Thai Royal Guards march in front of a portrait of the King Bhumibol Adulyadej during a military parade as a part of a celebration of his upcoming birthday in Bangkok, Thailand, on 3 December 2015. REUTERS/Athit Perawongmetha Report 274 / Asia 10 December 2015 4 minutes 泰国推三宕四的民主化进程 泰国的军政府虽承诺回归民主,但却时时以推迟大选来延续统治。除新宪法之外,泰国还需建立新的社会契约,并以此化解民选政客与军队、官僚和皇室等非民选机构之间令其渐渐分崩离析的斗争。 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Also available in English Chinese, Simplified English 执行摘要 2015年9月6日,由泰国军政府——国家和平秩序委员会(NCPO)——委任的改革委员会否决了宪法草案,而该宪法正是由其亲命的起草委员会所撰写。随之付诸东流的还有国家和平秩序委员会在2014年5月政变后所宣布的通往“全面民主化运转”的路线图。此举不仅让军政府的任期延长了至少七个月,还把全民选举推迟至了2017年中旬。包括对新宪法全民公投在内的大选之路已重新开始;但这一进程的展开却是要——在皇室继承迫近、经济衰退、以及军政府未能解决的政治社会持续两极化的背景下——逆流而上。而军政府的独裁倾向和要监督皇权交接的明确决心则会扼制泰国展开一场以基于保护人民主权的政治秩序为题的、包容性全民对话。 泰国被夹在了一场在政治、经济和地缘层面上变革与延续的冲突中,这则体现在民选与非民选政权之间的摩擦上。传统政治阶层——如,官僚机构、军方、和皇室脉络——在面临社会经济变革和省级选民的政治诉求时,寻求维持现状。自2001年到2006年政变前夕,他信•西那瓦总理(Thaksin Shinawatra)以其野心和竞选实力挑战了政权的传统卫士。而当局的政治剧目——如,官僚监督、宪法设计、司法干预、街头抗议和政变——都不能制衡他信,或是抑制为他所用的群众政治诉求。他信的政党则赢得了自2001年起的每一场大选。在普密蓬•阿杜德69年的统治即将画上句点、且皇室继位迫在眉睫之际,泰国当局为控制局面采取了更强硬的措施。 国家和平秩序委员会对英拉•西瓦那(Yingluck Shinawatra)的获选——他信的妹妹于2011年7月被选为泰国总理——进行了数月的抗议,并在2014年以持续暴力威胁为由夺得政权。不少要求英拉下台的人认为,政变是根除腐败和所谓的议会独裁的必要途径。国家和平秩序委员会则宣布了一个三段走的民主化路线图: 重建安全与和解、民选政府、以及持续的改革进程。然而,它却一再推迟普选的预估日期。 新宪法生效是路线图第二阶段的先决条件,而宪法起草委员会(CDC)所起草的文件则令持不同政治观点的观察者们都感到震惊。其条例包括多数党任命参议院、允许总理不经选举产生、以及一个由军方官员组成的“危机委员会”;而该委员会亦被授权,可借国家安全利益之名而凌驾于议会和政府之上。由国家和平秩序委员会任命的改革委员会在其游说下,否决了该宪法草案;从而,其不仅延长了任期,且还免去了草案在公投中被否决的潜在尴尬。鲜少有人对草案无果而终感到遗憾;对许多人而言,草案的否决使他们质疑军方向民选政府交权的承诺。大多数泰国人并不指望军政府会在近几年内——至少在新国王登基之前——禅让。一些人还担心,下一部宪法将助军方设计令其持久的政治霸权。 新的宪法起草委员会必须在2016年4月1日之前制定出一份草案,并进行全民公投。2015年草案的失败表明,国家和平秩序委员会可能无法颁布一部两全其美的宪法——其既能满足当局对维持政治控制的关切,又可以被公众所接受。如果下一部草案失败,那这一过程又将从头再来。若是公众仅为了回归民选政府而投票通过草案,那民选与非民选权力之间的冲突或将再度浮现。国家和平秩序委员会现下似是在行缓兵之计,而它所摒弃的商议性起草程序则可能有助于为其下部宪法赋予合法性。 少数民主社运人士举行了零星的示威活动,而当局的政敌却大多选择了静候时机。尽管国家和平秩序委员会对权力的掌控并未受到明显挑战,但当局对批判者的持续骚扰却暴露了它的不安全感,而这在某种程度上可能源自于精英间讳莫如深的派系之争。与此同时,对当局腐败的指控削弱了其在道德监护上的主张,经济的恶化则加剧了民众的不满情绪;如不加以缓和,这可能会激起更积极的反对声浪。 在历经十年动荡、并眼见着现国王的统治即将结束,大多数泰国人似乎要么接纳了,要么则是顺从了这段军事统治的时期,但对未来将有动荡的预料亦是普遍存在的。而那些坚信时间站在人民主权一方的人,则不断重复着他们对实现更大民主化的集体夙愿。但少有人认为军方放弃对宪法秩序的否决权便能解决问题,而新宪法和普选本身也难以解决民选与非民选权力之间在合法性上的争斗。解决争端还需要一份新的社会契约,且其最佳的实现途径则是就泰国政治秩序进行对话。然而,泰国却缺乏展开这种对话的必要条件,其包括对政治权利的保护以及愿妥协利益的领导力。就目前而言,这一过程的实现则因——对现国王统治即将到期和异见人士受当局镇压的——焦虑情绪而受到阻碍。 曼谷/布鲁塞尔,2015年12月10日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English) Executive Summary On 6 September 2015, a reform council appointed by Thailand’s military-run administration, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), rejected a constitution prepared by a drafting committee it had itself appointed. With the draft scuppered, the military regime extended its tenure by at least seven months, backtracking on the roadmap to “fully-functioning democracy” it announced after the May 2014 coup and delaying a general election until mid-2017. Passage to a general election, including a new constitution subject to a national referendum, has started over. The process is unfolding against a backdrop of impending royal succession, a faltering economy and continuing political and social polarisation that military rule has failed to ease. The regime’s autocratic bent and evident determination to oversee the succession preclude an inclusive national dialogue on a political order rooted in popular sovereignty that protects the rights of all. The country is in the grip of a conflict between forces of change and continuity that has political, economic and geographical dimensions. It manifests itself as friction between elected and unelected authority. The traditional establishment – bureaucracy, military, and palace networks – seeks to preserve the status quo in the face of socio-economic change and political claims of provincial voters. Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister from 2001 until a coup in 2006, challenged the old guard with his ambition and electoral prowess. The establishment’s repertoire of bureaucratic oversight, constitutional engineering, judicial intervention, street protests and coups d’état failed to contain Thaksin or suppress the popular political aspirations he harnessed. Thaksin-aligned parties have won every general election since 2001. With the 69-year reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej drawing to an end and royal succession looming, the establishment required a more assertive effort to control events. The NCPO seized power in 2014, citing the threat of continued violence after months of protests against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, elected in July 2011. Many who demanded Yingluck’s ouster saw the coup as a necessary step in eradicating corruption and what they called parliamentary dictatorship. The NCPO proclaimed a three-phase roadmap to democracy: reestablishment of security and reconciliation; an elected government; and an ongoing reform process. However, it has repeatedly postponed the projected date for a general election. Ratification of a new constitution is a precondition of the roadmap’s second phase. The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) produced a document that alarmed observers across the political divide. Provisions included a majority-appointed senate, allowance for an unelected prime minister and a “crisis committee” stacked with military officers empowered to override parliament and the executive in the interests of national security. The NCPO appeared to lobby its appointed reform council to reject the draft, thereby not only extending its tenure, but also sparing it the potential embarrassment of rejection by voters in a plebiscite. Few lamented the draft’s demise, but for many, its rejection casts doubt on the military’s commitment to relinquish power to an elected government. Most Thais do not expect the military to step down for several years, until well after a new king is on the throne. Some are concerned that it will use the next constitution to engineer enduring political supremacy. A new CDC must produce a draft constitution by 1 April 2016 that will be subject to a national referendum. The failure of the 2015 draft suggests that the NCPO may not be able to issue a constitution that both satisfies its concerns about maintaining political control and is acceptable to the public. If the next draft fails, the process will start yet again. If the public approves a draft simply in order to return to elected government, the conflict between elected and unelected authority is likely to re-emerge. The NCPO has spurned the kind of deliberative drafting process that could help confer legitimacy on the next constitution and appears to be playing for time. A handful of democracy activists have staged sporadic demonstrations, but the regime’s political opponents have mostly opted to bide their time. The NCPO faces no evident challenge to its hold on power. Nevertheless, continued harassment of regime critics betrays its insecurity, which may stem in part from arcane elite factionalism. Meanwhile, allegations of corruption have undermined its assertion of moral guardianship, and a worsening economy fuels growing discontent, which, if not assuaged, could spur more active opposition. After a decade of turmoil, and with the king’s reign drawing to an end, most Thais appear either receptive or resigned to a period of military rule. Yet, expectation of future turmoil is pervasive. Those convinced that time is on the side of popular sovereignty cite recurring collective demands for greater democracy. But few see the military surrendering its veto over the constitutional order. Nor would a new constitution and a general election by themselves resolve the legitimacy struggle between elected and unelected authority. This requires a new social contract, best achieved through dialogue about Thailand’s political order. Necessary conditions for such a dialogue, including protection of political rights and leadership with a stake in compromise, are absent. For now, anxiety surrounding the end of the current reign and the regime’s repression of dissent rule out such a process. Bangkok/Brussels, 10 December 2015 Related Tags More for you Q&A / Asia Thai Establishment Thwarts Popular Will with Post-election Moves Briefing / Asia Southern Thailand’s Stop-start Peace Dialogue Also available in Also available in Bahasa Malaysia, Thai