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As Trump Alights in Israel, Palestinians are Descending into Darkness
As Trump Alights in Israel, Palestinians are Descending into Darkness
Palestinians walk on a road during a power cut in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip, 12 January 2017. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem

As Trump Alights in Israel, Palestinians are Descending into Darkness

President Trump plans a 22-23 May visit to Israel and Palestine in pursuit of the “ultimate deal”. But behind the scenes, rising tensions between Palestinian factions may be drawing Gaza and Israel closer to a new war.

President Donald Trump makes a 26-hour visit to Israel on 22 May to discuss the “ultimate deal” — a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians — with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Bethlehem. With his eyes on the big prize, Trump risks neglecting a critical element of any agreement: the Palestinian territory of Gaza, where a new bout of war is potentially brewing.

Gaza’s 1.8 million Palestinians are administered by a third force, Hamas, labeled a terrorist organisation by the U.S. and others, and the isolation of the territory, imposed by Israel and Egypt, is pushing the population dangerously into dire straits. At the end of April, the inhabitants of the narrow coastal strip saw electricity supplies drop to only a few hours a day. The economic lifeline of government salaries has been sharply cut. Access to the internet is slow and irregular. Medicines are critically short.

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One reason for this is the policy of “closure” exercised by Gaza’s neighbours, Israel and Egypt, who are trying to make the other take responsibility for one of the planet’s most overpopulated, oppressed and traumatised places. This policy prevents the vast majority of the territory’s residents from leaving, and greatly increases their sense of entrapment and desperation.

Tensions are being aggravated by an intra-Palestinian feud over taxes, salaries and legitimacy between Hamas, rulers of Gaza since 2007, and President Abbas’s Palestinian Authority, administrators of parts of the West Bank. This month’s change of leadership in Hamas, and its attempt to put a softer face on its armed struggle with Israel by publishing an ambiguous new political document, is unlikely to change its isolation. The general Palestinian mood is also turning rebellious, with West Bankers and Gazans united in overwhelming support of a hunger strike of over 1,500 Palestinian detainees for better conditions in Israeli prisons.

It is unclear what President Trump can do to mitigate any of these inter-related conflicts. Both Netanyahu and Abbas have now visited Trump at the White House, and both are in discussions with the new U.S. administration about its still nascent plans to restart peace negotiations. Though Israelis and Palestinians are sceptical that anything can come of such negotiations, Abbas and Netanyahu feel obliged to show goodwill toward the new and highly unpredictable U.S. president.

The perception that Trump is capricious offers him some leverage that other U.S. presidents might not have had. He is feared by leaders of both sides.

The perception that Trump is capricious offers him some leverage that other U.S. presidents might not have had. He is feared by leaders of both sides. Palestinians worry that he could radically alter, to their detriment, U.S. positions on the core issues of a peace settlement. Trump has been extraordinarily vague about his vision of what he calls “the ultimate deal”, has given the impression that he is not particularly concerned about the details of a would-be accord, and has gone so far as to state that he could “live with” either one state or two.

Trump’s ambiguity concerns the Israelis too. They worry that if he approaches the Israeli-Palestinian conflict like a real-estate transaction, he may, in order to close the deal, apply pressure on them. After all, he has proclaimed political partiality to the Jewish state, but not demonstrated visceral affinity for it. Another concern, for both sides, is what Trump will do if and when he decides that one of them is the primary obstacle to his achievement of a deal that he has prioritised. Could he turn vindictive and isolate, even punish, one or both of the parties?

The ticking time bomb of Gaza

While Trump, Netanyahu and Abbas position themselves for the next round of discussions, a time bomb is ticking. A number of Israeli security analysts and former Israel Defence Forces generals are warning that Gaza’s misery is reaching intolerable levels, as was the case prior to the summer 2014 war that killed 2,139 Palestinians, 64 Israeli soldiers and six Israeli civilians. In fact, the situation in Gaza today is worse than it has been at any time since Israel conquered the territory in 1967, fifty years ago next month.

[The] situation in Gaza today is worse than it has been at any time since Israel conquered the territory in 1967.

In “normal” times, Gaza suffers electricity blackouts of roughly twelve hours per day. Its chronic power shortages have worsened considerably in recent months to 20 hours per day. In January, residents turned out in very large numbers to protest the blackouts and the horrible effects they had on hospitals, water, and sewage. To alleviate the crisis, Qatar and Turkey donated fuel to Gaza for a three-month period, which expired in April.

There are three main sources of electricity for Gaza: about one-tenth comes from Egypt, on three power lines that have been repeatedly shut down in recent years; about one third from the local Gaza power plant, currently working at half its capacity (in part due to fuel shortages); and the rest from Israel. Together these add up to 207-212mw, which is less than half of the power Gaza needs.

Gaza’s electricity supply is complicated by internal Palestinian feuding over who should pay for it and how, and the end result merely underlines how powerless the Palestinian sides are compared to Israel. Days before Abbas’s visit to Washington, the PA said it would stop paying for part of Gaza’s electricity. But the PA cannot actually carry out its threat to stop paying for electricity in Gaza without Israel’s permission.

That’s because goods entering Palestinian territory — including fuel for the Gaza power plant — are taxed by Israel, on behalf of the PA, for a 3 per cent collection fee, which is then transferred to the PA. But before the transfer is made, Israel deducts what the Palestinians owe for electricity in both Gaza and the West Bank. In May, to the PA’s chagrin, Israel carried out its usual deductions for electricity from PA tax revenue and continued to supply Gaza with the same amount as in previous months.

Israel does this not only because it is obliged to do so under existing agreements, but also because it has little incentive to see Gaza descend further into darkness. Israel recognises that the territory’s worsening humanitarian situation might drag it and Hamas toward a new war.

Little help from the neighbours

Keeping up basic services to Gaza’s population is further complicated by the way the territory’s two neighbours, Egypt and Israel, have engaged in a years-long struggle to foist responsibility for Gaza onto the other. Egypt has largely won. Almost all of the goods entering and exiting Gaza now go through Israel, as do most of the small number of Gaza’s residents whom Israel allows to leave (the majority of them are merchants, and the next largest category, which is much smaller, is medical patients). Egypt does not wish to revert to a situation in which it has relatively more responsibility for Gaza, and it is not interested in helping Hamas establish a successful, nearby model of Islamist rule by the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Israel fears that improving conditions in Gaza could strengthen Hamas and undermine the authority of the [Palestinian Authority].

