In the euphoria at the demise of the New Order, there was an expectation that the 1945 Constitution’s declaration that Indonesia was a state based on the rule of law might be resurrected after 40 years of neglect. The euphoria soon dissipated, however, when the scale of the challenge and the weakness of the first democratically elected government since 1957 became evident.

Reform of particular institutions, like the Indonesian National Police (INP), cannot be implemented in isolation from the other institutions of state. An effective police force will soon be rendered impotent if prosecutors, judges, and prison governors fail in their responsibilities. Likewise, reform in any of these institutions is unlikely if government revenues are not adequate to pay salaries that meet basic needs and cover the basic resources and operational costs of the institutions of government.

As a result of these shortcomings, corruption has become endemic across the whole field of public employment from top to bottom. Despite democratic elections, the underlying political structures are still based on deeply rooted patronage networks. Reforms that threaten these structures will be strongly resisted unless means are found to raise taxes to cover reasonable costs of government and legitimise the existing structures of power.

Reform is not so much a matter of inadequate law, feeble institutions, ethical codes or expertise as of mustering political will. The Abdurrahman Wahid government is in survival mode, and there are doubts about the capacity of a successor government to address fundamental issues. Even in the absence of political will, however, it should still be possible and productive to pursue reform in areas of police administration and operations that do not threaten the structures of power. As political conditions change, reform might spread to more significant areas, eventually containing corruption to manageable levels. But there should be no illusions that this is a short-term process.

Senior police leadership is seen by some observers to be heavily politicised and inclined to block officers who want to push reform more energetically. That might be so but it also faces an enormous task of maintaining a semblance of law and order across a huge country while trying to exercise expanded responsibilities for internal security with grossly inadequate resources. It may consider that trying to impose radical change in such circumstances would overwhelm the capacity of the organisation to cope.

Regardless of senior leadership’s motives, the absence of pressure from within reinforces the need for political leadership to provide the policy, resources and oversight to drive the reform process forward. The discussion of individual motives also suggests that ‘the power of one’ should not be forgotten. Authoritarianism seeks to suppress individuality but individuals with vision, organisational skills and drive will emerge and should be identified and encouraged. These persons, even acting separately, can give organic direction and impetus that might eventually force democratic change in and on the institutions of state, including the police and create a culture that minimises corruption.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 February 2001