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Prospects for Peace: The Way Forward in Afghanistan
Prospects for Peace: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

Prospects for Peace: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

In this testimony delivered to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Crisis Group's Asia Program Director Laurel Miller analyses the 29 February U.S.-Taliban agreement, assessing its implications for both the U.S. military presence and the larger peace process in Afghanistan.

Good afternoon, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to testify at this important hearing on the prospects for peace in Afghanistan in light of the February 29 conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Taliban.

I will provide an overview and analysis of the main elements of the agreement; discuss what the agreement means for U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, particularly the continuation or not of a military presence in the country; sketch several scenarios for the outcome of the peace process; and identify several problems to watch for that could thwart a political settlement.

Founded in 1995, International Crisis Group is a field-based organization that conducts research and advocacy on preventing and resolving deadly conflict. We operate in dozens of countries around the world and have worked on Afghanistan for almost two decades. Our field work gives us insight into the perspectives on all sides of conflicts and crises and on the dynamics that shape them on the ground.[fn]A fuller description of Crisis Group’s mission and methodology can be found – together with our publications on Afghanistan and other regions – at CrisisGroup.orgHide Footnote

Key Terms of the U.S.-Taliban Deal and Early Implementation Challenges

On 29 February 2020, in Doha, Qatar, the United States and the Taliban signed a four-page “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”.[fn]Available at https://www.state.gov/agreement-for-bringing-peace-to-afghanistan/.Hide Footnote  The agreement reportedly has two non-disclosed annexes regarding implementation measures that have been made available to Members of Congress for review. References in my testimony to the agreement concern only the publicly-available main portion.

The agreement centers on a U.S. commitment to withdraw all military forces and other non-diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan within 14 months from the signature date of the agreement, in exchange for a Taliban commitment to prevent al-Qaeda or any other group or individual from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States or its allies. Importantly, it also includes a Taliban commitment to enter into “intra-Afghan negotiations” – a process that the text indicated was set to commence on March 10. The agreement makes clear that the forces of U.S. allies and partners in Afghanistan would be drawn down in parallel with U.S. forces.

Two paragraphs of the agreement lay out the withdrawal timeline and conditions. The first of those states simply that, within 135 days, the U.S. will reduce its number of troops to 8,600 (and allies and Coalition forces will reduce proportionately), and that all forces will be withdrawn from five bases. This paragraph states no conditions for this first phase of withdrawal – meaning, on the agreement’s face at least, that this phase will proceed regardless of the Taliban’s conduct.

The second of the withdrawal paragraphs states that “complete withdrawal” of all remaining forces from remaining bases will occur within the subsequent nine and half months. This paragraph does include conditionality, the entirety of which is stated as a preface to the withdrawal language, ie, “[w]ith the commitment and action on the obligations” of the Taliban, the withdrawal will proceed. Those obligations are that the Taliban “will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qa’ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies” and will “not host” such individuals or groups. The Taliban also agree to “instruct” their members not to cooperate with such groups or individuals, and to “prevent” such groups or individuals from recruiting, training, and fundraising.

The agreement’s only other indication of conditionality is a statement that four elements – the Taliban’s anti-terrorism assurances, the withdrawal timeline for foreign forces, the Taliban commitment to “start” negotiations with other Afghans, and the Taliban’s commitment to include permanent ceasefire as “an item on the agenda” in those negotiations – are “interrelated”. The intended meaning of the inter-relationship is ambiguous, however, because the agreement also says that the “four elements each will be implemented in accordance with its own agreed timeline and agreed terms”, a provision that seems potentially contradictory to inter-relation.

In a concession to the Taliban, the agreement also includes an aggressive timeline for removal of UN sanctions (by 29 May 2020) and U.S. sanctions (by 27 August 2020) imposed on members of the Taliban, though these are stated as goals. Attracting greater controversy so far, the agreement includes, as another concession, a U.S. commitment to achieve the release of “up to” 5,000 Taliban prisoners and “up to” 1,000 prisoners “of the other side” prior to the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, and all remaining prisoners over the course of the subsequent three months. Taliban prisoners are held by the Afghan government, not the United States. Afghan government authorities have so far balked at this timeline for prisoner releases.

