Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Twitter Video Camera Youtube
Oversight Needed to Make Police Accountable
Oversight Needed to Make Police Accountable
Briefing 139 / Asia

印度尼西亚:亚齐旗帜引发紧张局势

概述

印度尼西亚2014年全国大选即将到来,亚齐省政府决定采用前反叛组织——自由亚齐运动(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM)的旗帜作为官方省旗。这一决定是对自治权限度的考验,同时也激怒了雅加达,激化了民族及政治矛盾,使得亚齐分裂运动卷土重来,并引发了人们对于暴力活动的担忧。

2013年3月25日,亚齐省立法机关通过一项法规(qanun),决定采用自由亚齐运动的旧旗帜作为省旗。亚齐省长扎伊尼·阿卜杜拉立即签署了这项法规。亚齐党由前叛军领导人于2008年成立,亚齐的省长及副省长均为亚齐党人,而亚齐省的立法机关也在其控制之下。

中央政府认为,自由亚齐运动的旗帜是分离主义的象征,因而违背国家法律。因此,法规通过之后,中央政府立刻提出反对,要求亚齐省做出更改。亚齐党领导人则认为,这一旗帜是在2014年动员群众的有力工具,因而拒绝了中央政府的要求。亚齐党领导人称,既然自由亚齐运动遵照2005年赫尔辛基和平协议,明确承认印度尼西亚的主权,那么这一旗帜就不能算作分离主义的象征。正是赫尔辛基和平协议结束了将近30年的亚齐叛乱。亚齐党认为,如果自己坚持立场,雅加达最终会像2012年处理选举纠纷一样,做出让步。

印度尼西亚总统苏西诺领导的政府陷入了两难的境地。一方面,政府不希望与自由亚齐运动的领导人争斗。2005年的和平协议是苏西诺最重要的成就之一,他在最后的任期内非常在意其政治遗产。政府也不愿过度激怒对方,以免自由亚齐运动再度掀起冲突。许多亚齐人认为政府的担忧毫无根据,但亚齐党则非常乐意利用政府的这种恐惧心理。另一方面,2014年的选举即将到来,安全力量中的部分人士更是依然坚信,自由亚齐运动没有放弃独立目标,而是改用民主手段追求亚齐独立。在这样的背景下,政府不愿被贴上反民族主义的标签。总统及其顾问也知道,允许自由亚齐运动的旗帜飘扬,会对巴布亚省造成影响。在巴布亚省,几十名支持独立的激进分子由于升起巴布亚独立运动的晨星旗帜而遭到监禁,现在仍在狱中。

自由亚齐运动的领导人坚持立场也不会有什么损失。自由亚齐运动的旗帜能够激发民众的强烈情感,与雅加达对抗在当地一般都是稳赢的策略。有些议员未能为选民带来任何实质的利益,因而便借此机会恢复自己下跌的民望。另外,亚齐党还做出了一个颇具争议的决定,即与前将军普拉博沃·苏比安托所属的大印尼运动党合作,参与2014年选举。副省长及前自由亚齐运动军队司令穆扎基尔·马纳夫等领导人可能希望利用旗帜事件,向民众表明,虽然他们的盟友苏比安托经常由于人权纪录不佳而受到质疑,但他们自己并未在原则问题上做出妥协。

在亚齐省内部,采用自由亚齐运动旗帜作为省旗的决定引发了中央高地及西南部非亚齐人的抗议。自由亚齐运动的腹地一直是东海岸,因此对于加约人这样的高地居民来说,自由亚齐运动的旗帜代表了沿海亚齐人对他们的统治。旗帜事件也使得已经沉寂的亚齐分裂运动重新兴起,这一运动主张建立两个新的省份——中央高地的勒塞尔山亚齐省(ALA)及西南部的西南亚齐省(ABAS)。这样,亚齐就会分成三部分。如果自由亚齐运动在旗帜问题上拒不妥协,那么情报部门可能会进一步支持分裂运动,从而导致民族矛盾激化。

要打破僵局,印度尼西亚似乎有以下几种选择:政府让步;自由亚齐运动让步,通过在旗帜上增加或删减某个元素,对旗帜做出微调;自由亚齐运动同意对旗帜的展示方式及地点加以限制;或者可以将纠纷交由最高法院审理,借此推迟问题的解决。

与此同时,自由亚齐运动组织的势力正在亚齐省不断增强。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2013年5月7日

Op-Ed / Asia

Oversight Needed to Make Police Accountable

Originally published in The Jakarta Globe

Indonesia urgently needs a competent civilian body that can police the police and show that there are tangible consequences to refusal to enforce the law or in some cases, actively violate it.