Israel’s Gaza policy is the outcome of several conflicting interests. First and foremost, it wants to keep Hamas weak so that it does not come to pose a greater military threat to Israel and, as importantly, does not grow in power in the West Bank at the expense of Fatah, which is the largest political faction in the PLO (the umbrella organisation for the Palestinian national movement) and the most influential force in the Palestinian government, known as the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel fears that improving conditions in Gaza could strengthen Hamas and undermine the authority of the PA, by stabilising Hamas rule and making the PA appear less unattractive. Second, and in tension with the first, Israel wants to avoid a new war, which means ensuring that conditions do not become so dire that Hamas believes that violence is its only means of escaping from slow suffocation. Third, Israel wants to avoid reoccupying Gaza. Doing so is seen as too costly in blood and treasure, and there does not appear to be any viable exit strategy. None of the potential alternatives to Hamas appears strong enough to take and retain power in Gaza – not the PA or Fatah, and not Salafi-jihadist groups, which, even if they weren’t too weak, would be seen as too dangerous.

Palestinian feuds

The humanitarian crisis is not just aggravated by Israel and Egypt, but by the Palestinians’ own internal divisions. The latest move in the PA’s campaign to squeeze Gaza was a decision by the PA health ministry to stop supplying Gaza with medicines and baby formula. There is a severe shortage of medicine in Gaza, and over 90 per cent of cancer medicines are totally absent. The PA, which typically ships medicine to Gaza every two months, has not sent medicine in three months. The PA claims that whatever shortages exist in Gaza also exist in the West Bank, though there is no comparing the state of health in the two territories, and it says a new shipment will be sent in the coming days.

The [Palestinian Authority] has consistently tried to leverage its relationship with the U.S. to sideline Hamas.

The PA has consistently tried to leverage its relationship with the U.S. to sideline Hamas, partly by attempting to show itself to be a useful weapon against Hamas. Ahead of Abbas’s latest visit to Washington, this took a dangerous turn: the PA decided to drastically cut payments to its employees in Gaza. These were cuts of at least 30 per cent in each employee’s total compensation. Since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, many of these employees have been paid to sit at home, as the PA hoped that it could topple the Gaza government by forcing civil servants, who are largely identified with Fatah, to refuse to work.

Ten years on, this strategy has failed. Hamas hired its own employees, as well as some who had worked for the PA, and many of the PA employees took second jobs. Others sat at home, where their idleness and in some cases drug addiction often had destructive effects on their families. But though these people were not productive, their government salaries were critical to the functioning of the Gaza economy. The PA constituted Gaza’s single largest funding source, with far more “employees” than those hired by the actual, Hamas-run government or by the UN.

When the largest employer in Gaza removes at least one-third of the compensation to its employees, the effects are disastrous, especially when the second-largest employer, the Hamas-led government, has been paying half-salaries for several years. Palestinians refer to the PA pay cuts as the “salaries massacre”. In Gaza, many protesters contend that Abbas’s primary motivation for the cut was simply to show Trump that he was doing what he could to weaken Hamas and bring Gaza to heel. The PA was also motivated by Hamas’s March 2017 decision to set up a formal, parallel administrative committee for overseeing Gaza. Doing so appeared to undermine the 2014 agreement between the PA and Hamas to form a “government of national consensus”, which has only been partially implemented.

The PA justified the cuts by stating that donor aid to the PA had dropped, which is true. But it is also a rather partial and -in this context-  misleading account of PA finances. Before President Sisi took power in Egypt in 2013 and shut nearly all the tunnels under the fences on the Gaza-Sinai border, goods that entered Gaza through the tunnels were taxed by the Hamas-run government. Now that the flow of goods entering Gaza has moved to routes through Israel, Hamas has lost its main source of revenue, while overall PA revenues have increased.

Hamas struggles to evolve

Hamas won general Palestinian elections in 2006, lost a struggle for control of the West Bank to the Western-backed Palestinians now running the PA, and then seized effective control of Gaza in 2007. It is now trying to present a new face to the world. It unveiled a long-expected, more moderate-looking new political document just before Khaled Mish‘al stepped down as leader of Hamas in early May. (Internal Hamas bylaws prevented him from running for another term.)

The specific timing of the press conference to announce the new document does seem to have been influenced by Abbas’s meeting with Trump. Prior to heading to Washington, Abbas had threatened to take new and unspecified steps against Gaza, and, just like Abbas and Netanyahu, Hamas has every reason to fear what the new U.S. administration’s policy toward it might be. Most worrisome is the possibility that Abbas could further squeeze Gaza, with the approval of the U.S. and its Arab allies. The day after Abbas’s meeting with Trump, U.S. Special Representative Jason Greenblatt attended a meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, a group that coordinates development aid to the Palestinians, and placed sole responsibility for Gaza’s electricity crisis on Hamas. Israeli security officials, by contrast, put much of the blame for the humanitarian situation in Gaza on the PA.

Hamas had been trying for many years to downplay the significance of its charter and dissociate itself from it, but a full renunciation was apparently a bridge too far.

The political document does not contain Hamas’s 1988 founding charter’s anti-Semitic or conspiratorial elements, it denounces ethnic and sectarian extremism and bigotry, and it places greater emphasis on Hamas’s nationalist, rather than Islamist, character. During his remarks at the launch press conference, Mish‘al clearly tried to suggest that the political document, and not the charter, now represents Hamas’s vision. But Hamas has not said it is a new charter, and nor does it abrogate or supplant the founding charter. Hamas had been trying for many years to downplay the significance of its charter and dissociate itself from it, but a full renunciation was apparently a bridge too far.

Even so, the document contained no surprises. It is highly cautious, hinting at moderation while still adhering to Hamas’s hardline tenets. It clearly rejects the so-called Quartet principles, the three conditions on diplomatic and financial support to any PA government: recognising Israel; renouncing violence; and abiding by past agreements (the document explicitly rejects the Oslo agreements). At the same time, Hamas wanted the document to be interpreted as a sign of moderation and a potential opening for engagement with governments that have boycotted it.

In attempting to please all, the document risks pleasing none. It hints at compromises in such a tepid manner that, on one hand, hardliners were not too angered, and, on the other, Western and Arab governments were not too impressed. The document fell short of expectations that the movement had itself helped set: dissociating Hamas from the Muslim Brotherhood (which would have been a positive signal to Egypt); accepting a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 lines without recognising Israel; and endorsing so-called “popular” or more-or-less unarmed resistance as a legitimate tool.