Two complications quickly beset implementation of the agreement; the lasting significance of these is not yet clear. First was the dissension over prisoner releases. Differences between the U.S.-Taliban agreement and a “Joint Declaration” the United States and Afghan government signed in Kabul the same day created ambiguity as to whether there were shared understandings on whether and when releases would occur.[fn]Available at https://www.state.gov/agreement-for-bringing-peace-to-afghanistan/.Hide Footnote  Regarding prisoners, the declaration states only that the Afghan government will “participate in a U.S.-facilitated discussion with Taliban representatives on confidence building measures, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant numbers of prisoners on both sides”. As of the time this testimony was submitted, U.S. discussions with the Afghan government and Taliban aimed at reaching an accommodation on this issue appeared to be underway.

The second complication stemmed from a separate ambiguity, concerning expectations of the extent to which violence would persist after 29 February. The U.S., Afghan government and Taliban had mutually agreed upon and implemented a seven-day period of “reduction in violence” beginning on 22 February that was intended to improve the atmosphere for concluding the agreement. U.S. officials had pointedly expressed their expectation that the Taliban would keep violence subdued even after signing of the agreement, but the Taliban did not publicly confirm their concurrence in such expectations. The text of the agreement does not require the Taliban to abjure violence at this stage. Since 29 February, Taliban violence has somewhat increased over the reduced level of preceding days, drawing U.S. and Afghan government complaints and military actions in response. The Taliban does not technically appear to be in violation of the agreement, however.

Public debate about the U.S.-Taliban agreement has surfaced the question whether it is a peace deal or “just” a withdrawal deal.

What Kind of Deal Has the U.S. Made with the Taliban?

Public debate about the U.S.-Taliban agreement has surfaced the question whether it is a peace deal or “just” a withdrawal deal. This is the wrong question to ask because the former characterization oversells the agreement and the latter undervalues it.

The deal is not a peace agreement. Even full implementation of the terms that are within the four corners of the four-page agreement would not alone bring peace to Afghanistan. Only a political settlement among the Afghan parties to the conflict can do that. The U.S.-Taliban deal does, however, create an opportunity for that political settlement to be achieved by committing the Taliban to enter into intra-Afghan negotiations – but it is so far only an opportunity.

The deal is unquestionably a withdrawal agreement, in that it sets out terms for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. But the withdrawal commitment is inextricably linked to the potential for a negotiated peace. In light of the Taliban’s longstanding primary demand for the complete end of the foreign military presence in Afghanistan, there is no prospect of a political settlement of the war that does not include the promise of a U.S. military withdrawal. If there was ever to be such a settlement, sooner or later the U.S. would have to commit to pulling out. Making that commitment prior to the start of peace negotiations among Afghans, rather than in connection with the outcome, was a U.S. concession to the Taliban, but it was one the U.S. probably had to make to jump-start talks. Years of U.S. efforts to catalyze peace negotiations without making that sequencing concession had failed precisely for that reason.

The U.S. has a starker choice to make than some would prefer. Either it can keep military forces in Afghanistan indefinitely or it can enable the possibility of a political settlement by agreeing to withdraw its forces; it cannot do both. Some who are uncomfortable with both perpetuation of “endless war” and the risk entailed by complete withdrawal have suggested that the U.S. military should draw down but maintain a small number of forces in Afghanistan. These suggestions fail, however, to grapple with the Taliban’s refusal to countenance to a continued foreign military presence no matter the size.

Because the agreement calls for a complete military withdrawal within 14 months, it appears to signify that the U.S. has now made this choice. But this is another respect in which the agreement contains some ambiguity. U.S. officials have emphasized repeatedly that the withdrawal commitment is conditions-based. As already noted, the condition (there is only one) – Taliban “commitment and action” on its anti-terrorism “obligations” – is very briefly stated. The U.S. appears to have left itself wide latitude to judge the specific nature and sufficiency of Taliban “action”. The Taliban may dispute U.S. judgments in this regard but it will not be able to compel the U.S. to accept an interpretation at variance with an American one.

