Yemen Conflict Alert: Seize the Chance to End the Conflict
Yemen Conflict Alert: Seize the Chance to End the Conflict
Toward Open Roads in Yemen’s Taiz
Toward Open Roads in Yemen’s Taiz
A Southern Resistance fighter is pictured through a damaged door glass in Yemen's southern port city of Aden on 24 July 2015. REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser
A Southern Resistance fighter is pictured through a damaged door glass in Yemen's southern port city of Aden on 24 July 2015. REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser

Yemen Conflict Alert: Seize the Chance to End the Conflict

The military tide has turned against Huthi fighters in Yemen. Emboldened by recent gains, the Saudi-led coalition has started to push into the centre of the country from Aden, the southern port city taken in mid-July, and may even attempt to capture the capital, Sanaa, further north. To avoid a new and potentially more deadly phase of conflict, the Huthis should honour the concessions they made through UN mediation efforts in Muscat on 8-9 August, including among others a militia withdrawal from cities in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2216 (14 April). In turn, their opponents should accept a compromise that produces an immediate ceasefire, negotiations over the details of an orderly withdrawal of militias from cities and a return to a Yemeni political process to settle outstanding questions.

Widespread conflict broke out in March, when political talks collapsed and Huthi fighters, supported by military units affiliated with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, marched south, forcing President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi to flee to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, which views the Huthis as Iranian proxies, promptly launched an air campaign and imposed a de-facto naval and air blockade to roll back the advances and reinstate Hadi’s government. By the end of June, the Saudi-led coalition, which includes nine other, mostly Arab states, had slowed Huthi advances in the south and east, where domestic opposition to them is strongest.

In July, the stalemate was broken. A combination of new ground troops (both Yemeni and coalition), an injection of Western-made armoured vehicles and intense airstrikes overwhelmed the overextended Huthis in Aden. On 15 July, anti-Huthi fighters captured the international airport there and within two weeks consolidated control over most of the city. Since then, they have wrested control of surrounding governorates from war-weary Huthis, who are thinly spread and ill at ease in areas far from their northern home territory. This has changed the war’s psychology and inspired opposition forces to intensify their fight against the Huthis farther north in Taiz, Ibb, Sanaa and Marib provinces.

There is now legitimate fear that the Saudi-led coalition may be tempted to forego a political compromise and seek a more decisive military victory throughout the country, including the capital. Coalition actions indicate that this is its plan. But a military campaign in the northern highlands and particularly Sanaa would likely open a longer, more deadly military phase, compound a catastrophic humanitarian crisis and push Yemen further away from any chance of a durable political solution.

The coalition is on the verge of repeating the Huthis’ principal mistake: rapid expansion into inhospitable terrain difficult, if not impossible, to hold. Coalition victories thus far are predominately in the south and east, majority Shafai (Sunni) areas where resistance to the Huthis is strongest. The northern highlands are very different. There the Huthis have a popular base and familiar, mountainous terrain conducive to prolonged guerrilla warfare. They have many enemies as well, of course, especially among tribal families such as the Ahmars and affiliates of the Sunni Islamist party Islah. But latent opposition to the Huthis from other groups, such as Saleh’s General People’s Congress Party (GPC) and affiliated military units, is tempered by widespread resentment of the Saudi-led military campaign, President Hadi and Islah. Coalition attempts to support anti-Huthi fighters in this multi-layered environment are more likely to fuel a thriving war economy than to produce a decisive military victory against a well-entrenched local militia.

Instead of prompting more violence, recent coalition gains could and should serve as a pivot to a political solution. The UN special envoy has already met with Huthi and Saleh’s GPC representatives in Muscat to discuss a package deal that would facilitate a durable ceasefire and a move to political negotiations. Significant progress was made, with the Huthis for the first time showing willingness to treat seriously their opponents’ demands, including withdrawal from cities and working within the framework of Security Council resolutions. The changed balance of power on the ground seemingly has produced an opportunity for compromise, but only if the Hadi government in Riyadh and its Saudi backers seize the moment.