The document’s ambiguous circumlocutions are open to many interpretations. Despite the lack of explicit dissociation from the Muslim Brotherhood, some see significance in the fact that the words Muslim Brotherhood do not appear in the document, or the vague affirmation that “Hamas stresses the necessity of maintaining the independence of Palestinian national decision-making. Outside forces should not be allowed to intervene”. The much-promised acceptance of a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 lines was not an acceptance but rather an assertion that “Hamas considers” the establishment of such a state, without recognising Israel, “to be a formula of national consensus.”

The document emphasises continued armed resistance to Israel, and offers less than expected to those hoping Hamas might embrace nonviolent tactics and accept a two-state settlement. The text only makes a weak allusion to non-military methods: “Managing resistance, in terms of escalation or de-escalation, or in terms of diversifying the means and methods, is an integral part of the process of managing the conflict and should not be at the expense of the principle of resistance”.

Senior Hamas leaders had publicly made far more explicit statements in support of compromise than the ones appearing in the document. More than five years ago, Mish‘al himself offered more clearly and strongly worded support for both popular resistance and a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 borders: “Now we have a common ground that we can work on … the popular resistance, which presents the power of people .... We have political differences [with Fatah and the PLO], but the common ground is the state on the ‘67 borders. Why don't we work in this common area?”

For years, political forces seeking engagement with Hamas and those seeking its continued boycott and isolation have screamed past one another without changing many minds. Those in favor of engagement remain a minority, and the new political document is unlikely to boost them. They will point to the document’s clauses on the pre-1967 borders, but those upholding the boycott of Hamas will point to the clauses on liberating all of Palestine, from the river to the sea. Those in favor of engagement will point to the allusion to “diversifying the means and methods of resistance”; their opponents will point to the document’s emphasis on armed resistance. The debate will continue, and the document will now be cited by both sides. It’s hard to see what will change as a result of it.

Trump’s trip

The majority of observers expect that when President Trump eventually encounters serious difficulties, as he inevitably will, he will give up and turn to another issue. For now, though, it is deeply troubling to both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships that unpredictable outcomes are even possible.

What that means for the Trump administration is that he may have more coercive power than other U.S. presidents have had in getting the parties to agree to talks and accompanying confidence-building steps. In March, when Netanyahu threatened to dissolve the current government, the Israeli press was rife with speculation that one of his primary motivations in considering early elections was to buy time — from the moment an election is called until the next government is formed can take over half a year — in order to forestall a new Trump-led peace process. This might include demands on Israel that would be difficult for the present government to accept but also risky to reject, since Trump’s reaction to Israeli intransigence is wholly unknown. Elections could also potentially allow Netanyahu to form a governing coalition that would give him greater freedom to meet challenging U.S. requests.

When Trump was first elected and during the early weeks of his administration, the PLO leadership (it is the PLO, not the PA, that engages in negotiations with Israel) appeared quite nervous because, as was widely reported, it had difficulty establishing contact with senior members of the new administration. Those fears subsided considerably after Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo’s visit to the West Bank in mid-February, the March visit to Israel and the West Bank by Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s Special Representative for International Negotiations, and, especially, the phone call in which Trump invited Abbas to the White House.  

The other important thing for the Palestinians is to show goodwill to the U.S., to assure this administration of the PA’s utility to the U.S., and to make sure that the PLO is not seen as the obstacle to Trump achieving a historic agreement. The Palestinian leadership is keenly aware that U.S. officials view the PA primarily through a security and counter-terrorism prism. The U.S. spends a large portion of its aid to the Palestinians on training, equipping and otherwise supporting its security forces in the West Bank, and the primary aim of this support is to thwart attacks against Israel and more generally minimise friction between Israelis and Palestinians. When talking to U.S. officials, PA leaders typically emphasise their close and ongoing coordination with Israeli security forces, as well as the fact that the Palestinian security forces are praised and valued by Israel. PA leaders also contrast the PA and PLO with Hamas and argue that support to the PA can strengthen self-identified Palestinian moderates and help the U.S. achieve its broader counter-terrorism aims in the region.

Trump seems determined to start a new peace process and, for now, the parties seem determined not to openly upset him.

For his part, Trump seems determined to start a new peace process and, for now, the parties seem determined not to openly upset him. On 9 May, Abbas said that he told Trump that the Palestinians “were ready to collaborate with him and meet the Israeli PM [Benjamin Netanyahu] under his auspices to build peace”. It took President Obama nearly two years to get Abbas and Netanyahu to launch a very short-lived set of direct negotiations. If Trump’s visit secures that alone, it will be a success for him.

Whether Abbas and Netanyahu are any more likely to reach a peace agreement once they do start negotiations is another matter, as is the question of whether a new war over Gaza may overtake them all.

A demonstrator carries a Venezuelan flag as he runs next to a list of the victims of the violence during protests against Venezuela's president Nicolas Maduro government in Caracas, Venezuela, June 12, 2017. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado

Power without the People: Averting Venezuela’s Breakdown

Violence is escalating in Venezuela, killing 70 people in over two months of ever-angrier popular protests against a government that is abandoning representative democracy. Regional states should avert a humanitarian catastrophe by pressuring the Maduro regime to withdraw plans to elect a phony constituent assembly on 30 July.

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I. Overview

Venezuela is in turmoil after more than two months of almost daily mass demonstrations organised across the country by the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance. Almost 70 people have been killed; human rights groups ascribe at least a third of these deaths to excessive force by National Police (PNB) and National Guard (GNB) riot squads, sometimes accompanied by groups of gunmen on motorcycles (so-called colectivos). Thousands have been arrested – some in violent raids on residential properties carried out without warrants – and hundreds arraigned before military tribunals, in violation of the constitution. Systematic looting in several cities adds to the misery of daily life in a country suffering from chronic shortages of food, medicines and other basic goods. Armed thugs, either affiliated with or tolerated by the government, hold de facto authority in many areas.

Venezuela has ceased to be a democracy.

Venezuela has ceased to be a democracy. President Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro have systematically eroded constitutional checks and balances over nearly two decades. The government has suspended democratic elections and stripped the opposition-led National Assembly of virtually all its powers. It intends to rewrite the 1999 constitution, electing a 545-member constituent assembly next month under a specially designed system that almost guarantees a loyalist majority, despite the government’s low poll ratings. The assembly will be empowered to write a new constitution that sweeps aside existing institutions and installs a “communal state”. Government spokesmen have threatened to close the National Assembly, eliminating legislators’ parliamentary immunity and “turn upside down” the prosecution service (fiscalía general) whose head – the former loyalist Luisa Ortega Díaz – now publicly opposes the president.