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper added to the uncertainty by asserting an additional condition not in the text of the agreement in an opinion piece published on 29 February.[fn]“Defense Secretary Mark Esper: This is our chance to bring troops home from Afghanistan for good”, Washington Post, 29 February 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/29/defense-secretary-mark-esper-this-is-our-chance-bring-troops-home-afghanistan-good/.
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 He stated that the U.S. troop presence would be reduced “to a goal of zero in 2021” if “progress on the political front between the Taliban and the current Afghan government continues”, and that stalled progress probably would translate into suspension of the drawdown. This suggestion of conditionality outside the actual text muddies the deal.

A peace settlement among Afghans will have to determine how to share power and security responsibilities...

The Next Stage, and the Next Main Hurdles

If the initial complications regarding prisoner releases and expectations regarding violence are resolved and intra-Afghan talks commence, then even tougher issues await negotiators than those addressed in U.S.-Taliban talks. A peace settlement among Afghans will have to determine how to share power and security responsibilities, and how to modify state structures to satisfy both the current government’s interest in maintaining the current system and the Taliban’s desire for a system they would regard as more Islamic.[fn]Regarding substantive issues that will likely have to be addressed in intra-Afghan negotiations, see Laurel E. Miller and Jonathan S. Blake, “Envisioning a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Afghanistan”, RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2937.html.
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This next stage of talks appears to be, as yet, woefully under-prepared. Even with the negotiations possibly imminent there is still much left to be decided and done: the parties have yet to name a venue for the talks, at least publicly; agree on an agenda (save for the Taliban’s commitment to include ceasefire as a topic); or designate the members of negotiating teams. Putting together the negotiating team is a problem particularly on the Afghan government’s side, due to the recent high-stakes political tensions over presidential election results. In addition, U.S. intentions regarding its role in shaping or participating in the next-stage negotiations are unclear – nor is it apparent what sort of U.S. involvement the Afghan negotiating sides would welcome.

A process as difficult as peace talks aimed at ending decades of war in Afghanistan is unlikely to get off to a productive start without thorough and urgent preparation. International Crisis Group has proposed practical steps that can be taken to bolster the prospects for sustaining intra-Afghan talks beyond an opening round and eventually producing a political settlement to the conflict.[fn]Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°160, Twelve Ideas to Make Intra-Afghan Negotiations Work, 2 March 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/b160-making-intra-afghan-negotiations-work-twelve-ideas.Hide Footnote  These include designating a neutral mediator, selecting a location for talks based on the host government’s ability to organize and facilitate them effectively, and clarifying the format and structure for talks.

Scenarios for Plausible Outcomes

If the Afghan parties, with support and pressure from the U.S. and other interested governments, overcome both the political and organizational challenges to starting an Afghan peace process, that process is not likely to produce results quickly. A timeline of a year or more would not be surprising given the complexity of the issues and other experiences with peace processes around the world. If the talks extend beyond the 14-month timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal, Washington will have to face the decision whether to proceed with the withdrawal regardless. If the talks fail to gain traction and the peace process collapses, the U.S. also will have to face that same decision.

Setting aside the question of the timeline, in a scenario in which the Afghan parties succeed in reaching a political settlement there will be no basis (in accordance with the 29 February U.S.-Taliban agreement) for the U.S. to keep any forces in Afghanistan, including for a counter-terrorism mission. Unless the Taliban dramatically changes its viewpoint on the question of a foreign military presence, zero will have to mean zero or else the Taliban will not concur in a settlement. In this scenario, the U.S. would be able to maintain its embassy (and appropriate security personnel for the embassy), and thus would be in a position to provide both diplomatic and necessary financial support for implementation of the settlement. There is a theoretical possibility that a future Afghan government that includes the Taliban might agree to some form of counter-terrorism security cooperation with the United States, but the plausibility of that is quite uncertain.

In an alternative scenario in which the peace process collapses and there is no political settlement, the war will persist. In those conditions, if the U.S. decides to maintain troops in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that their numbers could dip much below the level anticipated in the first phase of withdrawal. Some have suggested that the U.S. military might be able to scale down its mission to one focused only on counter-terrorism. That is an implausible outcome because Afghan government forces would continue to be reliant on the U.S. in their existential fight against the Taliban insurgency, and the Afghan government would not likely consent to a U.S. force presence that aims to serve only U.S. counter-terrorism interests while declining to back up the government in its fight. Moreover, any U.S. forces remaining in the country would have to maintain sufficient capabilities to continue protecting themselves from Taliban attacks.

