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In the Tracks of Boko Haram in Cameroon
In the Tracks of Boko Haram in Cameroon
The local vigilante group of Amchide, Far North, March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup
Our Journeys / Africa

In the Tracks of Boko Haram in Cameroon

Two years ago, the Cameroonian government declared war on Boko Haram. Despite some progress, the group’s violent impact is still seen and felt deeply in the remote north of the country. 

In March 2016, Crisis Group Analyst Hans De Marie Heungoup travelled for four weeks into an insecure area only few researchers are given access to: Cameroon’s Far North Region. He was escorted three days by the military between the front-line towns of Ldamang, Mabass, Kolofata, Amchidé and Gansé, before he went on to travel alone across the region: to Maroua, the Minawao refugee camp, Mokolo, Mora, Kousseri and Goulfey. During the four weeks he spoke to a wide range of people, including traditional chiefs, local inhabitants and administration staff, refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), vigilante groups, local NGOs, humanitarian actors, academics, the military, former Boko Haram members, former traffickers, and others, some in presence of the military but the vast majority on his own. He completed his research in April and May 2016 with additional interviews in Kerawa, Bargaram, Fotokol, Makary, Hile Alifa and Blangoua. Read Crisis Group’s in-depth report on the crisis in the area.

This is the story of his journey.

Cameroon's Far North district. CRISIS GROUP

At 8 o’clock in the morning, I hear seven vehicles stopping in front of my hotel: two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and five four-wheel-drive vehicles. Sitting inside are over forty Cameroonian soldiers, who are here to take seven journalists and me into Cameroon’s Far North district – a region that has severely suffered under Boko Haram, and still does.

I want to understand what – apart from weapons – it takes to counter Boko Haram.

I am joining this convoy because I want to find out how Boko Haram operates in this area, and how strong it is, two years after the government started to clamp down on the insurgency. I want to see how the people living here are affected, understand if Boko Haram still recruits fighters in the Far North, and hear how large its network of sympathisers remains. And I want to understand what – apart from weapons – it takes to counter Boko Haram. I am especially curious to learn about the so-called “vigilantes”, local self-defence groups that have gained a certain fame in this Cameroonian war on terror. What can these groups really achieve?

The starting point of our trip is Maroua, a buzzing city of 400,000 inhabitants and capital of the Far North region. The region has never gained the sad notoriety of Nigeria’s Borno state, but it gradually became an important refuge for Boko Haram fighters in the 2000s. And it has suffered immensely under the insurgency over the past years, particularly since 2014 when Boko Haram entered into open confrontation with the Cameroonian government.

The Alpha escort of the BIR in Maroua, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

The group’s tactics then changed quickly: smaller incursions and occasional kidnappings soon grew into larger raids on towns and villages as well as strategic attacks against the Cameroonian army. In just two years, the insurgency staged more than 500 attacks and incursions, and around fifty suicide bomb attacks in Cameroon, making it the second most targeted country after Nigeria. According to Cameroonian soldiers, they fought fourteen fierce battles in Kolofata, Amchidé, Fotokol and Bargaram in 2014 and 2015 against sometimes hundreds and even up to a thousand heavily equipped Boko Haram fighters from mainly Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.

In total, in two and a half years the insurgents have killed at least 1,300 civilians, 120 soldiers and abducted an estimated thousand people in Cameroon. They have burned down hundreds of schools and businesses and forced thousands to flee. Today, there are over 190,000 internally displaced Cameroonians in the Far North and around 65,000 refugees from neighbouring Nigeria, according to OCHA figures.

Before we leave Maroua, one of the soldiers gives me a helmet and a bullet-proof vest. This will be my outfit for the entire journey, the standard equipment for everyone travelling in this once peaceful area whose broken tracks are now sown with mines and improvised explosive devices (IED). These were laid by Boko Haram to block the government’s way into the territory. More than 50 incidents have been recorded since October 2014, with 22 of the mines killing at least 30 soldiers and wounding many more.

SABC News: "Boko Haram Has Leveled a Threat at Cameroon and its President Paul Biya"

Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau threatens to step up violence in Cameroon. In a video posted online, Shekau threatens the people of Cameroon and its president, Paul Biya. SABC News

I climb into a mine-resistant armoured personnel carrier (APC). But our safety has a price: despite air conditioning it’s over 45 degrees Celsius inside. With sweaty faces, the journalists and I look at each other, suddenly understanding, at least slightly, the physical challenge that the soldiers patrolling the region experience each day.   

Twenty kilometres outside of Maroua the roads become bumpy. And then there are no roads at all. But the driver finds his way toward the north east and after four hours we arrive at Mabass, a village right at the Nigerian frontier. Mabass and the neighbouring towns of Tourou and Ldamang were repeatedly attacked by Boko Haram in 2014 but the insurgents never managed to fully occupy them.

We stop at a rocky plateau overlooking the vast sandy frontier area with Nigeria where the local commander, Captain Ticko Kingue, points at a lake in the distance. “You see the lake over there?” he asks. “That’s the Nigerian town of Madagali. This entire frontier area is plagued by the insurgency. Even last night there were attacks. We cannot go into Nigeria, not here, we’re not allowed to. So what we do is we prevent the insurgents from coming in”.

A soldier belonging to the Emergence 4 Unit deployed at Poste de Mabass, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

It is crucial that the Nigerian and Cameroonian armies cooperate in the fight against Boko Haram. But for a long time, the two country’s historically difficult relations painfully slowed down their military coordination. Today, two years since the Cameroonian government declared war on Boko Haram, there’s still a great need for better exchange of intelligence. But at least cooperation between the two armies has improved significantly within the context of the region’s Multinational Joint Task Force – partly operational since November 2015 with the aim of crushing Boko Haram.

Here in Mabass, we are very close to the Nigerian army base near Madagali. “Sometimes they come to us, especially if we can help them with equipment”, says Captain Ticko Kingue. “And they inform us how things are going on their side”.

On the other side of the frontier, most border towns are still held by Boko Haram. “It’s been a long time since they managed to occupy new territory”, Captain Kingue says. “But they keep trying. They usually come in large groups of 200 fighters or more. We call this a ‘combat de masse’. Usually they come at night in a surprise attack. Sometimes they pretend to attack a larger village or town to divert the army’s attention while they try to seize smaller villages”. Although Boko Haram use indiscriminate violence, they also sometimes target these smaller villages to seize supplies or preach to the population, as happened on 15 December 2015 in Kerawa, where Boko Haram members rounded up the population to preach to them for hours in Kanuri, Haoussa and Arabic.

At Poste de Mabass.

Crisis Group Cameroon Analyst Hans De Marie Heungoup in conversation with local army commander Kingue at Poste de Mabass, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. (Subtitles available in French and English) CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

Boko Haram’s firepower reached its peak between summer 2014 and spring 2015. In the face of Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian military pressure since then, Boko Haram had to change its tactics and appears to be in decline. The jihadist group lost much of the territory it occupied and has much less military equipment than it used to. The army claims it has dismantled most Boko Haram cells in Cameroon, killed about 2,000 members in fighting and arrested more than 1,000 suspects since 2014. Today, Boko Haram is ostensibly weaker and is not able to conduct large-scale attacks any more. But it is far from defeated. It still goes after smaller targets, and increasingly relies on suicide bombers.

Contrasting with the army’s success stories, a recent Amnesty International report documents severe failings and human rights violations in the Far North counterinsurgency campaign. According to Amnesty International, many of the army’s arrests were arbitrary, the rights of detained suspects were “routinely denied” and they did not receive fair judicial treatment. The Amnesty report has been widely criticised and rejected by the government, the military, civil society and the majority of local media. Crisis Group research raised similar concerns as Amnesty’s, but when speaking to a wide range of people it also found a high degree of local support for army actions in the face of Boko Haram’s bewildering violence.

Boko Haram is ostensibly weaker and is not able to conduct large-scale attacks any more. But it is far from defeated.

We continue our journey into the Mayo Tsanaga district toward the only refugee camp in the Far North. The camp near the village of Minawao is run by the UNHCR and hosts almost 57,000 people. Most of them are Nigerians from the border areas. More than 190,000 Cameroonians were also displaced, mostly fleeing to other villages and towns of the Far North.

When the camp was built in 2011, living conditions were extremely poor, but that changed, thanks to combined efforts by the UNHCR, other humanitarian agencies and the Cameroonian government. Housing is simple but resembles how people live elsewhere in the Far North. Refugees receive three meals per day, which is more than many ordinary Cameroonians get to eat. Children of all ages can go to school. Nonetheless there is still much room for improvement. The UNHCR claims that not even 10 per cent of the funds needed to care for all refugees have been provided. Because of that, sanitary conditions in the camp are still not up to adequate standards.

A child going to school at Minawao refugee camp. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

Another problem is that refugees have nearly no opportunity to work. For security reasons – especially the fear of suicide bombers – refugees are not allowed to leave the camp. The UNHCR is currently trying to come up with social activities to help the fact that many refugees feel condemned to doing nothing.

The psychological burden is hardest on those who came to the camp traumatised by the atrocities they saw or experienced during the insurgency, particularly women and girls who suffered abuses. There are only a couple of psychologists in the camp providing care for the newcomers – not enough to give permanent psychological assistance to the thousands who need it.

Most refugees tell me that they want to return to their homes as soon as the security situation allows it. But nobody can estimate when that will be. Many find it hard to believe that they will be safe again in the near future. One refugee from the Nigerian town of Pulka in Borno state says, “I may have many complaints, but nonetheless we are fine here in Minawao. I won’t go back”.

Our convoy returns to Maroua before night falls. Situated 100 kilometres away from the border, Maroua is out of Boko Haram’s reach and therefore one of the safest places in the Far North. But it too has suffered violent attacks. In July 2015, Boko Haram sent four young girls as suicide bombers to four public places in Maroua. When they blew themselves up, they killed over 37 people with them and wounded 114 others.

Youth are seen by Boko Haram as easy prey. The insurgents can either recruit or force them into their ranks and use them for their purposes.

My tour with the military over, I meet with one of the survivors, 13 year old Kevin, who tells me what happened on the night of 25 July: “It was night and I was with my friends. We wanted to buy candy from a shop close to the Boucan bar. There was a queue with six or seven people ahead of us. And then suddenly, a girl who was sitting right next to the vendor blew herself up. I remember hearing the detonation of the bomb before I passed out. I only woke up later at Maroua hospital. It was there that I realised that one of my legs was completely burnt. There were lots of small splinters in my belly, chest and neck from the explosion. The government paid for the surgery and I could leave the hospital about a week later, but I wasn’t the same. They had amputated the lower part of my burnt leg and I learnt that one of my friends had died during the attack. My other friend is alive, but they amputated both his legs and his face is burnt. I had never seen the girl who had blown herself up in the neighbourhood before. After we left the hospital, neither the government nor any of the humanitarian NGOs followed up with us on what had happened. A Catholic priest passes by from time to time at our house to speak with my mother and help my parents buy medicine”.

