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The Libyan Political Dialogue: An Incomplete Consensus
The Libyan Political Dialogue: An Incomplete Consensus

The Libyan Political Dialogue: An Incomplete Consensus

The preliminary political agreement that emerged from UN-led talks between Libyan rival factions at a signing ceremony in the Moroccan coastal resort town of Skhirat last week was a critical first step toward ending the Libyan civil war. Yet one side’s refusal to come on board without further amendments to the text potentially makes the agreement stillborn. Under the leadership of UN Special Representative Bernardino León, Libyan, regional and international actors should therefore put all their efforts into reaching a broader consensus on the text before proceeding to the next mileposts on the political roadmap, first and foremost the establishment of a national unity government, as well as security arrangements in Tripoli to support it.

On 11 July 2015, eighteen out of the 22 participants of the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue signed a preliminary framework agreement in Skhirat, Morocco, that charts a way out of a conflict that has divided Libya into two rival sets of parliaments, governments and military coalitions since July 2014. The Political Dialogue includes four representatives from each parliament – the internationally recognised House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and its predecessor, the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli – as well as boycotting members from both sides and a number of independents, mainly former bureaucrats. The GNC delegation stayed away from the final talks in Skhirat and refused to sign the agreement, demanding further changes based on its perception that the text effectively sidelines its camp from the proposed political arrangement.

The Skhirat agreement envisions the creation of a consensus-based national unity government (“Government of National Accord”) that would have wide powers to govern from its seat in Tripoli, including foreign and security policy and oversight of state finances and institutions. It would extend the life of the HoR, the parliament elected in June 2014 and currently based in the eastern city of Tobruk, for at least another year and make it the sole legislative authority. And it would set up a separate body, the State Council, to absorb GNC members. It is the ambiguity concerning the State Council’s powers and role in the new setup that prompted the GNC’s refusal to sign on to the deal.

Giving Libyans Hope

In light of Libya’s growing chaos and fragmentation, even the incomplete consensus secured in Skhirat is an achievement, although a very limited one: it gives Libyans hope that a year-long conflict could be coming to an end. The presence of six mayors, including from the country’s three main cities (Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata), and representatives of two main political parties, the liberal-leaning National Forces Alliance (Tahaluf al-Quwwat al-Wataniya) and the Muslim Brotherhood-led Justice & Construction Party (Adala wa Binaa), at the signing ceremony was further evidence that many constituencies support the deal. Other negotiating tracks, representing municipal councils, political parties and women, also signalled their backing, as did Libya’s neighbours and the wider international community.

Despite this building consensus, however, the GNC’s objections must be taken seriously ­– both because the GNC represents a significant constituency with understandable concerns and because it has the power to derail the agreement’s implementation. The GNC’s principal concern is uncertainty over how the State Council’s members will be appointed and what powers, if any, it will have. Unlike a previous draft (released on 8 June and opposed by the HoR), the text adopted on 11 July does not give the State Council any powers and indeed is vague on what specific role the institution will play. The GNC is understandably upset about this change, as the 8 June draft had raised its expectation that it would play a meaningful role in the new order, one it could defend toward its political and military backers.

The GNC has indicated it wants the State Council to have equal weight to the HoR in approving legislation and making appointments to key state positions, including the heads of Libya’s financial and oil institutions and its public prosecutor. It also demands that decisions taken by the HoR since August 2014 be invalidated. At the heart of this request is its fear that the HoR will not cancel its appointment of General Khalifa Haftar, the pro-GNC camp’s chief military opponent, as head of the Libyan armed forces. Their fears are not out of place. In a 15 July televised interview Haftar alluded to the possibility he might oppose the agreement if he sees it undermining both his authority and formal recognition of the armed forces he leads, stating that while he supported the Political Dialogue – which he said “was in Libya’s interest” – if the final agreement is not in the “interest of the Libyan people, there is no chance it can succeed”.

Some members of the GNC delegation (and many in the pro-GNC camp more broadly) were willing to accept the 11 July agreement with reservations, ie, on the understanding that after the signing the GNC’s concerns about the State Council would be taken into consideration and addressed in the agreement’s annexes. A powerful hard-line faction in the GNC, however, sees the agreement as aiming to marginalise the GNC and is therefore holding out to secure ironclad guarantees that the GNC (like the HoR) will at least have veto power over giving confidence to, or revoking it from, a future national unity government. The GNC hardliners have a key ally in GNC President Nuri Abu Sahmein, who has the power to decide whether to put a motion up for a vote. For example, Abu Sahmein refused to allow a vote on the draft agreement in early July and likewise refused to authorise the GNC delegation’s participation in the final Skhirat meeting, which led to the agreement being initialled on 11 July.