Several steps are needed so that this opportunity is not lost:

  • The Yemeni government in Riyadh and the Saudi-led coalition should support progress made in Muscat and work with the UN envoy to secure a framework plan that provides, among other things, for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of militias from cities and a return to a political process, all in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2216.
  • Both sides should then publicly agree to the UN-brokered framework. Some components of a plan will take longer than others to negotiate and implement, but combatants can do two things at once to build confidence:
    • release political prisoners; and
    • withdraw militias from the southern city of Taiz in accordance with a locally brokered plan to return control of the city to the local security committee. The Taiz plan is ready and could be a model for other cities, including Sanaa.
  • As soon as a ceasefire is in place, the Huthis should remove heavy weapons from the Saudi border and Saudi Arabia should expedite aid to the northern Yemeni governorate of Saada.
  • The permanent members of the UN Security Council, especially the U.S., which has been providing weapons and other support for the coalition war effort, should clearly back the UN envoy’s efforts to broker a political solution in line with Resolution 2216 and be willing to adopt a follow-up resolution supporting the political process and criticising any side that rejects a compromise backed by the UN envoy.

The diplomatic breakthrough in Muscat, for which Oman deserves much credit, is a real opportunity to arrest Yemen’s downward spiral. The war has already cut deeply into the social fabric, exacerbating and militarising political, sectarian and regional divides in ways that make reconciliation more challenging. Over 4,000 have died in the fighting, and the country is on the brink of man-made famine. If this opportunity is missed, the next round of violence promises to be more devastating, not only in the north, but also in the south and east, where a range of anti-Huthi fighters – from southern separatists to al-Qaeda – are heavily armed and likely to turn on each other.


A car travelling from Yemen’s Taiz city to Aden via the Hajjat al-Abd road. This route is prone to car and truck accidents which can be deadly. CRISIS GROUP / Ahmed Basha

Toward Open Roads in Yemen’s Taiz

Taiz, a city in central Yemen, is besieged by Huthi rebels and practically cut off from the rest of the country. Restored road access would save lives and build trust that could help bring peace to Yemen, but time is short.

More than a month has passed since the UN announced a truce between Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the Huthi rebels it has been battling for the past seven years with backing from a coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Thus far, the truce itself has held, if somewhat shakily. But the UN has been able to secure partial implementation of only two of the three confidence-building measures it attached to the deal that has halted the fighting: passage of fuel shipments into the Huthi-held Red Sea port of Hodeida and reopening of the Huthi-held Sanaa International Airport to commercial flights for the first time since 2016. There has been little if any progress on the third measure – reinvigoration of efforts to restore road access to Taiz, a city in central Yemen that the Huthis have besieged since 2016. UN officials are now in a race against time to ensure that the Sanaa airport remains open in the hope of prolonging the truce and starting political talks. Important as that task is, they must not forget Taiz. What happens there could either accelerate a shift away from violent confrontation to political negotiations, or become an impediment that derails UN-led efforts to finally end Yemen’s destructive war.

A Fragile Opportunity

Recent developments present a moment of opportunity in Yemen. The two-month truce came into effect on 2 April. It is an informal, self-policed agreement by the parties to stop fighting. In theory, it is renewable. The UN’s hope is that an extended truce can be a springboard for political talks about a formal ceasefire and a negotiated way out of the conflict.

Less than a week after the UN announced the truce, Yemen’s president of ten years, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, announced that he was ceding power to a new eight-member presidential council led by the former interior minister, Rashad al-Alimi. Hadi reportedly stepped down under pressure from Saudi Arabia as part of an initiative to reorganise the anti-Huthi bloc. Anti-Huthi Yemenis had heavily criticised Hadi for exercising too little leadership in the disparate anti-Huthi alliance. The Huthis publicly dismissed the new council as a mere “reshuffling of mercenaries” that underscores what they see as the government’s lack of legitimacy. Yet the council is broadly representative of the range of military and political factions opposing the Huthis. It has since been inaugurated in Aden, along with a prime minister and cabinet.

The truce and the council’s formation ... present an important, if limited opportunity to kickstart a political process.

The truce and the council’s formation – and the latter’s public declarations that it will pursue peace with the Huthis – present an important, if limited opportunity to kickstart a political process, particularly given the decline in the Huthis’ battlefield dominance as a result of renewed Emirati support for anti-Huthi forces. It is probably an exaggeration to say peace is an immediate possibility, and many Yemenis see the truce as an opportunity for the rival parties to regroup rather than to cease hostilities. Still, prospects for a move from violent combat to meaningful political negotiations are better now than they have been in years.

In order to capitalise on the opportunity for a truce extension, the parties need to make sustained progress on all three of the related confidence-building measures. The UN appears already to be pushing hard on fuel shipments and reopening Sanaa airport. The Taiz issue, however, requires closer attention.