Luckily, the horrors of the attack have not taken away Kevin’s hope for the future. When I ask him if he still goes to school he says: “Yes, I have passed the first trimester. My teachers are very happy with me. When I finish school I want to become an engineer”.

Hans De Marie Heungoup with a victim of a suicide bomb explosion. Maroua, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans de Marie Heungoup

65 per cent of Cameroon’s population of 23 million is under 30 years old. Children and youths are the most vulnerable in this war. Many are traumatised by the violence they see or experience at a young age.

At the same time, youth are seen by Boko Haram as easy prey. The insurgents can either recruit or force them into their ranks and use them for their purposes, like the four girls in Maroua.

Recruitment is helped by the fact that many young people are unemployed, poorly educated, belong to a part of the society that is not well integrated or don’t see a future for themselves for other reasons. Local authorities and traditional chiefs in Maroua as well as in Mokolo and Mora told me that Boko Haram has lost its appeal and capacity to recruit almost entirely. Very few youths are still joining the movement voluntarily. Nonetheless, forced recruitments still continue in the border areas. As Boko Haram indiscriminately killed Muslims and Christians, fundamentalist Muslims distanced themselves from the movement, stating that Boko Haram represents neither Wahhabi nor Salafi Islam. Many Imams and Muslim clerics told me that the war against Boko Haram has actually limited the spread of fundamentalist trends of Islam as hard-line preachers are now afraid to speak up in public. 

The Far North is the poorest of Cameroon’s regions, with 70 per cent of its people living on less than one dollar per day. During the past three decades, the influence of conservative Salafi Islam has increased in the region and many children grow up exposed to radical religious viewpoints. There is an urgent need for the state and public institutions to care for these youths and make sure they do not radicalise in the first place – and if they do radicalise, offer them help to leave the group and be fully re-integrated into society.

Maroua has a big prison, and the vast majority of suspected Boko Haram members arrested in Cameroon, almost 900 of them, are detained here. What is sorely missing is a de-radicalisation program, one that teaches a more tolerant Islam and re-integrates into society those who were recruited by force and are willing to abandon the movement. 

When speaking to the regional administration, I learn that there are also no public counter-radicalisation programs outside of the prison aimed at keeping young people and others away from extremist groups. The only efforts made in this direction come from civil society groups and the churches. Cameroon’s Association for Inter-Faith Dialogue (ACADIR) has set a positive example by organising conferences and meetings that have brought together religious leaders of different strands of Christianity and Islam. But these initiatives only scratch the surface of the problem. They don’t reach those who are the biggest threat to religious dialogue in the Far North: radical Islamist leaders.

If the government does not invest in development, the impoverished local population will stay vulnerable to radical groups and religious radicalisation.

If the government is to turn a security-focused approach into a long-term political strategy against radicalisation, there is still much to do. If the government does not invest in development, the impoverished local population will stay vulnerable to radical groups and religious radicalisation.

Last year, when the government launched an emergency development plan with a budget of roughly $10 million per year, hardly anyone believed that this could make a big difference. Most experts estimate that the current plan covers only about one per cent of what is needed to significantly improve the situation in the country’s least developed region. With $10 million, you cannot construct a road network in the Far North, develop public services in all areas, like health and education, help business owners get back on their feet, create employment opportunities and pay for preventive programs to keep especially the youth away from radical groups.

It might be possible for Cameroon to find other funding to do the job, but a correct assessment of the needs is necessary. Only then can the government show that it has understood the scope of the problem and can hope for help from its international partners.

Members of the BIR in the Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. PHOTO/Erwan Decherysel

I leave Maroua a second time to go up to the Mayo Sava district. This time, I am picked up by soldiers of the BIR, “Bataillon d’intervention rapide” (rapid intervention force). Of the approximately 8,000 soldiers deployed in the Far North, 2,400 belong to this well-trained and equipped elite unit. They take me to a place that has become a symbol of the war: Amchidé.

We are confronted with the sight of a ghost town. Formerly inhabited by 30,000 people, Amchidé is among the hardest hit places in Cameroon and the stage of three long battles between the army and the insurgents in late 2014 and early 2015.

Amchide, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

The BIR camp of Amchidé has been baptised “Le Palais” (the Palace), not just because of its palace-like shape but also because it was one of the insurgent’s key strategic targets in Cameroon. Despite a dozen of conventional attacks, including three where Boko Haram mustered 800 insurgents, the city only fell for one day, on 15 October 2014. But the military base never succumbed. 

In Amchide.

Crisis Group Cameroon Analyst Hans De Marie Heungoup in conversation with Captain Kiki, commander of the BIR military base of Amchide, Cameroon, in March 2016. (Subtitles available in French and English) CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

The entire population of Amchidé fled during the fighting and only 10 per cent have come back – to an almost dead city. There are no businesses in Amchidé anymore, since the fighting has cut all Amchidé’s supply lines.

Most of those who came back are men, and about 40 of them joined forces to form a vigilante group. These vigilante or community defence groups are nothing new. In many Cameroonian towns and villages, unarmed vigilante groups have existed for a long time. But they have gained a new level of importance with the insurgency. They are groups of normal citizens – always men – patrolling their villages to make sure everyone is safe, especially at night. 

Members of the vigilante group of Amchide, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

As the Boko Haram threat increased, the government realised how these vigilantes can help in the fight on terror. It provided equipment, such as rifles, torches and night vision gear, and worked with traditional village chiefs who handpicked the most “suitable” men of their village to be part of the vigilante group. Vigilante groups have since played an important role against Boko Haram. They identify strangers they believe could be potential suicide attackers. And sometimes they even fend off smaller Boko Haram attacks. In the past year as well as this year, the Amchidé vigilante group and similar ones in Limani, Kerawa and Tolkomari have been involved in low intensity fights with small groups of about half a dozen Boko Haram fighters. In some cases they were able to surround smaller Boko Haram cells or win a fight against attackers. In other cases, they were not successful – and suffered casualties.

A member of the vigilante group of Amchide, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

Although they are praised by the government and local authorities, the vigilante groups are not exempt from criticism. Sometimes, vigilantes have denounced local inhabitants as members of Boko Haram just to settle private accounts. In other cases, vigilantes have been suspected of providing information to Boko Haram and were therefore arrested by the army. 

In the case of Amchidé, the first vigilante group formed by the BIR had only Christian members, who harassed and extorted money from the local Muslim majority. Following complaints, the BIR dissolved Amchidé’s first vigilante group and formed a new one with Christian and Muslim members. 

Unarmed vigilante groups have existed for a long time. But they have gained a new level of importance with the insurgency.

The last stop of my four weeks’ research trip is Kousseri, an old market town in between the Chari and the Logone rivers. You only have to cross a bridge to reach the metropolis of N’Djamena, capital of neighbouring Chad.

In economic terms, Kousseri is the most important city in the Far North. It has strong links with Chad to the east and Nigeria to the west, especially the Nigerian town of Maiduguri. In the past two years, it has been flooded with Cameroonian IDPs and Chadian refugees. Its population has grown from 200,000 to 280,000. Many of them come from the city of Fotokol, 100 kilometre to the west on the Nigerian border, where Boko Haram caused most casualties suffered in the country during the main phase of the war between May 2014 and March 2015.

For a period of several months in 2014 and 2015, Boko Haram staged almost daily attacks on Fotokol. One especially heavy battle took place in Fotokol in early February 2015. For two days, about 1,000 Boko Haram insurgents were fighting against Cameroonian BIR forces and Chadian soldiers, killing 81 to 400 civilians, seventeen Chadian soldiers, seven Cameroonian soldiers and 300 attackers, according to various reports. 

One woman from Fotokol tells me that Boko Haram killed her husband. Another woman describes how Boko Haram raided the village asking: “Where are the Christians?”. Some IDPs in Kousseri tell me that they feel relatively safe now, but the violence they have seen is hard to forget, and life remains hard for them. They receive only limited support from aid organisations like the World Food Program and no support from the state. They have to find their own housing or stay with friends and relatives. Opportunities for work are scarce and the local economy has suffered from the fighting. Tens of thousands of merchants relied on cross-border trade. When the Nigerian border was closed due to insecurity, many of them were left without work. Aya, who used to own a large shop in Fotokol, lost everything. She tells me: “There is no possible turning back for me and my children. We have been chased from our village, our house was burnt; we have to make our life here in Kousseri”. 

Hans De Marie Heungoup with a displaced family from Fotokol in Kousseri, Far North, Cameroon. March 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Hans De Marie Heungoup

After four weeks in the Far North, when I return to the capital Yaoundé, the main concern resonating in my head is that people cannot imagine that security will be restored soon. The military battle against Boko Haram is ongoing and despite some successes it is far from won. At the same time, the military’s performance is tainted by accusations of human rights violations against the population, including arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances - allegations which the military mostly denies. During our discussion, the spokesman of the Defence Ministry replied to similar claims: “Cameroon’s army is republican and professional. We systematically investigate all human rights abuses cases and sanction. As you should know four soldiers in the Far North have been discharged a few months ago for committing grave acts against the honor of the army”.  

While his claim that all abuses are investigated is clearly an exaggeration, and it is not clear that all sanctions concern Human rights abuses, there has been some progress. Disciplinary measures have been taken against some officers and soldiers  in the Far North, who have been removed from operational assignments to administrative posts or dismissed. Some judicial investigations into rights abuses are underway. 

Still, efforts made are far from sufficient and the defence ministry’s focus on sanctions is too narrow. There are no financial or material compensations for victims of the families of victims that suffered human rights violations. Neither has the military officially apologised. The government should pursue a stricter and proactive sanctions policy against soldiers who committed abuses, publicise its sanctions and put in place measures that can rebuild communities’ confidence. If human rights violations by the army continue, they will jeopardise the success of the counterinsurgency, as parts of the population may radicalise and take the side of the insurgents. At the same time, Western countries might withdraw their support for the army, as happened in Nigeria when there was a rash of human rights abuses by Nigerian army.

If human rights violations by the army continue, they will jeopardise the success of the counterinsurgency. Parts of the population may take the side of the insurgents.

As much as security efforts are crucial to curb the insurgency, Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad also need to shape new policies that can prevent the emergence of new jihadist groups. More and more, the central authorities seem to understand that. At the ministry of defence and at the ministry of external relations, I meet several senior officials who recognise that a sustainable victory is impossible without development in the Far North. But then, they all add “the priority is to defeat Boko Haram militarily first”. Otherwise, the sad example of Chinese development workers who were kidnapped in 2014 by Boko Haram while building roads in the Far North could be repeated, they say. 

Boko Haram is much weaker today than in 2014. Nonetheless, the government must not delay proving to its population that it cares for its needs, and that it is trying to give those who feel neglected by the state new hope for their future. 

This commentary is part of Crisis Group’s series Our Journeys, giving behind the scenes access to our analysts’ field research. 