Participants in the Political Dialogue appear to have mixed views on whether the text can still be amended before it is considered final. HoR delegates say that after the signing ceremony the text became binding. Some independents closer to GNC circles, however, said they signed the document with the understanding that there would be room for some adjustments. The UN delegation has stayed ambiguous on the matter. The fact that no actual text was attached to the two pages of signatures collected in Skhirat is testament to such ambiguity.

It should be possible to amend the 11 July agreement to accommodate at least some of the GNC’s demands without subverting the HoR’s legislative authority. Both sides owe it to the Libyan people and the country’s future to show the flexibility necessary to reach a final, mutually acceptable text of the framework agreement. One way to reflect some of the GNC’s concerns would be to specify the composition and responsibilities of a new State Council in an annex to the framework agreement rather than in the main body of the text.

Avenues for Compromise

The pro-HoR camp, which opposes further revisions, should understand that the advantages of adopting a more accommodating line toward their rivals in Tripoli outweigh the disadvantages of refusing to amend the agreement. Without the GNC on board negotiations on the formation of a national unity government will be moot. Moreover, without key GNC figures backing the deal there is a real risk of a military escalation in the capital. Their continued participation is essential to ensure that the Tripoli-based militias also support it. At the moment, security forces in Tripoli control access to all government and state institutions, such as the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation. The GNC’s opposition to the agreement could therefore mean that the future government will not be able to use these buildings unless pro-agreement armed groups seize them. The calculation apparently made by some Misratan participants that a coalition of pro-agreement militias from Misrata and Zintan would be able to take control of the capital from the deal’s opponents is short-sighted and underestimates the resilience of some of the security forces present there.

For its part, the pro-GNC camp – particularly GNC President Nuri Abu Sahmein – should show goodwill toward the negotiations, end belligerent rhetoric and stop taking unilateral security decisions. (As the debate on the latest draft agreement was taking place in early July, Abu Sahmein sidelined the Tripoli-based army chief of staff in initiating an internal restructuring of the GNC-aligned army units and took the podium at a military parade in the centre of the capital vowing to resist any attempt by HoR-allied armed groups to enter the capital.) The GNC leadership must understand once and for all that the international community will not extend legitimacy to the GNC as such and should therefore grasp the opportunity to retain influence through the State Council and national unity government.

Some of the GNC’s demands – for the State Council to have equal weight to the HoR in approving legislation and for decisions taken by the HoR since August 2014 to be invalidated – are unrealistic, given the HoR’s and its backers’ absolute and explicit refusal to accommodate them. However, the State Council’s role could perhaps be fine-tuned to accommodate the core interests of both sides and thereby reach a deal. While the State Council should have the power to review and advise on legislation drafted by the HoR, its responsibility should be of a strictly consultative nature. Yet on critical political matters, such as approving a new government and making appointments to key state positions as part of the transition, the HoR and State Council should jointly reach consensus, thus giving each veto power. As for the council’s composition, the GNC should have the right to have 90 of its members join the new institution.

Moving the UN Process Forward

To move forward, the UN-led process would benefit from modification as well. Participants in the talks, the UN and international actors should acknowledge that the rush to the initial 11 July agreement was short-sighted if it was their aim to stabilise Libya through the creation of a consensus-based governing arrangement. Part of the problem has been the talks’ format. As the HoR refused direct negotiations with the GNC, all five groups participating in the Political Dialogue held separate one-on-one sessions with the UN team, which then drafted language that it showed to them for approval. From the participants’ perspective, this approach created too many surprises and thus caused unnecessary delays. Moreover, successive drafts appeared to favour once the pro-HoR camp, then the pro-GNC camp, each time prompting the losing side to accuse the UN of bias.

If talks resume on a mutually acceptable text, the best way to proceed would be for the participants to agree to hold direct face-to-face talks, with the UN as facilitator. To be effective, each side would need to empower its delegation to negotiate rather than serve as a mere conduit for proposals requiring their approval at every stage. Such a change in the negotiating process would accelerate the time needed to reach an understanding on all the pending issues and minimise the risk of eliciting destructive inflammatory reactions to each amendment.