Venezuela’s descent toward violent anarchy threatens not only its 31 million inhabitants but also the wider region, whose leaders are unable to agree on how to help their neighbour restore democracy, the rule of law and stability. A negotiated resolution remains the best hope for avoiding even greater bloodshed, but not by returning to the futile, time-c0nsuming “dialogue” of 2016. Negotiations should be rigorously structured, with an agreed timetable and agenda, and mediated by external actors able to act as guarantors. The active engagement of the Organization of American States (OAS) will be essential.

Negotiations should be rigorously structured [...] and mediated by external actors able to act as guarantors. The active engagement of the Organization of American States (OAS) will be essential.

Since the present government has rejected such negotiations, however, there is little hope for progress without the emergence of significant fractures between pragmatists and hardliners within both the military and civilian leaderships. Carrots as well as sticks are needed. Chief among the former is a credible plan to restore peaceful democracy that offers guarantees to both sides, including a transitional justice scheme. But first the government must abandon its project for a constituent assembly, which would only intensify the conflict and make a solution even more difficult.

II. What Provoked the Latest Protests?

At the beginning of 2017, the Maduro government was in a buoyant mood. It no longer faced the threat of early presidential elections, having used its institutional stranglehold to block a presidential recall referendum in 2016.[fn]Under the terms of Article 233 of the constitution, the president’s removal during the last two years of his six-year term does not lead to fresh elections. Instead, the vice president (an appointed figure) completes the term. January 2017 marked the beginning of the last two years. For more details on the recall referendum process, see Crisis Group Latin America Report N°59, Venezuela: Tough Talking, 16 December 2016.Hide Footnote The appointment of Aragua state Governor Tareck el Aissami as vice president reinforced the hardliners.[fn]Maduro appointed Aissami vice president on 4 January and within days also named him head of a new, military/civilian “anti-coup command”, which immediately began making arrests. On 13 February the U.S. Treasury Department designated Aissami a “prominent drug-trafficker”, freezing any assets he might have in the U.S. and prohibiting U.S. citizens from doing business with him. “Treasury Sanctions Prominent Venezuelan Drug-Trafficker Tareck el Aissami and his Primary Frontman Samark López Bello”, Treasury Department press release, 13 February 2017.Hide Footnote The MUD was in disarray, internally divided and seemingly unsure where to go next. An abortive dialogue facilitated by the Vatican, which began in late October, fell apart in December, having succeeded only in demobilising street protests and undermining the credibility of opposition leaders.[fn]The dialogue also was facilitated by former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and two Latin American ex-presidents, as well as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) Secretary General Ernesto Samper.Hide Footnote The MUD reorganised, dismissing its secretary general, Jesús “Chuo” Torrealba, and adopting a cumbersome system of coordinating bodies seemingly designed to paper over the splits among member parties.[fn]“Nueva estructura de la Unidad Democrática inició formalmente sus funciones”, Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, 23 February 2017.Hide Footnote

Then in late March, the Supreme Court (TSJ) issued two resolutions that would trigger new conflict, uniting and reinvigorating the opposition. Most controversially, Resolution 156 transferred legislative powers of the National Assembly to the court, a move the MUD condemned as a coup d’état. The resolutions also accused MPs of treason, virtually eliminated their parliamentary immunity and threatened them with trial by military tribunals. On 31 March, Attorney General Luisa Ortega, previously considered a hardline government loyalist, declared that these decisions marked a “breakdown of constitutional order”.[fn]Ortega’s comments came at the end of a presentation carried live on state television. “Luisa Ortega Díaz ruptura del hilo constitucional en Venezuela”, YouTube video, 31 March 2017.Hide Footnote To limit the damage, the government convened the National Defence Council, chaired by Vice President Aissami, which “exhorted” the Supreme Court to reconsider the resolutions – an order the judges promptly obeyed by partially rescinding them.[fn]The u-turn by the court itself was deemed unconstitutional by many independent legal experts. See José Ignacio Hernández, “Sobre el inconstitucional exhorto del Consejo de Defensa Nacional al TSJ”,, 1 April 2017.Hide Footnote

The next day, opposition legislators called the first in a series of demonstrations to demand early general elections and dismissal of justices responsible for the rulings. The OAS Permanent Council, which only days earlier had held an inconclusive meeting on Venezuela, reconvened on 3 April and passed a resolution declaring the court rulings “incompatible with democratic practice” and a “violation of constitutional order”.[fn]In mid-May, the U.S. announced targeted sanctions against Supreme Court President Maikel Moreno and the seven members of the court’s constitutional branch for their role in issuing the resolutions. “Venezuela Supreme Court judges hit with U.S. sanctions”, Reuters, 18 May 2017.Hide Footnote The resolution invoked both the OAS charter and the Inter-American Democratic charter, which includes provisions for dealing with the breakdown of constitutional rule in a member state. It also called for a consultative meeting of OAS foreign ministers. In protest, Venezuela announced it would leave the organisation.[fn]The formal letter announcing withdrawal was handed to Secretary General Luis Almagro on 28 April. The process, however, takes two years to complete. Mariano de Alba, “Venezuela y su posible retiro de la OEA”,, 26 April 2017.Hide Footnote

Though the partial reversal of the Supreme Court resolutions seemed to indicate a climb-down, the Maduro government soon made clear that it was ready to pour more fuel on the fire. On 7 April, the comptroller general announced that it was banning Henrique Capriles, a key opposition leader, from holding elected office for fifteen years.[fn]Capriles, the MUD’s presidential candidate in 2012 and 2013, is governor of the state of Miranda, which includes a large part of the capital, Caracas. He belongs to the Primero Justicia party. A month later a similar ban was imposed on one of the other two opposition state governors, Liborio Guarulla of Amazonas.Hide Footnote The MUD announced that street demonstrations would continue until the government backed down. A pattern emerged of at least three major rallies or marches a week, which were then blocked, dispersed and violently attacked by police and National Guard riot squads, backed in Caracas by armoured vehicles and water-cannon. On average, one person – a demonstrator, a passer-by or a member of the security forces – was killed every day. On 1 May, Maduro announced his plans for a constituent assembly, saying this was the only way to restore “peace”. The opposition dismissed the proposal as a fraud to provide quasi-legal justification for dictatorship.

III. Goodbye to Representative Democracy

Like his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, Maduro came to power through an election, though he won the presidency in April 2013 by only a narrow margin and despite legal challenges.The g[fn]For an account of the 2013 election and the alleged irregularities cited by MUD, see Crisis Group Latin America Report N°28, Venezuela: A House Divided, 16 May 2013.Hide Footnote overnment’s willingness to again face the electorate evaporated after the December 2015 legislative elections, however, when the MUD obtained two thirds of the 167 parliamentary seats.[fn]See Crisis Group Latin America Briefing No°35, The End of Hegemony: What Next for Venezuela?, 21 December 2015.Hide Footnote Since then, it has manoeuvred to avoid elections, evade its commitments under international treaties, and finally change the constitution in order to abolish representative democracy altogether.

