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African Powers Must Support Democracy in DR Congo
African Powers Must Support Democracy in DR Congo
DR Congo: A Recount and Talks to Find a Way Out of the Crisis
DR Congo: A Recount and Talks to Find a Way Out of the Crisis
Democratic Republic of Congo's President Joseph Kabila arrives for a southern and central African leaders' meeting to discuss the political crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Luanda, Angola, on 26 October, 2016. REUTERS/Kenny Katombe.
Commentary / Africa

African Powers Must Support Democracy in DR Congo

African leaders meeting in Luanda this week got part of the way to solving the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) political crisis, endorsing a proposed sixteen-month delay for the DRC’s presidential election. But to ensure the frustration of the DRC opposition and popular anger does not spill over into more violence, they must do much more to make sure the elections actually happen this time.

The DRC Constitution stipulates that the election should take place by 19 December, but the lack of preparation means this now cannot happen. This has sparked a political crisis over the future of President Joseph Kabila, who appears determined to defy the constitution’s ban on him standing for another term and staying in power beyond that date.

Since September, the African Union has mediated a Congolese dialogue in which some but not all domestic DRC parties discussed how to deal with what should happen after December. They reached a political agreement on 18 October. This is what was endorsed by the leaders in Luanda, meeting under the auspices of the follow-up mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC.

But the political agreement lacks domestic consensus and has controversial elements. Its call to monitor (“control”) the activities of NGOs in the election process is worrying at a time that Kinshasa is clamping down on civil society. It places the election date at the end of April 2018, but says nothing about the president not standing again, even if the preamble underlines the need for a change of regime through democratic elections. And it says nothing about any limits on presidential or government powers after the 19 December constitutional deadline.

The agreement has been signed by the ruling party and its allies, the ‘moderate’ opposition and those civil society organisations that participated in the dialogue. It “remains open” to other signatories. This reflects the weakness of the dialogue itself, which did not include the biggest parties and personalities of the opposition, Etienne Tshisikedi and Moise Katumbi. The Catholic Church, the strongest moral arbiter in the country, has criticised the agreement and called for a new dialogue.

The DRC authorities have barely tried to disguise their satisfaction regarding the soon-to-be-formed transitional coalition government as a price worth paying for such generous breathing space. Meanwhile the Constitutional Court, which back in May supported Kabila staying in power beyond the end of his mandate in December, has seemingly validated the new electoral timeline, although serious questions remain as to whether the requisite number of judges were present to do so.

The government and opposition remain miles apart, pointing to a dangerous political polarisation which contains serious risks of continued urban violence.

Civil society groups have criticised the agreement, focusing on the overly generous timeframe for the elections and the failure to clearly state that President Kabila should not stand in future elections. Some have simply continued to call for him to stand aside in December. The Rassemblement opposition group has condemned the agreement and called for a fresh dialogue. Previously, on 4 October, it had called for a “special regime” to be put in place following 19 December, rather than for President Kabila to stay on with full powers.

The government and opposition remain miles apart, pointing to a dangerous political polarisation which contains serious risks of continued urban violence. To make matters more complicated, the international community is reflecting this division back at them.

Western powers have become increasingly strident in their criticisms of the government: in a recent statement the European Union (EU) took its hardest line yet against the government’s strategies for delaying the elections, moving its position closer to that of the U.S. By contrast, Angola, the host of this week’s meeting in Luanda, had already effectively endorsed the agreement before delegates had arrived. Foreign Minister Georges Chicoti said it should be accepted and the proposed new election date in April 2018 supported, otherwise “everyone would make up their own calendar”.

This situation presents three immediate dangers. The first is the evident distance between the government and the opposition. Suspicions that some politicians may enter government to refill their electoral war chests will fuel anger, while the opposition will feel emboldened by Western backing and by popular support apparently evident in recent polling.

The second danger is the ever-widening gap between Western and African positions, playing out in a context of anti-Westernism expressed through growing hostility on the continent to the International Criminal Court. This will only encourage the hardliners in the government and opposition alike to camp on their positions, and make resolution harder.

Finally, the rapid and almost unconditional acceptance of the agreement by leaders assembled in Luanda means that Kinshasa will feel under little pressure to implement it and actually stage the elections. The government, which has spent two years perfecting ways of slowing down preparations for polls, may simply repeat for the April 2018 deadline what it has already done for the one in December 2016.