There are good reasons to hurry, both for Libyans and for regional and international actors worried about Libya’s trajectory. The Islamic State and other jihadi groups have spread their presence in Libya dramatically since 2014, taking control of several towns in the Gulf of Sirte and carrying out a series of attacks against foreign workers, oil infrastructure and military and civilian targets in areas controlled by either of the two main camps, most recently striking twice in Misrata. Libya’s neighbours, Egypt foremost among them, are growing worried that further delays in reaching a political deal will increase security threats to their interests. The migrant and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean and the EU’s desire (backed by strong political pressure from certain member states) to find a Libyan partner to combat people smuggling has also created new urgency. An October 2015 deadline – the point at which the HoR’s term will lapse if no accord extending it is found – also looms, pushing some in the pro-GNC camp to stall for time in the hope that, after October, the international community might grant it recognition. Finally, the deadline of León’s mandate, currently scheduled to expire in September, also adds pressure, since he has been the talks’ architect.

The procedure to select the unity government’s prime minister and his two deputies will be the most critical step for the agreement’s implementation. Together these three positions will form the Presidency Council, each having equal veto power on key government decisions, most importantly in the security sector. They will then also be tasked with proposing the government line-up. The Skhirat agreement offers no agreed procedure on how such key figures will be chosen. While UN mediators have a procedure in mind, Libyan participants have many different – often conflicting – views. The UN mediator will have to convince the GNC that a truly inclusive government of national unity can be formed. Negotiations over the choice of persons to join the unity government and the appointment of the heads of contested state institutions, such as the National Oil Corporation and Libya’s sovereign wealth fund will succeed only if both the HoR and the GNC agree on some effective power-sharing arrangements.

Such agreement is unlikely to be reached unless the UN team reaches out to and engages the regional actors who have some influence on the Libyan parties, Egypt and the UAE for the HoR, Turkey and Qatar for the GNC. Pursuing a regional track should be a priority of the UN mediator.

It is also urgent to accelerate discussions of security arrangements to implement the agreement. One of the UN-led process’s main shortcomings has been the absence of a parallel security track that could have created a forum to bridge rival armed groups. While some progress has been made in creating points of contact between opposing armed factions in north-western Libya, thanks to the involvement of tribal leaders and local military commanders’ goodwill, a broader dialogue between the military coalitions in the east and west never kicked off. As for the south, no attempt has been made to even start reaching out to armed groups there.

The difficulty was in part due to the gradual fragmentation of the two main military blocks – Operation Dignity in the east and Libya Dawn in the west – and the erosion of a command and control structure that led to the absence of clearly identifiable interlocutors that the international community could use as focal points for dialogue. The noticeable deficit of security-sector expertise on the UN team (recently addressed by the addition of a EU security team), and most importantly their inability to enter Libya, was a further hurdle. Countries supporting the UN should provide greater resources to the security track.

Negotiators in Morocco, and those regional and international actors that support the process, should have no illusions that the agreement that appears within reach is just a beginning. The most difficult issues remain: how to de-escalate the conflict, implement security arrangements and create an effective unity government. Even as these negotiators sharpen their pencils to tackle these difficult issues, armed groups back home are oiling their weapons to be ready to pounce on their adversaries if and when the political process breaks down – or in order to bring it down as it lingers. It is therefore critical for all involved in the process to create the optimum conditions in which it can proceed and not start under a cloud of recrimination caused by an agreement based on an incomplete consensus.

Tripoli/Brussels

French President Emmanuel Macron (C) walks with French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian (2nd L), Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj (R) and General Khalifa Haftar (L), commander in the Libyan National Army (LNA), arrive for summit. PHILIPPE WOJAZER / POOL / AFP

Making the Best of France’s Libya Summit

Four main Libyan leaders meet in Paris on 29 May to sign a roadmap to peace, including 2018 elections with united international backing. But with Libya’s UN-backed peace process at risk from the meeting's format and the accord that France has brokered, the sides should instead commit to a broader declaration of principles. 

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What’s new? On 29 May France will host a summit on Libya bringing together the country's four principal competing leaders to sign an agreement on a roadmap to new elections in 2018. The event’s stated purpose is to unite international actors behind a single roadmap and ensure Libyan leaders adhere to it.

Why does it matter? If successful, the meeting could signal the rival leaders’ willingness to compromise and inject new momentum into a sputtering peace process. Yet both the meeting’s format and the accord that France has brokered have stirred significant controversy both in Libya and abroad.