In the peace process collapse scenario, if the U.S. maintains more or less the status quo level of forces, it probably could prevent the defeat of the Afghan government for the foreseeable future – at more or less status quo levels of financial support. The ongoing conflict would continue to severely constrain Afghan economic growth and limit improvements in governance capacity. On the other hand, if the U.S. in this scenario proceeded with military withdrawal, the conflict would likely worsen, perhaps even rapidly spiraling into intensified and multi-sided civil war. In that context, the U.S. embassy would be in jeopardy and probably would have to be evacuated; civilian assistance would be reduced to humanitarian-only; and security assistance would become difficult to deliver unless the U.S. were prepared to forego oversight. The implications for the Afghan population – which last year suffered over 10,000 civilian casualties alone – would be grave.

An especially difficult scenario for the U.S. to navigate would involve the Afghan parties sustaining peace negotiations for most or all of the 14-month drawdown period but collapsing around that point in time. If the U.S., in fact, adheres to the 14-month timeline, the drawdown will have to be well underway close to the final deadline. Notably, the 29 February agreement – again, in the public portions – says nothing about the pace and slope of drawdown during the period after the first 135 days, so it is uncertain what current U.S. military plans are in this regard.

The possibility of one or more parties to the talks negotiating in good faith just long enough for the U.S. to implement its withdrawal commitment cannot be excluded. This risk can be mitigated only imperfectly through measures such as assessing the parties’ negotiating behavior as talks proceed; encouraging a process that produces a series of interim agreements that build on each other rather than one that withholds any agreement until the end; and working diplomatically with other governments that have influence with the parties to sustain external pressure in favor of conflict resolution. It should be noted that even if the parties do negotiate in good faith and finalize a political settlement, that settlement – like many peace agreements – could still fall apart at any time during implementation. This is a risk that an indefinite U.S. military presence (leaving aside the implausibility of the Taliban agreeing to such) is not likely to mitigate successfully given that the last 18 years of U.S. experience in Afghanistan shows the limits of Washington’s ability to compel its preferred outcomes through force.

The more-positive and the more-negative scenarios sketched out here are plausible and therefore should equally inform contingency planning.

Problems to Watch Out For

As and when the currently unsettled state of the peace process begins to clarify, there are several problems that may come to the foreground.

First, the fuzziness of the withdrawal conditions in the 29 February agreement may indicate that the U.S. has not resolved its internal policy struggle over whether it really intends to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. President Trump has been clear about his preference to pull out and public support for the war has dimmed. But the commitment of elements of the national security bureaucracy appears uneven.

Second, even if Kabul manages to quickly pull together an inclusive negotiating team for the intra-Afghan talks, ongoing political disunity among factions and ethnic groups may bedevil the team’s ability to reach consensus on its negotiating positions. Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether the maximalists or those more amenable to compromise with the Taliban will be dominant on Kabul’s side of the negotiating table.

Third, as for the Taliban, they have not yet had to make any very difficult choices. Consequently, the nascent peace process has not yet seriously tested their ability to do so. Because their cohesion has been one of their comparative advantages and because they diligently, and sometimes ruthlessly, protect it, it is not yet clear whether they will be willing and able to make controversial compromises that might strain cohesion.

These are not the only problems the peace process is likely to encounter – I have not, for instance, touched on the capabilities of Pakistan and Iran to make a successful process more or less likely – but these problems alone could be enough to scuttle it. Because the U.S. can only be a supporting player in the next, intra-Afghan stage, it cannot guarantee a successful outcome. As it becomes clearer what the actual outcome will be, and if that outcome is failure of the peace process, the U.S. will need to weigh the known costs and risks of maintaining its military presence against the less certain risks of pulling out.

