Report / Asia 3 minutes

重设巴基斯坦与阿富汗的关系

执行摘要

一直以来,巴基斯坦同阿富汗关系的主要基调基本是互不信任,且仅建立在狭隘的安全议题上。虽然结束根深蒂固的仇恨要花很大力气,但两国有着紧密的民族、语言、宗教和经济联系。在巴基斯坦建国以前,阿富汗人就早已在往该地区迁移,现今已成为巴基斯坦社会不可或缺的成员。然而,巴基斯坦军方基于他们所认为的国家安全利益制定了干预政策,支持其在阿富汗以普什图人为主的代理人,两国关系因此受损。即将上任的阿富汗总统加尼提出扩展双边关系,为伊斯兰堡提供了改善关系的崭新契机。巴基斯坦总理谢里夫对此作出积极回应,然而,随着阿富汗过渡期的临近,巴基斯坦军方和文职领袖们对喀布尔的态度愈发不同。通过将两国关系重新向经济关系定位,并寻求解决巴基斯坦领土上数百万阿富汗难民的问题,巴基斯坦可以同邻国阿富汗进行更具建设性的接触。

稳定摇摇欲坠的经济是谢里夫的首要目标,但安全是前提,而不稳定的邻国也会造成障碍。因此,谢里夫的政府主动接触阿富汗,以期能缓解双方的紧张关系,并为过渡期后阿富汗的稳定出力。但是,巴基斯坦军方高级将领继续一手托两家,或明或暗地支持阿富汗卷土重来的叛乱活动,这有可能阻碍阿富汗的顺利过渡。

自2001年塔利班被赶下台以来,阿富汗叛乱分子一直把巴基斯坦当成避难所。三个主要武装组织—奥马尔领导的“舒拉”(意为“立法会”),希克马蒂亚领导的“阿富汗伊斯兰党”和同基地组织有关的“哈卡尼网络”—都把它们的指挥控制部门设在巴基斯坦,并在巴基斯坦行动。这些叛乱分子的温床一直在持续削弱阿富汗打击叛乱的努力,在2014年安全防务过渡之后,它们可能会继续带来这样的影响。

巴基斯坦的干预政策还危及国内和平。阿富汗叛乱分子同巴基斯坦自己的部落极端分子沆瀣一气,而这些部落极端分子则是宗派、地区和跨国圣战组织联盟的一部分。在阿富汗极端分子的支持下,巴基斯坦的部落极端分子挑战政府的权威,在同阿富汗接壤地带的联邦直辖部落地区和白沙瓦省尤为猖獗。军方领导的解决办法或以绥靖交易为基础,或是通过对巴基斯坦塔利班派别发动强势军事镇压,两者都效果不佳。

巴基斯坦极端分子利用他们与阿富汗同伙的关系,在阿富汗获得了避难所,并以此拓宽了向巴基斯坦目标发动袭击的行动空间,这说明巴军方必须结束一切对阿富汗代理人或明或暗的支持。然而,这很大程度上依赖于巴基斯坦文职政府能否在脆弱的民主过渡中从军方手中夺下对国家安全和外交政策的控制权。

从2008年巴基斯坦开始民主过渡起,连续两届政府都意图改善与阿富汗的关系,政策之一即不干预,但都因军方拒不让步而失败。在2013年5月的选举后,巴基斯坦首次实现了政权从一个民选政府向另一个民选政府的过渡,这给加强文官对国家安全和外交政策的控制提供了良机,包括改善同阿富汗关系。但是,以巴基斯坦正义运动党领导人伊姆兰·汗和神职人员兼政客塔希尔·卡德里为首的反政府示威活动从2014年8月开始一直持续至今,这加大军方的筹码,使其更能迫使谢里夫的巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟-纳瓦兹政府妥协,在涉及阿富汗这个巴基斯坦最敏感的地区关系之一时尤其如此。

然而,谢里夫仍有机会重新定义双边关系,将其扩展到狭窄的安全议题以外,这并不仅仅因为喀布尔的新政府开始了主动接触。在民主过渡稳定下来,巴政府可以结束对阿富汗代理人或明或暗的支持之前,谢里夫应同喀布尔合作,拓展经济关系,包括升级与扩充道路和两国边境铁路等基础设施,减少繁缛的安全措施,打击腐败,并开始就自由贸易协议展开会谈。简化过境和为两国公民提供经济机会也会使两国获益。但是,改善两国关系需要巴方帮助其领土上数百万阿富汗难民改善惶惶不安的生活。伊斯兰堡应签署并批准1951年《难民公约》及其1967年的议定书。在此之前,巴基斯坦应为难民立法,将对难民的长期保护和难民的权利写进法律,并尊重难民不被遣返的权利。