What should be done? France should revise the draft agreement and consider presenting it as a declaration of principles on political, security and economic steps, without necessarily compelling the four Libyan leaders to sign it. This would avoid causing resentment among those constituencies not represented in Paris and undermining the UN-led peace process.

Overview

France’s decision to host Libya’s main political and military leaders on 29 May is both audacious and risky. If Paris pulls it off, it will be unprecedented and signal the rival leaders’ willingness to compromise. But the proposed draft accord circulated thus far is problematic and, if not appropriately modified, could unintentionally undermine UN-led, consensus-based peacebuilding efforts currently underway. Reaching an accord could generate a brief moment of enthusiasm but risk being followed by recriminations when signatories – facing opposition by some of their allies back home – renege on their pledges. French organisers should avoid imposing too rigid a framework and consider not seeking a signed agreement for now. Instead they could use the event to push Libyan leaders toward compromise and a divided international community toward greater convergence through a broader declaration of principles on political, security and economic steps that would help stabilise and unite the divided country.

The Paris Summit

On 29 May, France is scheduled to host a meeting in Paris bringing together Libya's four principal competing leaders to endorse a roadmap for the country’s stalled peace process, which is to be sanctioned by key external stakeholders, including the UN. The proposed draft agreement, as circulated to international partners days prior to the event, calls for Libya to organise elections by the end of 2018, support adoption of a constitutional framework, reintegrate military forces through the ongoing Egypt-led security dialogue and reunify financial institutions.[fn]Document titled “Draft Accord Libya Conference”, version 7, 22 May 2018, circulated by France to foreign states invited to the event. This document, which contains thirteen points, was leaked to the Libyan and foreign media and was widely discussed inside Libya. A copy of the draft accord is available on the website of Italy’s La Repubblica daily newspaper, https://bit.ly/2sk9YRa. French officials say the draft agreement is under ongoing revisions following further consultations with international and Libyan stakeholders and is only likely to be finalised “at the very last minute, just prior to the meeting”. Crisis Group phone interview, French diplomat, 27 May 2018.Hide Footnote

France’s intentions are clear. The meeting, which President Emmanuel Macron will host, is designed to gather international and regional actors around a single agenda, put an end to individual, uncoordinated peace initiatives and press Libyan leaders to fall in line. French officials say the moment has come for a concerted push to hold elections later this year. They argue that successful voter registration to date shows there is popular demand for this even if some Libyan leaders appear keen to maintain the political status quo.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, French official, Paris, 26 May 2018. The official said France sought a binding agreement, negotiated with Libyan parties, that would hold them accountable.Hide Footnote

Such a fresh initiative could inject much-needed adrenaline into a sputtering peace process and should therefore be welcomed in principle. Yet both the meeting and proposed accord have stirred significant controversy both in Libya and abroad.[fn]Several Libyan interlocutors expressed dismay at the draft accord’s content. A Benghazi-based politician said: “This document is just wrong in every respect. It is so categorical”. Another from Misrata said: “What a disastrous draft agreement. It just shows such a superficial understanding of Libya’s problems and solutions”. Crisis Group phone interviews, Benghazi and Misrata, 26 May 2018.Hide Footnote Many Libyans are concerned that the initiative will subvert the UN-led process, which has been the lodestar of international efforts so far, and short-circuit its outcome.[fn]Crisis Group phone interviews, Libyan politicians, Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi, 23-26 May 2018.Hide Footnote A Misratan politician said:

We don’t see where the UN fits in all of this. What is the link between what the French are doing and what the UN representative has stated he wants to do? Is the agreement to be signed in Paris supposed to replace the Action Plan?[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, Misrata, 23 May 2018.Hide Footnote

The UN-led process is based on the Action Plan unveiled in September 2017 by Ghassan Salamé, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya, who is conducting consultations in preparation for a national conference comprising a broad range of Libyan political actors as an essential building block for elections, a constitution and the country’s institutional unification. However, French officials say this event is aimed at supporting the UN’s efforts, not at supplanting them, and takes place under the UN’s aegis.[fn]Crisis Group phone interviews, French officials, Paris, 25-27 May 2018.Hide Footnote

Libyan political actors also have expressed concern over who will be attending the Paris event and who will be left out (including by staying away). Libyan invitees include Faiez Serraj, head of the internationally recognised government in Tripoli; Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army, which controls much of eastern Libya; Aghela Saleh, speaker of the House of Representatives elected in June 2014 and based in the eastern city of Tobruk; and Khaled Mishri, the recently elected head of the High State Council, a Tripoli-based chamber intended to play an advisory role under the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. Each will be accompanied by a four-person delegation.

