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Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan
Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Why Europe’s Plan to Send Afghan Refugees Back Won’t Work
Why Europe’s Plan to Send Afghan Refugees Back Won’t Work
Report 262 / Asia

Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan

As Pakistan seeks to consolidate its fragile democracy, it should seize the moment to improve relations with its Afghan neighbour. Its biggest challenge comes from within. The civilian government has to regain control over national security and foreign policy from the military.

Executive Summary

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been largely characterised by mutual mistrust and devised through a narrow security prism. While it will require considerable effort to end deep-seated animosity, both countries share close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties. Longstanding Afghan migration to the territories that now compose Pakistan makes them an integral part of Pakistani society. Yet, military-devised interventionist policies, based on perceived national security interests, including support for Afghan, mainly Pashtun, proxies, have marred the relationship. The incoming Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai has offered to expand bilateral ties, providing Islamabad fresh opportunities to improve the relationship. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has responded positively, but the Pakistani military and civilian leadership’s preferences toward Kabul are diverging further as Afghanistan’s transition draws closer. By recalibrating relations toward economic ties and seeking solutions to the presence of millions of Afghan refugees on its soil, Pakistan could engage more constructively with its neighbour.

Sharif’s top priority, stabilising a faltering economy, will be elusive in the absence of security and hampered by an unstable neighbour; hence his government has reached out to Afghanistan, hoping to reduce bilateral tensions and contribute to post-transition Afghanistan’s stabilisation. The Pakistani military high command, however, continues to hedge its bets, either actively or tacitly supporting a resurgent insurgency, which threatens to undermine Afghanistan’s transition.

Since the Taliban’s 2001 ouster, Afghan insurgents have found safe havens in Pakistan. The command and control of the three main militant groups – Mullah Omar’s Shura (council), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami and the al-Qaeda-linked Haq­qani network – are based in and operate from Pakistan. These havens have and could continue to undermine Afghanistan’ efforts to confront the insurgency after the security transition in December 2014.

Pakistan’s interventionist policies are also undermining the peace at home. The Afghan insurgents are aligned with home-grown Pakistani tribal extremists, who in turn are part of a syndicate of sectarian, regional and transnational jihadi groups. With the support of their Afghan counterparts, Pakistani tribal extremists are challenging the state’s writ, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, bordering on Afghanistan. Military-led initiatives to counter such threats, based on appeasement deals or heavy handed-military operations against Pakistani Taliban factions, have proved ineffective.

The opening of spaces for Pakistani extremists, using their ties with their Afghan counterparts, to attack Pakistani targets from safe havens in Afghanistan, underscores the importance of ending all support, direct or covert, to Afghan proxies. Yet, much depends on the ability of civilian governments in Pakistan to wrest control over national security and foreign policy from the military in a fragile democratic transition.

Since Pakistan’s democratic transition began in 2008, two successive governments have wanted to mend fences with Afghanistan, including through a policy of non-intervention, failing in the face of military intransigence. The first ever transfer of power from one elected government to another, after the May 2013 elections, provided an opening to strengthen civilian control over national security and foreign policy, including in the relationship with Afghanistan. However, ongoing anti-govern­ment demonstrations, begun in August 2014, led by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan and cleric-cum-politician Tahirul Qadri, have strengthened the military’s ability to extract concessions from Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government, particularly regarding one of the most sensitive regional relationships, that with Afghanistan.

Yet, there are still opportunities, not least because of the new government in Kabul that is reaching out to Pakistan, for Sharif to reset the relationship by expanding ties beyond a narrow security focus. Until the democratic transition stabilises, enabling the government to end tacit or direct support for Afghan proxies, Sharif should work with Kabul to expand economic ties, including by upgrading and expanding infrastructure, including road and rail links connecting the two countries, reducing cumbersome security measures, combatting corruption and beginning talks on a free-trade agreement. The two countries would also benefit from easing cross-border movement and providing economic opportunities to their citizens. Improving the relationship would, however, require Pakistan to ease the uncertain and insecure lives of the millions of Afghan refugees on its territory. Islamabad should sign and ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Until it does, it should enact a national law for refugees that codifies long-term protections and rights, and respects the right of non-refoulement.

Islamabad/Brussels, 28 October 2014

Op-Ed / Asia

Why Europe’s Plan to Send Afghan Refugees Back Won’t Work

Originally published in POLITICO Europe

There is no quick fix to the refugee crisis; in fact, a short-sighted response raises difficult moral and practical questions.

