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The U.N. Security Council Finally Considers Weighing In on Climate Security
The U.N. Security Council Finally Considers Weighing In on Climate Security

Central Asia: Water and Conflict

Competition for water is increasing in Central Asia at an alarming rate, adding tension to what is already an uneasy region.

Executive Summary

Competition for water is increasing in Central Asia at an alarming rate, adding tension to what is already an uneasy region. Agriculture is the mainstay of the region’s economy, and thirsty crops such as cotton and rice require intensive irrigation. Water use has increased rapidly since the Central Asian states became independent in 1991 and is now at an unsustainable level. Irrigation systems have decayed so severely that half of all water never reaches crops, and several years of drought have cut available water by a fifth even as demand continues to soar. Efforts to rebuild Afghanistan will now put yet more strain on supplies.

The problems of increasing demand and declining supplies have been compounded by the failure of the region’s nations to work together. Under the Soviet Union, water and energy resources were exchanged freely across what were only administrative borders, and Moscow provided the funds and management to build and maintain infrastructure. Rising nationalism and competition among the five Central Asia states has meant they have failed to come up with a viable regional approach to replace the Soviet system of management. Indeed, linked water and energy issues have been second only to Islamic extremism as a source of tension in recent years.

An annual cycle of disputes has developed between the three downstream countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – that are all heavy consumers of water for growing cotton, and the upstream nations – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The downstream countries require more water for their growing agricultural sectors and rising populations, while the economically weaker upstream countries are trying to win more control over their resources and want to use more water for electricity generation and farming.

Tensions focus on the two main rivers of the region that both flow to the Aral Sea – the Syr Darya from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the Amu Darya from Tajikistan through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Amu Darya and its tributaries form part of the border between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan.

This report identifies four key areas of tension among the Central Asia nations:

  • lack of coherent water management;
     
  • failure to abide by or adapt water quotas;
     
  • Non-implemented and untimely barter agreements and payments;
     
  • uncertainty over future infrastructure plans.

Water management has suffered from the Soviet legacy of top-down control and general rivalries between the states. The Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) that was set up in 1992 has failed to take into account changing political and economic relations. It is an inter-governmental body with little transparency that focuses almost exclusively on the division of water. There is no representation from agricultural or industrial consumers, non-governmental organisations or other parties. Management is dominated by officials from Uzbekistan, leading to suspicions that it favours that country’s national interests. This has contributed to a lack of political commitment by other countries to the commission, resulting in a serious shortage of funds. In the meantime, the individual countries have done little to contribute to the maintenance of water systems that benefit the region.

Western donors have started to develop other management systems such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) program, in coordination with the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS). The UN-backed Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) is also working on water management. However, none of these initiatives have made much headway in dealing with the key political obstacles, particularly the unwillingness of the states to cooperate.

Shortly after independence, the five countries agreed to maintain the Soviet-era quota system, but this has become unworkable. The civil war in Tajikistan and the decay of Kyrgyzstan’s economy has meant that water-monitoring facilities have fallen into disrepair. Control and enforcement mechanisms no longer function and the various countries now often accuse each other of exceeding quotas. Turkmenistan is using too much water to the detriment of Uzbekistan, which in turn has been accused by Kazakhstan of taking more than its share. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan say that the three downstream countries are all exceeding quotas. Even within Uzbekistan, provinces have accused one another of using too much water.

Some of the most serious tensions have centred around barter agreements and payments. The upstream countries trade water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for energy in the form of gas, coal or power. Since energy deliveries have been unreliable, Kyrgyzstan has responded by releasing more water through its hydropower dam in winter, which results in downstream flooding and less water for summer irrigation. Attempts by Kyrgyzstan to demand payment for water have been resisted by the downstream countries.

As each country has started to view the problem as a zero-sum game, it has taken steps to increase control over water, often to the detriment of the others. There is increasing uncertainty in Central Asia over plans to build new reservoirs and dams or to expand irrigation. There has been little consultation over most of these projects, leading to intensified suspicions between states. Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, there has been concern about the implications of efforts to rebuild agriculture in Afghanistan. Currently that country uses very little of the water from the Amu Darya but reconstruction of irrigation systems will put additional pressure on the river.

Tensions over water and energy have contributed to a generally uneasy political climate in Central Asia. Not only do they tend to provoke hostile rhetoric, but they have also prompted suggestions that the countries are willing to defend their interests by force if necessary. Uzbekistan has carried out exercises that look suspiciously like practice runs at capturing the Toktogul Reservoir. The gas shortages and winter flooding that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have inflicted on each other have a direct and widespread impact on the peoples of those countries and have the potential to inflame ethnic tensions in the Ferghana Valley. Competition for water can only increase, and tensions will rise unless better mechanisms are put in place to manage the problems.

A multifaceted regional approach is needed that addresses energy, agriculture and demographic aspects of water use. Thus far, emphasis has been on bilateral agreements that lack political weight and cannot resolve what is a regional problem. Management of water must be reformed to increase accountability and transparency as currently the public, NGOs and the media have little access to information or the decision-making process. Efficient water management requires quotas that are sustainable and are backed up by enforcement mechanisms and sanctions against violators. The Central Asia nations still approach the issue purely as an engineering problem rather than one of managing multiple political, social and economic factors.