A number of other Libyans have been invited to attend on the margins but will not be asked to sign the agreement.

A number of other Libyans have been invited to attend on the margins but will not be asked to sign the agreement. This two-tier approach has caused resentment among some Libyans. A delegation from the city of Misrata, a key military and political constituency in Libya’s west, refused to travel to Paris when informed they would not be treated on par with the other four delegations.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, Misratan politician, Misrata, 27 May 2018.Hide Footnote

As Crisis Group has argued, negotiating through individual personalities without ensuring a broader consensus across the political and military spectrum is likely to be counterproductive.[fn]See Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°57, Libya’s Unhealthy Focus on Personalities, 8 May 2018.Hide Footnote In the past, this approach has obstructed peace efforts, as France knows very well: a July 2017 meeting Macron hosted between Serraj and Haftar produced a photo-op but both men abandoned most of their commitments quickly afterward.[fn]The 25 July 2017 meeting between Serraj and Haftar held in La Celle Saint-Cloud, outside of Paris, resulted in a joint declaration but most of the commitments the two men made they failed to implement. See “Libya-Joint Declaration (25 July 2018)”, French ministry of foreign affairs, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/libya/events/2017/article/libya-joint-declaration-25-07-17.Hide Footnote While the four invited leaders and the institutions they represent are critical to achieving peace, Libya remains a fragmented polity with multiple potential spoilers. These four individuals do not capture the ideological, tribal and political rifts that run through the country, and indeed have done much to deepen them. A number of armed groups from towns around western Libya have issued a statement that they do not consider the Paris meeting to represent them.[fn]Declaration by fourteen Libyan armed groups from western Libya, 27 May 2018.Hide Footnote

Representatives of the UN, EU, African Union, Arab League and fifteen member states will also attend. Among these are countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and Egypt and Turkey, that are in open conflict with one another elsewhere in the region. For France to persuade these states to attend the summit is a signal achievement and a hint of possible international convergence on Libya.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, French official, Paris, 27 May 2018.Hide Footnote But some Western countries, including ones with an important role in the diplomatic process in Libya such as Italy, the U.S. and UK, have expressed scepticism over what a European diplomat labelled a French “display of stubbornness”, referring to the Elysée’s insistence that the event go ahead on the scheduled date despite their misgivings.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, European diplomat, Tripoli, 23 May 2018. Several Western diplomats said the meeting was insufficiently prepared and advised the French government to take more time to refine the document. Only three weeks elapsed between the time the idea of the summit first emerged in early May and when it will take place. These foreign officials view France’s determination to host the summit as driven by Macron’s need for a foreign policy success after having failed to persuade U.S. President Donald Trump not to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear deal. Crisis Group phone interviews, Western diplomats, 24-26 May 2018.Hide Footnote One of Libya’s neighbours feels the meeting reflects French priorities only, and as such could not produce international consensus. An Egyptian diplomat said:

We are very much in favour of elections and putting an end to this interim period as soon as possible. But it has to be done right and we do not understand why France is precipitating things. If the electoral process is botched, it will leave behind a great vacuum.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, Egyptian diplomat, Cairo, 24 May 2018.Hide Footnote

The Problems with the Proposed Agreement

The latest circulated draft that France wants Libyan leaders to sign states four goals: elections before the end of 2018; support for adopting a constitutional framework; bridging deep rifts inside security institutions; and uniting equally split financial institutions. These are laudable objectives in principle, but the elections in particular are linked to an arbitrary and probably unachievable deadline. It would be difficult to hold elections this year because Libyan parties have yet to agree on which elections (presidential and/or parliamentary) to hold and in what sequence. Some want presidential elections at all cost and as soon as possible, while others say elections would be too divisive in the current polarised climate, and still others prefer to preserve a status quo favourable to their hold on power.

Most importantly, setting a deadline for elections without due preparation and at least the parties’ public commitment to respect the results is certain to raise tensions.