People buy used clothing at an open-air market in the city of Raqa in east central Syria on February 26, 2021. Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP
Report 229 / Middle East & North Africa

Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery

After suffering grievously under ISIS, and during the battles to defeat it, Raqqa is being rebuilt. The calm is tenuous, however. The U.S. and partners should work toward long-term stability in Syria’s north east, through investment and talks about sustainable governance and security arrangements.  

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Principal Findings

What’s new? Two years after an abrupt withdrawal of U.S. troops followed by a Turkish incursion, Raqqa is largely quiet. Yet the stability of this Kurdish-controlled predominantly Arab province in north-eastern Syria is precarious and hinges on U.S. deterrence of military moves from Turkey and/or Russia in tandem with the Damascus regime.

Why does it matter? Raqqa’s trajectory and fault lines provide insight into the challenges ahead in Syria. Regional and international forces use the area to project power and pursue their security interests. Any sudden shift in the balance of power is liable to lead to violence, severe humanitarian crisis and mass displacement.

What should be done? The Biden administration has signalled that it will maintain U.S. forces in Syria for the time being. While the deployment continues, the U.S. and other anti-ISIS coalition members should promote steps to stabilise the north east, including areas like Raqqa. They should seek diplomatic arrangements to avert further disruptive offensives.

Executive Summary

Raqqa, the former de facto capital of the Islamic State (ISIS), today is among the more stable areas in Syria. Yet this relative success rests on wobbly foundations. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who control Raqqa city as well as the majority of the province govern efficiently, but high-handedly as some perceive it, fomenting occasional unrest. The province in which the city sits remains divided and contested among Turkey, Russia and the Syrian regime, while ISIS remnants exploit porous internal borders to move around. Tit-for-tat confrontations between Turkey and the SDF keep the northern border on edge and could escalate. Crucially, Raqqa’s stability depends on the U.S. troops stationed further east, whose presence deters what otherwise could be a violent free-for all. While this deployment continues, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition should carry on investing in stabilising the area; encourage the SDF to adhere to ceasefires and reduce its monopoly upon local governance; and work toward negotiating sustainable arrangements sufficient to avert potentially destabilising military moves.

In the battles leading to ISIS’s defeat in Raqqa, the city and its immediate surroundings underwent destruction on an almost unimaginable scale. Today, the area has come back to life. With support from the coalition, the SDF established an array of institutions to secure, rebuild and administer the province, with a particular focus on the city of the same name. Despite the abrupt partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Raqqa in October 2019 and the subsequent Turkish military incursion, security, economic conditions and governance practices are better in Raqqa than elsewhere in Syria, including in adjacent regions that equally suffered under ISIS rule but were reclaimed by Damascus.

Yet the potential for renewed destabilisation and conflict remains. Raqqa governorate is divided into three areas, distinctly controlled by rival powers, each with its own limitations. Most of the province, including the city, is under control of the SDF, a non-state actor with connections to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group fighting an insurgency against Turkey since 1984. The northern part along the Turkish border is in the hands of Syrian factions ushered in by Turkey’s October 2019 incursion. Small pockets on the south-western edge are controlled by the Syrian regime, which has proven unable or unwilling to provide basic services and security to the population there. Russian forces also are on the ground; they do not hold territory, but they have established bases from which they conduct joint patrols with Turkish troops and, separately, with SDF and regime units under the terms of the 2019 ceasefire.

Any number of developments could violently upset the status quo. Resilient ISIS elements could exploit the lack of coalition presence in Raqqa, local Arabs’ alienation from SDF rule or deteriorating economic conditions to make new inroads with the hope of staging a comeback. Frictions between the SDF and the regime over governance, security and resource streams in areas where they uneasily coexist or are immediate neighbours could bring the two sides to blows. Turkey, which sees the SDF’s links to the PKK as a threat to its national security, could go on the offensive again, for example in response to attacks originating from SDF-controlled areas on its forces or the factions it backs in the north.

For now, these scenarios are kept at bay by the presence of a small contingent of U.S. forces further east and the support it provides for SDF control of the area. Absent an agreement between these actors and the SDF that provides credible guarantees against violent competition over territory and resources, there is a high probability that, were the U.S. to withdraw troops precipitously, north-eastern Syria would descend into chaos liable to trigger a severe humanitarian crisis and massive displacement. The Biden administration has signalled that it does not intend to withdraw U.S. forces for the time being; the criticism it has received for the chaotic pullout from Afghanistan makes such a move even less likely.

While the U.S. deployment continues, Washington and other anti-ISIS coalition members should use the leverage their presence in the north east affords to keep investing in the area’s stabilisation, encouraging negotiations among the parties and working in parallel to reach diplomatic understandings that would avert military moves by Ankara or Damascus if and when the U.S. does leave. Such efforts are key to addressing governance gaps and grievances that ISIS could exploit. Assistance should be contingent on the SDF both adhering to ceasefires and reducing its monopoly upon governance, including by enabling more substantial participation by non-SDF-affiliated Arabs and Kurds in the autonomous administration and local government’s decision making. The U.S. should push the SDF to restrain insurgent attacks on Turkish-controlled areas in the north, while seeking to dissuade Ankara from escalating on its end. At the same time, Washington should signal to all involved parties – Damascus, Moscow, Ankara and the SDF – its interest in exploring arrangements that could stabilise the area in a sustainable way.

Raqqa/Ankara/Brussels, 18 November 2021

I. Introduction

Raqqa’s population has lived through some of the Syrian war’s most dramatic shifts. Since 2011, Raqqa has changed hands four times, with waves of displacement, looting and destruction accompanying every battle. In March 2013, Raqqa city became the first provincial capital to fall under rebel control.[fn]Raqqa has been one of the country’s main breadbaskets, feeding millions. The countryside around Raqqa city produces large amounts of crops, and the province is the site of massive grain silos. The province had a pre-war population of around one million. No reliable current population figures are available.Hide Footnote A mix of shifting tribal loyalties and minimal Syrian regime resistance facilitated the takeover. The rebels showed little interest in governing the area, and even less capability for it. In 2013, the Islamic State (ISIS), an Iraqi group re-empowered in the brutality and chaos of the Syrian civil war, ruthlessly exploited the vacuum to establish itself. By November that year, it had absorbed, killed or pushed out any challenger and co-opted or intimidated much of the population.[fn]How Raqqa Became the Capital of ISIS”, New America, 25 July 2019.Hide Footnote  Four years later, the Syrian regime recaptured pockets south and west of Raqqa governorate, expelling ISIS, while the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led alliance with international backing, seized most of the governorate from ISIS, and established its administrative headquarters in Ain Essa, in the province’s northern part.[fn]Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps”, BBC, 28 March 2018.Hide Footnote

Despite the bloody legacy of ISIS’s four-year rule and the massive destruction inflicted by the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, relative stability prevailed in the province until late 2019, when a series of erratic U.S. decisions shifted the balance of power and created new lines of control.[fn]Crisis Group witnessed unimaginable levels of destruction in and around Raqqa city during visits in 2017.Hide Footnote  In October of that year, President Donald Trump abruptly ordered U.S. troops to withdraw from the area, in effect clearing a path for Turkey to act on its repeated threats to launch an incursion into Syria to fight the SDF, of which the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are a major component.[fn]Crisis Group Alert, “Calling a Halt to Turkey’s Offensive in North-Eastern Syria”, 10 October 2019.Hide Footnote The YPG are a Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged a guerrilla war against the Turkish state for over 30 years, and which Turkey, along with the European Union (EU) and the U.S., has designated a terrorist organisation. Ankara thus views the SDF’s – and the YPG’s – control of north-eastern Syria’s strategic territory and assets as a national security threat that amounts to having a PKK-run statelet on its border, protected by U.S. air power and arms supplies.

Syrian troops have played little more than a symbolic role, doing very little actual fighting,

Turkey’s offensive altered the status quo and introduced additional competing protagonists to the scene in Raqqa.[fn]Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°72, Steadying the New Status Quo in Syria’s North East, 27 November 2019.Hide Footnote Turkey inserted Syrian factions it backs to control Raqqa province’s northern Tel Abyad district.[fn]See Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Who are Turkey’s proxy fighters in Syria?”, The New York Review of Books, 27 November 2019.Hide Footnote This move prompted the SDF to invite several thousand Syrian government troops to redeploy in the area in an attempt to deter Turkey and shift the battle to an inter-state one. The SDF had long resisted a regime return to the north but faced a difficult choice, given the prospect that they might be overwhelmed by Turkish forces and their Syrian partners. In practice, Syrian troops have played little more than a symbolic role, doing very little actual fighting. The SDF was forced to retreat from several areas that Turkey captured or that became unsafe due to regular Turkish shelling, and removed its administrative headquarters from Ain Essa, but otherwise stayed in control of most of Raqqa governorate along with the rest of the north east.

A mix of U.S. carrots and sticks halted Turkey’s military advance and froze the new status quo. At first, the Turkish leadership may have read the withdrawal of U.S. troops from areas immediately adjacent to the Syrian-Turkish border as a green light for its own forces to cross into Syria. Turkey launched its operation just three days after the U.S. soldiers departed.[fn]Trump makes way for Turkey operation against Kurds in Syria”, BBC, 7 October 2019. The White House said in a 7 October 2019 statement that Turkey would “soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation into northern Syria”, adding that U.S. forces would abandon their positions in the incursion’s expected path.Hide Footnote As soon as the operation was under way, however, Trump threatened to “wipe out the Turkish economy” if Ankara did anything he considered “off limits”; imposed sanctions against Turkish ministries and senior officials by executive order; and warned of further punitive measures unless and until Turkey embraced an immediate ceasefire.[fn]President Trump froze Turkish officials’ assets in the U.S. by executive order and banned their involvement in transactions involving the U.S. financial system. He also ordered a hike in steel tariffs and cancelled negotiations over a $100 billion U.S. trade deal with Turkey. “Trump says he will wipe out Turkey’s economy if it wipes out the Syrian Kurds”, Reuters, 9 October 2010; “Turkey-Syria offensive: US sanctions Turkish ministries”, BBC, 15 October 2019; and “Donald Trump asks Turkey for ceasefire and orders sanctions as violence escalates”, The Guardian, 15 October 2019. Trump’s withdrawal decision created a significant domestic backlash. “Trump’s decision on Syria has already turned into a foreign policy disaster”, NBC, 14 October 2019.Hide Footnote At the same time, the U.S. offered to lift those sanctions once Turkey halted its offensive, which it did when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreed to a ceasefire on 17 October.[fn]The United States and Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria”, White House, 17 October 2019.Hide Footnote

Five days later, Erdoğan travelled to Sochi to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Syrian regime’s main foreign sponsor along with Iran, and one of the chief power brokers in the conflict. The two presidents agreed on Turkey’s exclusive control of a 32km-deep band of territory south of the border, stretching from Raqqa’s Tel Abyad district to Ras al-Ain city in al-Hasakeh, on the Syria-Turkey border.[fn]Turkey and Russia agree on deal over buffer zone in northern Syria”, The Guardian, 22 October 2019.Hide Footnote

Occasional skirmishes aside, the ceasefires have mostly held since then, but the risk of renewed escalation remains high. As of October 2021, Turkey has been threatening to move against the SDF near its border in response to attacks that it attributes to the YPG, while the YPG has made little effort to establish a détente with Turkey that could protect the area from further violence.[fn]Ankara-backed Syrian forces ‘prepared’ for Turkish operation”, Al-Monitor, 19 October 2021.Hide Footnote From its side, the Syrian regime could attempt to stir up trouble between the SDF and Arab groups, or capitalise on local grievances to destabilise the area. The SDF’s Kurdish leadership is still struggling to secure the support of the area’s predominantly Arab population. Raqqawis sense – rightly – that the SDF-linked governance bodies run primarily on party loyalty, rather than merit, and lack the sort of transparency that could generate trust.