There is considerable scepticism in Central Asia about foreign involvement in resolving the water issue. Donors have favoured technical rather than political solutions, and funds have been earmarked for the repair and replacement of inefficient irrigation installations. Technical solutions will only have a limited impact, however, if not accompanied by political measures.

Osh/Brussels, 30 May 2002

Op-Ed / Global

The U.N. Security Council Finally Considers Weighing In on Climate Security

Originally published in World Politics Review

The United Nations Security Council may be about to pass its first-ever resolution on the implications of climate change for peace and security. The council has talked about climate security since 2007, and it has acknowledged that environmental challenges such as droughts and degradation of farming land can fuel conflicts in regions like the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. But it has not laid out a systematic approach to assessing these risks or responding to them.

This could be about to change, as Niger and Ireland—two elected members of the council—plan to table a resolution on climate security this week. The draft asks U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to prepare a global study of climate security risks. It also encourages U.N. peace operations to pay more attention to these threats. These are quite tentative steps, but they would put the U.N.’s treatment of climate security on a sounder footing.

Coming after the underwhelming outcome of last month’s Glasgow summit on climate change, a Security Council resolution on the topic would also offer an encouraging signal about multilateral institutions’ capacity to respond to global warming. Yet the resolution could still fall victim to major power tensions at the U.N., as China and Russia may block it.

The proposed resolution enjoys widespread support among council members. Germany convened talks on a similar text last year, but shelved it when the climate-skeptical Trump administration promised to veto it. This year, the Biden administration indicated it would support a resolution. This encouraged Ireland and Niger to lead discussions on a new draft, with help from Norway and Kenya. Twelve of the 15 council members back the resolution.

Council members say that it is important that their African colleagues have led the charge on the resolution. Nigerien and Kenyan officials have been clear that they see climate change as threatening their national security, making it hard for its opponents to say it is unnecessary.

A chorus of other states inside and outside the council have flagged their support. Small island states have been vocal about the threat of rising seas to their existence, and Vietnam organized an informal council discussion of sea level rise last month ahead of the Glasgow summit.

Yet the resolution has had powerful opponents. China and Russia have voiced doubts about the proposal. India, an elected member of the council, has also been dismissive. The three skeptics say that there is still not enough evidence of the links between climate change and conflict to warrant a Security Council resolution. They also argue that the council risks trespassing on topics that other multilateral bodies, such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCC, should handle.

Some other major non-Western economies have flagged similar concerns, perhaps because they worry that the Security Council could one day start interfering in their industrial policies, even if the current resolution does nothing to lay the groundwork for such a move. Indonesia and South Africa, which held council seats in 2019 and 2020, refused to back Germany’s initial effort to develop a resolution. Brazil, which will join the body in January, has indicated that it doesn’t consider the current draft resolution a priority.

Niger holds the rotating presidency of the council in December and wants agreement on a resolution before a high-level council meeting on Dec. 9, which the country’s president will chair. Backers of the resolution argue that China’s position will be crucial. Diplomats note that their Chinese counterparts have couched their criticisms of the initiative in quite moderate terms. They suspect that Beijing is worried about the reputational damage of blocking a resolution that enjoys broad international backing.

China gained credit in Glasgow by agreeing to a joint statement with the U.S. on the two powers’ continued commitment to cooperation in containing global warming. Beijing could see similar advantages in acquiescing to the Security Council resolution, especially as it enjoys U.S. support. If China backs the text or abstains on it, rather than vetoing it, Russia might also let it pass, to avoid a rupture with its main ally at the U.N. If neither Beijing nor Moscow is willing to use its veto, India will not be able to stop the resolution from passing.

Without an overall framework to guide its work and generate momentum, the council’s engagement on climate matters will remain haphazard and advance more slowly.

How important is this resolution? If either China or Russia does choose to block the initiative, those council members that worry about climate security will not give up on the topic. They can continue trying to insert references to climate-related threats into the texts of the mandates of individual U.N. peacekeeping missions and political offices. Germany and Niger launched an informal council working group on climate security last year to discuss such issues. Yet without an overall framework to guide its work and generate momentum, the council’s engagement on climate matters will remain haphazard and advance more slowly.

If, on the other hand, the resolution passes, it could spur efforts inside and outside the U.N. to come to grips with the challenges of climate security. As a point of comparison, Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security—passed in 2000—has acted as the basis for policy debates about gender and conflict for over two decades. The U.N., other multilateral organizations and concerned governments have a lot of work to do to grasp how processes associated with climate change, such as desertification and forced migration, will influence future conflicts.

If the Security Council can spark more thinking on these themes, the resolution will be worthwhile. In the short term, it could also make the Security Council look a little more relevant to international debates about the climate crisis. All too often, the council seems to be trapped in sterile and unproductive debates about conflicts, like the war in Syria, that it is unable to solve. A climate security resolution would not resolve those arguments. But it would be an opportunity for the council to show that it can adapt to evolving global threats.

Contributors

UN Director
RichardGowan1
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Pyotr Kurzin
Former Crisis Group UN Assistant