable those gains.

In the meantime, the Taliban seem poised to continue fighting. The group is configured to draw strength from its performance on the battlefield, not from politics. As a Taliban fighter told Crisis Group recently: “The reason everyone is talking about us is our military power and fighting ability; otherwise, nobody would have been talking about peace and reconciliation.” In some respects, the prospect of a peace agreement threatens the Taliban’s existence in its current form. They do not seem likely to give up the fight prematurely.

What is the U.S. doing differently in these talks?

Previous rounds of U.S. talks with the Taliban raised the prospect of negotiating a troop withdrawal but did not address that issue head on. This time the Americans seem to have acceded to Taliban insistence on front-loading discussions on a U.S. troop withdrawal, before details are established on intra-Afghan political dialogue. This step reflects U.S. interest in winding down its military involvement in Afghanistan that has been building for years but has spiked sharply in the second year of the Trump administration.

The fact that the U.S. has openly been negotiating bilaterally on substantive issues with the Taliban is another change from past discussions. There have been intermittent U.S.-Taliban contacts since 2011, but never with as much publicity and as many expressions of urgency. How deeply the latest talks have delved into the core substantive issues will only be apparent once more details emerge.

Is the Kabul government on board with the U.S. approach?

U.S. envoy Khalilzad travelled to Kabul for a meeting with President Ashraf Ghani after the talks in Doha. Subsequently, on 28 January, Ghani made a formal address on state television about a future Afghanistan without international troops – something his administration has resisted envisioning for years. He mentioned recent air strikes that reportedly killed civilians and expressed his hopes that Afghan security forces would have a different role after a peace agreement. Still, the president was cautious in his comments on the talks. Ghani reminded his audience of the fate of his predecessor Mohammad Najibullah, who survived the withdrawal of Soviet forces only to be killed by the Taliban during the chaos that ensued.

The Taliban announced that their co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar would [...] become responsible for the Taliban “political commission” based in Doha, making him their chief negotiator.

Whereas Ghani may view a deal with the Taliban as a threat to his position, some of his political opponents among the Afghan elite seem more positive toward the developments in Doha, perhaps hoping for roles in an interim administration that might be installed as part of a peace agreement. Still, the entrenched view among anti-Taliban political factions is that major compromises with their opponents – such as an entirely new constitution – are unacceptable. They also are concerned that the U.S. risks making a “separate peace” and leaving them behind. The U.S. will likely need to use its considerable leverage with these Afghan political factions to bring them to the table and encourage a deal with the Taliban.

What is the significance of the new appointment to the Taliban negotiating team?

As talks progressed last week, the Taliban announced that their co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar would assume the title of deputy leader and become responsible for the Taliban “political commission” based in Doha, making him their chief negotiator. This development suggests the Taliban are serious about negotiations and may reflect a constructive role by Pakistan – which had imprisoned Baradar in 2010, releasing him only last October as U.S. negotiating efforts began to gain traction. The appointment also cemented the role of Qatar as the main venue for negotiations, despite efforts by other regional countries to serve as facilitators. The Taliban had been waiting for the right moment to make this announcement, once they believed that peace efforts had moved to a sufficiently advanced stage. Baradar is a senior and widely respected member of the movement who is probably empowered to test whether the group can achieve its goals through politics rather than fighting.

What would a settlement look like?

Details do not appear to have been hammered out yet, and, until results are shown in writing, it is also possible that U.S. and Taliban negotiators have somewhat different understandings about what has been agreed to so far. As details emerge from the talks, Crisis Group will be watching for answers to these and other questions: to what degree are the elements of the framework understanding part of a package deal that includes a ceasefire and intra-Afghan dialogue? How will implementation of a troop withdrawal be tied to these issues? Would the understandings so far – especially on troop withdrawal – be implemented regardless of how much progress is achieved in the subsequent stages of the process? To the extent that the Taliban agree to negotiate with their Afghan opponents, would they talk to the government or only to some yet-to-be-formed broader collection of Afghan power holders? What will be the agenda of intra-Afghan talks, and, specifically, will the current constitutional system be the starting point for hashing out future political arrangements, or will everything be up for grabs?

Contributors

Program Director, Asia
LaurelMillerICG
Senior Analyst, Afghanistan
Consultant, Afghanistan