A. Avoiding the Electorate

Using the nominally autonomous Supreme Court, Maduro had all laws passed by the opposition-controlled assembly in 2016 declared either unconstitutional or financially unviable. The court’s constitutional bench then removed parliament’s other powers, including oversight of the executive branch and budgetary authority, accusing the assembly of contempt for attempting to seat members from Amazonas charged with vote-buying.[fn]These allegations have never been aired in court, and there has been no move to hold fresh elections, leaving the voters of Amazonas without parliamentary representation. Julett Pineda Sleinan, “Diputados de Amazonas solicitan sentencia definitiva a Sala Electoral del TSJ”, Efecto Cocuyo (, 2 August 2016. The court is divided into salas or benches, such as criminal, electoral and constitutional. The latter has become the de facto court of last appeal.Hide Footnote The president has ruled by decree under a state of emergency first imposed in January 2016, and renewed (to date) seven times.[fn]States of emergency lasting up to 90 days can be declared under the terms of Articles 337-339 of the constitution, but must be approved by the National Assembly. They can be renewed just once, for the same length of time.Hide Footnote When the MUD responded by seeking a presidential recall referendum, under Article 72 of the constitution, Maduro used his control of the electoral authority (CNE) to delay and ultimately block the effort.[fn]All elected officials in Venezuela are subject to a mid-term recall referendum if requested by 20 per cent of the electorate. For details of how the referendum against Maduro was blocked, see Crisis Group Report N°59, Venezuela: Tough Talking,op. cit.Hide Footnote

Elections for state governors, originally scheduled for December 2016, were put on hold. Excuses included lack of funds, controversy over the recall referendum and the court’s decision to launch a complicated, months-long process to “revalidate” political parties, which appears designed to eliminate many of them.[fn]In 2016 the Court ordered that all political parties that had not obtained the votes of at least 1 per cent of the electorate in the 2015 legislative elections should re-register with the electoral authority, a process that involves obtaining the signatures of at least 3 per cent of the electorate in at least twelve states. Initially, 59 parties were affected (though not the opposition Democratic Unity umbrella group nor the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela). The opposition complained that the logistics imposed by the CNE made it almost impossible for most parties to comply with the conditions. Alessandro di Stasio, “Claves para conocer el proceso de renovación de partidos políticos anunciado por el CNE”, Efecto Cocuyo (, 8 February 2017.Hide Footnote On 24 May, the electoral authority announced that the delayed elections would take place on 10 December. However, it also announced elections for a constituent assembly (ANC) on 30 July.[fn]In contrast to the recall referendum petition of 2016, which the CNE took around eight months to process and was eventually denied, Maduro’s ANC petition was granted immediately. After taking 48 days in 2016 to produce the forms for gathering signatures, the CNE produced the equivalent forms in 48 hours, and every other aspect of the process was similarly expedited. Eugenio Martínez, “CNE acelera todos los procesos para cumplir con exigencias de Maduro”, Diario de las Américas, 30 May 2017.Hide Footnote Once elected, the assembly will have authority to cancel any other elections, or even eliminate state governorships altogether.

B. Venezuela’s Divorce from the OAS

Hugo Chávez, who regarded representative democracy as a tool for political control by elites, chafed at the human rights provisions of the Inter-American system, as embodied in the OAS charter and the Inter-American Democratic charter.[fn]Chávez claimed to adhere to “participatory democracy”. See Margarita López-Maya, “Democracia Participativa en Venezuela (1999-2010): orígenes, leyes, percepciones y desafíos”, Centro Gumilla, 2011.Hide Footnote Although Chávez signed the charter (which, ironically, was first invoked in response to a coup that briefly ousted him in April 2002), he made clear his reservations. He was equally dismissive of the Inter-American Human Rights commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose rulings the Venezuelan Supreme Court either ignored or ruled inapplicable. Chávez denied the commission access to Venezuela, arguing that its criticisms were part of a U.S.-inspired campaign against his government. In September 2013, Venezuela renounced the American Convention on Human Rights.[fn]The decision, which took effect a year later, means no further cases relating to Venezuela can be brought before the Inter-American Human Rights Court. José Ignacio Hernández, “Venezuela se sale de la CIDH. ¿Y ahora?”, Prodavinci (, 10 September 2013.Hide Footnote

This process of withdrawal from the Inter-American system reached its logical conclusion with the Maduro government’s decision to renounce its OAS membership. The unprecedented move leaves Venezuela isolated from the regional body’s other 34 members, along with Cuba, which was suspended from 1962-2009 and has refused to rejoin. Other close allies of the Maduro government, such as Bolivia and Nicaragua, have shown no inclination to follow Venezuela’s example.

C. The National Constituent Assembly

The government’s decision to convene a constituent assembly or ANC epitomised its rejection of internationally accepted democratic norms. President Maduro says his aim is to promote dialogue and restore peace. Declarations by other leading proponents suggest a different intention, however. Former Attorney General Isaías Rodríguez, a member of the presidential commission charged with promoting the assembly, has spoken of using it to “annihilate” the political right.[fn]“Isaías Rodríguez llama a ‘aniquilar la derecha’ con la nueva constitución, Agencia Efe, 3 June 2017. Rodríguez vowed that the government would, “sweep aside, finish off, definitively annihilate” what he called “the right”.Hide Footnote Diosdado Cabello, vice president of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela, said the ANC would close down the National Assembly and eliminate current legislators’ parliamentary immunity, while another member of the presidential commission, constitutional lawyer Hermann Escarrá, said it would even assume criminal justice functions.