A four-wheel vehicle carries passengers travelling from Aden to Taiz city through the Hajjat al-Abd road, a dangerous detour route linking both governorates. CRISIS GROUP / Ahmed Basha

Taiz and the Truce

That the truce has held up so far, if a bit tenuously, is an achievement in and of itself given the depth of distrust between the Huthis and their rivals, who have exchanged recriminations over delays in taking the agreed-upon steps. Yet nowhere does distrust of the Huthis’ intentions run higher than in Taiz, where residents greeted the truce announcement with protest instead of celebration. Many residents saw the agreement’s provisions for their city as unrealistic. For many in the anti-Huthi camp, Taiz has become a symbol of what they see as a lopsided international approach that gives short shrift to their grievances while seeking to appease the Huthis. 

Taiz governorate has been isolated from the rest of Yemen since battles in 2015 left the Huthis holding its economically and strategically important northern regions and encircling Taiz city, whose centre remained under the control of government-aligned forces. Fighting has cut off all the main overland routes linking Taiz with Huthi- and government-controlled areas. No matter where they travel, Yemenis who live in the city are forced to navigate single-track mountain roads with perilous hairpin bends and checkpoints manned by armed groups. 

The consequences have been debilitating for civic life and commerce. Travel time to and from Taiz has increased dramatically. A trip from Huthi-controlled Hawban, Taiz governorate’s industrial hub where many residents work, to government-controlled Taiz city centre once took between 5 and 15 minutes by car and now takes 5 to 6 hours along a poorly maintained one-lane road. Travelling from Taiz to the southern port city of Aden takes from 6 to 8 hours by car; it took 2 to 3 hours before 2015. Moving basic goods like food and fuel by truck between the two nominally allied cities can take anywhere from 14 hours to several days. Higher transport costs and checkpoint fees, combined with other costs of operating in a war economy, have driven up food and fuel prices inside the city, making it one of the most expensive places to live in Yemen. It is not uncommon for sick Taizis to die on their way to Aden or Sanaa for urgent medical care. Thus far, the Huthis have had little incentive to improve road access to the city: they control the governorate’s economic heart and are keeping their main local rivals boxed in. Further complicating matters, parts of Taiz governorate not controlled by the Huthis are heavily contested by rival groups within the anti-Huthi bloc, sometimes violently.

Hawban to Taiz
Aden to Taiz

Failed Precedents

A series of local and international initiatives has failed to improve access to Taiz city – a failure that many residents see as the product of a UN and international bias in favour of the Huthis. In explaining their frustration, they point to the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, which staved off a battle for Hodeida, and was intended to set the stage for broader peace talks. That agreement contained a vague sub-agreement on Taiz: it called on both sides to select representatives to a joint committee, which would work toward the goal of reopening humanitarian corridors into the city centre. The committee was also to submit a single report on movement toward improving road access into the city in the run-up to future consultations.

But the sub-agreement yielded no meaningful progress on restoring Taiz residents’ access to the rest of the country. Although the UN held individual meetings with each of the parties’ representatives, the delegations never met jointly as a committee, much less reached agreement on how to achieve the goals articulated in Sweden. Anti-Huthi Yemenis criticised the UN for failing to expend the same energy on reopening Taiz – which residents see as a humanitarian issue – that it did on ending the siege of Hodeida. Many of the Yemenis who have worked on the Taiz road issue since the start of the war believe the UN should not have made it part of the Stockholm deal and instead should have negotiated access on a separate track. In their view, placing Taiz in the Stockholm framework made it too easy for the Huthis to make progress on this issue contingent on implementation of other aspects of the agreement. There is also a widespread perception that the UN gave up too quickly when negotiations over the roads faltered and other pressing issues took precedence.

The Taiz situation plays into tensions among the anti-Huthi bloc’s various components.

The Taiz situation plays into tensions among the anti-Huthi bloc’s various components, which Riyadh has been trying to unify under a single umbrella. Many Taizis believe that the Saudi-led coalition – and especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has an expressly anti-Islamist domestic and regional agenda – wishes for Taiz to remain isolated in order to keep Islah, an Islamist group dominant in Taiz, weak. Yemenis in this camp point to the ability of UAE-backed forces to mobilise troops and retake territory in other parts of the country, as they did in three districts in southern Shebwa and Marib earlier in 2022. They believe that the Saudi-led coalition could, if it wished, provide more military assistance to anti-Huthi forces in Taiz to push the Huthis back from the roads around the city at the very least. Some anti-Huthi Yemenis also perceive the truce as a signal that Saudi Arabia wants to extricate itself from the war. They believe that the Saudis agreed to include progress on Taiz issues as one of the three confidence-building measures only to mollify the Hadi government, which reportedly had resisted the deal.