Demonstrators gather along the fence surrounding Lafayette Park outside the White House as protests continue over the death in police custody of George Floyd, in Washington, U.S. on 2 June 2020. REUTERS/Jim Bourg

To Calm Turmoil, U.S. Leaders Must Stop Courting Conflict

At May’s end, the police killing of George Floyd sent a wave of unrest rolling through U.S. cities. Rather than easing tensions, the Trump administration has used incendiary rhetoric, called military units to Washington and threatened to send them elsewhere. Cooler heads must prevail.

For more than a week, the world has watched as the United States’ deepest wounds, inflicted by the unhealed legacy of slavery and rubbed raw by sustained racial injustice, erupted into public rage and violence. The police killing of George Floyd, an unarmed African American man, in Minneapolis, Minnesota touched off a wave of protest that reached virtually every corner of the country, with riots and looting in many major cities. The crisis put the nation’s political divides on full display. In some states and cities, at least some of the time, local leaders and security officials sought to reduce tensions through a combination of empathy and firmness. In many other instances, however, local police moved to disperse demonstrations with excessive force. In Washington, the nation’s political and security leaders appeared to egg on a heavy-handed response, comparing U.S. cities to a “battlespace” and threatening military action if local authorities did not quell the unrest. Over the long term, the nation will need to take steps to end the police’s brutality and militarization as well as structural racial inequality if it wants to avoid similar future crises. At present, however, what the country’s leadership most needs to do is insist that those culpable for Floyd’s killing are brought to justice, stand in support of those local officials and community leaders who are calling for calm and reform, abandon its martial rhetoric and stop making the situation worse.

The trouble started on 25 May, Memorial Day, a holiday treated as the unofficial beginning of summer across the United States. Floyd, a 46-year-old who had preached non-violence on social media, was apprehended by police outside a convenience store in Minneapolis. The store clerks said Floyd had purchased cigarettes with a counterfeit $20 bill. Surveillance cameras and onlooker cell phones captured what happened next. After a brief struggle, the police subdued and pinned the unarmed Floyd to the ground, with an officer’s knee buried in his neck for nearly nine minutes – even after he complained, at least sixteen times, that he could not breathe, and even after he lost consciousness. Later that day, a local hospital pronounced him dead. In the coming days, as images of Floyd’s killing went viral, parts of Minneapolis exploded, and the outrage spread.

Some observers expressed shock at the force of the reaction in Minneapolis, which saw a furious crowd burn a police precinct house to the ground. But that was just the beginning. Marchers surged into the streets in 140 cities across the country, with gatherings recorded in all 50 states. They included mainly peaceful protesters, but in some places also rioters with more violent designs and looters. In some cities, such as parts of New York, the largely peaceful demonstrations that filled the streets during the day were replaced by scenes of looting and destruction after nightfall. Crowds defaced CNN’s corporate headquarters in Atlanta, and smashed storefronts on posh shopping streets in Chicago, New York and Washington.

There were also confrontations between protesters and police. On 30 May, protesters in the nation’s capital pushed up against police lines in Lafayette Park in front of the White House. Whether for good reason or not, the Secret Service was sufficiently rattled at one point that evening that agents ushered President Donald J. Trump to an underground bunker. Police responses varied widely around the country – with some forces showing discipline and restraint (one Michigan sheriff dropped his protective gear and walked alongside the marchers) and others using indefensibly heavy force against protesters and journalists.

The nation’s fractured politics played out in the words of its civic leaders. Some, like Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms and rapper Killer Mike, struck a balance – both insisting on reforms to address the deep pain and injustice borne by the African American community and urging protesters to be peaceful. Others, particularly conservative leaders like President Trump and Attorney General William Barr, urged local police to be “much tougher” and emphasised the role of radical left-wing groups and anarchists in fomenting the unrest. They singled out Antifa (a phrase that has become shorthand for an amorphous grouping of “anti-fascist” activists), which Trump threatened to designate as a terrorist organisation, even though U.S. law affords him no such power.

Perhaps the most sobering political development was a growing inclination among some prominent elected and security officials to frame the civil unrest in the language of armed conflict.