Although Article 348 of the constitution states that the president is among those who can trigger the drafting of a new constitution, Articles 347 clearly states that only “the people” can convene a constituent assembly. Most scholars argue that this requires a prior referendum, but the government has refused to hold one.[fn]José I. Hernández, “Sobre el extraño caso de la firma del decreto de la ‘constituyente ciudadana’”, Prodavinci (, 3 May 2017.Hide Footnote  It is also unclear whether the electorate will get to approve any resulting constitutional text. Under pressure from both the opposition and dissident chavistas, the government modified ANC regulations to include a referendum. However, the final decision will rest with the constituent assembly itself.[fn]Among the many voices rejecting the ANC proposal is that of the Catholic Church, which has declared it both unnecessary and inappropriate. “Palabras de Mons. Diego Padrón Sánchez al Presidente de la Comisión Organizadora de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente”, 21 May 2005.Hide Footnote

Even more serious are problems with how the ANC will be elected. The method proposed by the government (and accepted by the Supreme Court and electoral authority) is skewed against heavily populated urban areas where the opposition is strongest.[fn]The government changed regulations used to elect the 1999 Constituent Assembly, probably because they would likely produce an opposition majority. Around two thirds of respondents in recent polls do not think a constituent assembly is a priority, and more than 80 per cent would like Maduro to leave office this year. “7 de cada 10 venezolanos opinan que viven en dictadura, apoyan las protestas y quieren que Maduro se vaya”,, 22 May 2017.Hide Footnote Each of the country’s 335 municipalities will elect one assembly member, regardless of population size. Municipalities that are also state capitals will elect two. This means, for example, that the city of Maracaibo (capital of Zulia state), with almost a million voters, will elect two members, while the state of Táchira with 29 municipalities but only 826,000 voters, will elect 30. Tiny towns in remote Amazonas state will have the same weight as municipalities in metropolitan Caracas with hundreds of thousands of voters. The system would also make it almost impossible for the opposition to take both seats in state capitals, giving the government a virtually guaranteed 50 per cent of these (ie 23 seats).

The rules also provide for 173 assembly members to be elected by eight arbitrarily chosen “sectors”: students, peasants and fishermen, business owners, the disabled, pensioners, workers, indigenous people, members of communal councils and members of communes. There are no published electoral registers for these sectors; only the government has access to relevant databases. Some – particularly the communes and communal councils – are vulnerable to manipulation by the state.[fn]The government created communal councils in 2006 as grassroots citizens’ organisations politically and economically dependent on the central government. Under a constitutional reform proposed by Chávez in 2007 and rejected in a referendum, the “commune” would have become the basic unit of social and political organisation. Despite the defeat, the plan has been partially implemented. Voters deemed to belong to these or any other of the “sectors” will also vote for their municipal representative. But it is the government that will decide who belongs to which voting bloc, and not everyone will have a “sectoral” vote.Hide Footnote

IV. The Risks of Escalation

The Maduro government has shown that it is willing to use state-sponsored violence to remain in power rather than give in to opposition demands for free and fair elections. Opposition protests have for the most part been non-violent, but its current leaders may not be able to retain control of the anti-Maduro movement, which includes sectors of the population that have little affinity with them.[fn]A poll by More Consulting, for example, carried out between 2 and 5 May 2017, found over 70 per cent in favour of Maduro leaving office this year, compared with around 55 per cent support for the opposition.Hide Footnote And while a split in the armed forces might bring about a swift conclusion to the conflict, it is also possible that it could lead to protracted violent clashes on the streets, with rival factions, both civilian and military, fighting for control.

A. Will the Opposition Shoot Back?

The Democratic Unity alliance, which represents the overwhelming majority of opposition political parties, says it is committed to a non-violent, electoral solution to the conflict. Many of its leaders, including members of parliament, have been injured while marching at the forefront of demonstrations without gas masks, helmets or other forms of protection.[fn]On 3 May alone at least five MPs were injured. “Varios diputados resultaron heridos tras represión en la marcha opositora”, Tal Cual, 3 May 2017. Miranda state governor and former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles was attacked by the National Guard on 29 May. “GNB agredió a Capriles y robó a su equipo en Las Mercedes”, El Nacional, 29 May 2017.Hide Footnote Despite their rejection of violence, the Maduro government has painted protest leaders as terrorists.[fn]“Presidente Maduro: Pese a algunos focos terroristas, Venezuela sigue en paz trabajando”, VTV (available on, 16 May 2017.Hide Footnote

Groups of youths, known as La Resistencia, have clashed for hours with security forces, using rocks, petrol bombs and other projectiles, including home-made mortars.

The demonstrations, however, have not been entirely peaceful. Groups of youths, known as La Resistencia, have clashed for hours with security forces, using rocks, petrol bombs and other projectiles, including home-made mortars. Trucks and buses have been hijacked and set alight; in a few cases “infiltrators” allegedly have been lynched.[fn]Circumstances surrounding some of the bus-burning incidents (including non-intervention by security forces and apparent presence of colectivos) suggest they may have been carried out by government supporters. The lack of response from security forces and the reported presence of colectivos seem suspicious. The most notorious lynching incident took place in the Altamira district of Caracas during a demonstration on 20 May when 22-year-old Orlando Figuera was set alight. The government has insisted that the victim, who later died, was lynched for allegedly being a chavista. The prosecution service, however, concluded that he had been accused of theft.
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Communities and some outsiders regularly erect barricades in parts of the capital while elsewhere they have set fire to government buildings, ruling party headquarters and even police and military installations, most notably in the western states of Táchira and Barinas but also in Aragua, on the central northern coast, and Sucre to the east. In Zulia and Anzoátegui states, demonstrators have destroyed or damaged statues of Chávez. Protests have also erupted in communities west and south west of Caracas that until recently were bastions of chavismo.[fn]Particularly striking were mass demonstrations in the La Vega barrio, not far from the presidential palace, beginning on 2 June, in which local people complained of lack of food and medicines and were met with teargas and GNB riot squads. “La Vega amaneció entre protestas y represión”, El Nacional, 2 June 2017.Hide Footnote

The opposition leadership could lose further control if the conflict is not resolved quickly. Illegal firearms are available in large quantities and there are plenty of people – particularly former members of the police and armed forces – with the skills and experience to make use of them.[fn]An opposition politician told Crisis Group that ex-security forces members had offered to create an armed wing of the movement. The politician rejected the proposal. Crisis Group interview, Caracas, 8 May 2017.Hide Footnote