But this anti-Saudi sentiment, and a sense that Riyadh acted imperiously in pushing for formation of the new presidential council, could wind up working in Taiz’s favour. The council, whose head, al-Alimi, is himself from Taiz, is under pressure to demonstrate that it is working at least as much with ordinary Yemenis in mind as with Riyadh’s desire to be done with Yemen. Thus, it is possible that the council will seek to underscore its bona fides by making road access a central pillar of its negotiating strategy in much the same way that the Huthis have done with Hodeida port and Sanaa airport, namely by refusing to allow talks on other issues to progress without movement on the roads in Taiz.

Thus far, however, there has been very little progress of any kind. As part of the truce agreement, the Huthis and the government committed to form a joint negotiating committee to tackle the Taiz roads issue, as they did previously under the Stockholm Agreement. Yemeni government officials say they have named their candidates for the committee and provided proposals on reopening the Taiz-Hodeida, Taiz-Sanaa and Taiz-Aden roads. They claim that the Huthis have yet to nominate their own negotiators, casting the rebels as the main barrier to progress. In fact, the Huthis have laid out new demands to reopen roads in Taiz, the first of which are to halt fighting in the governorate and remove military equipment from its main arteries.

The currently closed Hawban road which used to connect government-controlled Taiz city and Huthi-held Hawban. CRISIS GROUP / Ahmed Basha

Building Confidence Goes Both Ways

Whatever happens next, the Taiz road access issue is likely to become increasingly contentious, particularly as the UN ramps up efforts to sustain progress on the other two confidence-building measures in an effort to extend and expand the truce. To date, according to a Yemeni government official who spoke with Crisis Group, at least eleven fuel ships have arrived at Hodeida port. Moreover, the first commercial flight out of Sanaa in six years departed for Amman shortly after the government announced it would allow people carrying Huthi-issued passports to travel. Despite such progress, rumours are spreading of a military build-up as the parties prepare for the possibility of the truce either buckling or expiring.

The risk is that the truce may not survive beyond its current two-month timeframe if there is no meaningful progress on all three of the confidence-building measures. Pushing Taiz to the side would jeopardise prospects for renewal. As noted, some in the government camp may advocate making negotiations over fully reopening Sanaa airport dependent on progress on Taiz, thus undermining the possibility of the truce being extended if the Huthis continue to delay on the latter. The Huthis, for their part, continue to be dismissive of the Taiz roads issue and show signs of slow-walking negotiations, giving the government a perfect excuse to stall efforts to move toward talks.

Resolving the Taiz roads question is thus closely linked to the fate of the truce overall, as well as of any future talks between the belligerents. Outside powers should employ a two-pronged approach to reaching a resolution. First, as part of a broader diplomatic push with the Huthis in Sanaa, they should focus the rebels on the need to make progress on Taiz, signalling that the issue is high on their agenda. The absence of sustained, serious diplomacy around the Taiz question can only have contributed to the lack of action to date. Secondly, mindful of the risk of mixing the road access file with other political and military issues, diplomats should raise Taiz in their discussions with Saudi Arabia, since the kingdom has its own channels with the Huthis. Involving Saudi Arabia in advocacy to reopen Taiz can enhance the kingdom’s credibility, since many Yemenis believe (and resent) that it wishes to keep Islah on the back foot in one of the country’s most economically important areas. It would also serve Riyadh’s aim of helping bring the war to a close.

The parties should not miss this opportunity for progress. The partial reopening of Sanaa airport has rekindled hope among Yemenis that they will once again be able to travel outside the country. Likewise, the reopening of Taiz roads would bring great benefits for the city’s residents whose freedom of movement has been curtailed for too long. If there is no movement on Taiz, the chances of a truce extension beyond the two-month timeline, and peace in Yemen, will only grow slimmer. Despite widespread scepticism, the truce, the first countrywide halt in fighting since 2016, has held thus far. Yemenis should not be made to wait six more years for another opportunity for peace.

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