If African powers ... are to rally round this agreement, they need at the same time to seize this vital opportunity to put real and sustained pressure on the government in Kinshasa to get to elections

If African powers, especially the key players Angola and South Africa, are to rally round this agreement, they need at the same time to seize this vital opportunity to put real and sustained pressure on the government in Kinshasa to get to elections – no excuses this time. African powers should demand clear timetables, agree upon benchmarks (including a commitment to the provision of funding for the elections by the national government, as well as the opening of political space) and clarity of responsibilities between the independent electoral commission and other relevant government institutions to ensure polls are held by April 2018.

This will mean close, hands-on supervision of the implementation of the agreement through the follow-up committee of the dialogue, which has been given a regionally constituted role for international support. But most of all it will need sustained, fully coordinated diplomatic pressure, particularly by those African powers that have contributed to the agreement. Any weakness or division will be taken by Kinshasa as a signal to again slow down preparations for any election.

As for Western powers, they may have reasons to be unhappy with the agreement. But faced with a choice between working to brace and to implement the African position and ploughing their own furrow, they should choose the former.

Read the PDF version here.

Supporters of Martin Fayulu chant slogans and carry placards as he delivers his appeal contesting the CENI results of the presidential election at the constitutional court in Kinshasa, on 12 January 2019. REUTERS/Kenny Katombe
Statement / Africa

DR Congo: A Recount and Talks to Find a Way Out of the Crisis

The DR Congo is facing a major political crisis over the 30 December election’s result. A recount would allow subsequent negotiations to take place on the basis of a clear understanding of who won.

A dispute over the results of the DR Congo’s 30 December election cast a dark shadow over what should be a historic transition of power but a surprisingly robust reaction by regional actors offers a genuine chance for a course correction. According to official tallies, opposition leader Felix Tshisekedi was the winner, but these stood in stark contrast to a parallel count by Congolese Catholic Church observers, which indicated a landslide for Martin Fayulu, another opposition leader. Data leaked from sources within the electoral authorities confirm the church’s figures, strongly suggesting an effort to rig the vote in favour of the opposition candidate more palatable to incumbent President Kabila and his allies. On 17 January, the African Union (AU) unexpectedly issued a statement questioning the official results, calling for a suspension of final results, and dispatching a delegation to Kinshasa on 21 January to help Congolese parties reach consensus on next steps. To both reflect the will of the people and avoid a dangerous confrontation, that delegation should push for a recount, so that subsequent negotiations on a way forward can take place on the basis of a clear understanding of who won. All international actors should throw their weight behind the AU’s initiative, appeal for calm and encourage the putative winner, Fayulu, to adopt a conciliatory approach toward his rivals.

On Sunday 30 December, millions of Congolese voted for a new president and provincial and national lawmakers. The presidential election pitted Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, the preferred candidate of incumbent President Joseph Kabila, against two opposition leaders, Felix Tshisekedi and Martin Fayulu, the latter supported by two political heavyweights, Jean-Pierre Bemba and Moïse Katumbi, who had been barred from contesting the vote. Despite repeated delays and the unwarranted exclusion of around 4 per cent of the electorate, balloting passed off in relative calm.

Since then, however, a major political crisis has erupted over the results. Before the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) released its official tallies, the Episcopal Council of the Congolese Catholic Church, known as CENCO, which had deployed some 40,000 observers to monitor the polls, reported that its parallel tabulation had revealed a clear winner and, though it could not legally name a victor before official results were proclaimed, sources close to the church confirmed a landslide win for Martin Fayulu. In contrast, the CENI’s provisional results, released on 10 January, indicated Tshisekedi was the victor, with 38.6 per cent of the vote to Fayulu’s 34.8 per cent and Shadary’s 23.8 per cent. The provisional results also showed President Kabila’s political coalition winning a large majority in of the national legislative and provincial elections, thus appearing to ensure his coalition’s continued political dominance.

By now, the CENI results have been widely discredited, viewed as the result of manipulation by the electoral authorities to secure a win for an opposition candidate that Kabila and his allies view as more conciliatory. Indeed, data leaked from the CENI makes clear that Fayulu decisively won, perhaps with as much as some 60 per cent of votes (similar to CENCO’s estimates). Fayulu has rejected the results and appealed to the Constitutional Court, which is generally regarded as pro-Kabila. By law the Court must adjudicate the election dispute by 19 January.