The tenuous calm … largely depends on the U.S. military presence further east [of Raqqa].

While the U.S has no physical presence in Raqqa, the tenuous calm that now prevails in the province largely depends on the U.S. military presence further east. Since late 2019, the U.S has maintained bases scattered across eastern al-Hasakeh and Deir al-Zor up to the Iraqi border. From these bases U.S. troops patrol the lands east of Tel Tamr, while U.S. planes control the skies over the same vicinity, occasionally carrying out airstrikes on suspected ISIS elements, including outside this area.[fn]The reported number of U.S. troops in Syria is around 900. In additional to bases in the north east, the U.S. also maintains an intelligence presence in Qamishli and an outpost in al-Tanf, near the tri-border region with Iraq and Jordan in south-eastern Syria.Hide Footnote

A continuing U.S. military presence is not a given, and in and of itself might prove insufficient to maintain stability in the area. The U.S. has been reluctant to help resolve the YPG-Turkey standoff and has made clear its desire to reduce its military footprint in the Middle East; it has also stated that its focus in Syria remains the anti-ISIS fight. That said, it appears unlikely the Biden administration will remove the troops any time soon; indeed, officials confirm that withdrawal is probably off the cards, especially after the chaotic U.S. pullout from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s subsequent seizure of power there.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, U.S. officials, Washington, October 2021.Hide Footnote From their side, European members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS have kept both their diplomatic efforts and financial contributions in the area to a bare minimum for fear of running afoul of their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally Turkey and of being surprised by a sudden U.S. withdrawal, which was a serious possibility during the Trump administration.

In sum, the residual U.S. force in eastern Syria, as well as the two ceasefires mediated by the U.S. and Russia, temporarily froze the conflict and prevented what could have become broader, regionally destabilising hostilities. But the area got no closer to a sustainable solution.[fn]Crisis Group Briefing, Steadying the New Status Quo in Syria’s North East, op. cit.Hide Footnote  By leaving Turkey’s national security concerns along with questions about a viable end-state for the north east unaddressed, these stopgap arrangements have left the door open for new rounds of military confrontation that could derail stabilisation and counter-terrorism efforts.

This report takes as its starting point the status quo created in north-eastern Syria in October 2019, proceeding to focus on subsequent developments in Raqqa governorate. In many ways, the report shows, the Syrian conflict’s key fault lines, replete with fragile ceasefires and competing local, regional and international interests, appear in microcosm in Raqqa. The report is based primarily on more than 100 interviews in Syria, the U.S. and Turkey with civilian and security officials, civil society and communal leaders, humanitarian aid workers and ordinary residents, including in government-, Turkish- and SDF-controlled districts of Raqqa. It also builds on Crisis Group’s previous reports and briefings on the Syrian war.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

II. Layered Military Control in Border Areas

Two years after the precipitous U.S. withdrawal from areas west of Qamishli (including Raqqa governorate), security and governance in the province have remained remarkably stable. The arrival of Russian and regime forces in parts of the predominantly Arab governorate raised questions about the SDF’s ability to maintain control, but so far none of the parties has been able to shift the new demarcation lines. Since these forces deployed, their presence has not resulted in an expansion of the regime’s control. Likewise, Turkey and the Syrian factions it backs have been confined to the strip of territory they captured in northern Raqqa. As a result, control of the governorate remains divided among three competing forces, with the SDF maintaining the upper hand over the majority of the province.

A. A Regime Return That Wasn’t

The abrupt U.S. drawdown in 2019 raised fears across northern Syria that the regime’s security forces might reassert themselves in areas that have been out of their hands for years. As the U.S. was pulling out of its bases, the SDF reached an alternative defence arrangement with Russia and the Syrian regime.[fn]See tweet by Mutlu Civiroglu, Kurdish affairs analyst, @mutludc, 3:07pm, 13 October 2019.Hide Footnote  SDF commander Mazloum Kobani (also known as Mazloum Abdi) said he went to Damascus immediately following the launch of the Turkish incursion to pursue such a deal.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, Mazloum Kobani, October 2020.Hide Footnote  At first, he said, the regime refused to budge from its demand that the SDF dismantle its security apparatus and hand over all areas and institutions under its control to Damascus.[fn]Mazloum Abdi, “If we have to choose between compromise and genocide, we will choose our people”, Foreign Policy, 13 October 2019. Some Syrian officials, including the foreign minister, express antagonism toward the SDF, accusing its leaders of being separatists and U.S. agents. They further claim that the SDF’s presence gives Turkey a pretext for its occupation of the border strip. See “Syrian regime refuses talks with the Kurds and accuses them of treason”, Deutsche Welle, 10 October 2019 (Arabic).Hide Footnote  The YPG rejected this demand, insisting on maintaining the unity and command of its civil and military institutions. It was only when it became clear that the U.S. was not pursuing a full withdrawal from Syria, Kobani said, that the regime, with Russian mediation, acquiesced to the YPG’s conditions.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, Mazloum Kobani, 18 September 2020. See also Dareen Khalifa, “The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria”, Crisis Group Commentary, 25 November 2020.Hide Footnote  According to Kobani, it then agreed to a partial redeployment of the Syrian army as part of a military cooperation arrangement with the SDF, including in border areas in northern Raqqa, to deter any further advance by Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian groups.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

Damascus at the time celebrated the deal as a full return of the state with all its institutions to north-eastern Syria. President Bashar al-Assad said: “The Syrian army will not deploy in north-eastern Syria only to play a military and security role. It will be accompanied by all state institutions”.[fn]President Assad: The Turkish occupier is a U.S. agent in the war and, if it does not leave completely, there will be no option but war… the army’s entry into northern areas is tantamount to the state’s re-entry”, SANA, 31 October 2019 (Arabic).Hide Footnote  While the return of state institutions did not come to pass, Syrian forces deployed to the 93rd Army Brigade base at Ain Essa, north of Raqqa city, in October 2019, close to the contact line with Turkish forces, as well as Tel Tamr. Syrian media also showed video footage of elite Republican Guard units entering the towns of Manbij and Kobani in Aleppo governorate, and lower-tier Syrian army units, such as the 17th Division and border guards, to the towns of Malikiya and Darbasiya in al-Hasakeh governorate.[fn]People in Tal Tamr town in north-western Hasaka welcome Syrian Army units”, SANA, 14 October 2019. See also Gregory Waters, “Return to the northeast: Syrian Army deployments against Turkish forces”, Middle East Institute, 20 November 2019. The SDF estimates the number of regime troops in SDF-controlled parts of north-eastern Syria in May 2021 at between 1,000 and 4,000. Crisis Group interview, senior SDF commander, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote  The swift deployment scored headlines, but most of these units subsequently withdrew from the towns to border areas.

Many Arabs fear that the Kurdish leadership will sell them out to the regime.

Their arrival during the last week of October and first week of November 2019 created great concern, bordering on panic, among the population.[fn]See Mariya Petkova, “Raqqa residents flee amid fear of Syrian government return”, Al Jazeera, 15 February 2020.Hide Footnote  Locals tried to find ways to either flee the country or strike “reconciliation” deals with Damascus – individual arrangements with regime security branches for pardons allowing the person to return home. Without clear information about the scope of the regime’s return and the delineation of responsibilities between it and the SDF, residents feared retaliation and collective punishment.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, locals in north-eastern Syria, October 2019.Hide Footnote  The SDF’s attempts to reassure them were hindered by lack of trust in the YPG’s intentions among Arabs. Many Arabs fear that the Kurdish leadership will sell them out to the regime in a trade-off that would allow the YPG to keep control of majority-Kurdish areas in return for relinquishing most of Raqqa governorate and its majority-Arab population.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, tribal notables from Manbij and Raqqa, October 2020. These concerns find echoes in other predominantly Arab areas under SDF control, such as Manbij and Deir al-Zor.Hide Footnote

Contrary to such fears, however, the SDF carefully circumscribed the Syrian army’s return to the north. In contrast to areas in south-western Syria, like Deraa, which reverted to government control in July 2018 through Russian-brokered deals between Damascus and local rebel groups, the army’s return to parts of the north east, including pockets of northern Raqqa, was not followed by violence, arrests or intimidation.[fn]Crisis Group Middle East Report N°196, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 27 February 2019.Hide Footnote

One reason for the regime’s relatively smooth return was that it was limited in both size and capability. Syrian army units are deployed in certain areas on the governorate’s boundaries as determined by the SDF. Troops are not allowed to leave their bases without coordinating with the SDF. They are blocked from engaging in combat independent of SDF command, and otherwise are allowed to patrol only within SDF-drawn zones. The SDF also prohibits them from entering city centres or interacting directly with the population, thus limiting their ability to carry out arrests.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, SDF commanders, Raqqa, November 2020, May 2021.Hide Footnote  Failure to comply with these rules has led the SDF to arrest numerous Syrian soldiers and thwart army attempts to set up checkpoints to press Raqqawi men into military service.[fn]Local sources reported that, in November 2019, army officers established a makeshift checkpoint at the entrance to Ain Essa and began checking passing men’s names against computerised lists, then arrested some who were wanted and others between the ages of 18 and 45 for army (active or reserve) service. The men were released after their families complained to the SDF, whose fighters engaged in an altercation with the troops stationed at the 93rd Brigade base. The army then removed the checkpoint and stopped questioning or detaining people on the roads. Crisis Group interviews, Raqqa, September 2020.Hide Footnote

Regime troops deployed in Raqqa in October 2019 were also hobbled by the army’s own weakened capabilities. They arrived poorly equipped and unprepared to engage in direct combat with Turkish or Turkish-backed forces. Turkey, from its end, was not politically deterred by the army’s presence on the border, and it did not hesitate to attack regime forces the same way it fought the YPG. As a result, the army suffered dozens of casualties from Turkish shelling and in combat with Turkish-backed Syrian groups.[fn]Because the army is stretched thin fighting insurgencies in central and eastern Syria, Damascus sent a hodgepodge of soldiers to the north, drawing them from nearly two dozen divisions and regiments from across the country instead of deploying whole units. See Waters, “Return to the northeast”, op. cit.Hide Footnote  Regime forces’ small numbers and lack of capacity made them dependent on the SDF for free food and fuel, as well as stipends and combat support.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Arab SDF commander, Raqqa, September 2020.Hide Footnote  They also resorted to looting to provide for themselves, a behaviour they share with army units and associated forces elsewhere in the country.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, SDF-affiliated internal security officers, Raqqa, November 2020. For accounts of looting elsewhere by regime forces, see Rafya Salamah, “The looting years”, Al-Jumhuriya (Damascus), 24 October 2018.Hide Footnote  This situation continued until Russia started channelling weapons and military supplies to the army units in the north east, including night thermal sights and anti-tank guided missiles.[fn]Crisis Group interview, SDF official, Qamishli, November 2020.Hide Footnote  Regardless, the SDF has maintained the upper hand, keeping regime forces under tight control.