But beyond the splintering of leader-level discourse, perhaps the most sobering political development as the protests reached the one-week mark was a growing inclination among some prominent elected and security officials to frame the civil unrest in the language of armed conflict. On 1 June alone, Congressman Matt Gaetz called the rioters “terrorists” and urged that they be “hunted down like … in the Middle East”; Senator Tom Cotton tweeted that there should be “no quarter for insurrectionists, anarchists, rioters and looters”; and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper urged state governors to “dominate the battlespace” in their cities. Esper’s characterisation (which he later walked back) drew sharp rebukes from some retired military brass. Retired General Martin Dempsey, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tweeted, “America is not a battleground. Our fellow citizens are not the enemy”.

It was hardly clear, however, that administration officials intend to heed this caution. On the evening of 1 June, President Trump addressed the nation from the White House Rose Garden, threatening to dispatch “thousands and thousands of heavily armed soldiers and military personnel” to keep the peace in U.S. cities, intimating that he might even do so over the objection of state officials whom he had earlier in the day chided for being “weak”. As a matter of law and precedent, he might be able to do so. Some legal scholars say far-reaching authorities (including the 1807 Insurrection Act) may, under certain circumstances, permit the president to commandeer national guard troops – who normally answer to state governors – and deploy both them and active-duty military personnel to quell civil unrest.

Shortly after Trump’s Rose Garden remarks, security forces fired smoke canisters and rubber bullets to break up a crowd of peaceful protesters and allow the president to walk through Lafayette Park with Secretary Esper and General Mark A. Milley, the current Joint Chiefs chairman, to pose with a bible in front of the venerable St. John’s Episcopal Church, whose basement had been set afire in earlier rioting. Later in the evening, General Milley, whom the president had announced would be “in charge” of managing the crisis, was photographed in combat uniform, assessing the military presence that had been mustered to patrol the streets of downtown Washington. On 2 June, the White House announced that about 1,600 additional troops, including an active-duty army quick-reaction force and military police, would be deployed to the capital region.

International reactions were swift and strong. They ranged from large anti-racist demonstrations in Sydney, Paris and elsewhere to the painting of a mural of George Floyd in Syria’s rebel-held Idlib. The UN Secretary-General weighed in, while the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, issued a powerful statement denouncing this “latest in a long line of killings of unarmed African Americans”, calling on U.S. authorities to “take serious action to stop such killings, and to ensure justice is done when they do occur” and pointing to the “role that entrenched and pervasive racial discrimination plays in such deaths”. Close U.S. allies bemoaned Trump’s “pouring [of] oil into the fire” and condemned Floyd’s killing as an “abuse of power”, while adversaries were quick to make hay of the situation to point to U.S. hypocrisy. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, drew parallels between Floyd’s treatment at the hands of police and U.S. actions abroad, saying, “The crime committed against this black man is the same thing the U.S. government has been doing against all the world”. The result, inevitably, will be to further undermine U.S. global standing and credibility, particularly when it comes to condemning repression or brutality perpetrated by other governments.

Whatever happens next, U.S. policymakers should not let chaos or spectacle obscure the origins of the week’s events. George Floyd’s killing sparked a firestorm of protest and violence in part because it met such an abundance of dry tinder. The United States has never adequately come to terms with the horrific legacy of two and a half centuries of chattel slavery. Nor has it healed or conquered the institutionalised violence and racism toward African Americans that followed their emancipation in the 1860s. There are still millions of Americans who grew up under the Jim Crow system of segregation underwritten by the Supreme Court’s infamous 1896 ruling (since overturned) that racially separate but ostensibly equal facilities are constitutionally permitted. The Jim Crow period was a time when lynchings – in which white mobs killed black people expressly to terrorise other blacks – were common. African Americans born after Jim Crow was dismantled during the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s have nevertheless lived with glaring structural inequalities: unequal access to education, employment, housing, health care, nutrition and protection under the law.

Against this backdrop, police brutality toward black men and women has been both a chronic problem and a recurrent source of instability in U.S. cities.

