Briefing / Asia 3 minutes

印度尼西亚:亚齐旗帜引发紧张局势

概述

印度尼西亚2014年全国大选即将到来,亚齐省政府决定采用前反叛组织——自由亚齐运动(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM)的旗帜作为官方省旗。这一决定是对自治权限度的考验,同时也激怒了雅加达,激化了民族及政治矛盾,使得亚齐分裂运动卷土重来,并引发了人们对于暴力活动的担忧。

2013年3月25日,亚齐省立法机关通过一项法规(qanun),决定采用自由亚齐运动的旧旗帜作为省旗。亚齐省长扎伊尼·阿卜杜拉立即签署了这项法规。亚齐党由前叛军领导人于2008年成立,亚齐的省长及副省长均为亚齐党人,而亚齐省的立法机关也在其控制之下。

中央政府认为,自由亚齐运动的旗帜是分离主义的象征,因而违背国家法律。因此,法规通过之后,中央政府立刻提出反对,要求亚齐省做出更改。亚齐党领导人则认为,这一旗帜是在2014年动员群众的有力工具,因而拒绝了中央政府的要求。亚齐党领导人称,既然自由亚齐运动遵照2005年赫尔辛基和平协议,明确承认印度尼西亚的主权,那么这一旗帜就不能算作分离主义的象征。正是赫尔辛基和平协议结束了将近30年的亚齐叛乱。亚齐党认为,如果自己坚持立场,雅加达最终会像2012年处理选举纠纷一样,做出让步。

印度尼西亚总统苏西诺领导的政府陷入了两难的境地。一方面,政府不希望与自由亚齐运动的领导人争斗。2005年的和平协议是苏西诺最重要的成就之一,他在最后的任期内非常在意其政治遗产。政府也不愿过度激怒对方,以免自由亚齐运动再度掀起冲突。许多亚齐人认为政府的担忧毫无根据,但亚齐党则非常乐意利用政府的这种恐惧心理。另一方面,2014年的选举即将到来,安全力量中的部分人士更是依然坚信,自由亚齐运动没有放弃独立目标,而是改用民主手段追求亚齐独立。在这样的背景下,政府不愿被贴上反民族主义的标签。总统及其顾问也知道,允许自由亚齐运动的旗帜飘扬,会对巴布亚省造成影响。在巴布亚省,几十名支持独立的激进分子由于升起巴布亚独立运动的晨星旗帜而遭到监禁,现在仍在狱中。

自由亚齐运动的领导人坚持立场也不会有什么损失。自由亚齐运动的旗帜能够激发民众的强烈情感,与雅加达对抗在当地一般都是稳赢的策略。有些议员未能为选民带来任何实质的利益,因而便借此机会恢复自己下跌的民望。另外,亚齐党还做出了一个颇具争议的决定,即与前将军普拉博沃·苏比安托所属的大印尼运动党合作,参与2014年选举。副省长及前自由亚齐运动军队司令穆扎基尔·马纳夫等领导人可能希望利用旗帜事件,向民众表明,虽然他们的盟友苏比安托经常由于人权纪录不佳而受到质疑,但他们自己并未在原则问题上做出妥协。

在亚齐省内部,采用自由亚齐运动旗帜作为省旗的决定引发了中央高地及西南部非亚齐人的抗议。自由亚齐运动的腹地一直是东海岸,因此对于加约人这样的高地居民来说,自由亚齐运动的旗帜代表了沿海亚齐人对他们的统治。旗帜事件也使得已经沉寂的亚齐分裂运动重新兴起,这一运动主张建立两个新的省份——中央高地的勒塞尔山亚齐省(ALA)及西南部的西南亚齐省(ABAS)。这样,亚齐就会分成三部分。如果自由亚齐运动在旗帜问题上拒不妥协,那么情报部门可能会进一步支持分裂运动,从而导致民族矛盾激化。

要打破僵局,印度尼西亚似乎有以下几种选择:政府让步;自由亚齐运动让步,通过在旗帜上增加或删减某个元素,对旗帜做出微调;自由亚齐运动同意对旗帜的展示方式及地点加以限制;或者可以将纠纷交由最高法院审理,借此推迟问题的解决。

与此同时,自由亚齐运动组织的势力正在亚齐省不断增强。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2013年5月7日

I. Overview

The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and political tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014.

On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) making the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature.

The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute.

Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most important achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti-nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro-independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the independence movement.

GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emotive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a controversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Prabowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned.

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that campaign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of increased ethnic tensions.

The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution.

In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow.

Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013

Subscribe to Crisis Group’s Email Updates

Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.