Unlike other parts of eastern Syria, ... Raqqa has not ... been a hub of pro-opposition activity.

Damascus has attempted to win hearts and minds in areas where its troops deployed in Raqqa, but it appears to have had little success thus far. Unlike other parts of eastern Syria, such as Deir al-Zor, Raqqa has not, throughout the war, been a hub of pro-opposition activity, which worried the SDF that the regime’s efforts might gain traction. It also raised the regime’s ambitions to regain influence in Raqqa after ISIS’s 2017 defeat, and especially after it was able to deploy its troops there in 2019.[fn]The Syrian regime continued efforts to win the support of tribes in Raqqa. In January 2019, Damascus announced that its officials had met with tribes in the Ithriyah region (125km south of Raqqa city), with hundreds of regime-supporting tribal figures in attendance. See Ammar al-Musarea, “The Role of Syrian Tribes: Betting on a Lost Cause”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 March 2021.Hide Footnote  Senior regime officials met with Raqqawi tribesmen to win them over, reportedly to no avail.[fn]Ali Mamlouk calls on the Jazira tribes to defect from SDF”, Enab Baladi, 6 December 2019.Hide Footnote  Syrian army commanders also made several visits to the Raqqa countryside throughout 2020 to project the regime’s influence, and pro-regime media regularly spread rumours about an imminent government takeover of Raqqa to encourage defections from the SDF and boost morale within Syrian military ranks.[fn]In one instance, Brigadier General Suheil al-Hassan, commander of the 25th Special Mission Forces Division, also known as the Tiger Forces, made a surprise visit to Raqqa’s regime-controlled western countryside, signalling that the regime might make a military move on Raqqa. “Why did Suheil al-Hassan visit Raqqa?”, The Syrian Observer, 8 July 2020. See also a story filed by correspondent Omar al-Shabali on Facebook, 25 October 2019.Hide Footnote  The YPG leadership is aware of these attempts to draw the population away from the SDF, but it has not been able to put a stop to them.[fn]Crisis Group interview, co-president of the Raqqa civil council, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote

The YPG and many locals additionally believe that the regime is actively trying to destabilise areas outside its control in Raqqa by fanning grievances among Arabs, encouraging defections from the SDF and organising anti-SDF protests.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, SDF officials and local Arab representatives, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote  The SDF has tried to block such schemes by arresting the alleged instigators and intensifying its own outreach to Arabs to reassure them that its grip is firm.[fn]See Patrick Haenni and Arthur Quesnay, “Surviving the Aftermath of Islamic State: The Syrian Kurdish Movement’s Resilience Strategy”, European University Institute, 7 August 2020.Hide Footnote  Both the YPG and some tribal figures claim that the regime – as well as remaining ISIS cells – are paying people to plant explosives, conduct hit-and-run attacks and start fires on agricultural lands.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, SDF officials and tribal figures, north-eastern Syria, November 2020.Hide Footnote  Regardless of the merits of such accusations, they have become so widespread as to feed anti-regime sentiment in Raqqa.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Raqqawis, November 2020, May 2021. The leadership in Damascus has also hinted at its ability to stir up local resistance to what it described as the occupying force in the north east. See tweet by Elizabeth Tsurkov, analyst, @Elizrael, 4:35am, 12 March 2020.Hide Footnote

While [Raqqawis] would welcome the return of the state’s administrative services, they are terrified of being subject once again to the regime’s repression.

The general sense in Raqqa appears to be that while people would welcome the return of the state’s administrative services, they are terrified of being subject once again to the regime’s repression. As a Raqqawi notable put it:

The people of Raqqa don’t want the return of the military recruitment department, military bases, security branches, Baath Party branches or police. They want the government’s official stamps to complete their administrative papers; they don’t want the Assad regime’s crackdowns and corruption.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Raqqa, March 2020.Hide Footnote

Locals are also keenly aware of the situation in regime-controlled parts of Raqqa. Many people living in those areas cross the line of control into SDF-held districts in search of economic opportunities. Students in SDF-held areas often cross into government-controlled parts of Raqqa to take their exams in government-accredited schools. People also frequently travel through government-controlled parts of Raqqa on their way to receive medical care in Damascus.[fn]See Hussam al-Omar, “Iran-backed militias wreaking havoc on Raqqa countryside – locals demanding liberation”, Enab Baladi, 30 April 2021.Hide Footnote  A farmer from the regime-held town of Maadan, 60km downstream along the Euphrates from Raqqa city, said: “When the government returned to our areas, we expected it to provide us with basic services. This never happened. Instead, it set up security branches and drafted young men, while looting and extortion continued”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Maadan, Raqqa, September 2020.Hide Footnote Areas of southern Raqqa wrecked by regime and associated forces during the 2017 anti-ISIS war have not been rebuilt and remain unsafe. People in regime-controlled towns and villages in Raqqa, including Rasafa, Maadan and al-Sabkha, complain of recurrent theft, extortion and murders by unknown gunmen.[fn]Crisis Group interviews and observations, 2020-2021.Hide Footnote

In sum, and contrary to Assad’s 2019 statements, the army’s deployment in Raqqa neither brought a return of government services nor re-established regime sovereignty. Instead, it revealed the power imbalance in the north east between Damascus and the SDF, a force that continues to enjoy U.S. backing. While Damascus has access to and influence among some local tribes, its ability to draw them away from the de facto governing authority seems to be limited as long as that imbalance holds.

B. Russia’s Limited Role

Washington’s partial withdrawal from northern Syria, including Raqqa, has for the most part presented only a limited opportunity for Moscow to expand its footprint. Russia managed to insert itself diplomatically in the region by mediating a defence arrangement between the SDF and Damascus and a cessation of hostilities with Turkey. It also scored media headlines by taking over bases that the U.S. had evacuated in 2019. But its forces failed to take effective control of subsequent events.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior SDF official, May 2021. See also Brian Katulis, “Russian flags over an American base”, Center for American Progress, 6 December 2020.Hide Footnote  Almost two years later, Moscow’s ability to extend its military and political reach in the area has proven limited, at least partly because the U.S. kept a residual force in place rather than carrying out a full withdrawal.

Russian attempts to box the U.S. out of the north east arguably even backfired. On several occasions in 2020, Russian military vehicles came into close contact with U.S. armoured vehicles, causing injuries among U.S. soldiers in one incident in al-Hasakeh governorate in August 2020.[fn]The incident took place in Deyrik near Malikiya, a town close to the Turkish and Iraqi borders. “Syria war: American troops hurt after Russian and US military vehicles collide”, BBC, 27 August 2020; and Lolita Baldor and Robert Burns, “Vehicle collision with Russians injures 4 US troops in Syria”, ABC News, 26 August 2020. A video of the incident is available in a tweet by Rob Lee, doctoral student, @RALee85, 10:05am, 26 August 2020.Hide Footnote  Brett McGurk, the U.S. special envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition during the Trump administration (and now White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa), stated on Twitter at the time: “These incidents have been ongoing for months”, and blamed them on what he described as “Trump’s impetuous withdrawal decision” in October 2019.[fn]Tweet by Brett McGurk, (then former) U.S. official, @brett_mcgurk, 1:32pm, 26 August 2020. McGurk had resigned over the withdrawal decision.Hide Footnote  Moscow may have intended to complicate the U.S. presence in Syria and confirm the instincts of those officials in Washington who favour a full U.S. withdrawal from Syria, but the incidents instead prompted the U.S. to dispatch extra troops and force protection supplies in September 2020.[fn]Syria war: US deploys reinforcements to Syria after Russia clashes”, BBC, 19 September 2020. The U.S. claims to have 900 troops on the ground, but this number may not be accurate. See David S. Cloud, “Inside U.S. troops’ stronghold in Syria, a question of how long Biden will keep them there”, Los Angeles Times, 12 March 2021.Hide Footnote  That, in turn, appears to have persuaded Russia to halt such incidents.

Beyond mediating the narrow October 2019 defence arrangement at a time when the YPG faced a major threat to its presence in northern Syria, and occasionally resolving local SDF-regime standoffs, Moscow’s attempts to broker a settlement between the YPG and Damascus have also been unsuccessful. Russian officials blame what they describe as the YPG’s tough negotiating position toward Damascus, which they see as a function of the group’s confidence in continued U.S. protection.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Russian diplomat, Geneva, March 2020.Hide Footnote  The YPG, in turn, portrays Damascus’s position as uncompromising, and expresses little trust in Russia’s guarantees for the deals it has brokered, based on Moscow’s inability or unwillingness to uphold its promises in other parts of Syria, where opposition groups acquiesced to so-called reconciliation deals negotiated under Russian auspices only to face arbitrary arrests and kidnappings.[fn]From the YPG’s standpoint, the recurring arrests and forced disappearances in Deraa highlight the unreliability of Russia’s commitments and thus the importance of maintaining the military capacity to protect itself. See footnote 99 in Crisis Group Report, Lessons from the Syrian State's Return to the South, op. cit.Hide Footnote  Additionally, whatever trust might have existed between the YPG and Russia dissipated after Moscow greenlighted Turkey’s attack on the predominantly Kurdish district of Afrin in northern Syria in early 2018, which the YPG has not forgotten.[fn]Afrin has historically been a YPG stronghold, a predominantly Kurdish district with wide popular support for the YPG and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. SDF commander Mazloum Kobani said: “Afrin is one third of Rojava [the Kurdish region of Syria]. We have thousands of Kurdish families currently displaced because of the Turkish invasion who are not able to go home. We are under a lot of pressure [from our people] because of this”. Crisis Group interview, al-Hasakeh, 25 November 2020.Hide Footnote

Turkish officials have started expressing frustration at what they see as [Moscow’s] unfulfilled promise.