B. Will the Army Split?

On 10 April, three Venezuelan army lieutenants asked for political asylum in Colombia after crossing the border at Cúcuta. Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez called for their extradition, accusing them of plotting a coup. The lieutenants, who recorded a video calling on the armed forces to “turn their back on the tyrant”, belong to an apparently large group of dissident officers, most of whom graduated from the military academy in 2012. Analysts attribute their discontent to the presence of Cuban officers and rampant corruption in the upper echelons of the military.[fn]Javier Ignacio Mayorca, “Alzados en el Ejercito contra la cubanización”, Revista Clímax (, 22 May 2017.Hide Footnote Many officers, from various branches of the armed forces, reportedly are in detention, either in military prisons or intelligence (DGCIM) installations.[fn]Girish Gupta & Andrew Cawthorne, “Fourteen Venezuelan army officers jailed in first week of protests – documents”, Reuters, 6 June 2017.Hide Footnote Some appear to be National Guard officers, detained for ignoring orders to repress demonstrations by force, although information is scanty.[fn]On 6 May defence minister General Vladimir Padrino López told National Guard officers, “I don’t want to see another National Guard (soldier) committing atrocities in the street”, in what was seen by some analysts as evidence of unease in the army over the behaviour of military riot squads. No change in their behaviour was subsequently observed, however. “Afirman que declaración de Padrino. López es un quiebre público con Reverol”, El Nacional, 7 June 2017.
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The armed forces appear to remain largely unified, however. This cohesion could be tested if the government uses the army to bolster police and National Guard riot squads. It has already deployed some units to the interior, sending 600 Special Forces troops to the south-western state of Táchira on 17 May, along with 2,000 additional National Guards. Ostensibly, their role is to neutralise “paramilitary” or “mercenary” groups allegedly employed by the opposition to “overthrow the government”.[fn]Hernán Lugo Galicia, “Uso de fuerzas especiales y tres anillos forman parte del Plan Zamora (1)”, Crónica Uno, 23 May 2017. See Section C (below) for more on Plan Zamora.Hide Footnote

C. “Colectivos” Unleashed

On 17 April, President Maduro announced plans to expand the Bolivarian Militia to 500,000 (and eventually 1 million) members, each equipped with a rifle.[fn]The Militia was created by Hugo Chávez as a fifth branch of the Venezuelan armed forces (the constitution only recognises four) in 2008. Its allegiance is to the chavista movement, not the nation. Edecio Brito, “Control Ciudadano: la milicia se consolida como un cuerpo armado al servicio del Gobierno”, El Pitazo (, 17 June 2016.Hide Footnote The militia, he said, would defend the country against a “ferocious offensive” mounted by opposition “traitors”. Diosdado Cabello said there were also 60,000 motorizados ready to protect the centre of Caracas. These armed civilians on motorcycles, also commonly referred to as colectivos, act as para-police groups, enforcing political loyalty in the barrios and sometimes helping police and National Guard break up opposition demonstrations.[fn]Attorney General Luisa Ortega told the press on 24 May that prosecutors had opened criminal investigations into 165 armed civilian groups. “Fiscal Ortega Díaz: ‘A Pernalete lo impactó una bomba lacrimógena’,” El Pitazo (, 24 May 2017.Hide Footnote The government denies involvement with the colectivos, though photographs and videos apparently show armed civilians on motorcycles operating in coordination with uniformed security forces.[fn]In recent weeks, armed civilians acting in concert with the National Guard have invaded and damaged private property, sometimes in daylight hours. Sabrina D’Amore, “Paramilitares y GNB reprimieron, robaron y amedrentaron a vecinos de La Urbina”, Runrunes, 4 May 2017.Hide Footnote

A day later, the president authorised implementation of the first phase of Plan Zamora, a military/civilian plan to combat threats to internal order by those allegedly planning a coup. It includes deploying armed civilians alongside security forces and using military tribunals to try government opponents.[fn]The systematic incorporation of para-police groups into public order functions was prefigured in the unconstitutional State of Exception decree of 13 May 2016. “Decreto No. 2.323, mediante el cual se declara el Estado de Excepción y de la Emergencia Económica, dadas las circunstancias extraordinarias de orden Social, Económico, Político, Natural y Ecológicas que afectan gravemente la Economía Nacional”, Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria No. 6.227.Hide Footnote The pretext for the plan’s launch was an outbreak of looting in the country’s third city, Valencia. Some 780 people were arrested, including 251 put before military tribunals on charges such as rebellion.[fn]According to the legal aid group Foro Penal Venezolano, collective hearings involving up to 40 defendants took place. “¿Por qué militares procesan a civiles?”, BBC Mundo, 9 May 2017.Hide Footnote

D. A Failing State?

The Venezuelan government is unable to fulfil some of the modern state’s most basic functions. Not only is the country suffering from acute food insecurity and a collapsing health system (see below), but also from rampant and largely unpunished criminal violence: more than 90 per cent of the 20,000-plus homicides committed every year go unpunished.[fn]According to the attorney general there were 21,752 murders in Venezuela in 2016, a rate of over 70 per 100,000 inhabitants. Human rights and security activists put the impunity rate for homicide at between 94 and 98 per cent, similar to rates recorded in Central America’s violent Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras).Hide Footnote Gangs run many of the country’s prisons, using them to organise extortion, kidnapping and hijacking rackets. The colectivos engage in crime as well as threatening and harassing the opposition. On the Colombian border, a similar role often is played by guerrillas of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), an armed leftist group engaged in tentative peace talks with the Colombian government, or by the home-grown paramilitaries of the Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación, who operate smuggling, kidnap and extortion rackets and profess loyalty to the government. Both groups have threatened opposition activists in border areas.[fn]Crisis Group interview, foreign journalist reporting on border region, 6 June 2017.Hide Footnote

State security forces are increasingly prone to brazenly predatory acts against civilians.

Control over certain territories is shifting to quasi-state armed groups. In south-eastern gold and diamond mining areas, the so-called sindicatos (nominally miners’ unions, but in practice armed, criminal gangs reportedly linked to senior military officers and the state government) exercise de facto control, smuggling vast quantities of precious minerals out of the country. “They come and ask for food”, said a farmer in Bolívar state. “If you say you don’t have any, they shoot your cattle right in front of you”.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, farmer in El Callao, Bolívar, 22 May 2017.Hide Footnote State security forces are increasingly prone to brazenly predatory acts against civilians. National Guard officers at alcabalas (military checkpoints on the highway) extort money from smugglers and legitimate transport companies alike, and they are not alone. Fruit and vegetable vendors in central Venezuela say their costs have increased because of the so-called vacunas (literally “vaccinations”, meaning bribes) that the truckers have to pay en route. Informal alcabalas sometimes spring up even on main highways in daylight.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, security analyst in Maracaibo, 31 May 2017. GNB troops, as well as police, have also been accused in recent days of systematically robbing demonstrators in Caracas, particularly of their mobile phones and other valuables. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles said on 29 May that he and his staff had been beaten and robbed by the GNB. “GNB agredió y robó a su equipo en Las Mercedes”, El Nacional, 29 May 2017.Hide Footnote