As the global refugee crisis dominates the political agenda and Europe considers repatriation of refugees to supposedly conflict-free parts of Afghanistan, they would do well to consider people like the Basharpals.

The Basharpal family — father, 38, mother, 37, and their four children — originally fled Afghanistan in early 2015 and made it to Norway. Last month, they were deported back to Afghanistan. As they awaited local resettlement, a bomb went off some 100 meters from their hostel.

When I spoke to Mirwais Basharpal early in September, he and his family were once again preparing to embark on the dangerous and illegal trip to Europe.

Afghan refugees make up the second-largest group of migrants in Europe. In 2015, approximately 200,000 Afghans — less than 4 percent of the 6 million Afghan refugees worldwide — arrived in Europe.

Faced with the biggest influx of migrants since World War II, the EU has drafted a plan to deport 80,000 Afghan asylum seekers back to Afghanistan. This is a politically driven response to a humanitarian crisis: an attempt to restrain rising xenophobia and the growth of right-wing political parties across the Continent. In May, the Austrian anti-immigration Freedom Party came close to winning the presidency. In Berlin state elections this past Sunday, Alternative for Germany (AfD) — a populist party that was formed only three years ago — cleared the 5 percent threshold to enter the state assembly.

The repatriation of asylum seekers and proposed resettlement programs by European countries raise difficult moral and practical questions in the face of continued insecurity, limited economic opportunities and the inability of the Afghan government to manage such high numbers of returnees.

Although the Afghan economy is struggling as international engagement winds down, what drives Afghans to leave their country is growing fear of conflict.

The global community is faced with two problems: finding a way to stem the tide of refugees and creating conditions for families like the Basharpals to return safely to their homes. In the case of Afghan refugees, the answer to both problems is the same: better security.

A survey last year by the Asia Foundation suggests that although the Afghan economy is struggling as international engagement winds down, what drives Afghans to leave their country is growing fear of conflict.

The security situation in Afghanistan remains extremely fluid. Provinces that were considered safe a few years ago are once again dangerous. The main highway heading north from Kabul, once one of the safest roads in the country, is now frequently attacked by the Taliban. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported a sharp increase in the number of civilian casualties in its annual report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in Afghanistan. According to the U.S. State Department, “travel to all areas of Afghanistan remains unsafe.” They also warned that “extremists associated with various Taliban networks, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant–Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP), and members of other armed opposition groups are active throughout the country.”

With the latest gains by the Taliban, there is a widespread perception that security is deteriorating and militants of various groups are gaining ground. Over 30 percent of all districts in the country (116 of 384) are under serious threat, while 91 districts face a “medium threat” from insurgent groups, according to a recent Independent Directorate of Local Governance report. “Repatriation efforts are unrealistic and against the UNHCR Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative guidelines as evidenced from recent attacks in Kabul,” said Abdul Ghafoor, a prominent refugee activist in Kabul.

Unemployment stands at around 35 percent with an additional 300,000 to 400,000 young people entering the job market annually. Afghanistan’s small private sector — a mere 10 to 12 percent of the country’s official GDP — has been hit hard since 2014 with the reduction of aid and international contracts, causing thousands of Afghans to lose their jobs.

Europe’s current short-term, political, domestically inspired response to a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude is counterproductive.

There is strong evidence that repatriating Afghan refugees does not work. Returnees do not necessarily stay in Afghanistan once deported, as the Basharpal family shows. As Mirwais Basharpal put it, “There is no security. My children spent nine months in Norway and three years in Russia. They won’t be able to adjust here. I cannot return to my district in [the eastern province of] Nangarhar because of the Islamic State presence. I feel embarrassed to tell my relatives about our deportation.”

Refugee outflows on the scale of Afghanistan or Syria are the inevitable fallout of a failed state. There is no quick fix to the refugee crisis in Afghanistan or elsewhere, and Europe’s current short-term, political, domestically inspired response to a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude is counterproductive.

The international community needs to recognize that alleviating suffering is no substitute to preventing it. Triage in Afghanistan involves maintaining sufficient military and financial support to prevent security and the economy deteriorating more rapidly, and giving families like the Basharpals confidence that they have a future in the country in which they were born.