For its part, Turkey accuses Russia of having under-delivered on its promises in north-eastern Syria.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, Ankara, January 2021.Hide Footnote  According to the October 2019 agreement between Ankara and Moscow, Russian military police and Syrian border guards were to facilitate the removal of YPG fighters and their weapons from along the Turkish-Syrian border to a depth of 30km.[fn]Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation”, Russian Presidential Office, 22 October 2019.Hide Footnote  Russian officials say they followed through on that pledge, but both Turkish and YPG officials counter that Moscow has not attempted to persuade the YPG to relinquish control of the border area.[fn]Turkish officials claim that when they asked their Russian counterparts about the YPG’s presence in the border area, the latter responded by saying they had removed the YPG entirely – incorrectly, according to the officials. Crisis Group interviews, Turkish officials, Ankara, January 2021.Hide Footnote  The Russia-Turkey agreement also states: “All YPG elements and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifat”.[fn]Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation”, op. cit.Hide Footnote  To date, however, the YPG continues to operate in all border areas of north-eastern Syria that are not Turkish-held; it also holds Manbij and is present alongside regime forces in Tel Rifat.[fn]Crisis Group visits to north-eastern Syria in November 2019 and May 2021 suggest that the YPG is still present in Manbij and all areas north east of the Euphrates,  except for parts captured by Turkey in October 2019.Hide Footnote  The YPG has also been regularly shelling Turkish-controlled areas from territory under Russian protection, such as Tel Rifat, killing two Turkish officers in October 2021.[fn]“Erdogan says latest Kurdish YPG attack on Turkish police is ‘final straw’”, Reuters, 11 October 2021.Hide Footnote  While Ankara at first said little about Moscow failing to uphold its end of the bargain, Turkish officials have started expressing frustration at what they see as an unfulfilled promise.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, Turkish official, April 2020; Turkish officials, Ankara, January 2020. The Turko-Russian disagreement in the north east presents similarities with the situation in Idlib, where Moscow complains of what it sees as insufficient Turkish efforts to fight the locally dominant group Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham. See Crisis Group Middle East Report N°213, Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, 14 May 2020.Hide Footnote

Russia was able to chalk up one notable gain in October 2019. It won control of parts of the strategic M4 highway linking Aleppo to the north east. The M4 had been a vital route for trade and humanitarian assistance to Raqqa from northern Iraq, as well as the main artery for military supplies from the YPG’s stronghold in Qamishli to Raqqa. The YPG was compelled to hand control of parts of the highway over to Russia to protect it from Turkish strikes, though attacks on the M4 from the Turkish-held side have continued intermittently, disrupting traffic and often rendering the road unsafe, including for Russian-escorted commercial and military convoys.[fn]Fighting continues over flashpoint town in northern Syria”, Voice of America, 5 January 2021.Hide Footnote

Beyond this gain, Russian and regime forces have been unable to expand their presence. Notwithstanding Trump’s bungled attempt to pull out, Moscow appears to believe that the U.S. is likely to maintain a military presence in Syria for the foreseeable future.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Russian official, Ankara, September 2021.Hide Footnote  Indeed, some senior U.S. officials have signalled that they see the U.S. military presence in Syria as necessary to avert the type of violence that would threaten Washington’s local partner, the SDF, and destabilise the region, potentially enabling an ISIS resurgence.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, U.S. officials, north-eastern Syria, May 2021. To signal their commitment to U.S. troops staying in north-eastern Syria, Acting U.S. Assistant Secretary Joey Hood, joined by the deputy assistant secretary and acting special representative for Syria, the deputy envoy for Syria and the National Security Council director for Iraq and Syria, travelled there in May 2021 for meetings with SDF and autonomous administration senior officials, as well as ranking council members and tribal leaders. See “Acting U.S. Assistant Secretary Joey Hood Travels to North East Syria”, U.S. Department of State, 17 May 2021.Hide Footnote Accordingly, Moscow seems more focused on preserving its existing footprint than on trying to enlarge it.

C. Governance Challenges

Along the lines of military control, governance in Raqqa is divided into three zones, each with its distinct modus operandi and complex set of challenges. Damascus governs pockets south of the province along the Euphrates river, Turkish-backed Syrian groups have set up their own governing councils in Tel Abyad district (as well as in al-Hasakeh governorate’s Ras al-Ain city) with direct support from Turkey, and SDF-affiliated local councils continue to govern most of Raqqa governorate with backing from the U.S. and other Global Coalition members. The U.S. presence allows the SDF to shepherd resources and pay the running cost of the autonomous administration. The U.S. and the coalition also train and equip both the SDF and the internal security forces affiliated with the autonomous administration. Additionally, the SDF gets political and diplomatic backing through engagement with the U.S. and other coalition members.

The Kurdish-dominated SDF has established a relatively effective administration in the Arab-majority governorate, but its rule has not been without flaws. The main problems, as noted by the local population, are the overbearing influence of PKK-trained party cadres on administrative decision-making; the opaqueness of party-linked money-making ventures and certain policies, such as forced conscription and reduction of subsidies on bread and fuel; and perceived corruption on the local level. These features of SDF rule have at times alienated locals and stirred up unrest.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Arabs and Kurds throughout north-eastern Syria, November 2020 and May 2021.Hide Footnote

Raqqa has experienced a remarkable transformation since 2017.

What is indisputable is that Raqqa has experienced a remarkable transformation since 2017. The international coalition’s preponderant use of air power during the anti-ISIS fight left nearly 70 per cent of Raqqa city and its surroundings obliterated and emptied the town of its inhabitants. Residents spoke of destruction on a stunning scale.[fn]Local sources say the destruction in the city’s major neighbourhoods reached 60 to 70 per cent, hitting 80 per cent in some areas, such as al-Thakana and al-Fardous, and 40 per cent – as in Al-Mansour street – or 20 per cent in others – as in Hisham bin Abdulmalak street. Crisis Group telephone interviews, June 2021. Observations from Crisis Group visits in October 2017 confirmed that the destruction was massive.Hide Footnote  With U.S. and coalition support, the SDF then began to restore essential services to both the town and its environs, working alongside a number of Western-funded local organisations.[fn]While the SDF has not made its budget for north-eastern Syria public, SDF officials have stated privately that the autonomous administration’s running costs, including civil servants’ salaries, are around $45 million monthly. Crisis Group interview, senior autonomous administration official, Raqqa, March 2019. The SDF also implies that its major source of income is revenue from selling oil it extracts in eastern Syria to the Damascus regime via Syrian businessmen. Crisis Group interviews, autonomous administration officials, Qamishli, November 2020. While there are no official numbers, some observers estimate that the SDF sells around 30,000 barrels of oil per day. Crisis Group telephone interview, former U.S. official, July 2021.Hide Footnote

The Raqqa civil council, the administrative governing body affiliated with the SDF, employs and pays salaries to over 9,000 civil servants, including teachers.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Leila Mustafa, co-president of the Raqqa civil council, November 2020.Hide Footnote  This number has increased as the economic conditions in government-held areas deteriorated, prompting people to seek opportunities in SDF-controlled areas, where the autonomous administration pays salaries up to ten times higher than the regime does in areas it holds. With U.S. support, the SDF has also managed to restore water and electricity to almost 70 per cent of the governorate. Raqqawis attest that even limited Western investment in Raqqa, such as in putting up streetlights, significantly reduced crime and ISIS-linked attacks.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Raqqa, November 2020.Hide Footnote

Raqqawis complain … that qualified technocrats have lost senior positions in favour of Kurds with … militant backgrounds.

Despite these improvements, the SDF has incurred much local criticism. While it has recruited tens of thousands of locals (from diverse ethnic backgrounds and political affiliations) to work for civil and military-affiliated institutions, it has been reluctant to delegate authority to them beyond day-to-day bureaucratic dealings. Decision-making on more important matters remains secretive, with ultimate authority residing in a few PKK-trained cadres appointed by the party in closed-door meetings.[fn]Turkey estimates that there are about 2,500 PKK-trained cadres in north-eastern Syria. Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, Ankara, June 2021.Hide Footnote  These cadres draw up the administration’s budget, appoint front-line and regional commanders, oversee distribution of military supplies and coordinate with the Global Coalition.[fn]Crisis Group observations on frequent visits to north-eastern Syria since 2016.Hide Footnote  Raqqawis complain in particular that qualified technocrats have lost senior positions in favour of Kurds with YPG and/or PKK party affiliations and militant backgrounds.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Raqqa, November 2020.Hide Footnote  For instance, residents point to the fact that the Kurdish president of the Raqqa civil council has held her position since the council’s establishment, while several Arab co-presidents, whose roles are broadly seen as cosmetic, have served only brief terms.

Residents also complain about the opaque way in which the YPG has allocated the resources it obtains from taxation and its control of the north east’s oil and gas resources and cross-border trade with Iraq, as well as international support (channelled primarily through the U.S. government) to stabilise areas captured from ISIS. Arab contractors claim, for example, that budgets for public works are sometimes inflated, allowing Kurdish cadres or others in the administration to skim off a significant part of the allocated money.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Raqqa, November 2020.Hide Footnote  Perceptions of corruption are widespread. While specific allegations may be difficult to substantiate, the perception itself can be almost as damaging as actual corruption and reveals a general lack of trust in governance or feelings of exclusion.

The SDF so far has been able to manage local frustrations with its rule in Raqqa.

That said, the SDF so far has been able to manage local frustrations with its rule in Raqqa by addressing tensions between the local administration and the population with an agility it has not displayed in some other areas it controls, such as parts of Deir al-Zor. The international attention and resources given to Raqqa, and the SDF’s use of well-regarded Kurdish interlocutors (not always present in, for example, Deir al-Zor) who acted as trusted focal points, contributed to its success. Raqqawis in particular appear to view positively one of the main senior YPG cadres who, while not holding an official position in the Raqqa civil administration, became the go-to person to resolve all sorts of governance-related issues. Having lived in Raqqa since 2017, he has become accustomed to local traditions and tribal dynamics – an important asset.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Raqqa, November 2021.Hide Footnote

Generally, the entrenchment and acculturation of PKK-trained Syrian cadres in local communities has become increasingly evident across the north east. Yet public sentiment against the SDF prioritising party affiliation over merit at senior administration levels still prevails and could stir ethnic and political tensions in the absence of structural governance reforms that would devolve decision-making power to locals.[fn]In November 2020, the autonomous administration held a conference in al-Hasakeh attended by civil society and tribal representatives from across north-eastern Syria to cap off a series of town hall meetings. As a result of these consultations, they agreed to reforms that would devolve decision-making in local governance. Crisis Group observations, al-Hasakeh, November 2020.Hide Footnote