Initial reactions from Western and African diplomats were muted. Some Western countries questioned the CENI’s results, but many appeared to view Tshisekedi’s win as presenting a silver lining: Kabila’s preferred candidate had been roundly defeated, Kabila himself was out – no mean feat given his earlier determination to stay on – and perhaps the DR Congo could turn a page on the mismanagement and corruption of his rule. Declaring the vote a sham and trying to force a Fayulu presidency, they feared, could provoke a dangerous backlash from pro-Kabila forces who still dominate the security forces – a crisis for which they lacked the will or capacity to deal. In contrast, many surmised, backing Tshisekedi’s, or at least not rocking the boat, might strengthen his hand against Kabila, who it seems is intent to retain influence through parliament and the powerful security sector.

Moreover, it was unclear early on how the region would respond and, without African support, Congolese leaders could portray Western pressure as unwarranted meddling. African leaders began by reacting cautiously as well, calling for any challenges to results to be pursued legally and for consensus. That a statement critical of the elections by Zambian President and chair of the Southern African Development Communities’ (SADC) Organ on Politics, Security and Defense, was rebuked by some of his counterparts illustrated the depth of divisions in the region.

The surprise came on 17 January, when an ad-hoc high-level meeting of the AU put out the strongest statement from the continent. Saying “there were serious doubts” about the provisional results, it called for the “suspension of the proclamation of the final results [by the court] of the elections”. The AU announced it would send a high-level delegation on Monday 21 January to Kinshasa to “interact with all Congolese stakeholders, with the view to reaching a consensus on a way out of the post-electoral crisis in the country”.

The dramatic AU statement and forthcoming visit offer a path forward. The delegation should push for some form of recount or audit, potentially monitored by SADC or the AU, both of which fielded observers for the vote. Such a process could be concluded quickly, since electronic election data, transmitted by the voting machines, is available (observers’ vote tallies based on copies of results sheets in the polling stations might potentially be used to validate that data). This exercise should be conducted for presidential, parliamentary and local elections. Indeed, the starting point for any credible negotiations among Congolese leaders should be a clear understanding of who genuinely won on 30 December. All international actors should throw their weight behind such a process.

Of course, a recount presents risks. Politics in Kinshasa are already deeply polarised and a recount could divide them still further. It is unclear how Tshisekedi’s supporters would respond to having his victory, in their eyes, snatched away. Perhaps more dangerous still, President Kabila and his allies, particularly powerful figures in the security sector, could well resist, given the wariness with which they regard Fayulu, Bemba and Katumbi. Indeed, on 18 January, both the government and Felix Tshisekedi allies rejected the AU’s call to delay the proclamation of the final result of the presidential vote. The government accepted talking to the AU’s delegation but Tshisekedi’s party clearly fears being denied the presidency.

Yet if a recount carries risks, the alternative of acquiescing in the rigged results would be much worse. CENCO tallies and the leaked CENI data suggest the Fayulu ticket attracted almost two-thirds of the vote. Even allowing that some of those votes may have been cast more in protest at Kabila than in support of Fayulu, that still leaves a large constituency that would feel its vote stolen. Supporters of Fayulu and those of his powerful backers Bemba and Katumbi have not yet taken to the streets, but they could easily do so in the future.

The goal of African and Western leaders should be to both ensure that the will of the Congolese people is respected, and prevent a destabilising and costly confrontation. They can promote this outcome by taking several steps. To begin, they should strongly urge all Congolese parties to call for calm and eschew violence. The purported victor, Fayulu, and his allies have a special responsibility to reassure those in both Tshisekedi’s and especially Kabila’s camp. At the same time, the AU delegation should warn that if Tshisekedi’s inauguration goes ahead, it and the regional organisations of which the DR Congo is a member would consider punitive measures, including refusing to recognise the new government with all that would entail for those involved.

More broadly, African and Western leaders ought to combine diplomatic pressure for a recount with equal pressure for negotiations over a consensual political arrangement. This arrangement, which ultimately will have to be decided by the Congolese, could involve, inter alia, inclusive, broad-based power-sharing, a national unity government or the organisation of new elections after two or three years (as Lamuka, the coalition backing Fayulu, had originally foreseen).

Regardless of the precise formula, the outcome should allow the DR Congo’s leaders to leave their political trenches and work with their international and regional partners to begin dealing in earnest with the key sources of instability in large parts of the country and the dire socio-economic situation that most Congolese citizens continue to endure. If they act wisely, they at long last have a chance to do that.