Against this backdrop, police brutality toward black men and women has been both a chronic problem and a recurrent source of instability in U.S. cities. In April and May 1992, the failure to convict four Los Angeles police officers being tried for the brutal beating of Rodney King launched six days of violence that killed 60 people. In August 2014, the killing of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri police kicked off ten days of unrest, which saw protesters squaring off against police clad in military-grade equipment obtained through a Pentagon-sponsored program. In April 2015, the death of Freddie Gray from traumatic injuries he suffered while being transported in a police van kicked off two weeks of protests and violence in Baltimore, Maryland.

In the present context, George Floyd’s killing came when the memory of other killings was still fresh. Just weeks before Floyd’s killing, a video tape surfaced showing an African American man, Ahmaud Arbery, being hunted down and killed by two white men while jogging through a suburban neighborhood in southern Georgia. In mid-March, police acting on a faulty arrest warrant in Louisville, Kentucky broke down the door of Breonna Taylor, an African American emergency medic. In the melee that ensued, they shot her eight times and killed her in her own home. To date, no one has been charged in her murder.

Also fresh were memories of forms of protest that sought to call attention to police violence against African Americans without taking to the streets. Some commentators have noted how political leaders heaped scorn on National Football League player Colin Kaepernick’s efforts to do this by kneeling during the national anthem. In 2017, Vice President Mike Pence conspicuously walked out of an NFL game when Kaepernick and a few other players knelt during the anthem. Trump later said athletes who express this type of dissent “maybe shouldn’t be in the country”.

In the absence of fundamental reform, the issue of police violence will remain a source of division and instability for the United States.

But the issue of police violence cannot be so easily shunted aside. Indeed, what the current protests show is that in the absence of fundamental reform, it will remain a source of division and instability for the United States. The more that the U.S. government can do to embrace some of the ideas that have been put forward in this vein – whether forming a national task force to draft legislation that would increase police accountability, or taking steps to constrain how and when police can use force and to make it easier to fire those who do not abide, or reinvigorating the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division – the more reason protesters will have to believe that authorities are finally taking their grievances seriously. Of particular immediate importance will be to show that authorities are taking all responsible steps to ensure that justice is done in the case of George Floyd. The Minnesota attorney general’s decision on 3 June to indict all four officers involved in Floyd’s death, upgrading the charge against the lead officer to second-degree murder, was a good start.

Perhaps of greatest urgency, the country’s leaders need to stop making the situation worse.

Perhaps of greatest urgency, the country’s leaders need to stop making the situation worse. For the past quarter-century, Crisis Group has analysed conflicts and crises around the globe, learning some lessons along the way about the do’s and don’ts of crisis resolution. Unfortunately, the current leadership in Washington seems to be picking far more from the “don’ts” list – taking actions and making statements that ought to be avoided if the goal is to tamp down tensions rather than exacerbate them. The Trump administration and its allies in Congress should dispense with incendiary, panicky rhetoric that suggests the U.S. is in armed conflict with its own people, or that some political faction is the enemy, lest security forces feel encouraged or emboldened to target them as combatants. Rather than demonise reporters, who have in several instances been attacked and arrested by the police they are helping hold to account, political leaders should underscore that a vigorous press is a pillar of U.S. democracy and stability. While national authorities should support firm and responsible policing where necessary to end the nightly looting that continues in some locations, they should also set an example for local police by apologising for what occurred outside the White House on 1 June and making clear that no security force should ever use these tactics against peaceful protesters.

To be sure, a number of local leaders and some security officials have set the right kind of example. But the benefit of this leadership could be lost if, at the other end of the spectrum, President Trump – perhaps playing to what he thinks will be his political advantage as the 2020 election nears – continues to send a message of anger, intolerance and frustration, and fails to announce any measure to demonstrate a meaningful commitment to at least some of the reforms that are long overdue. Perhaps worst of all would be if he escalates tensions by invoking the Insurrection Act and carrying through with his sweeping threats to deploy the U.S. military – a move that even Secretary Esper has now publicly discouraged. That should be reserved for only the most extraordinary circumstances. In a powerful statement on 3 June, former Secretary of Defense General James Mattis lambasted Trump for “militarizing our response” to the week’s unrest and setting up “a conflict – a false conflict – between the military and civilian society”. Since assuming office in 2017, Trump has made much of his desire to pull the U.S. back from overseas wars. He should take great pains not to act like he wants one at home.