Additionally, the overall deteriorating economic situation in Syria has taken its toll on the autonomous administration. Hyperinflation and the severe devaluation of the Syrian pound – compounded by U.S. and European sanctions on the regime – have all had their impact on Syria’s north east, leading to a precipitous drop in purchasing power. To respond to the crisis, the autonomous administration raised civil servants’ salaries by almost 100 per cent. Yet only a couple of months after raising salaries, it issued a decision to increase fuel prices by more than 200 per cent.[fn]On 17 May, the price of gasoline was raised from 150 to 400 Syrian pounds per litre, and the price of cooking gas cylinders from 2,500 to 8,000 pounds. See “Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring Pilot Project May 2021”, COAR Global, 30 June 2021.Hide Footnote  The price hike triggered fierce protests, with angry demonstrators blocking roads and storming SDF offices, leading the administration to reverse its decision.[fn]See Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Following protests, Kurdish-led authorities in northeast Syria overturn fuel price increase”, Kurdistan 24, 19 May 2021. Prices for subsidised gasoline, which reportedly is of low quality, stand at between 200 and 250 Syrian pounds ($0.07) per litre. Gasoline of higher quality reportedly smuggled from the Kurdistan region of Iraq sells for ten times that price.Hide Footnote

Adding to the overall economic crisis is an unprecedented water shortage in the area. The Euphrates has reportedly dropped to critically low levels, with significant implications for wheat production.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, residents, Raqqa, May 2021. An autonomous administration official said that as of May 2021, the river in Raqqa had dropped by as much as 5m compared to its water level a year earlier. Crisis Group interview, al-Hasakeh, May 2021.Hide Footnote  The low water level has adversely affected the Tishreen Dam’s hydroelectric potential, causing blackouts across north-eastern Syria.[fn]See “No Peace for the Dammed: Alarming Water Scarcity in Northeast Syria”, COAR Global, 10 May 2021.Hide Footnote  The SDF claims that neighbouring Turkey is deliberately withholding water upstream to put pressure on the SDF and destabilise the area it controls.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Leila Mustafa, co-chair of the Raqqa civil council, May 2021.Hide Footnote  But experts contend that drought in Turkey and global warming are the main reasons for the shortage.[fn]See “No Peace for the Dammed”, op. cit.Hide Footnote The serious decline in water availability is harming the SDF’s ability to provide potable water, electricity and bread, among other essential services, to the population. Residents of Raqqa said the city was getting electricity for only seven hours per day in June 2021, compared to 2020, when it had up to fourteen hours of power per day.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, June 2021.Hide Footnote  Such supply problems are spreading discontent.

The SDF’s conscription practices have likewise run into controversy. In an attempt to limit popular backlash, the SDF did not impose conscription in Raqqa city when it first arrived, but it has been drafting men born between 1990-2003 in other parts of the governorate. Young men thus fear being pressed into service if they leave the city. In 2021, the SDF started conscripting young men from predominantly Arab cities like Raqqa and Manbij. Forced recruitment that included schoolteachers and medical personnel infuriated the public, triggering demonstrations across north-eastern Syria throughout 2021.[fn]See Hassan al-Kassab, “SDF's forced conscription campaign in Raqqa threatens instability and potential displacement”, Syria Direct, 16 March 2021 (Arabic).Hide Footnote  Some of these protests have been met with violent SDF crackdowns, further fuelling local anger.[fn]On 1 June 2021, between six and eight people were reportedly killed and at least 25 injured in Manbij when the SDF cracked down on demonstrations against military conscription. Public pressure then led the SDF to halt its conscription campaign in Manbij. See “Deadly SDF Crackdown and Conscription Campaign Sparks in Menbij”, COAR Global, 7 June 2021.Hide Footnote  The recruitment drive has also extended at times to minors, who are abducted, in effect, by Kurdish militants with ambiguous links to the YPG but perceived to be operating outside of the SDF’s authority.[fn]Amberin Zaman, “Child recruitment casts shadow over Syrian Kurds’ push for global legitimacy”, Al-Monitor, 7 December 2020.Hide Footnote

Education policies imposed by the autonomous administration are also creating backlash. In 2016, the administration started replacing the Syrian government school curricula in predominantly Kurdish areas with its own Kurdish course of study. The practical effect of this decision was that students would receive graduation certificates that are not recognised anywhere else in Syria, limiting their options in pursuing higher education. The decision led those who could afford it to send their kids to private schools or hire private tutors to teach them the Arabic government-accredited curriculum. In a highly controversial move in late 2020, the administration started shutting down private institutions that taught in Arabic in Qamishli, arresting those running them.[fn]See Mohammed Hardan, “Authorities in northeast Syria struggle to impose Kurdish curriculum”, Al-Monitor, 24 February 2021.Hide Footnote  While the unaccredited curriculum has not been imposed in Raqqa or on Arabs under SDF control, the policy has created widespread concern among Arabs and Kurds alike throughout the SDF-held region who fear that the SDF could force it upon them in the future.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Raqqa, November 2020.Hide Footnote

Declining international support has ... been a major challenge for those governing Raqqa.

Declining international support has also been a major challenge for those governing Raqqa, as it is in other parts of Syria’s north east. In addition to overall Syria fatigue, reflected in shrinking Western pledges for humanitarian assistance, donors have been reluctant to support anything beyond the restoration of essential services to avoid being seen as involved in reconstruction as part of a nation-building effort.[fn]Crisis Group Middle East Report N°209, Ways Out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum, 25 November 2019.Hide Footnote

As a result, most services are supported only by U.S.-funded stabilisation schemes, which the Trump administration scaled back significantly in its later years.[fn]In March 2018, President Trump ordered a freeze on $230 million in U.S. stabilisation aid to Syria. That November, the U.S. State Department reported that more than ten Coalition members had filled the funding gap in “very hard contributions”, including Saudi Arabia with $100 million and the United Arab Emirates with $50 million, as well as Germany and the UK. See “Trump freezes $200 million in aid promised to Syria’’, ABC News, 31 March 2019.Hide Footnote  While the autonomous administration continues to coordinate with U.S.-funded local NGOs on restoring services such as water and electricity, and getting schools and hospitals running again, the number and scope of those NGOs have diminished, as they operate with a limited budget following the March 2018 U.S. presidential freeze of stabilisation assistance for Syria. Although the freeze has been lifted, and the U.S. State Department obligated some assistance while it was in effect, U.S. officials say its impact will likely continue to be felt through 2022.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, U.S. official, July 2021. See also U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2021-March 31, 2021”, 4 May 2021.Hide Footnote  The burden of meeting the basic needs of Raqqa’s residents thus falls on the autonomous administration, as more people return to their homes in the province and others move there in search of economic opportunities.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, senior autonomous administration official, Raqqa, May 2021; civil society representative, Raqqa, May 2021. Also see “Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, op. cit.Hide Footnote

In successive U.S. administrations, some officials have framed stabilising areas formerly controlled by ISIS as a national security imperative. They highlight the challenges the SDF would face in trying to contain thousands of ISIS detainees (as well as fighting resurgent militant cells) in areas previously under ISIS control without continued financial support and military cover.[fn]In August 2020, U.S. Central Command commander General Frank McKenzie said if countries fail to repatriate ISIS-affiliated citizens detained in SDF-run facilities and displacement camps in Syria, the Coalition’s efforts against ISIS “may be for naught”. “Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020”, U.S. Department of Defense, 30 October 2020.Hide Footnote  Certainly, Western countries’ hesitation to invest in areas they helped capture from ISIS has a direct impact on the SDF’s ability to stabilise these areas. The SDF’s initial legitimacy stems from having defeated ISIS militarily and presenting itself as a more benevolent alternative to the Syrian regime. It could gradually diminish as local frustration increases because the SDF cannot continue to provide basic services, even if the group succeeds in maintaining security.

III. A Fragile Calm

U.S. and Russian diplomacy halted the fighting in and around Raqqa in October 2019, without addressing the drivers of conflict. As a result, a fragile stalemate has prevailed, punctured by occasional clashes between opposing forces, while ISIS attacks continue in regime-, SDF- and Turkish-controlled districts of Raqqa.

Renewed Turkish military moves against the SDF are the main potential threat to the area’s stability.

Renewed Turkish military moves against the SDF are the main potential threat to the area’s stability. Given that Ankara views the SDF’s control over north-eastern Syria’s strategic territory and assets as a national security threat and unacceptable, it has used brinkmanship and shown willingness to take political and military risks to address its concerns.[fn]In August 2016, Turkey conducted a cross-border operation named Euphrates Shield in northern Aleppo governorate, capturing these areas from ISIS. In January 2018, Turkey launched another military operation, this time targeting Afrin district, pushing out the YPG and handing control of the area to Syrian opposition groups it backs.Hide Footnote  As a result, the ceasefires remain brittle and may crumble. The area has seen cross-line attacks by the YPG and Turkish-backed groups, YPG-linked attacks in Turkish-controlled regions of Raqqa and Aleppo, and Turkish drone strikes targeting the YPG along the border. The SDF has publicly distanced itself from bombings directed at Turkish-backed groups but appears to do little to stop those attacks, which have killed or injured dozens of civilians.[fn]Crisis Group interview, YPG official, al-Hasakeh, November 2021.Hide Footnote  Many such bombings involve improvised explosive devices smuggled in from SDF-controlled areas.[fn]See Khaled al-Khateb, “New Kurdish group in Syria attacks Turkish-backed opposition in Afrin”, Al-Monitor, 24 April 2021.Hide Footnote  Kurdish militant groups with ambiguous links to the YPG and that enjoy some protection and freedom of movement within north-eastern Syria have claimed some cross-line attacks.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

Despite distancing itself from the attacks, the SDF claims they are legitimate and justified. SDF leaders say attacks strike only military targets and are carried out in response to attacks by Turkey and Turkish-supported groups.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, Mazloum Kobani, SDF commander, 18 September 2020.Hide Footnote  They cite as another motivating factor Turkey’s occupation of Afrin, a district in north-western Syria which had a Kurdish majority until Turkey and Syrian rebel groups it backs seized it in March 2018, resulting in the displacement of many Kurdish inhabitants.[fn]More than 150,000 people in Syria's Afrin displaced: Kurdish official, monitor”, Reuters, 17 March 2018.Hide Footnote  International organisations have alleged widespread human rights abuse by the new authorities, which some SDF leaders view as justifying resistance to an “occupying power”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Kurdish official, al-Hasakeh, November 2020. On human rights violations in Afrin, see “UN rights chief calls for Turkey to probe violations in northern Syria”, UN News, 18 September 2020.Hide Footnote  The SDF also claims that abuses by Turkish-backed groups in Turkish-held areas are fuelling violence.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Mazloum Kobani, SDF commander, al-Hasakeh, 25 November 2020.Hide Footnote  Such abuses, if not addressed firmly, may create both a humanitarian problem and a longer-term political one, and damage Turkey’s reputation.