伊斯兰堡/布鲁塞尔,2014年10月28日

Executive Summary

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been largely characterised by mutual mistrust and devised through a narrow security prism. While it will require considerable effort to end deep-seated animosity, both countries share close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties. Longstanding Afghan migration to the territories that now compose Pakistan makes them an integral part of Pakistani society. Yet, military-devised interventionist policies, based on perceived national security interests, including support for Afghan, mainly Pashtun, proxies, have marred the relationship. The incoming Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai has offered to expand bilateral ties, providing Islamabad fresh opportunities to improve the relationship. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has responded positively, but the Pakistani military and civilian leadership’s preferences toward Kabul are diverging further as Afghanistan’s transition draws closer. By recalibrating relations toward economic ties and seeking solutions to the presence of millions of Afghan refugees on its soil, Pakistan could engage more constructively with its neighbour.

Sharif’s top priority, stabilising a faltering economy, will be elusive in the absence of security and hampered by an unstable neighbour; hence his government has reached out to Afghanistan, hoping to reduce bilateral tensions and contribute to post-transition Afghanistan’s stabilisation. The Pakistani military high command, however, continues to hedge its bets, either actively or tacitly supporting a resurgent insurgency, which threatens to undermine Afghanistan’s transition.

Since the Taliban’s 2001 ouster, Afghan insurgents have found safe havens in Pakistan. The command and control of the three main militant groups – Mullah Omar’s Shura (council), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami and the al-Qaeda-linked Haq­qani network – are based in and operate from Pakistan. These havens have and could continue to undermine Afghanistan’ efforts to confront the insurgency after the security transition in December 2014.

Pakistan’s interventionist policies are also undermining the peace at home. The Afghan insurgents are aligned with home-grown Pakistani tribal extremists, who in turn are part of a syndicate of sectarian, regional and transnational jihadi groups. With the support of their Afghan counterparts, Pakistani tribal extremists are challenging the state’s writ, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, bordering on Afghanistan. Military-led initiatives to counter such threats, based on appeasement deals or heavy handed-military operations against Pakistani Taliban factions, have proved ineffective.

The opening of spaces for Pakistani extremists, using their ties with their Afghan counterparts, to attack Pakistani targets from safe havens in Afghanistan, underscores the importance of ending all support, direct or covert, to Afghan proxies. Yet, much depends on the ability of civilian governments in Pakistan to wrest control over national security and foreign policy from the military in a fragile democratic transition.

Since Pakistan’s democratic transition began in 2008, two successive governments have wanted to mend fences with Afghanistan, including through a policy of non-intervention, failing in the face of military intransigence. The first ever transfer of power from one elected government to another, after the May 2013 elections, provided an opening to strengthen civilian control over national security and foreign policy, including in the relationship with Afghanistan. However, ongoing anti-govern­ment demonstrations, begun in August 2014, led by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan and cleric-cum-politician Tahirul Qadri, have strengthened the military’s ability to extract concessions from Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government, particularly regarding one of the most sensitive regional relationships, that with Afghanistan.

Yet, there are still opportunities, not least because of the new government in Kabul that is reaching out to Pakistan, for Sharif to reset the relationship by expanding ties beyond a narrow security focus. Until the democratic transition stabilises, enabling the government to end tacit or direct support for Afghan proxies, Sharif should work with Kabul to expand economic ties, including by upgrading and expanding infrastructure, including road and rail links connecting the two countries, reducing cumbersome security measures, combatting corruption and beginning talks on a free-trade agreement. The two countries would also benefit from easing cross-border movement and providing economic opportunities to their citizens. Improving the relationship would, however, require Pakistan to ease the uncertain and insecure lives of the millions of Afghan refugees on its territory. Islamabad should sign and ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Until it does, it should enact a national law for refugees that codifies long-term protections and rights, and respects the right of non-refoulement.

Islamabad/Brussels, 28 October 2014

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