Staging elections this year is unrealistic from a strictly technical perspective as well. Neither the legal nor the constitutional framework is in place – hurdles that may prove impossible to overcome within a short timeframe. Most importantly, setting a deadline for elections without due preparation and at least the parties’ public commitment to respect the results is certain to raise tensions. French officials say they are considering rephrasing the reference to an elections deadline in the final accord to state that they should take place “preferably” before the end of 2018.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, French official, Paris, 27 May 2018.Hide Footnote

The stated objectives also give too little attention to conditions required for success. The proposed accord is vague on the timeline for approving the draft constitution, which the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) completed in 2017. Yet the elections will require some constitutional framework that defines the powers and responsibilities of elected officials. Libyan actors have yet to decide whether to amend the 2012 interim constitutional declaration, put to a referendum the (contested, especially in the east and by ethnic minorities) CDA draft, or revise the latter before a referendum. At the heart of the debate stands the unresolved question of whether a nationally approved constitution – rather than certain constitutional guidelines – will be needed prior to holding elections.

The draft agreement’s proposed solution for addressing security rifts is problematic as well. It calls on Libyan parties to commit to support the ongoing Cairo talks – an Egypt-led effort to unify the country’s fragmented military apparatus. This dialogue – the only security track in the peace process for the moment – has gathered officers of Haftar’s Libyan National Army and a few high-ranking officers from the west loyal to the internationally recognised government. It excludes many others from across Libya’s fragmented security landscape. France, which has backed Haftar militarily in the east in the past, declared its support for the Cairo dialogue in March.[fn]Statement published on the Facebook page of the Embassy of France to Libya, 26 March 2018, https://www.facebook.com/AMFRLI/.Hide Footnote But both Libyan and international actors have openly questioned whether Egypt is the best-placed facilitator for the security track, given its pro-Haftar bias. It would be better to launch a wider discussion on the best way to establish a viable, more inclusive security track, and bring to the forefront what role the UN can play in aiding Libya’s efforts to restructure its security apparatus.

Finally, the proposed agreement’s provisions on economic issues likewise are inadequate. The last circulated draft provides few details apart from calling for the “immediate” unification of relevant technocratic institutions vital for the functioning of the economy. There is wide agreement in Libya and among external stakeholders that the Central Bank and other state institutions that split when the current conflict began in 2014 need to be reunified, but not on how this should be done and who should be in charge of each. Libyans also readily agree that economic governance needs to be boosted through concrete steps that address endemic matters with a direct impact on people’s lives – cash shortages, soaring living costs, corruption and speculation between the official and black currency markets. French diplomats say they are adjusting the language of the agreement on this point, so as to offer a more concrete solution to Libya’s financial and economic woes.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, French diplomat, Paris, 27 May 2018.Hide Footnote

Conclusion: Broaden Support and Work out the Principal Details Before Seeking a Binding Agreement

Much work remains to be done for a peacebuilding effort to succeed, especially reaching agreement on how to establish a viable and integrated political, security and economic strategy to which a wide range of Libyan actors and their international backers can subscribe, and how to operationalise it. The French initiative does not offer this prospect, yet it has the ambition of establishing timelines and requesting commitments that would require broader support and more substantive operational depth if they are to be implemented.

If Libyans see the Paris summit as the latest exercise in international pageantry culminating in an unimplementable signed accord, it could backfire by creating unrealistic expectations.

For this reason, France should substantially review the draft text of the agreement and ask its four invited guests to commit to but not sign a more open-ended declaration of principles on the required political, security and economic steps – instead of requesting that they sign an accord – and use the declaration of principles as a platform to start forging consensus in coordination with the UN-led effort. This would entail launching a debate on a political roadmap and focusing on the need for criteria before setting a specific deadline for an important political milestone such as elections. It would also entail openly reviewing both the potential and limits of the Cairo security dialogue and pressing for a realistic and incrementally implementable economic strategy for Libya.

As elsewhere, perception counts for much in a deeply fragmented Libya. Allowing the four main invited guests to sign an agreement could give the impression that other important constituencies not present in Paris are being deliberately left out, which would only serve to position them against its contents. If Libyans see the Paris summit as the latest exercise in international pageantry culminating in an unimplementable signed accord, it could backfire by creating unrealistic expectations that, when dashed, can only harden competing, mutually exclusive narratives and further inflame tensions. A declaration of principles would also have an element of spectacle, but would be less contentious, particularly if the four Libyan leaders invited to Paris pledge support for but do not sign it. It would allow the Paris conference to meet its primary goal of infusing new energy and focus into the Libyan peace process without prejudging outcomes and giving time for securing buy-in for a more concrete agenda.

Brussels, 28 May 2018

Contributor

Senior Analyst, Libya