For its part, Turkey, while wary of launching a new ground offensive and thus antagonising the new U.S. administration, has kept up military operations against the YPG. Turkish forces have periodically attacked senior YPG cadres along the border and buffer zone with drone fire, reportedly causing civilian casualties on a couple of occasions.[fn]Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Turkish drone strike kills 3 women in north Syria's Kurdish city of Kobani”, Kurdistan 24, 23 June 2020; and “Turkish drone strike injures civilian near north Syrian town of Kobani”, Kurdistan 24, 23 January 2021.Hide Footnote  (A senior SDF commander claimed that, in addition to killing civilians, Turkish drones, apparently by accident, on one occasion struck a Russian patrol that was on its way to investigate Turkish attacks in the area.[fn]Crisis Group interview, al-Hasakeh, November 2020.Hide Footnote ) For its part, Turkey claims it has mostly been targeting non-Syrian PKK cadres with its drone strikes.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Turkish officials, Ankara, September 2021.Hide Footnote  According to the SDF, Moscow also several times pulled Russian forces out of the area north of Raqqa to allow Turkish forces to put pressure on the SDF.[fn]Crisis Group interview, SDF official, Qamishli, May 2021.Hide Footnote  Shelling by Turkish-backed forces has intensified only intermittently; Moscow’s attempt to press the YPG to hand complete control of the area over to the regime also came to nought.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, SDF official, December 2020.Hide Footnote

Still, continued YPG-linked attacks could at some point trigger a more forceful Turkish reaction and thus unleash an escalatory cycle of fighting. A Turkish official said in early 2020: “From our perspective, the ceasefire is no longer in effect. The YPG is breaking it on a daily basis and we will eventually respond decisively to their attacks”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara, January 2020.Hide Footnote  Indeed, in October 2021, Turkey stepped up its rhetoric and transferred military equipment to its Syrian partners, threatening a new military move against the YPG.[fn]See Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syrian rebels mobilise for possible Turkish attack on Kurdish fighters”, Reuters, 4 November 2021.Hide Footnote

[A] major threat to calm in Raqqa governorate is recurring ISIS attacks.

Another major threat to calm in Raqqa governorate is recurring ISIS attacks. The security situation has noticeably improved compared to the immediate aftermath of the battle against ISIS. Yet it remains vulnerable. In 2017, the city and its outskirts were littered with antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices planted by ISIS. Moving around in the area was extremely dangerous; hundreds of civilians fell victim to mines.[fn]Syria: Landmines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Raqqa”, Human Rights Watch, 12 February 2018.Hide Footnote  Today the area has been mostly cleared, but intermittent ISIS attacks continue, including by improvised explosive devices, hit-and-run assaults and assassinations in both the city and the governorate at large, especially in the eastern al-Karama district, a former ISIS stronghold.[fn]Crisis Group observations and interviews, civil society representatives, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote

Throughout the past year, ISIS launched repeated operations targeting the SDF’s internal security forces and their checkpoints in Raqqa.[fn]See Abdullah Al-Ghadhawy, “ISIS in Syria: A Deadly New Focus”, Newlines Institute, 28 April 2020. Hide Footnote  A senior SDF security official said in May 2021: “61 of our internal security forces and 32 SDF fighters in Raqqa were killed by masked guys on motorbikes or roadside bombings throughout the last year”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote  ISIS also attacked regime targets in SDF-controlled areas in the Raqqa countryside.[fn]Statement Issued by the General Command of the Internal Security Forces – Raqqa Province”, Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria, 12 May 2021.Hide Footnote The U.S. Central Command assesses that ISIS likely has sufficient manpower and resources to operate indefinitely at its present level in the Syrian desert. Since 2019, the group has refrained from attacking U.S. troops and instead directed its fire at the SDF; during the past year, it has stepped up attacks on the regime and the Iranian-aligned militias cooperating with it.[fn]Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2021–June 30, 2021”, U.S. Department of Defense, 17 August 2021.Hide Footnote

The SDF attributes the attacks to the frequent infiltration of fighters, often disguised as civilians, from government-controlled parts of Raqqa into SDF-controlled ones, and then on to Turkish-controlled Tel Abyad district.[fn]Crisis Group interview, SDF commander, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote  The majority of ISIS attacks in Raqqa governorate target security forces in regime-controlled areas in the south, however.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, SDF commanders, Raqqa, May 2021.Hide Footnote  Many strikes have hit Syrian army positions and patrols, while a few have targeted oil fields south of Tabqa.[fn]A Syria expert reported 70 confirmed ISIS attacks in southern Raqqa between January 2020 and September 2021. Crisis Group interview, Gregory Waters, October 2021.Hide Footnote  The proximity of regime-controlled parts of Raqqa to northern Homs and Hama, where ISIS has regained strength, has made them especially vulnerable.

A final threat to stability in the north east is the potential for a regime military advance. The U.S. residual troop presence in eastern Syria has kept a lid on Russian and regime military moves. But absent a détente between the SDF and Damascus regarding the oil-rich region’s future, Damascus will undoubtedly expect to be able to recapture the area or impose its terms on the YPG in the event of a U.S. withdrawal.

IV. Helping Stabilise Raqqa

In the four years since the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS levelled much of Raqqa city and its surroundings, the governorate has experienced a remarkable revival. Yet its recovery is both precarious and partial, because some of the main underlying challenges remain unaddressed.

The province remains a playground for adversaries competing for control and influence. The majority of Raqqa remains under the military control and administrative governance of a group – the SDF/YPG – that is deeply at odds with the regime in Damascus and antagonistic to Turkey. With such foes, it might not be able to maintain its rule without the protection of a small U.S. military contingent. Yet, notwithstanding the Biden administration’s stated intent to stay in Syria for now, it remains uncertain how long the U.S. will keep its troops there. Nor is it clear that Washington is ready and able to use forces deployed as part of counter-ISIS efforts to act as a buffer between the SDF-controlled area and its two competing foes. The regime would like to retake the area once it regains its strength and can summon Russian and Iranian support. For its part, Turkey, at least so long as it sees the YPG as an extension of the PKK, will remain intent on ending YPG rule in the north east, viewing it as a threat to its national security.

Raqqa has turned into a success story … worth preserving, especially in the absence of a timely, credible path to a negotiated settlement of the overall conflict.

Still, amid the horrors of the Syrian war, Raqqa has turned into a success story of sorts. The gains it has made are worth preserving, especially in the absence of a timely, credible path to a negotiated settlement of the overall conflict. Progress is even more remarkable given that stabilisation and reconstruction occurred without much planning, much less a coherent strategy, amid reluctance by coalition members and international organisations to engage in rebuilding, severe limitations on access and uncertain U.S. financial or military investment. It continued even after the U.S. withdrew its remaining forces from Raqqa to neighbouring Deir al-Zor and al-Hasakeh governorates in October 2019. In stark contrast to many areas reclaimed by Damascus or Turkish-backed factions, SDF-held areas of Raqqa enjoy a decent level of security, moderate prosperity and fairly capable local governance which, for all its faults, has created conditions that have made the area a magnet for migrants and investment from other parts of Syria.[fn]See Crisis Group Report, Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins, forthcoming.

For this reason, the U.S. and other Global Coalition members should use the relative calm in former ISIS strongholds, including Raqqa, to address the underlying threats to these areas’ stability.

Western states that contributed to Raqqa’s destruction as members of the Global Coalition should protect the area from an ISIS resurgence and contribute to its rebuilding. European countries should likewise work to address the damage done to the area and its people in the process of fighting ISIS. This support should not be unconditional, however. As the U.S. starts releasing Congressionally appropriated stabilisation funds to Syria, it should take into account the following factors.

First, the international coalition, and the U.S. in particular, should ensure that its protection of the SDF and autonomous administration does not turn north-eastern Syria into a staging ground for militant attacks on other parts of northern Syria, or in Iraq or Turkey. The SDF, which wields effective control over the area, should be held accountable for the actions of other Kurdish militants there. The U.S. should leverage its increased stabilisation assistance to achieve a cessation of insurgent attacks emanating from the north east on Turkey or Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. In parallel, Washington should work with Ankara to improve the human rights situation in areas the latter controls in northern Syria, including Afrin, Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain, which have seen killings, kidnappings and seizures of property; and to make conditions in these areas safer for displaced people who wish to go home.[fn]On human rights violations, see “Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet”, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 September 2020.Hide Footnote  Washington should also press Ankara to rein in the Syrian groups on its payroll, compelling them to cease human rights violations in Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria and to impose firm penalties for repeat offenders.

Secondly, the YPG’s readiness to credibly devolve governance responsibilities will be crucial to preventing local grievances from turning into ethnic or political vendettas. The YPG has been a very effective and committed military partner in the anti-ISIS fight to the U.S. and the international coalition, who in turn empowered its leadership through diplomatic and military support. This U.S. approach, however, has alienated the north east’s Arab population, and excluded many in the Syrian diaspora from strategic conversations about the area’s governance and future.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, tribal figures, north-eastern Syria, May 2021.Hide Footnote

Western countries should direct their assistance … to support governance reforms … greater transparency … [and] ways to restore administrative links between the area and Damascus on issues such as education.

This situation needs to change. Western countries should direct their assistance to the autonomous administration to support governance reforms that would substantively expand decision-making beyond the YPG’s power structure, thus providing pathways to more meaningful participation in governance by residents outside the YPG’s inner orbits. They should also encourage the YPG to take steps to effect greater transparency on critical issues such as revenue generation, budget allocation and political talks with the U.S., Russia and the regime.

Thirdly, Raqqa is an integral part of Syria, as is the entirety of the north east. The key to avoiding further violent conflict is that the SDF and its international backers act accordingly. Western states should therefore discourage the SDF from taking steps in administration and governance that could be perceived as a step towards a de facto separation, such as the imposition of unaccredited school curricula. They should instead encourage the SDF to pursue ways to restore administrative links between the area and Damascus on issues such as education. Such steps would be a relief for locals, who suffer from a lack of formal documentation (such as professional degrees and civil status papers). For their part, Damascus and Moscow should resist the temptation to use military altercations or insurgent proxies to press the U.S. toward a full withdrawal from the north east. Such moves could inadvertently trigger difficult-to-contain escalations.

V. Conclusion

The situation in Raqqa is much improved since the province suffered devastation in the war between ISIS and the U.S.-led coalition assembled to defeat it four years ago. But the future of the province and its capital city remains on a knife’s edge, balanced between competing forces whose fortunes depend to a great extent on the presence of the small contingent of U.S. troops and military advisers in north-eastern Syria and U.S. surveillance craft in the skies above it.

Given the pivotal U.S. role, the Biden administration’s Syria policy will play an outsized part in determining the north east’s fate. The area’s population already once experienced the fallout from a precipitous U.S. withdrawal, which was aborted just as abruptly, but not before it did real damage. It enabled a Turkish military incursion that sent hundreds of thousands of civilians temporarily fleeing their homes, followed by the deployment of Syrian regime troops and Russian military monitors. The resulting jumble of forces vying to control the area has further complicated efforts to stabilise it. In Raqqa, this situation is compounded by tensions between the SDF and the Arab population. For the sake of a population that endured enough pain under ISIS rule, the Biden administration should set out a policy that helps rebuild the area in the short term and deploys U.S. diplomatic heft now to ensure its stable future.

Raqqa/Ankara/Brussels, TK November 2021

Appendix A: Map of Political Control of Northeast Syria

Appendix B: Map of Political Control of Raqqa