Those with the authority to hold the police accountable, including the president, seem to lack the political will to do so; civil society groups appalled by police behavior have so far been unsuccessful in pressing for change. If Indonesian democracy is going to move forward, it is up to these groups to make a concerted effort to press the president and House of Representatives to bring a civilian oversight body into being.

The standoff with former chief detective Susno Duadji is a case in point. On April 24, West Java Police, together with a political party militia linked to a former justice minister, prevented prosecutors from taking Susno from his luxury house to prison after he lost all appeals against a bribery conviction. Susno was once head of the West Java command, one of the largest regional police units in Indonesia, and many officers there still owe their careers to him. It was clearly more important for top officers to protect the culture of patronage than to enforce the law.

This is not the first time the police have braved public scorn to protect one of their own. Last year, police blocked the anti-corruption commission from investigating the alleged corruption of Djoko Susilo, an active general who once led the lucrative traffic division. He is currently on trial after public uproar, presidential intervention and the discovery of a number of mansions under the names of his multiple wives.

Polls show high distrust of the police. Kompas newspaper last year found that 72.9 percent of respondents thought police would not touch the rich or powerful. In 2011, a survey by human rights group Imparsial revealed that 74.8 percent of those polled associated the police with corruption.

Why are the Indonesian police so tone-deaf to public opinion instead of working to build public trust?

Crisis Group analyzed this problem last year in a report titled The Deadly Cost of Poor Policing. One answer is that police see the post-1999 reforms in terms of structure, not institutional culture. The public may see reform in terms of increased competency, honesty and humanity. Those inside the institution are more focused on sustaining the new privileges, opportunities and powers that reform has brought about.

The 1999 divorce from the armed forces gave police authority over internal security after decades of playing junior partner to the army. But no thought was given to how this newly empowered force would be supervised. The 2002 police law gave it a direct reporting line to the president rather than placing it under a ministry and created a National Police Commission that ended up largely toothless because it can only provide advice to the president, rather than having powers to investigate, subpoena or censure. Since then,  attempts, including a 2007 draft of  the national security bill, to put police under the Home Affairs or Justice Ministry have hit the wall of entrenched police opposition that parliamentarians seem loathe to challenge.

Immune from external supervision that could hold wrongdoers accountable, the police can continue to distribute the increasing spoils of the reform without disruption. A reasonable livelihood is guaranteed as long as members are loyal to the internal norms. In the absence of credible performance-based reviews and an incentive structure that rewards professionalism and punishes incompetence, officers find that their promotions, educational opportunities and access to additional funds depend on relationships inside the force, especially with direct superiors. Deference trumps competence and initiative every time.

This does not mean that civil society should stop complaining about police shortcomings. Public pressure can make a difference. In October 2012, the police in Lampung failed to stop a deadly eruption of inter-ethnic violence when they should have anticipated trouble. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was slow to respond but in the face of public anger, the Lampung Police chief was forced to apologize and saw his scheduled promotion canceled.  Last month, when the Yogyakarta Police failed to protect murder suspects from being executed by soldiers in their cell, Yudhoyono again faced pressure to act, and the Yogyakarta Police chief was replaced. In both cases, the police denied that public uproar had sparked the decisions but events hinted otherwise.

Accountability must be institutionalized, however. It is insufficient to hope that media coverage and public advocacy will force a president to act or a police force effectively to control its own behavior. Indonesia must revisit the idea of a civilian oversight commission with real clout. This will require a new law, and public pressure could help bring it about. It may be the only way to ensure that reform means professionalism rather than patronage.