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Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 139 / Asia

印度尼西亚:亚齐旗帜引发紧张局势

概述

印度尼西亚2014年全国大选即将到来,亚齐省政府决定采用前反叛组织——自由亚齐运动(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM)的旗帜作为官方省旗。这一决定是对自治权限度的考验,同时也激怒了雅加达,激化了民族及政治矛盾,使得亚齐分裂运动卷土重来,并引发了人们对于暴力活动的担忧。

2013年3月25日,亚齐省立法机关通过一项法规(qanun),决定采用自由亚齐运动的旧旗帜作为省旗。亚齐省长扎伊尼·阿卜杜拉立即签署了这项法规。亚齐党由前叛军领导人于2008年成立,亚齐的省长及副省长均为亚齐党人,而亚齐省的立法机关也在其控制之下。

中央政府认为,自由亚齐运动的旗帜是分离主义的象征,因而违背国家法律。因此,法规通过之后,中央政府立刻提出反对,要求亚齐省做出更改。亚齐党领导人则认为,这一旗帜是在2014年动员群众的有力工具,因而拒绝了中央政府的要求。亚齐党领导人称,既然自由亚齐运动遵照2005年赫尔辛基和平协议,明确承认印度尼西亚的主权,那么这一旗帜就不能算作分离主义的象征。正是赫尔辛基和平协议结束了将近30年的亚齐叛乱。亚齐党认为,如果自己坚持立场,雅加达最终会像2012年处理选举纠纷一样,做出让步。

印度尼西亚总统苏西诺领导的政府陷入了两难的境地。一方面,政府不希望与自由亚齐运动的领导人争斗。2005年的和平协议是苏西诺最重要的成就之一,他在最后的任期内非常在意其政治遗产。政府也不愿过度激怒对方,以免自由亚齐运动再度掀起冲突。许多亚齐人认为政府的担忧毫无根据,但亚齐党则非常乐意利用政府的这种恐惧心理。另一方面,2014年的选举即将到来,安全力量中的部分人士更是依然坚信,自由亚齐运动没有放弃独立目标,而是改用民主手段追求亚齐独立。在这样的背景下,政府不愿被贴上反民族主义的标签。总统及其顾问也知道,允许自由亚齐运动的旗帜飘扬,会对巴布亚省造成影响。在巴布亚省,几十名支持独立的激进分子由于升起巴布亚独立运动的晨星旗帜而遭到监禁,现在仍在狱中。

自由亚齐运动的领导人坚持立场也不会有什么损失。自由亚齐运动的旗帜能够激发民众的强烈情感,与雅加达对抗在当地一般都是稳赢的策略。有些议员未能为选民带来任何实质的利益,因而便借此机会恢复自己下跌的民望。另外,亚齐党还做出了一个颇具争议的决定,即与前将军普拉博沃·苏比安托所属的大印尼运动党合作,参与2014年选举。副省长及前自由亚齐运动军队司令穆扎基尔·马纳夫等领导人可能希望利用旗帜事件,向民众表明,虽然他们的盟友苏比安托经常由于人权纪录不佳而受到质疑,但他们自己并未在原则问题上做出妥协。

在亚齐省内部,采用自由亚齐运动旗帜作为省旗的决定引发了中央高地及西南部非亚齐人的抗议。自由亚齐运动的腹地一直是东海岸,因此对于加约人这样的高地居民来说,自由亚齐运动的旗帜代表了沿海亚齐人对他们的统治。旗帜事件也使得已经沉寂的亚齐分裂运动重新兴起,这一运动主张建立两个新的省份——中央高地的勒塞尔山亚齐省(ALA)及西南部的西南亚齐省(ABAS)。这样,亚齐就会分成三部分。如果自由亚齐运动在旗帜问题上拒不妥协,那么情报部门可能会进一步支持分裂运动,从而导致民族矛盾激化。

要打破僵局,印度尼西亚似乎有以下几种选择:政府让步;自由亚齐运动让步,通过在旗帜上增加或删减某个元素,对旗帜做出微调;自由亚齐运动同意对旗帜的展示方式及地点加以限制;或者可以将纠纷交由最高法院审理,借此推迟问题的解决。

与此同时,自由亚齐运动组织的势力正在亚齐省不断增强。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2013年5月7日

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

Originally published in The Interpreter

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.