V. How to Prevent a Catastrophe

Venezuela is immersed in a profound crisis that is not just political but also economic (see graphs 1 and 2 below). Per capita GDP has fallen by more than a third since 2012, the second worst economic collapse in recent Latin American history.[fn]Francisco Rodríguez, “Don’t let Venezuela become the next Libya”, Financial Times, 31 May 2017. The worst was wartime Nicaragua 1977-1979.Hide Footnote Ten per cent of the population living in extreme poverty (around 1.5 million people) admits to obtaining food from the garbage.[fn]Encuesta Condiciones de Vida (Universidad Central de Venezuela, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello & Universidad Simón Bolívar), February 2017. “Encovi: 82% de los hogares está en pobreza”, Agencia Efe, 17 February 2017.Hide Footnote Infant mortality increased by more than 30 per cent between 2015 and 2016, and more than 11 per cent of children suffer from acute malnutrition.[fn]Health Minister Antonieta Caporale was sacked on 10 May, just days after publishing the epidemiological bulletins for 2016, which revealed a 30 per cent increase in infant mortality and a 76 per cent rise in maternal mortality, as well as the reappearance of diphtheria after 24 years and a 76 per cent increase in malaria cases. “Lo que revelan las cifras de salud oficiales de Venezuela”, BBC Mundo, 10 May 2017. The bulletin had not been published since late 2014.Hide Footnote  Most essential medicines are unobtainable. Domestic production has collapsed, with manufacturing firms operating at 20-30 per cent of installed capacity. Imports fell by 72 per cent between 2012 and 2016, and continue to plummet in 2017.

Negative Growth. Venezuela’s national income plummeted in 2015. Although forecasts suggest some recovery, the economy is not expected to grow in real terms for years. (Change in GDP at constant prices). Data after 2016 are estimates. International Monetary Fund and Bloomberg.
Economists forecast that Venezuela’s economy in 2019 will be roughly the same size it was in 1999. (GDP in real terms relative to 1996). Note: Data for 2016 is an estimate, reflecting IEA data showing a drop of 220,000 barrels a day that year. BP, International Energy Agency and Bloomberg.

To pay its most urgent bills (especially the foreign debt) the government is selling off assets at massive discounts.[fn]In May, the government sold $2.8 billion in state oil company bonds to the investment bank Goldman Sachs for just 31 cents on the dollar. Kejal Vyas & Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Goldman Sachs bought Venezuela’s state oil company’s bonds last week”, The Wall Street Journal, 28 May 2017.Hide Footnote Lack of food, medicines and other basic goods, along with a collapse in the purchasing power of wages, is driving tens of thousands to leave the country, especially to neighbouring Colombia and Brazil, straining their resources.[fn]Colombia recently sent a delegation to Turkey to learn about how to respond to sudden mass migration. “Preparan un plan de contingencia por llegada masiva de venezolanos”, El Tiempo (Colombia), 17 May 2017. It is reported to be preparing to receive up to a million displaced people, many of them of Colombian origin.Hide Footnote The government’s response is to blame its enemies and radicalise its base – a recipe for further polarisation, violence and poverty. There is no indication that the group around Maduro, including both civilian and military leaders, has any intention of negotiating a return to democracy. Such a restoration will only take place if pragmatists in government and the judicial system gain the upper hand, or if the government collapses, either because it runs out of money, or because the armed forces withdraw support.

The opposition sees little option but to maintain its campaign of non-violent demonstrations in a bid to persuade both the armed forces and/or civilians in key positions (especially the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the electoral authority and the ombudsman’s office) to break ranks. Offers of leniency to government members through a transitional justice bill passed by parliament could prove useful in that regard. Government hardliners may ultimately need to be offered safe passage to exile, since no feasible transitional justice system is likely to offer them immunity from prosecution for human rights violations or involvement in serious organised crime.

Neither Venezuela’s neighbours nor the wider international community should remain on the margins. The region should put in place a “contact group”, ideally comprising four to six countries, including at least two allies of the Venezuelan government, to push for a negotiated solution. This effort will need to secure broad international support, including from major powers friendly to the chavista regime, such as China and Russia. Such a move already has been contemplated by a majority bloc within the OAS. But a consultative meeting of foreign ministers on 31 May failed to reach consensus, with the fourteen-nation CARICOM bloc of Caribbean states urging “non-interference”. The meeting was to reconvene just before the OAS General Assembly in Cancún, Mexico, 19-21 June 2017.

If the OAS fails to set up a contact group, an ad hoc group of countries should step in to promote a negotiated solution.[fn]There are precedents for this, of which the Contadora Group, formed in 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, and which laid the groundwork for peace in Central America, is the most obvious.Hide Footnote The most urgent task of either a contact or an ad hoc group would be to put pressure on the Maduro government to abandon plans for a constituent assembly, commit to free and fair elections, and begin complying with the four key commitments it made during the 2016 dialogue but never implemented.[fn]The four (succinctly enumerated in a 2 December 2016 letter from Vatican Secretary of State Pietro Parolin to Maduro) are: freedom for political prisoners, restoration of the powers of the National Assembly, autonomy for the CNE and TSJ, and a humanitarian corridor.Hide Footnote The powers of the National Assembly should be restored, political prisoners released, a humanitarian assistance program launched and steps taken to replace government loyalists in the Supreme Court and the electoral authority with independent, respected professionals in accordance with constitutional requirements.

Should neither persuasion nor protest force the government to change course, then the international community must be prepared to deal with the humanitarian consequences of even more intense conflict.

It is likely, as indicated above, that little progress will be made until the Maduro government runs out of alternative options, or is replaced by a more pragmatic leadership. Should neither persuasion nor protest force the government to change course, then the international community must be prepared to deal with the humanitarian consequences of even more intense conflict, including mass emigration, extreme hunger, and even more bloodshed.

Should the government prove willing to negotiate in good faith, however, restoration of constitutional rule probably will require formation of a transitional government of national unity under a mutually acceptable interim president, pending regional elections (currently scheduled for December 2017) and presidential elections in December 2018 as required under the 1999 constitution. The constitution may need to be amended to reinstate adequate checks on executive power and reassure chavistas there will be no witch hunts under a future opposition presidency. Given the massive foreign debt and critical scarcity of foreign reserves, there is also an urgent need for debt relief and a swift injection of capital to restore financial viability. An emergency economic program should also include extensive welfare programs for the most vulnerable groups in society.

There is still time to avert an outbreak of full-scale violence, but only if the government exercises restraint, the opposition shows leniency, and the international community presses both sides to cooperate while holding out the promise of immediate humanitarian relief and long-term economic aid.

Caracas/Brussels, 19 June 2017

Appendix A: Map of Venezuela

Map of Venezuela. International Crisis Group/KO/June2017.